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SUMMARY  
OF THE  
PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND MEASURES  
OF THE  
VICEROYALTY  
OF  
HIS EXCELLENCY THE EARL OF MINTO  
VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA.

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*1905—1910.*

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Sikkim, Bhutan, Assam, Burma and Siam.

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## ADEN.

Major-General H. M. Mason was Resident at Aden until the 14th March 1906, when Colonel C. T. Becker

### Personnel.

officiated pending the arrival of Major-General E. DeBrath, C.B., C.I.E., on the 19th April. The Assistant Political Residents were Majors F. DeB. Hancock and J. R. B. Carter; Captain E. O'Brien and Lieutenant A. H. E. Moss with Major H. F. Jacob as Political Agent at D'thala, and Major H. P. C. Schneider as temporary Assistant Resident at Perim.

Major-General DeBrath took leave from the 17th April to 28th July 1907 during which Lieutenant-Colonel P. R. Legh officiated.

He again went on leave from the 16th April to the 26th July 1908, during which Colonel A. N. Lysaght officiated.

Major-General DeBrath was again granted leave, for seven months, from the 14th April to the 14th November 1910. Brigadier-General J. A. Bell, Commanding the Lucknow Brigade, was appointed to officiate.

At the time of Lord Minto's arrival in India it may be briefly stated in regard to the Aden region, that the Anglo-Turkish frontier of the Hinterland of Arabia had been recently demarcated, and the policy was being pursued of exercising both political and military predominance up to the boundary line; and to this end D'thala, situated 100 miles inland from Aden on splendid uplands, had been occupied by a British Political Officer, with a strong backing of troops at his headquarters and on the lines of communication.

Lord Minto arrived in India in November 1905, and the outstanding event during his period of office has been the entire withdrawal at the instance of the Home Government, of every appearance of the British occupation.

The correspondence relating to this measure, showing the policy which His Majesty's Government decided was to be pursued in regard to Aden and its Hinterland, is summarised in the following paragraphs.

On 4th May 1906, the Secretary of State intimated that the appointment of

a new Resident at Aden seemed to be a proper occasion for laying before the Government of India the views of His Majesty's Government on the main questions arising in connection with the tribes of the Aden Hinterland. The Secretary of State referred in the first place to the following statement made by Lord Lansdowne in the House of Lords of 30th March 1903, in reply to a question as to whether the demarcation of the Aden Boundary which had been arranged with Turkey had enlarged the British sphere of influence:—"With regard to the responsibility for these territories, I do not see why what has taken place should make any difference in these responsibilities. We have never desired to interfere with the internal and domestic affairs of the tribes. On the other hand, we have throughout made it perfectly plain that we should not tolerate the interference of any other Power with them." The Secretary of State remarked that His Majesty's present advisers concurred in the fullest sense in this interpretation. They considered that the security and strength of Aden, as one of the main posts and fortresses guarding the line between England and India, must always be a standing object in national policy. That strength would, however, obviously be impaired and not augmented by quarrels with the tribes, by intervention in their disputes, by multiplication of formal agreements with them, by locating troops at a distance from the fortifications of Aden, or by any excessive readiness to resort to expeditions out of all proportion, whether immediate or indirect, either to the occasions for them or to any clear advantages to be gained by them. If, as His Majesty's Government had decided, the main purpose of the recent delimitation was achieved by the fixing of a line beyond which Turkish troops or agents cannot advance, the following propositions appeared to be well fitted to carry out the

decision which had been arrived at, and they were accordingly submitted to His Excellency the Viceroy :—

(1) The importance of trespasses across the Turkish frontier if neither serious nor deliberate, should not be exaggerated, and, should a protest be required, it would naturally be by way of action at Constantinople ; (2) outside the territory of British India and within a limited area of the Protectorate similar to that formerly known on the Somali coast as the “ ten-mile limit,” internal disturbances would call for interposition. But beyond that line the Political Resident should be careful to avoid any step that might lead in the direction of military or political entanglements without the express sanction of the Secretary of State ; (3) a railway to D’tali and a cantonment or sanatorium there should be considered as outside the contemplation of the Government. This being so, the large body of troops now stationed at D’tali should be withdrawn, leaving only a sufficient escort for the Political Officer as a temporary arrangement ; (4) in view of the change of circumstances, resulting from the present instructions, the arrangements for the retention of a Political Officer at D’tali should not be regarded as a permanent one, and it should be sufficient for the Political Agent to visit D’tali temporarily and for special purposes as occasion may require. For the present, however, His Excellency the Viceroy should decide when, after the retirement of the troops, the Political Officer and his escort should be withdrawn ; (5) the despatch of postal runners or agents of the British Government into the interior should be as much as possible avoided ; (6) any project for disarming the tribes in the nine cantons should be dismissed from serious consideration ; (7) punitive expeditions for offences committed during the demarcation, and not punished then and there, should be regarded as out of the question ; (8) no demonstration along the frontier, whether demarcated or not, seemed to be needed, and, without previous reference to the Secretary of State, no attempts should be made to conclude fresh treaties. The Secretary of State concluded by saying that he trusted that these propositions would commend themselves to His Excellency the Viceroy, as principles to be pressed upon the attention of the Government of Bombay, and as matter for instructions to the Resident at Aden.

In reply the Government of India informed the Secretary of State that they had considered this despatch and understood that the views therein enumerated were not of the nature of absolute orders. They thought it better to give the Bombay Government and the Resident at Aden an opportunity of explaining their views as to whether any serious danger or difficulty would arise if the new policy were forthwith carried out, and trusted that they might be allowed to make certain representations on the subject before it was enforced, on receiving the opinion of the Bombay Government and the Resident at Aden.

To this the Secretary of State replied that this letter laid down, not merely general views, but the definite intentions and purposes of His Majesty’s Government. Points of detail as to how to give effect to the policy, in other matters than the prompt withdrawal of troops from D’tala, were, however, left to the consideration of the Government of India, and their views on these details, and any questions affecting the administration of Aden, were invited. In the meantime, no action was to be taken that was not in strict conformity with the despatch, a copy of which was to be furnished to the Resident without further delay.

On the 9th August 1906, the Government of India addressed the Secretary of State in regard to the Hinterland, and explained that they had no desire to extend their responsibility and entangle themselves in purely tribal affairs, but the question of policy in the Hinterland was one to which they attached vital importance and which it appeared to them might have been prejudged, under the idea that they were associated with a policy that they in no way desired to support. If His Majesty’s Government were led to their decision to withdraw the troops and the Political Agent from D’tala by a fear that the Agent at D’tala would use his position there as a vantage ground for undue interference with the tribes, their views might be materially modified by the assurances to the contrary which were now given, and the strong opinions of the Bombay Government, who at first viewed the establishment of the agency with distrust. Also the fact that there was no accommodation at Aden for the troops now at D’tala and that the arrangements necessary for their return to India or England must involve some delay,

afforded an opportunity for submitting the matter for reconsideration both on strategical and general grounds. His Majesty's Government held that the strength of Aden as a fortress would obviously be impaired by the location of troops at a distance from its fortifications, and that, as the recent delimitation had fixed a line beyond which Turkish troops or agents could not advance, the retention of British troops as well as the posting of a Political Agent permanently at D'thala, was both unprofitable and a source of weakness.

These conclusions appeared to require further examination. Regarded from a purely strategic point of view, the situation of the post at D'thala, only 96 miles from Aden, was, in the opinion of the military experts in India, such as to augment the strength of that fortress. For, by dominating the principle points on the newly-demarcated frontier, and commanding the main trade routes between Aden and the Hinterland, it enabled a small body of troops, at no great expense, to enforce our will at any time and promptly to repress at its start any movement which promised to be dangerous. If we were to withdraw from this advantageous position, we should leave the initiative to the tribes, who, by choosing the time most inconvenient to us, could give much trouble and lock up a considerable body of troops. It was to be remembered, moreover, that D'thala occupied an important position on the line of communications between Aden and Yemen, and that there was a prospect that the Hedjaz Railway would at a near date be continued to the Yemen, or that an independent line linking up with the Hedjaz system would be constructed. It was in fact only a few months since the British Ambassadors at Constantinople and Paris had informed Sir Edward Grey of schemes seriously put forward for a line from Hodeida through Sana to Taiz, in the direction of Aden, which would be linked up with the Hedjaz line. With a Turkish rail-head at Taiz, close to the recently delimited border and linked up with Constantinople, and no point occupied in the Hinterland from which British influence could be effectively exerted to retain the allegiance of the tribes, it would be possible seriously to threaten Aden from the land side, and the whole strategic position of that fortress would be changed.

The present policy of concentrating our naval forces in European waters might easily leave the command of the Arabian Sea in the hands of a Foreign Power for a considerable time, in which case it would be most desirable that communications with the Hinterland and its supplies should be fully open. More than this, the sanctioned garrison of Aden was not sufficient to man the defences, even if the deteriorating effect of the climate could be overlooked, and, in the event of war with a Naval Power, an immediate increase would be necessary which it might not be possible then to send by sea.

The climate of Aden was a severe tax on the health of the troops stationed there; and, moreover, owing to the nature of the country, very little military training could be done, nor were any other occupations or amusements available.

On the other hand, the uplands of D'thala formed an admirable training ground, while the climate admitted of men working in the open air all day long. They thus retained excellent health there, and their efficiency as soldiers was very different from that of men confined to the narrow limits of Aden itself.

Accordingly, even if the other weighty reasons adduced by the Resident and the Bombay Government for retaining troops there could be ignored, the Government of India considered that on the score of humanity, as well as of efficiency, the withdrawal of the troops from D'thala to Aden was to be deprecated.

And they were no less opposed to the change from a political point of view. The mere delimitation of the frontier line seemed to be little security against the advance, if not of Turkish troops, at least of Turkish agents, as the Al Doka incident showed; and a Political Officer stationed at Aden and only occasionally visiting D'thala had small opportunity for checking or reporting the existence of Turkish intrigues in the protected territory. It must be remembered that after such a withdrawal as was now contemplated, he could probably only visit the place with a considerable escort, which might give rise to trouble and certainly would not conduce to the ready collection of secret information or the spread of friendly influence. This ignorance and impotence might well lead to a spread of disaffection

in the country behind Aden, a result which, in the event of difficulties with Turkey or some other Power, would greatly weaken the position of the fortress. There was, moreover, no doubt that the British were bound to check raids or encroachments from their side into Turkish territory; and this obligation had been repeatedly recognised by His Majesty's Government and enjoined upon the Government of India by them at the instance of the Porte. For this purpose no instrument could be so effective and inexpensive as a small body of troops maintained in a central position like D'thala.

Another political consideration was the effect which withdrawal would have upon our reputation among the Arabs, a matter of the first importance at the present time, when it was doubtful whether the Turks would be able to restore their rule in Yemen, or would be succeeded by independent Arab tribes owing possibly a nominal allegiance to the Imam of Sana.

The case of the Amir of D'thala, whose position was mainly the creation of the delimitation proceedings, seemed to call for special examination, since, if the reports received during the past few years from officers in the Hinterland could be relied on, he believed that he owed his present position entirely to British intervention; he welcomed the presence of the Political Agent and the British force, and was convinced that he would suffer from the proposed withdrawal.

Only eighteen months ago he had entered into a treaty by which he was assured that the British Government would extend to the territory of D'thala "the gracious favour and protection of His Majesty the King-Emperor;" and two years ago the Resident had expressed his conviction that the vacation of D'thala would immediately result in the Amir leaving the district and taking refuge in Aden or Lahej, as his position would become untenable. Such a result would lay the British Government open to the charge of a breach of faith and of treaty obligations.

The cases of the Haushabi Sultan of the Upper Yaffai, and of the Nawa, Rubeaten, and Dthabiani tribes were, as the Resident showed in his letter, not widely different from that of the Amir of D'thala; and to abandon those who had cast in their lot with us and to whom we had promised our countenance and protection appeared unwise even if it could be regarded as consistent with pledges we might fairly be considered to have given.

There was thus a real danger that, if we now withdrew, we might in a few years be confronted with an independent Arabia which would have lost faith in our ability or willingness to keep our promises to our friends, and which would therefore be contemptuous of, or hostile to, us. It was submitted that, at least until the issue of the present struggle between the Turks and Arabs were known, it would be impolitic in the highest degree to abandon such an important post of observation and control as D'thala.

The disadvantages expected by His Majesty's Government to result from a retention of our position might, with the exercise of discretion and a loyal adoption of the policy of non-interference, be easily avoided. On the other hand, if Turkish intrigue and Muhammadan fanaticism were in the future to be left uncontrolled in that country, it was feared that before long operations would become necessary that might have been avoided by a firm and consistent attitude towards the tribes. The Government of India therefore deprecated the proposed change in policy as being, in their opinion, likely to bring about the very result that His Majesty's Government desired to avert.

Finally, the Government of India suggested that in any case the present opportunity appeared favourable for a further examination of the question of the transfer of Aden to the direct control of His Majesty's Government, as presented in their despatch dated the 14th May 1903, to which no answer had been received. In that communication the desirability of uniting financial and political responsibility in the same hands was pointed out, and the opinion then given had been fully confirmed by the subsequent course of events. They concluded by expressing a hope that, if the step contemplated was finally taken, they might be relieved of the administration of the Settlement and Hinterland, as they felt considerable doubt whether in the circumstances this could be effectively conducted from India.

On the 7th August 1906, Sir N. O'Connor informed Sir E. Grey that he had noticed in the correspondence dealing with the question of the Aden Hinterland that the opinion of His Majesty's Government appeared to be tending towards the ultimate withdrawal of the Political Agent at D'thala. His Excellency stated that, if this was really the case, in his opinion, the advisability of taking this step at a time when the Yemen was in so disturbed and critical a condition ought to be carefully weighed and considered.

On the 12th September 1906, the Secretary of State telegraphed that he had carefully considered the representations of the Government of India, but was unable substantially to modify the conclusions arrived at in his despatch of the 4th May, and that a despatch would follow in which the views of the Government of India would be fully examined. The Resident at Aden and the Political Officer at D'thala were in the meantime to continue to act strictly in a spirit of non-intervention and on the understanding that the continuance of the latter appointment was strictly temporary. They were, therefore, to conduct affairs so as to minimise the effect of withdrawal of the Political Officer when it might take place, and any extension of responsibility with the Upper Yaffai or other Sheikhs was to be carefully avoided.

In a despatch, dated the 5th October 1906, the Secretary of State replied that he considered that the discussion threw light upon the views that had influenced the course pursued since the delimitation of the external frontier of the Aden Protectorate, and that it marked the difference of opinion that existed as to the objects sought by the local authorities and His Majesty's Government respectively. The retention of a part of the Aden garrison at D'thala, and the permanent presence there of a British Agent, were advocated by the Government of India as developing the policy of the delimitation, by the extended establishment of British authority among the tribes on the British side of the border. To accomplish this end, it appeared to the Government of India to be necessary to overcome the reluctance of the tribesmen to accept the suzerainty of the Amir of D'thala; to carry our influence into the territory of other tribes with whom we had practically no dealings till, during the delimitation, treaties were concluded with the representatives of the Upper Yaffai, who, however, had since been discovered to be persons of no real authority; to secure for the Chiefs of the protected tribes ready and friendly advice in the settlement of tribal disputes; to check the spread of the Pan-Islamic programme in Yemen; and to maintain our reputation with the Arabs.

In the opinion of His Majesty's Government, on the other hand, British interests at Aden were mainly centred in the British territory and fortress at Aden, and the primary object of recent arrangements with the Ottoman Porte was to reduce the risk of international complications by arriving at a definite understanding as to the outer boundary of the tribal country in political relations with the British settlement. Turkish infractions of a serious character, since the notification made to the Porte in 1873, had been mainly due to the want of a map recognised as correct by both the Turkish and the British Governments. Within the protectorate of the nine cantons, since the occupation of Aden in 1839, there had usually been some degree of disturbance, and the precise authority of the leading Chiefs had changed so much, from time to time, that our policy in direct negotiations with the tribesmen had necessarily followed the varying exigencies of the day. The guiding fact was that during the last half century these inter-tribal disputes had, to a large extent, regulated themselves, and admitted of peaceful settlement by the Resident at Aden, without the continual presence of either troops or Political Agents in the interior. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government the recent treaties of demarcation and protectorate ought to strengthen the hands of the Political authorities at Aden in resuming the long standing policy of inactivity, and called for no departure from it. It might be perfectly true that the Arabs expected British troops to remain in their country, and that some Chiefs and some sections of tribes might be glad of their support, but His Majesty's Government never authorised any action calculated to commit them to this extension of their responsibilities, involving, as it must, an augmentation of the Aden garrison, and an increase of expenditure. The protection formally extended to the tribes was a protection against foreign aggression, and had particular reference to the proceedings of the Turkish Govern-

ment, in respect of which the situation had been fundamentally altered by the settlement of the frontier agreed to by the Porte. The presence of a British garrison at D'thala was only too likely to be regarded as inimical to Turkish interests, and as indicating an intention to interfere more than formerly in matters of tribal administration. It was inconsistent with a policy of reliance on the effect of diplomatic representations at Constantinople, in the event of violations of the frontier or serious disputes, and, for the reasons stated in paragraph 2 of the despatch, dated 4th May 1906, was open to other serious objections.

Mr. Morley pointed out that the policy of non-interference with the internal and domestic policy of the tribes, to which the Government of India subscribed, was inconsistent with the objects at which they apparently aimed, namely, the consolidation of the waning authority of the Amir of D'thala and the control of Turkish intrigue and Muhammadan fanaticism.

Next, he drew attention to the Indian aspect of the question. He observed that the Aden Hinterland was not a frontier province in any natural sense, and he therefore deprecated any comparisons between its circumstances and those of the North-West and other frontiers of the Indian Empire. He regarded Aden as an outlying post administratively connected with Bombay and wholly different in its character from the boundaries that had been reached upon our vast border line. The position of Aden, in short, in the ordering of Indian territories and policy, was peculiar, and arguments overlooking this circumstance might easily fall wide of any true mark of Indian statesmanship. Whether the rise of an independent Arabia were a near or a remote contingency, there could at least be no doubt that the advent of such a question upon the international horizon, whatever part a British Government might choose to take in respect of it, would assuredly be a subject of Imperial policy, not to be decided by considerations of Indian interests alone or even primarily. Lord Salisbury, as Secretary of State for India, pointed out, in the year 1874, the marked change that had been effected in the military, political, and commercial value to Great Britain of our position at Aden since it came into our possession as a decayed settlement of comparatively small importance nearly seventy years ago. The Suez canal had wholly transformed its place in any system of Indian interests, making it the key to the great commercial highway to the East, used by great fleets of merchant ships of all the nations of the world. "We are thus involved," said Lord Salisbury, "in diplomatic action in which India has no direct voice and over which she has no practical control." The occupation of Aden, in short, derived its principal importance "from its relation to the general foreign policy of the Empire, in which it holds a position analogous to that of Malta and Gibraltar." This proposition was beyond dispute. In view of it, any enlargement of Indian obligations in regard to Aden was wholly unjustifiable, and all operations tending in any degree towards such an enlargement were to be sedulously and vigilantly avoided.

From these larger considerations of general policy, Mr. Morley passed to what might be regarded as the secondary arguments in the Government of India's despatch. It had been stated that Aden was unhealthy, and that troops could not be trained at Aden. Neither the Aden Administration reports nor the Army Medical reports tended to prove, however, that the climate had become of late more injurious either to Native or European troops. Compared even with the returns for Poona, Aden seemed to be not particularly unhealthy. Indeed, it appeared that the Native troops had suffered more severely than before since they were required to serve in the interior. As regards training, the position was not affected by anything that had occurred of late, and the Secretary of State considered that so long as our military and naval requirements demanded the presence of a garrison on this distant portion of the Presidency of Bombay, the situation must be alleviated otherwise than by the maintenance of a sanitarium in the interior. He stated that if, in the opinion of the Government of India, any special measures were required at Aden itself for the comfort of the garrison or for their proper training he would be ready to consider them, but that His Majesty's Government were not prepared to withdraw the troops, which were required for other purposes at Aden, to D'thala, a distance of nearly a hundred miles from the coast. He therefore desired to be informed when the Government of India had withdrawn to Aden, or, if thought fit, to India, the detachment stationed at D'thala, and sug-



gested that the withdrawal could be most conveniently effected in the course of the present relief season.

He noticed one other argument which had been brought forward as a reason for remaining in the Amiri country—namely, the control of the arms traffic. He considered that so long as arms could be landed on the coast, no troops that could be employed in the interior would prevent the passage of arms, and he was unable to agree that the Europeans stationed at D'thala could be of any material service in stopping that traffic.

The question had also to be considered in its financial aspect. The latest Aden Administration Report received (for 1904-05) showed the expenditure under the heads respectively of "Political", "Territorial and Political Pensions," and "Military" as Rs. 3,02,014, Rs. 73,775, and Rs. 38,54,091. Doubtless this scale of expenditure had since been reduced in consequence of the termination of the delimitation proceedings, but the figures quoted were very greatly in excess of those for the year 1899-1900, when the cost under "Political" was Rs. 1,97,826, under "Territorial and Political Pensions" Rs. 73,383, and under "Military" Rs. 17,62,816.

As regards the Political Officer at D'thala, Mr. Morley had recognised in his despatch of 4th May 1906 that, in existing circumstances, his immediate withdrawal might be impracticable. This view was confirmed by the despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople of the 7th August 1906 last. But His Majesty's Government continued of opinion that his retention should be strictly temporary; and Mr. Morley desired that the Political Officer should conduct affairs on that understanding, so as to minimise the effect of his departure whenever it might take place. In the meantime, there was no objection to his discussing, as suggested by Sir N. O'Connor, affairs of secondary importance with the local Turkish authorities when necessary. He was, however, to be circumspect in dealing with complaints, and careful not to exaggerate such incidents as might occur. The need for caution had been shown by the precipitancy of the action taken on the occasion of the alleged violation of Amiri territory reported in the correspondence terminating with the Government of India's letter of the 29th December 1904.

Next, Mr. Morley requested that no sort of permission or encouragement might be given to the extension of any line of railway into the British territory at Aden without his express sanction, and he desired to be informed what steps had been taken by the Abdali Sultan towards giving any concession for railway enterprise in his own country. He noticed that the commerce of Aden by land had fallen off in recent years, and wished to know what estimates had been framed of the cost of a railway in the Abdali territory and of its probable profits.

In regard to the question of the detachment of Aden from the Presidency of Bombay, which had been revived by the Government of India, the Secretary of State remarked that the question was of great importance, and deserved the full consideration that the Government of India might be disposed to give to it, but that it would, however, be more freely discussed when the administration of Aden had resumed its normal lines. Meanwhile, if the Government of India were to approve any suggestions made by the Government of Bombay, for strengthening the administration of that portion of the Presidency of Bombay, Mr. Morley would give them his prompt attention. He was disposed to believe that since the Resident must be largely occupied in his military duties, the appointment of a specially qualified First Assistant to co-operate in tribal and frontier affairs would be altogether advantageous. He therefore desired that an arrangement with that object should, if possible, be made without delay. Instructions were accordingly issued for the withdrawal of the troops from D'thala, with the exception of such as it might be necessary to retain as an escort for the Political Agent, and for the reduction of the Aden garrison to its normal strength.

In reply to an inquiry from the Secretary of State, the Government of India reported on the 15th December 1906 that orders had already been issued a week  
**Withdrawal of British troops from D'thala.**



previously for the withdrawal of all troops from D'thala, save a suitable escort of Native Infantry for the Political Officer—which meanwhile had been limited to 300 men.

On the 12th January 1907, the Resident reported that the evacuation of D'thala had been completed.

Meanwhile on the 8th January 1907, the Secretary of State requested that the Political Officer at D'thala might be instructed to furnish, as soon as practicable, a report as to the date when his withdrawal would be possible, and as to the means of conducting frontier affairs after his withdrawal. The Government of India replied in a despatch, dated the 25th April, to the following effect.

The presence of a Political Officer at D'thala [had hitherto been of advantage in three ways. Firstly, he had been able to afford valuable assistance to the Resident in the settlement of inter-tribal quarrels, and thereby had contributed to the safety of the trade route. Secondly, he had exercised his influence to check Turkish intrigues in the protected territory, to adjust disputes between Turkish subjects and the British tribesmen, to secure the rebuilding of boundary pillars that had been thrown down, and to prevent violation of the frontier by either party. Thirdly, he had kept a watchful eye on the conflict between the Turks and the Arabs in the Yemen, and had prevented the tribes on the British side of the frontier from being drawn into the struggle.

The Government of India understood, however, with reference to the first two of these considerations, that His Majesty's Government had definitely decided not to retain an officer permanently or for an indefinite period at D'thala. With regard to the question whether an early withdrawal would be prejudicial to British interests as regards the struggle between the Imam and the Porte, the Government of India pointed out that the situation in Yemen was still very unsettled, and the Porte had apparently found it necessary to despatch a commission comprising leading Mullas to effect a settlement by pacific means which they had hitherto failed to secure by force of arms. The latest advices pointed to a recrudescence of fighting between the Turks and Arabs, and it was by no means improbable that the Imam, who was anxious to enter into a treaty of alliance with the British Government, would make further endeavours to attract protected Chiefs to his side. So long as a British Agent was at D'thala, the Government of India were likely to get timely intelligence of such intrigues, and Major Jacob would be able, by his personal influence, to frustrate them. After the withdrawal, however, it was quite possible that they might flourish undetected, and serious complications might conceivably ensue. The attention of His Majesty's Government was drawn to the representation which Sir N. O'Connor had already submitted to Sir E. Grey in his letter of 7th August 1906, questioning the advisability of withdrawing the Political Agent while the Yemen was still in a disturbed and critical condition. If, however, His Majesty's Government held it unnecessary, even with reference to affairs in the Yemen, to retain a post of observation at D'thala, then it would be necessary, before abandoning the position, to make simultaneously with the withdrawal arrangements for ensuring the safety of the Aden-D'thala road. Briefly, the scheme put forward by the Political Resident was that agreements should be entered into with the Kotaibi, Haushabi, and Alawi tribes with the object of making them responsible for safeguarding portions of the road which passed through their territories. The Political Resident recommended that a stipend of Rs. 50 a month should be paid to the Kotaibi Chief through the Amir of D'thala, and that he should be granted a present of 50 rifles with 100 rounds of ammunition per rifle. In return for this concession, the tribe would be held responsible for the safety of the Habilen portion of the Aden-D'thala road.

As regard the Alawi tribe, the Resident considered the stipend of Rs. 50 a month which they received to be inadequate, and recommended that it should be doubled, subject to the condition that the Alawi should be responsible for the safety of the portion of the eastern trade route lying between Jimil and Al Hajar.

As regards the Haushabi, the Resident proposed that the stipend already received by the Sultan should be increased by Rs. 50, and that he should be given 50 Martini-Henry rifles and 1,000 rounds of ammunition to assist him in guarding the portion of the road from Nobat Dakim up to Jimil and also the Mavia caravan road.

The Government of India concurred in these proposals, and represented to the Secretary of State that there was every reason why the measures devised by General DeBrath, with a view to apportioning responsibility for the road, should be brought into force before Major Jacob left D'thala, since, otherwise, the withdrawal might be the signal for outrages on the road and disturbances among the tribes which would make the situation a very difficult one for the Resident to deal with from Aden. They therefore suggested that the Resident should be directed to introduce these arrangements without delay, after which the withdrawal could be effected, at the discretion of the Resident at the earliest convenient date.

With regard to the conduct of affairs after the withdrawal, they concurred with the Political Resident that it would be advisable, in order to assist the negotiations of the Resident with the tribes and with the Turkish authorities, that a Political Officer should occasionally be deputed with an escort to the frontier.

These proposals were approved by the Secretary of State on the 14th June 1907, on the understanding that the Resident was satisfied that the scheme of paying the Kotaibi tribe through the Amir of D'thala would not occasion fresh disputes, and that the redistribution of the posts was so arranged as to be acceptable to the tribes concerned. The Secretary of State presumed that no difficulty would be caused by the payment of the increased Haushabi stipend through the Abdali Sultan or by the transfer to him of the post at Nobat Dakim. To the proposal that these arrangements should be introduced before the Political Officer finally left D'thala, the proviso was attached that he would not prolong his stay there for more than one month after receipt by him of the orders. No deputation of a Political Officer to the frontier was to take place after the withdrawal without a previous reference to the Secretary of State, except on occasions of undoubted emergency.

On the 16th July 1907, the Resident telegraphed that no fresh disputes were anticipated from the scheme for paying the Kotaibi tribe through the Amir of D'thala, nor from the redistribution of posts, nor from the proposals regarding the payment of the Haushabi stipend and the Abdali occupation of Nobat Dakim. He proposed the early conclusion of the agreements on the lines of the drafts which he had submitted. The presents provided for therein were to be granted simultaneously, and the immediate destruction of the Dar-al-Quabtan in arrangement with the Alawi was to follow. Subsequently Suleik fort was to be destroyed upon withdrawal to Nobat Dakim, and Nobat Dakim was to be handed to the Abdali Sultan upon the final withdrawal to Aden itself.

On the 20th July 1907, the Government of India, with reference to the imminent withdrawal of the Political Officer from D'thala, communicated to the Secretary of State reports which they had received regarding successes achieved by the Imam of Yemen against the Turks.

In reply, the Secretary of State enquired on the 25th July 1907, what steps had been taken to give effect to the instructions, contained in his telegram of the 14th June 1907, for the withdrawal of the Political Officer from D'thala. He stated that the successes of the Imam, if as great as reported, might undoubtedly produce complications which would have to be settled as they arose. This fact, however, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, constituted no reason why the withdrawal of the Political Officer should be delayed. In view of the situation at Constantinople, there seemed to be, on the contrary, distinct advantages in avoiding dealings with the Imam as long as possible, and in treating the question as far as possible as one between him and the Turkish Government. His Majesty's Government could not, therefore, entertain any idea of retaining the Political Officer at D'thala for purposes of negotiations with the Imam, but desired to receive the views of the Government of India as to the advice which should be given to the Amir of D'thala regarding his own dealings with the Imam,

if he applied for it without any suggestion from the British Government, and as to whether it was necessary at present to do more than warn him against allowing himself or his subjects to take part in the transaction of frontier affairs. The broad object of His Majesty's Government was to preserve British international obligations towards Turkey and in other respects to avoid responsibility for tribal affairs in the Hinterland. The Secretary of State was most sincerely impressed with the risk of giving pledges, in anticipation of complications with the Imam, which might involve the British Government hereafter in military operations on the borders of the protectorate at an impossible distance from the fortress of Aden.

In reply, the Government of India, on the 29th July 1907, informed the Secretary of State of a proposal which they had received from the Resident on the 23rd July, to the effect that the evacuation of D'thala should take place at his discretion within one month of signing the proposed agreements. This suggestion involved the retention of the Political Officer at D'thala beyond the 29th July, which was the date on which he should leave in accordance with the orders of His Majesty's Government. In their opinion it would be undesirable to evacuate D'thala and to demolish the posts before the agreements had been approved. If His Majesty's Government concurred in this, the Resident would be instructed in the meantime to proceed with the arrangements for the evacuation at as early a date as possible on the assumption that the agreements would not be materially altered.

On the 1st August 1907, the Secretary of State telegraphed expressing regret that further delay had occurred in the withdrawal from D'thala, since unforeseen complications might arise from it in the present state of the Arab rising across the border. In a later telegram, dated the 28th August 1907, Mr. Morley stated that he could hardly avoid the impression that there had been unnecessary delay notwithstanding the importance which his despatches and telegrams showed to be attached by His Majesty's Government to speedy action. He requested that any matters not strictly necessary for the purposes of withdrawal might be excluded from the scope of the agreements, and that care should be taken not to include anything in the agreements likely to frustrate the policy of retirement, either by imposing fresh obligations on the tribes, or by creating disputes among the tribesmen themselves. If this could not be ensured he stated that the agreements must, if necessary, be considered at leisure, and the Agent was at once to withdraw, merely explaining and arranging matters amicably with the tribes on the basis of existing agreements and of the arrangements which they had accepted before the troops occupied D'thala.

On the 29th August 1907, the Secretary of State telegraphed that the Political Agent should be instructed, when making final arrangements for withdrawal, to warn the Sheikh against taking part himself, or allowing his subjects to take part in trans-frontier affairs. If the occasion warranted it, similar advice might be given to other Sheikhs. Anything in the nature of a pledge was, however, to be avoided by the Resident, and, without the previous sanction of His Majesty's Government, no communication was to be made to the Imam from the British Government.

On the 31st August 1907, the Government of India informed the Secretary of State that there had been no delay beyond what was necessarily involved in the preparation of the agreements by the local officers, and their consideration by the Government of India.

On the 4th September 1907, the Resident at Aden telegraphed that he had sent the amended agreements to Major Jacob with instructions to ascertain informally the willingness of the Chiefs to execute them and, if acceptable, to conclude them. Pending further orders, he proposed, owing to the difficulties of transport and the undesirability of accommodating men in tents owing to the great heat, withdrawing the Political Agent to Nobat Dakim about the end of September and to withdraw his escort to Aden for embarkation to India by the 11th October. Nobat would be left garrisoned as at the present time.

On the 7th September 1907, the Government of India repeated the foregoing telegram to the Secretary of State, and mentioned also that the Resident had

submitted proposals regarding the definition of the limit within which internal disturbances would call for interposition, and also regarding the reorganisation of the Aden Troop for the purpose of policing the area within that limit. The Government of India recommended that the Political Agent should remain at D'thala till the end of September, and that he should be permitted to make Nobat his head-quarters and to retain the British garrison there until they had considered the Resident's proposals referred to above.

On the 10th September 1907, the Secretary of State intimated that he did not see why questions regarding the limit of interference could not be considered at Aden, or why the Agent's retention at Nobat and the retention of the garrison there were required for that purpose. The agreements were to be proceeded with, but in order to enable their completion, and in consideration of the season, he agreed to allow till the end of the month for the withdrawal from D'thala.

On the 4th October 1907, the Resident at Aden telegraphed that the Aden Hinterland had been evacuated by the Political Agent, D'thala, and his escort, and that the Chiefs concerned had been summoned to Aden to sign the proposed agreements by the 15th idem. On the way down from D'thala the fort at Suleik and the Hardaba blockhouse were dismantled by the 81st Pioneers, while the Kotaibi Sheikh was persuaded to pull down Dar Taiz, and men of the 81st Pioneers with some of the Aden Troopers were sent up to ensure the completion of the work. This programme was acceptable to both parties. Ali Nashir, the Alawi Sheikh, unexpectedly refused, however, to give the necessary permission for the demolition of the fort at Dar-al-Kabtan unless the sum of Rs. 500 which had been promised him, as a gift, was first paid into his hands. Major Jacob reminded him that the receipt of the amount was contingent on his demolishing the Dar and building another elsewhere, but at this junction, the Alawi contingent on the hill, comprising over 50 or 60 armed men and made up of Alawis, Dthambaris, and Hejailis, began to show signs of hostility and to threaten severe measures if the demolition of the Dar were effected without the Sheikh's permission. A Dthambari with whom Major Jacob expostulated, aimed at him with his loaded carbine, but was seized by the bystanders and prevented from firing. The Kotaibi on the opposite hill at Dar Taiz, seeing the night coming on and Dar-al-Kabtan still standing, feared that Major Jacob had gone back on his word and sent a message that, until he completed the demolition, the British sepoys would remain in their hands as hostages. The Alawi Sheikh, Ali Nashir, then decamped in a rage, leaving 30 men on the hill and refused the necessary permission to demolish his Dar. As it was now pitch dark, and as Major Jacob could not leave the country without destroying the Dar-al-Kabtan fort, he paid the Rs. 500 to the Sheikh and blew up the Dar. He then proceeded to the Kotaibi camp and released his Pioneers.

In January 1908 sharp fighting took place between the Kotaibi and Alawi Sheikhs, resulting in the victory of the former.

During February 1908, the Amir of D'thala and the Kotaibi and Alawi Sheikhs all came into Aden, and the Political Resident held an interview with the two former in the Abdali's presence. All were more or less agreed that the Kotaibi should enjoy the fruits of his recent victory over the Alawi, and that the Alawi should not be re-admitted to a position of responsibility on the road, and that his transit dues and additional stipend should therefore pass to the Kotaibi. At the same time they were of opinion that to secure the better safety of the road in future some clear understanding was desirable as to their several and joint responsibilities.

In March the Resident reported that an Agreement for the future safety of the Aden-D'thala road, had been signed by the Chiefs concerned; but it contained no mention of the important question of transit dues, an omission which he would do his best to rectify. A week later he reported that the Chiefs had arranged to add to their Agreement a clause fixing a single place for the collection of all transit dues.

In the following September the Resident reported that the Kotaibi and Alawi Dars, the demolition of which had been made a necessary precedent to the grant of any assistance to either of these Chiefs, had again been rebuilt without

permission and would prove a constant menace to the peace of the trade route. Consequently, in the Resident's opinion, it would be undesirable to grant any stipend or other concession to the Kotaibi Chief until the Agreement was concluded; otherwise one of the most potent arguments for inducing him to sign the Agreement would be lost. Such being the state of affairs, the Resident had taken no further steps to obtain the final consent of the Chiefs concerned to the Agreement.

Mention has been made above of the proposals made by the Resident at Aden, owing to the withdrawal from D'thala, for policing the trade routes leading into Aden, and for the maintenance of peace in the vicinity of that place. These proposals were that the Aden Troop should police a belt of country 35 miles from Sheikh Othman, acting in support of the Abdali and Haushabi forces, and that detachments of the troop should be placed at Am Riga, Nobat Dakim and Bir-am Mukhnuk, with a support at Lahej, from which a system of patrols by tribal levies would be organized and support given to the troops of the Sultans of Lahej and Akrabi respectively.

The Government of India, after a consideration of the matter, doubted whether the Aden troop at its present strength (which after allowing for ordinary duties, sick, etc., would, probably, not exceed an effective strength of 60 men, or 15 for each post) would be capable of adequately performing the proposed duties. Further, as it was proposed that the tribal levies, supported by detachments of the Aden Troop, should be employed to check the illicit arms traffic, to safeguard travellers from highway robbery and exactions of unlawful transit duties—malpractices which were a source of profit to many in the Protectorate, including minor officials of the States, if not the Chiefs themselves—there appeared to be a strong probability of the troops of the Abdali and Akrabi Sultans being brought into open conflict with the tribesmen, and of their becoming involved in blood-feuds and perhaps open conflict with the Subehi or other of the more turbulent tribes. To provide weak detachments of the Aden Troop with the avowed object of strengthening the hands of the Abdali and Akrabi Sultans would be likely to place the troops in a false position, as, in the event of a conflict between the levies and the Subehi or other marauders, the weak detachments would find it impossible to give adequate assistance without unduly weakening their posts and running the risk of a disaster, which would inevitably bring about the punitive expedition which it was desired to avoid, while to give support to the Chiefs in the ineffectual performance of a distasteful duty, would be a measure incompatible with the proper maintenance of British prestige.

In these circumstances the Government of India considered that a more suitable means of obtaining the objects in view would be to reduce the strength of the Aden Troop to that of an escort for the Resident (say 40 sabres), and, for the remainder, to substitute a levy corps, in British pay, composed of representatives of every tribe in the Protectorate, under the command of a selected British officer. The proposal was not a new one, similar recommendations having been made by the Resident at Aden in 1903 and 1906. It was not at the time considered desirable to give effect to the recommendations, but now that the situation in the Hinterland had been changed by the withdrawal from D'thala, and the formulation of a definite policy of non-interference, it was possible to gauge to some extent the probable effect of the new policy, and the practicability of substituting a levy corps for the Aden Troop as a possible solution of the present difficulties could be discussed with advantage. The Bombay Government were accordingly asked on the 25th March 1909 to consider the proposal, and, if they saw no strong objection, to submit the necessary detailed proposals for the creation of a levy corps on the lines suggested.

In May 1910, the Bombay Government replied pointing out that the proposal to create a local levy corps was open to the strongest objection, in the first place, because the local Arabs have no real fighting instinct; secondly, they would have no cohesion; and thirdly, the effect of any action they might take would involve them in blood-feuds. The Local Government accordingly recommended a modified scheme under which the Aden Troop, reconstituted to a strength of 20

horse and 116 camel sowars, would, using Khor Maksar as a base, patrol the trade routes within the 35-mile limit leaving the frontier posts at Am Riga, Nobat Dakim, Bir-am-Mukhnuk and Lahej to be manned entirely by the Abdali's men. The matter was under reference to His Majesty's Government at the close of the period dealt with in this summary.

Sir N. O'Connor informed Sir E. Grey on the 7th February 1906, that he had spoken to Tewfik Pasha, the Turkish Foreign Minister, on the necessity for some formality on this subject, such for instance as the exchange of notes recording officially the results of the Aden frontier delimitation. It appeared, however, that this would necessitate a fresh Iradé, and that, in present circumstances, it would be difficult to obtain this from the Sultan, and a formal request might possibly give rise to new complications. Moreover the matter could, in a certain sense, be considered as settled, as the maps signed by the Commissioners of both countries had been received by the Turkish Minister of War, and the delimitation of the frontier, as shown in them, had not been questioned.

Sir N. O'Connor was disposed to concur in Tewfik Pasha's views, the more so that every section of the boundary agreed to by the Ottoman Commissioners had been sanctioned by separate Iradés and Vizirial orders, obtained during the course of the negotiations. Further, if he pressed for an Iradé, it was quite possible that the Ottoman Government, in order to avoid making an application to the Palace, might advance the argument that the north-east portion of the boundary between the Wadi Bana and the desert had not yet been delimited in detail, and that until this was done the final formalities, by an exchange of notes or otherwise, could not be carried out.

Sir N. O'Connor therefore suggested that it might be possible for Mr. Fitzmaurice to compare the maps in the Embassy with those in the possession of the Ottoman Minister of War, and if Sir E. Grey considered that this constituted a sufficient record of the frontier delimitation, nothing more need be done. The Secretary of State for India informed the Foreign Office on the 28th February that he was prepared to acquiesce in the course proposed by Sir N. O'Connor.

On the 1st September 1906, Sir N. O'Connor informed Sir E. Grey that the copies prepared by the Survey of India of the maps signed on the spot by the Commissioners for the Aden frontier delimitation had been duly forwarded to the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs, and by him transmitted to the Turkish War Office where they were compared in the General Staff Department with the original signed copies, and a number of "discrepancies" discovered by the Turkish officers. Mr. Fitzmaurice carefully examined these alleged discrepancies, which were, he stated, in no way essential and had reference mainly to places on the map where additional names and numbers had been inserted, and also to heights converted from feet on the original maps to metres on the copies.

He further stated that the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs had forwarded him a *note verbale*, dated the 21st August 1906, declaring that the map signed by the respective Commissioners "was the only one which, in case of necessity, could be consulted as authentic." Sir N. O'Connor thought that this written declaration might, for the reasons given in his despatch of the 7th February, be considered by His Majesty's Government as tantamount to a ratification by the Porte of the results of the labours of the Boundary Commission. In these circumstances he recommended, subject to the approval of the Government of India and the Home Government, that the most practical solution of the matter would be for him to be authorised to take action, by means of a responsive *note verbale*, of the above-quoted declaration of the Sublime Porte employing some phrase to the following effect: "That the original maps signed by the respective Commissioners are the only ones which, in conjunction with the Protocol signed at Sheikh Said on the 20th April 1905, can be consulted as authentic in case of difficulty arising on any part of the demarcated line."

This proposal was approved by His Majesty's Government, and Sir N. O'Connor took action accordingly. The Government of India subsequently



approved a proposal that the leading Chiefs of the Protectorate should be given a detailed description of the portion of the delimited frontier lying within their respective limits ; and that the Abdali Sultan should be furnished with a copy of a map of the whole Subaihi border.

In connection with the murder of Captain Warneford, Political Officer with the "British moveable column," by a sowar of the Sheikh Othman police in March

**Captain Warneford's murder.**

1904, the Government of Bombay, with the approval of the Government of India, authorised the Resident at Aden in December 1905 to withhold the monthly stipends of the Rijai, Mansuri, and Makhdumi Chiefs until such time as Saleh ba Haidara, the murderer, was surrendered. He was also to inform the Chiefs concerned that the arrears of stipends thus accumulated would be paid when the murderer was surrendered.

The Resident pointed out, however, that, if the stipends were withheld under Article IV of the Agreement concluded in 1871 with these tribes, they would have a right to revert to the old practice of levying fees on merchandise on two of the important trade routes tapping the Taiz districts, namely, the Mufalis and Madraja routes. He stated that any re-imposition of dues and taxes upon these routes was most undesirable, and might involve hostilities. He suggested, therefore, that, to commence with, action should be directed against the Rijai only, and that the first step should not be the stoppage of stipends, but the discontinuance of presents and intercourse, and that in the event of these measures proving ineffectual, punitive measures should be undertaken. He also mentioned that the Abdali Sultan had offered his assistance in case it were decided to undertake punitive measure against the Rijai.

To this the Government of Bombay replied on the 6th January that the authority given to the Resident did not preclude him from taking milder measures if he considered they would suffice, nor did it compel him to use the full authority entrusted to him at once without discretion. In their opinion, the temporary withholding of the stipends would hardly amount to stoppage of payment within the meaning of Article IV of the treaty. The Government of Bombay further stated that they were not prepared to contemplate anything in the shape of a military expedition against the Rijai tribe at present.

The Government of India approved these instructions, but on the 28th February the Secretary of State pointed out that further punitive measures might be necessitated if the stipends were withheld. He presumed that a reference would be made to him before any action, which was likely to result in a punitive expedition, were taken. The Bombay Government were accordingly instructed not to withhold payment of the stipends without further reference to the Government of India.

On the 29th April 1906, the Resident at Aden reported that letters had been received from the Abdali Sultan and from the younger Rijai Sheikh, to the effect that Captain Warneford's murderer, Saleh ba Haidara, had been shot in the vicinity of Am Riga, and buried at that village. To sift the truth of this report, the Resident asked the Rijai Sheikh to send in his informant, and the Mansuri Sheikh to send in the two men of the Ammaida clan, who were reported to have actually killed Saleh ba Haidara, but nothing definite was ascertained.

In November 1905 the Political Officer at D'thala received a letter from the Sheikhs of Rubeaten, forwarding a

**Turkish encroachment into Rubeaten.**

letter addressed to them from the Kaimmakam of Rada, in which the Sheikhs were apprised of the arrival in Rubeaten territory of six Turkish policemen, and were instructed to pay the Kaimmakam a visit without delay ; for which they would be given a safe conduct.

Major Jacob urged upon the Kaimmakam of Rada the advisability of non-intervention in the affairs of Rubeaten till the Governments concerned had come to a final conclusion in the matter of the Aden boundary, and he also counselled the Rubeaten Sheikhs who had sought his advice, to refer the Turkish policemen to their master with whom the Political Officer was in communication.

The Resident at Aden suggested to the Government of Bombay that representations should be made through the British Embassy at Constantinople, with a view to immediate withdrawal of the men and the constables. Should Government desire it, he would instruct the Political Officer to counsel the Sheikhs to expel the Turkish emissaries from their limits.

The Government of Bombay informed the Resident that Rubeaten was clearly within the British sphere of influence, and that the Political Officer at D'thala should be instructed to support the Sheikhs in the matter, and to ask for the withdrawal of the men.

A subsequent report showed that the Turks had not actually entered Rubeaten and that the Mudir of Rada had only invited the Rubeaten Sheikhs to go and meet him and make friendship. They had received a similar invitation from the Mudir of Juban and his son.

The Political Officer at D'thala advised them to reply that Rubeaten was within the British Protectorate, and his action was approved by the Secretary of State.

On the 4th July 1908, the Resident reported that, about ten days previously, the Ahl Hubeshia and Ahl Hajaj warned the people of Rubeaten that the Turks intended raiding their country if they persisted in refusing to pay tribute. The Rubeaten people took their cattle and possessions away from the border, and, with the assistance of the two tribes mentioned above, drove the Turks out.

On the 16th August, the Resident telegraphed that he had received a complaint from the Sheikhs of Rubeaten that they had been summoned by the Turkish Kaimmakam of Rada and the Commander of the Turkish troops with a view to exacting tribute. They forwarded three letters from the Turks in which the latter distinctly stated that Rubeaten was part of the Rada district. The Sheikhs also intimated that they had secured the Yafais' assistance against possible Turkish aggression. The Resident informed the Sheikhs that their grievance had been referred to Government, as Rubeaten was under the political control of the British Government. The Bombay Government considered that, under the *procès verbal* of the 30th April 1905, Rubeaten was unquestionably within the British sphere.

The Government of India replied, on the 19th August 1908, that it was understood that, subsequent to writing the letters referred to, the Turks had taken no action, and that they had not entered Rubeaten territory. Unless the Bombay Government considered that further action was required, the Government of India thought that it was only necessary to inform the Resident that he should report at once any further movement on the part of the Turks. For the present the reply of the Sheikhs to the letters of the Turkish local authorities to the effect that they were under British protection seemed sufficient. The Resident could also draw the attention of the local Turkish authorities to the facts, if he thought it necessary to do so, provided he did so in a form which would not commit the Government of India to action in any way. These orders were approved by the Secretary of State.

Some months later the Mausatta Sheikh of Upper Yaffa (under British influence) complained to the Resident regarding alleged Turkish encroachments on Nawa and Juban. The Bombay Government thereupon pointed out that although the actual boundary between the British and Turkish districts to the north-east of Lakmat-ash-Shub had not been demarcated, the Ottoman Commissioner had, in the *procès verbal* of the 20th April 1905, expressly stated that, provided Jaban remained part of the Kaza of Rada, he recognised that the Uzles of Rubeaten, Nawa and Dabiani formed part of Yaffa. They were of opinion, therefore, that any claim to Nawa must make reference to this document, and that it would be inexpedient to include Juban in any representation which His Majesty's Government might make to the Porte.

The Government of India in representing the matter to the Secretary of State, suggested that the Resident should be instructed to try and settle the matter locally, without committing the Government of India to action in any way. The Secretary of State approved this proposal.



In September 1908 the Nakib of Mausatta, accompanied by some Sheikhs of Juban and a representative from Dthubiani, arrived in Aden. The Juban Sheikhs asserted that Juban was a part of Upper Yaffa, that these districts had always been considered one, and that they did not want to be placed within the Turkish sphere; they complained that last year the Turks had collected \$3,000 from Juban, and that previous to this the last collection was about eight years ago. They also produced a document which the Sheikhs of Juban and Yaffa had agreed to and signed, about 76 years ago, to the effect that their countries were identical, their interests mutual, etc. The Nakib supported the Juban Sheikhs in their claim and stated that he would never agree to a separation of their countries, *i. e.*, one within Turkish and the other within British limits. The Juban Sheikhs also produced some letters from Tairi Pasha (the Turkish authority) which indicated that the Turks claimed Juban, Nawa, Yaffa and the Dthubiani countries.

The Dthubiani representative said that their district stretched to Rada (Turkish) and he also complained that the Turks collected \$300 from them last year. The Political Resident informed the Juban Sheikhs and the Nakib that the question of Juban had not been settled; that it was doubtful whether it was on the Turkish or British side of the border; and that the boundary in this direction had not been definitely demarcated.

The Government of Bombay in communicating their views on the case, said that they were of opinion that, however strong might be the understanding between the Juban and Yaffa tribes, it was impossible, in the face of the express stipulation in the *procès verbal* of the 20th April 1905 by the Ottoman Commissioner, for the British Government to move on behalf of the Juban Sheikhs for the recovery of the \$3,000 which had been levied from them by the Turks. As regards the complaints made by the Sheikhs of Nawa and Dthubiani, of illegal exactions levied from them by the Turks, it appeared to the Bombay Government that, in view of the fact that it had been tacitly admitted by the Turks to Mr. Fitzmaurice, the British Boundary Commissioner, that Nawa, Rubeaten and Dthubiani formed part of the Yaffa Canton, it would almost be better to forego all claims to influence over these tribes than to maintain the claim without attempting to enforce it. If no effort were made to protect them against Turkish aggression or to secure them compensation for Turkish extortion, our position in relation to them would become anomalous and the Resident at Aden would be placed in an extremely false position. The Kaimmakam of Rada was himself responsible for these extortions, and to enter into negotiations with him would not only be futile but tantamount to a confession of impotence. The Bombay Government therefore suggested that representations should be made to the Turkish Government through the regular diplomatic channels, in order that some definite understanding might be arrived at with reference to these tribes.

The Government of India, in forwarding the papers to the Secretary of State for India, expressed concurrence in the views of the Government of Bombay, and requested that the necessary representations might be made to the Turkish Government in order to obtain reparation for the exactions enforced from tribes whom we had taken under our protection.

But it does not appear that His Majesty's Government made any representation to the Porte in the matter. They merely decided that, in view of the terms of the *procès verbal* of the 20th April 1905, it should be made clear to the Juban tribesmen that Great Britain did not claim the district as part of the British protectorate. The Resident at Aden was accordingly instructed to take a suitable opportunity of informing the Nakib of Mausatta and the Sheikhs of Juban accordingly.

At the beginning of Lord Curzon's Viceroyalty, Great Britain had treaties with all the nine tribes in the neighbourhood of Aden, except the different sections of the Upper Yaffai and Upper Aulaki. All these were Protectorate treaties except those with the Abdali, Amiri and some sections of the Subaihi. We also had Protectorate Treaties with Shehr and Mokalla and the Wahidi.

Treaty with Beda.

During Lord Curzon's Viceroyalty, Protectorate Treaties were concluded with all the sections of the Upper Yaffai and Upper Aulaki tribes, and also with Behan-el-Kasab, except that section of the latter inhabiting Beda; and in regard to Beda negotiations for the purpose were in progress with good prospects of success.

On the 12th February 1906, the Bombay Government stated that the Resident hoped to visit Shugra and there arrange a Treaty with Beda. The matter was to be discussed personally in Bombay, but, before the Resident left, it was necessary for him to have instructions as to the amount of stipend to be granted to the Chiefs and also as regards an increase to the stipend of the Fadthli Sultan, if it was found that the latter had been instrumental in bringing about the Treaty. They proposed to use their own discretion in determining both amounts after discussion with the Resident.

The Government of India, on the 20th February, agreed that it was most desirable to secure a Treaty with Beda, and stated that they were willing to sanction an allowance of 150 dollars a month. They also intimated that the Treaty should, as in the case of that with D'thala, contain, if possible, a condition requiring the Chief to be responsible for any boundary pillars erected, and for the safety of any British parties which might have occasion to visit his territories. With regard to the increase in the stipend of the Fadthli Sultan, they thought it might be determined later on, when the terms of the Treaty with him could be fully discussed.

On the 13th June 1906, the Secretary of State enquired whether the Resident had received any further communications from the Rasasi Sheikhs with regard to the Beda treaty. He presumed that the Resident had been instructed, in accordance with the policy laid down in his letter of the 4th May 1906 (*vide* the beginning of this summary), to adopt an attitude towards the Sheikhs which would make it unnecessary to conclude a treaty, unless the Sheikhs themselves insisted on it in fulfilment of pledges already made to them. On the 19th June, the Secretary of State again telegraphed that, if the Resident did not understand the instructions contained in the former's telegram of the 13th idem, he should say so. On the 30th June 1906, the Secretary State was informed that the Resident understood the instructions.

In September 1909 the new Sultan of Beda informed the Resident that fighting was then going on between himself and the Audali. He hoped hostilities would soon come to an end, and that he would be able to visit Aden in order to conclude the long delayed treaty with the British Government. But there is nothing further to record on the subject, within the period of this summary.

Various proposals on the subject of a railway at Aden came before Lord Curzon's Government between 1900 and 1903,

**Railway construction in the Aden Hinterland.**

but none of them were seriously considered.

In April 1905, the Bombay Government submitted the text of an Agreement concluded between Messrs. Cowasjee, Dinshaw & Co., and the Sultan of Lahej for the construction of a railway in the latter's territory, together with an application from that firm to extend the railway into Aden, and expressed themselves as being in favour of the scheme for the construction of a line from Aden to Nobat Dakim. While attention was drawn to the irregularity of the procedure adopted by the Sultan and the firm in the present case, in that the agreement had been concluded without the cognizance of the Resident, it was pointed out that the arrangement concluded, marked a great stride in the direction of consolidating British political influence in the Protectorate.

The matter was submitted to Lord Curzon, who was of opinion that, as things stood, the idea of a railway, constructed by private enterprise, from Aden to Nobat Dakim, might certainly be favoured. His Excellency subsequently sanctioned a reply to the Government of Bombay to the effect that the Government of India were prepared to consider favourably proposals from any suitable applicants for the construction of a railway by private enterprise from Aden into the interior on certain conditions.

On the 3rd November 1905, Mr. Brodrick requested that he might be furnished with a statement of the views of the Government of India on the whole question of

railway construction in the Aden Hinterland before any steps were taken in connection with the offers that might have been received for the construction of the line. On the 5th October 1906, a Liberal Government having meanwhile come into power, the Secretary of State returned to the subject of a railway at Aden, in his despatch, already noticed, laying down the policy to be pursued in future in the Aden Hinterland. While requesting that no sort of permission or encouragement should be given to the extension of any line of railway into the British territory at Aden without his sanction, Mr. (afterwards Lord) Morley asked to be informed of the steps that had been taken by the Abdali Sultan of Lahej towards giving any concession for railway enterprise in his own territory. He further desired to know what estimates had been framed of the cost of a railway in the Abdali territory and of its probable profits, if it were constructed.

On the 14th February 1907, the Government of India addressed the Secretary of State on the subject by despatch. They stated that, in January 1905, Messrs. Cowasjee, Dinshaw & Bros. had informed the Resident at Aden that they had obtained a concession from the Abdali Sultan of Lahej to construct a railway through his territory, and that they were anxious to obtain a further concession from the British Government for the extension of the line into British limits from Dar-al-Amir into Aden. The Resident at Aden proposed very considerable alterations in the terms and conditions of the agreement between the Abdali Sultan and Messrs. Dinshaw, but the Government of India considered that, before Messrs. Dinshaw's offer was accepted at all, it was advisable that an opportunity of submitting definite proposals should be offered to other applicants of good financial position who in the past had expressed their desire to open up railway communications with the Hinterland. The Abdali Sultan at first objected to this proposal, but, in November 1905, he was induced to set aside the concession which he had granted to Messrs. Cowasjee, Dinshaw & Bros., and to agree to the publication of a draft notification prepared by the Political Resident explaining the conditions under which offers might be made for the construction of the line by private enterprise. An examination of the draft notification showed that the conditions proposed provided generally for the interests of the British Government, and under certain circumstances for the interests of the Sultan, but that they offered little inducement to a promoter to apply for the concession. There was, therefore, the risk of friction between the Sultan and the concessionaires, and the Government of India were disposed to consider that, if the advantages of constructing the line were established, it might be preferable for them to make the line themselves, paying to the Sultan a royalty on net profits. Before any further action was taken, however, the orders of His Majesty's Government of the 4th May 1906, in regard to the Aden Hinterland (q. v. page 1) were received, and further consideration of the question was abandoned. The Government of India enquired whether, in view of the decision of His Majesty's Government in regard to British policy in the Aden Hinterland, the Secretary of State considered it sufficient that the Government of India should abstain from collecting the material necessary for framing such estimates, or whether he desired that they should more actively discourage the Sultan's scheme for developing his territory by the construction of a railway.

On the 29th March, the Secretary of State replied taking the same view of the draft notification prepared by the Political Resident. The inference appeared to him to be that, under present conditions, it would be wiser to do nothing in the direction of encouraging railway construction in Abdali territory or elsewhere in the Aden Hinterland. Should the subject of a railway within the Sultan's territory be revived, he requested that the matter might be referred to him before the Government of India committed themselves to any undertaking.

On the 3rd July, the Government of Bombay forwarded further correspondence from the Resident at Aden, from which it appeared that the Abdali Sultan was still anxious for a railway to be constructed through his territories, and that he contemplated proceeding with the project whether he received assistance from the British Government or not. The Government of India asked the Secretary of State whether they were to allow the Sultan to take such measures as he considered desirable, with a view to the construction of a line, and, if so, whether they should assist him with advice as to the best method of securing his object. They resumed that, in any case, they should not take active steps to prevent the Sultan

from making the line, and were of opinion that, if it was to be made, such advice as could be afforded should be placed at the Sultan's disposal.

On the 27th September, the Secretary of State replied that the removal of the British garrison from D'thala, and the reversion of our political relations with the tribes to their former position had so materially affected the question of railway extension that it would be well to consider all previous proposals at an end and the correspondence closed. The matter could be re-opened on a new basis if the Abdali Sultan should wish later to construct an internal railway. In any case no proposals for extending an Abdali railway into the Aden settlement or for connecting it with its sea-board were to be discussed with the Sultan without previous consultation with the Secretary of State. Apart from this, the construction of a line, even exclusively within the Abdali territory, would also require consideration in connection with any advances to be made by British subjects, and with questions of policy or of a military character on which the British Government, as the protecting power, might have the right to be consulted. The Secretary of State considered it undesirable, however, to express any opinion on these matters unless or until the Sultan submitted a definite scheme for a railway confined to his own territory, which could then be examined on its merits.

In May 1910 it was reported that the Amir of D'thala during a recent visit to Aden had begged that Government would lay down a railway between Aden and D'thala in the interests of the peace and prosperity of the Hinterland, and had asked also that D'thala might again be occupied by troops with the same object.

In June 1910 it was again reported that the Amir had repeated his request for a railway, and asked that the work should be started before the Turkish railway in Yemen was started.

This Turkish railway in Yemen, it may be explained briefly, was a project that had been talked of some 4½ years previously. His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople had reported in January 1906 the publication of an Irade which authorised the preliminary survey of a line from Hodeidah through Jemile to Sanaa and thence to Taiz Assir and elsewhere, by an engineer representing a French group of capitalists. In February 1906 some engineers were reported to have arrived at Sanaa in connection with the proposed railway. But subsequently nothing further was heard of the scheme.

Whilst on the subject of railways in Arabia, some few details regarding the probable influence of the Hedjaz Railway on the politics of Arabia may be of interest.

#### The Hedjaz Railway.

On the 24th July 1906, Sir N. O'Connor forwarded to His Majesty's Government a memorandum by Mr. G. A. Lloyd, Honorary Attaché to the Embassy at Constantinople, respecting German influence on the Hedjaz Railway. At the close of the memorandum, Mr. Lloyd drew attention to the strategical importance from the Turkish point of view which the line would commence to have on its arrival at Medain-Saleh. He stated that the line had already reached Zat-el-Haj, about 150 miles from Medain-Saleh, and that when once it had arrived there, the centre and heart of the Nejd district would be immediately in touch with the railway. He pointed out that Hail, the capital of the Ibn Rashid family, was separated from Medain-Saleh only by some four or five dromedary marches and that the railway would thus have a very important effect upon the politics of the Nejd. He thought that it might be due to this fact that the Sultan had decided, after the death of Ibn Rashid, to continue to support the fallen fortunes of that family against the superior forces of Ibn Saood. He considered this aspect of the Hedjaz Railway to be very important from the British point of view.

Later in the year a further memorandum on the subject of the Hedjaz Railway was prepared by Mr. Lloyd. Referring to the political importance which the construction of the railway would have upon the situation in the Nejd, Mr. Lloyd pointed out that the re-establishment of effective Turkish control over the Nejd must come either from Basrah and Baghdad or from Medain-Saleh, and that the latter, which was within about five post marches from Hail, might serve as a strong military base from which Turkey could conduct operations in Central Arabia and the Nejd. Mr. Lloyd also stated that the construction of the railway would be liable to effect in no small degree the political position and influence of the British Government on the western shores of the Persian Gulf.

In May 1905 the Perim Coal Company applied to the Secretary of State for India for a consideration of the question of the renewal of the lease of land, etc., on Perim island, granted to them in 1883, and which will expire in April 1913. The Company pointed out the various improvements which they had effected on the island, *e.g.*, coaling facilities for vessels (including those of His Majesty's Navy), a well-lighted harbour (where previously there had been none and wrecks were frequent), a well-equipped salvage station, medical and sanitary arrangements, etc. Further the Company represented that their capital expenditure had amounted to £120,000 and there was still room for development, *e.g.*, a slipway, which would cost several thousands of pounds, for cleaning and repairing vessels, the provision of more salvage appliances, etc., but they felt that before entering upon extensive works which would involve considerable capital outlay, they should have an assurance of an extension of their lease. The Secretary of State requested the Government of India to take the question into consideration, in consultation with the Government of Bombay, with a view to determine whether a renewal of the lease should be granted, and, if so, what modifications of the terms of the existing lease were necessary or desirable. In this respect, the principal points which merited consideration were—(a) the Company's contribution to the administrative expenses of the island, (b) payment of income-tax by the Company, and (c) request of the Committee of Lloyd's to be heard regarding the renewal of the lease, as Lloyd Signal Station at Perim was dependent for water, transport, provisions, and conveyance, upon the Perim Coal Company.

The Admiralty, who were also consulted by the India Office, agreed to the renewal of the Company's lease, subject to the following two provisos—(1) that every facility should be given for Lloyd's to carry on signalling and wireless telegraphy, if established; (2) that in the event of war the Perim Coal Company should carry out all instructions of the Resident at Aden in regard to the disposal of their stock of coal and use their utmost endeavours to prevent or delay the enemy obtaining any coal or other supplies at Perim.

In August 1907, the Bombay Government reported that they concurred in the opinion of the Resident at Aden that the lease should be continued, the Resident's opinion being supported by the Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Squadron; while the arrangement was not objected to by Lloyd's, provided that facilities were assured them for working their signal station on the island. The conditions proposed by the Bombay Government were—(1) that the fresh concession should be limited to the actual requirements of the Company, who should be required to pay some land or quit-rent as at Aden (where 6 pies per square yard is levied), in place of the pepper-corn rent at present charged; (2) that land used for quarrying and storing salvaged cargo, at present included in the Company's concession, should be omitted; (3) that fees should be charged for quarrying stone at Aden; and (4) that if there was to be a clause prescribing compensation for buildings on the resumption of the land, it should be provided that no building be erected without the sanction of the Political Resident. The Government of India concurred in these proposals, and a draft revised lease was received from the Government of Bombay in December 1908.

In forwarding the draft lease to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India on the 25th March 1909, the Government of India concurred in the view expressed by the Government of Bombay that there was no objection to an extension of the lease being granted to the Company on the conditions embodied therein. They desired to accept the recommendation of the Bombay Government that, on the expiry of the current lease in 1913, the administration of the island should be conducted under the Aden Settlement Regulations, the Perim Coal Company, equally with other concessionaires, being treated as ordinary lessees and liable as such to taxation whether local or imperial. Under this arrangement, the details of which could conveniently be settled at a later date when the conditions accepted by the Company were known, the contribution which the Company have hitherto made towards administrative expenses, and which has in the past given rise to some controversy, would cease. Though the liability to pay cesses and taxes on land and buildings, &c., had been specially provided for in the lease, the Government of India did not

consider it necessary to introduce any express stipulation as regards income-tax, the payment of which is a legal obligation and could not, they thought, be contested. They considered, however, that in order to avoid any future doubt on the point it should be clearly explained to the Company that, on the renewal of the lease, they would be required to pay the tax.

In regard to the period of renewal of the lease, the Bombay Government subsequently telegraphed that, in the opinion of the Resident at Aden, it did not seem advisable to grant a long lease, until more was known regarding conditions as to shipping, which are changing, and are, with the deepening of the Suez Canal and the development of Port Soudan, likely to change to a still greater degree: the Company were not as far as the Resident was aware, contemplating the installation of new plant or any extension of their business, and were not likely to be discouraged by a reduction of the term of the lease. He therefore recommended an extension for a period of ten years. The Bombay Government agreed to this limit for the lease. The Government of India communicated these views to the Secretary of State, and stated that they had no objection to the term proposed, if the Company agreed.

A copy of the draft lease was forwarded to the Perim Coal Company by the India Office in June 1909. The remarks of the Company were invited in regard to the proposed ten-year term of the lease, with the reservation that whatever period might be fixed for the lease of the land buildings, the provisions respecting the administration of the harbour would be fixed for a maximum period of ten years. It was added that the Company would be assessed to Indian income-tax after the expiry of the current lease, and it was further stated that Viscount Morley wished it to be understood that the position of Lloyd's or any other agency which might be entrusted by the Government with signalling or wireless telegraphy at Perim must be safeguarded, and that any stipulations which might on fuller consideration be found necessary for that purpose would be added to the draft. In September, the Company in their reply again recounted the improvements they had effected on the island and the capital they had expended, they pointed out that the area of land granted to them under the existing lease was going to be very considerably reduced, and that the land leased to them in 1884 for quarrying purposes, etc., would also presumably now be resumed by Government. Having regard to all these circumstances, they submitted that the further lease should be granted for a period of at least 21 years. As to the provisions with regard to harbour control, under which the Secretary of State was at liberty to terminate the Company's control on giving three months' notice, they suggested that, having regard to the facts already urged by them, the administration of the harbour should remain with the Company for a definite period of at least 10 years before any such notice was given, and that then such notice should be twelve months instead of three. The Company accepted the position in regard to the safeguarding of the rights of Lloyd or any other agency as regards signalling or wireless telegraphy.

On the 13th October, the Secretary of State enquired whether the Government of India agreed to the term of 21 years proposed by the Company and also stated that he did not propose to accept the suggested alteration of the clause regarding the term of harbour control. The Government of Bombay were referred to, and adhered strongly to the opinion that the time-limit should be a short one, and that it should be limited to fourteen years; and His Majesty's Government were informed accordingly.

The further development of the matter belongs to a period not comprised in this summary.

In July 1905 the Imam addressed a letter to the King-Emperor, through the Political Resident at Aden, complaining of oppression and of the vicious disregard of the religious principles of the Islamic religion by which the Turkish officials of the Yemen had provoked hostility. He expressed doubt as to whether the representations addressed to the Sublime Porte had reached their destination and he prayed that the King-Emperor would communicate his views to the Sultan on his behalf in order to bring about a settlement of the present hostilities. The Imam



craved a similar position of independence in the Yemen to that enjoyed by his ancestors, but acknowledged the suzerainty of the Sultan of Turkey. His Majesty's Government decided that no answer should be sent to the communication at present, but that later, if it were considered advisable to give a reply, a verbal message might be sent to the effect that his letter had been received, but that the British Government were unable to interfere in questions of internal administration arising in Turkish territory.

The Resident at Aden, however, advised that omission to answer the letter addressed by the Imam to His Majesty the King-Emperor for intercession on his behalf with the Sultan of Turkey would most probably be construed as an insult; and the Bombay Government therefore suggested that it would probably be sufficient simply to say that the letter had been received, but that the British Government were unable to interfere in questions of internal administration arising in Turkish territory. It was added that, if it were decided to send a reply, the Political Agent at D'thala could procure a messenger to whom either a letter or a verbal communication could safely be entrusted. He would travel by a route which would avoid all risk of the communication falling into Turkish hands. The Secretary of State was informed that the Government of India concurred in the opinion of the Bombay Government, but considered that if a reply were sent it should be a verbal one. His Majesty's Government in reply stated that no reply should be sent pending settlement of the Turko-Egyptian frontier question.

The Political Resident reported (16th June 1906) the arrival at Aden of one Sharif Muhammad Ali of Khoulun, represented to be a Mukkadam of the Imam of Yemen. He brought a verbal message from the Imam expressing his friendship for, and good-will towards, the British Government, and soliciting assistance in the shape of Le Gras ammunition, which he wished consigned to the port of Maidi. The Sherif remarked that the Imam would continue to resist the Turks; that he was well supplied with rifles, but that he was short of ammunition. The Sherif, who hinted that he was short of funds for the return journey, was dismissed with a present of Rs. 50 and a verbal message to the effect that, since our relations with the Turks were friendly, we were unable to give the Imam any help against them.

The Political Resident at Aden reported, on 4th November 1906, that an emissary named Saiyid Mahmood bin Ali had been sent to him, through the Abdali Sultan, by the Imam of Yemen. At an interview which the Political Resident granted on the 2nd November 1906 to the emissary, the latter stated that he had come on behalf of the Imam to propose an alliance between him and the British Government and to ask for assistance in expelling the Turks from the Yemen. The Imam desired that this assistance should take the form of money and arms, and in return it appeared that he was willing to enter into an alliance of friendship with the British Government. The Saiyid stated that the Imam had already received overtures of friendship and alliance from the Governments of France, Germany, Italy, and Persia, but that he did not desire to enter into an alliance with any of these Powers, but only with the British Government. The Saiyid also stated in the course of the interview that the Imam was unwilling to accept any terms from the Turks, that he had recently been approached by a relation of the Sharif of Mecca and also by Ibn Rashid, the Emir of Nejd, but that the negotiations had come to nothing. He said that the Imam aimed at complete independence and that he was determined to continue the struggle for independence of Turkish rule. He had been pressed to put an end to the hostilities which had led to so much loss of human life, but he would not rest until the Turks had been expelled from the Yemen. The Resident informed the Saiyid that he would transmit the Imam's message to Government and that their reply would be communicated to him in due course.

On the 24th January 1907, the Secretary of State for India telegraphed that His Majesty's Government did not consider it necessary to send any reply to the Imam's overtures for an alliance with the British Government.

In April 1909 the Imam of Yemen addressed the Resident in general terms and also sent an emissary to Aden for an interview with the Resident.

At this interview the Imam's emissary attempted to enlist the sympathies of the British Government on behalf of the Imam in order to obtain arms and

ammunition for use against the Turks. The Resident assured him that it was impossible to help the Imam against a friendly Power. The emissary then asked the Resident for a written reply to the letter from the Imam stating that, if this were not done, the latter would feel deeply insulted. The Bombay Government agreed with the Resident that, owing to the appearance of bodies of the Imam's troops near Behan and the possibilities of revenge on our tribes if he were ignored, it would be politic to send the Imam a written reply in guarded terms; and this view being accepted by both the Indian and Home Governments, the Resident was authorised to reply to the effect that he was pleased to learn that relations between the Imam and the Turkish Government, with whom the British Government were connected by treaties of friendship, were improving; and that it was hoped that it would not be long before peace was firmly established between them.

On the 19th March 1906, the Government of Bombay reported from information received from the Resident at Aden that there appeared to be no doubt that dues were still being collected at Al Doka on behalf of the Turkish Mudir of Mufalis. They suggested that, as Al Doka was within the British side of the boundary line, it was desirable either that a formal representation should be made to the Porte by the Foreign Office regarding the violation of the frontier involved in the levy of these dues at Al Doka, or that the Resident in Aden should address the Mutassarif of Taiz on the matter.

The matter was reported to the Secretary of State; who in reply, asked for all the papers and the opinion of the Government of India on the question whether the dispute required the intervention of His Majesty's Government.

His Lordship was informed (October 11, 1906) that taxes, which were stated to be of the nature of transit dues, were being collected at Al Doka by Turkish employes in accordance with a practice which had obtained during the past 15 or 16 years, and that from the evidence recorded by Colonel Wahab in March 1904, during the progress of the Boundary Commission, it appeared that the Customs post had been established by some Turkish Arabs at Nobat Doka, above Shab, about the year 1885, after the withdrawal of the Sultan of Lahej from the Shab valley. In June 1904, Colonel Wahab reported that the Turkish Commissioners had agreed that the whole of the Shab valley, with its cultivation, should be included within Subaihi limits, and the map which accompanied Colonel Wahab's letter clearly indicated the position of Al Doka as on the British side of the boundary line.

The Government of India were of opinion, therefore, that there could be no doubt that the continued existence of the Customs post under Turkish auspices was an infringement of the terms of the Aden Boundary Settlement, and the infringement could hardly be considered as other than deliberate, since the claims of both parties to Al Doka were particularly discussed at the time of the survey of the border, and the decision which was arrived at was the result of most careful consideration by the Commissioners on both sides. This conclusion was confirmed by further reports which had been received from the Political Resident at Aden showing that the Turkish authorities, encouraged presumably by our omission to demand the withdrawal of the Al Doka post, had recently been taking active steps for the consolidation and extension of their influence in the Shab valley. Early in April, a party of Turkish and Arab soldiers appeared at Wadi Shab, announcing that they had come to collect the Customs dues. They were stated to have terrorised the inhabitants and to have done considerable damage to the cultivation. Shortly afterwards the Mutassarif of Taiz addressed a circular order to the Sheikh of the Shab valley, as well as to the neighbouring Sheikhs under Turkish influence, demanding, under pain of severe punishment, the immediate transmission of the dues of the Turkish Government. The Mutassarif had also announced his intention of visiting the Shab valley. In June 1906, the Mudir of Mufalis arrived in the Shab valley with an escort composed of Turkish troops and of Arabs from the neighbouring tribes on the Turkish side of the border. The Mudir demanded the payment of the Turkish dues and, in order to stimulate compliance, ordered the reconstruction of a ruined Customs post at a place within the southern limit of the



Shab valley. He also threatened to incite the neighbouring Turkish tribes to attack and plunder the people of Shab if they continued recalcitrant.

In the opinion of the Government of India the action taken by the local Turkish authorities constituted an open disregard of their obligations under the Boundary Settlement. They were of opinion that any failure on our part to insist upon the removal of the post at Al Doka, after the case had been decided in our favour, could only tend to shake the belief of the tribes in our intention or ability to exclude Turkish influence from the area which had been recognised formally as subject to the Protectorate of Great Britain. They therefore again recommended either that a formal representation should be made to the Porte regarding the violation of the frontier, or that the Resident at Aden should be instructed to address a protest on the subject to the Mutassarif of Taiz. The adoption of the latter alternative was advocated in the first place, as likely to lead to an early understanding between the local authorities with regard to the point at issue.

The Bombay Government subsequently forwarded a letter from the Shaabi Sheikh in which he stated that for a whole year he had been complaining of the aggressive action of the Turkish officials on the British side of the border at Wadi Shab without any benefit; and that, if the British Government was unable to help him, there was no use referring his grievances to others. He hoped he would be relieved from the responsibility of looking after the border, as he had suffered pecuniarily and had incurred the enmity of the Turkish officials.

On the 15th November 1906, Mr. Morley informed Sir E. Grey that he agreed with the Government of India that the maintenance of a post at Al Doka under Turkish control was an infringement of the Aden Boundary Settlement, and that the incidents reported indicated that the presence of authorised Agents of the Turkish Government on the British side of the border must lead step by step to an increasing measure of interference and friction, which, in the interests of both the contracting parties, it was desirable to stop without further delay. He was, therefore, of opinion that it was desirable in the interest of peace, and in order to prevent disturbances in the future, that all connection of the Turkish authorities with Al Doka and the Shaab valley should cease. Mr. Morley suggested that, if Sir E. Grey concurred in this view, His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople should be consulted on the subject, and authorised to make the necessary representations to the Porte direct, unless it was thought that they had better be made by the Resident at Aden to the Mutassarif of Taiz.

On the 20th November 1906, Sir E. Grey authorised Mr. Barclay to make the necessary representations to the Ottoman Government unless he considered it preferable that the Resident at Aden should deal with the matter.

On the 14th December 1906, Mr. G. Barclay forwarded to Sir E. Grey a Memorandum by Mr. Fitzmaurice pointing out that the collection of dues by the Turkish authorities appeared to have taken place actually at Nobat Absi, which was certainly in Turkish territory. Mr. Fitzmaurice considered, however, that the Turkish authorities were not justified in ordering the rebuilding of a post at Nobat-al-Mikrad which was on the British side of the boundary. In accordance with Mr. Fitzmaurice's suggestion, Mr. Barclay presented to the Sublime Porte a *pro memoria* requesting that immediate orders might be sent to the local authorities at Mufalis to refrain from further violation of the boundary agreement.

On the 27th December 1906, Mr. Barclay further informed Sir E. Grey that the Minister of the Interior had telegraphed to the Vali of Yemen, informing him of the complaint made by His Majesty's Government, and instructing him to see that the Customs authorities abstained from any action at variance with the decisions of the Aden Boundary Commission.

On the 6th November 1905, the Bombay Government submitted proposals for the development of a pearl fishery industry within the territorial waters of the Island of Perim. Captain Hancock, who was then Assistant Resident at Aden, reported that pearl shell existed in sufficient quantity and quality around the shores of the island to render the fishery, if properly managed a remunerative undertaking. The Naval Commander-in-Chief, on being asked whether he saw

any objection to the proposal, replied in the negative but advised that, as Perim was within the limits of the Mediterranean Command, the Chief of that station should be addressed. This was accordingly done and a reply was received that there appeared to be no objection to the proposal.

But before taking any action in the matter the Government of India thought it advisable to submit the scheme for the Secretary of State's approval, in view of the peculiar position of Perim, which was within a mile or two of Turkish territory on the one side, and only a few miles from French and Italian possessions on the other. The Government of India understood that there were no pearl banks on the Turkish side of the Straits, so that there would never be any question of infringement of Turkish rights. They therefore requested that they might be authorised to make the proposed Regulation under the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1870 (33 Vict. Cap. 3). On the 6th November 1908, the Secretary of State approved the draft notification for the regulation of the pearl fisheries at Perim.

On the 4th December 1908, the Secretary of State forwarded a copy of a letter from Lord Aldenham of the firm of Messrs. Antony Gibbs & Co., regarding a scheme contemplated by that firm for the investigation of guano deposits on certain islands in the Gulf of Aden and of a memorandum which had been privately communicated to His Lordship in reply to the effect that this was a matter in which the Government of India should be approached. In the event of any such proposals being laid before the Government of India, Viscount Morley desired to be consulted before a final decision was arrived at as to the grant of concessions, or as to affording facilities, to individuals or companies for negotiation with the local Arabs.

On the 13th December 1905, the Government of Bombay reported that Sultan Sir Ahmed Fadhli, K C S I., the Abdali Sultan of Lahej, had applied for the payment to him of his monthly stipend of 1,641 dollars for one year in advance to meet the marriage expenses of his second son and two nephews. The Resident and the Bombay Government recommended compliance with the request of the Sultan with whom, on account of the railway project, it was important to keep on good terms.

The Government of India, however, did not consider that the grounds upon which the Sultan asked for financial assistance justified an advance of a whole year's subsidy (Rs. 39,384), but agreed to an advance of Rs. 20,000 subject to the condition that the Sultan should undertake not to contract any other loans, pending adjustment of the present advance, without the sanction of the Government of India. The advance made was to be recouped by deducting one-half of the monthly stipend of Rs. 3,282 until the whole amount was paid off.

In regard to the detention and search of a pearl fishing dhow at Imran Bay in June 1905 the Government of Bombay raised the following two points:—

(a) whether there was any special agreement with the Porte, under Article XXII of the Brussels Convention, for stopping and searching a dhow flying the Turkish flag?

(b) whether there was any other authority for such action?

With regard to (a), the Government of India replied on the 27th February 1906 in the negative, but with regard to (b), the matter was more difficult.

It seemed indisputable that, from the standpoint of international law, the rights of Great Britain as the Protecting Power in the territorial waters of Imran Bay fully justified the action taken by H.M.S. *Perseus*; and this undoubtedly would be the attitude of Government in the event of representations being made by the Turkish Government.

It was true that Imran Bay, where the searching of the dhow took place, though within British protected waters, lay outside British India, and that the

provisions of the Indian Arms Act, 1878, did not, therefore, apply to the present case ; but, even in the absence of any special legal enactment providing for the exercise of such powers, there seemed no doubt that the detention and search were sustainable under the inalienable rights attached by the principles of international law to the status of a Protecting Power. It appeared, however, to the Government of India that there might be advantages in giving definite legal authority to the local officers with a view to regularising and defining the action that should be taken in dealing with such cases, and they considered that it was desirable to add the Indian Arms Act of 1878 to the list of enactments which it had been proposed should be applied to the Protectorate under the Foreign Jurisdiction Order in Council of 1902, subject to the introduction of suitable modifications in order to adapt the Act to local conditions. In applying the Act to the Protectorate waters, it would be necessary to direct particular consideration towards the question of legalising the custody of vessels seized in the waters of Aden proper, and to that of the place of trial for offences committed in the Protectorate waters. The Government of India saw no reason to anticipate any objection from the Aden Chiefs to the assumption of this position, since the claim of the former to control the arms trade in the neighbourhood of the Protectorate was well understood locally, being, indeed, expressly confirmed by the treaty with Lahej of 1881, which had not been cancelled, and which included the various Subaihi sub-tribes. The claim was also covered by the treaty of 1857 with the Akrabi, the tribe in whose territorial waters the present incident took place.

On the 23rd January 1906, the Bombay Government telegraphed that a postal

**Murder of a postal runner and robbery of the mail bags. Suspension of the Attifi stipend in consequence.**

runner conveying the mails had been shot near Sheikh Othman, and that the mails had been robbed. A further telegram was received on the same day reporting an attack on the Commissariat enclosure at Nobat Dakim.

The Resident subsequently reported that the postal runner was at the time conveying the mails from D'thala to Aden, that the attack was delivered near Sheikh Othman within British limits, and that the assailants belonged to the Attifi, Yusufi, and Sujaili—sub-tribes of the Subaihis. He accordingly wrote to the Sheikhs concerned and demanded the return of the mail bags and the surrender of the offenders ; and he informed the Bombay Government that the stipend of the Attifi and Yusufi Sheikhs would be withheld, and suggested that opportunity should be taken of the incident to send a punitive force into the Subaihi country.

In 1908, on the recommendation of the Resident, the Government of India sanctioned the payment of Rs. 400 to the relatives of the postal runner, the amount to be met from the arrears of the Attifi stipend, which the Resident had at once withheld on hearing of the outrage.

On the 17th March 1908, the Bombay Government submitted a proposal made by the Resident at Aden to the effect that the stipend of the Attifi tribe of the Subaihis, which had been withheld since February 1906, should, in future, be paid to the representative of the Turan section of the tribe. The Political Resident also asked for permission to inform the Turan Chief that, should he be able to regain such influence over the Awaidtha section of the tribe as would result in the surrender of the offenders in the postal robbery case, his stipend would be enhanced. The Government of India replied that they understood the Resident's first proposal to have been made partly in order to better secure life and property on the Attifi coast from Sheikh Saeed to Khor Umeira, and partly because he considered that the Turan section were not concerned in the postal robbery which led to the stoppage of the tribe's stipend. The Turan section should apparently be regarded as representing one-third of the Attifi tribe, since in the past they had been in receipt, under a private arrangement, of one-third of the stipend payable by the British Government. If, therefore, the Resident's proposals were adopted, it might possibly have the result of attaching to us only the weaker portion of the tribe, while alienating the stronger portion. Again, if the whole of the stipend were once granted to this section, there would be nothing left to pay to the Awaidtha section, in the event of their making submission ; and as soon as they realised this, they would probably assume an attitude of open

hostility to the Turan section. The Resident's second suggestion was opposed to the instructions of the Secretary of State regarding interference in the internal administration of the tribes and, therefore, could not be sanctioned. For the foregoing reasons, and on the merits of the case as presented, the Government of India preferred to adhere in this instance to the broad principle that in tribal matters subdivision of responsibility should be avoided. The Political Resident was, therefore, to continue to withhold the whole stipend until past offences, including the postal robbery, had been settled up in some way. It was understood that the withholding of the subsidy would not be likely to lead to serious disturbances necessitating further measures.

On the 27th October 1907, the Resident at Aden reported that Sheikh Saeed-ba-Ali, the Attifi, had proceeded to Taiz with a view to enlisting Turkish sympathy and assistance in his cause, if possible, and that he was said to be anxious to transfer his allegiance and possessions to the Ottoman Government.

The Secretary of State telegraphed on the 13th March 1906, that the Italian Government had reported their failure to secure a sufficient number of recruits for their service on the Benadir coast, although there was no scarcity of Arabs suitable for the purpose in the neighbourhood of Aden. They asked that the British authorities might be instructed to second or at any rate not to hinder the action of their recruiting agents.

The Secretary of State called for a report as to what had been done in the matter and the Government of India replied on the 16th April that the local British officials would place no obstacle in the way of the Italian recruiting agents, but that the Sultan of Shehr and Mokalla, who derived considerable profit from the trade which passed between his port and Mokalla and the Mijjertain and Benadir coasts, was not unnaturally averse to any action in the matter, which might be construed into co-operation with the Italians in endeavouring to coerce the inhabitants of the coast district concerned.

On the 14th October 1906, the Resident at Aden reported that a native dhow owned by an Italian subject residing at Assab, had gone ashore in the vicinity of Kao, about half-way between Khor Umeira and Imran, and had been pillaged by the Barhemi tribe of Subaihis. The Resident at once wrote to the Barhemi Sheikh, and demanded Rs. 2,200 as redress for the offence. He also requested the Sheikh to have the dhow refloated and sent into Aden at once.

H. M. S. *Proserpine* proceeded to Ras Kao on the 9th November and her commander reported on 15th November that the dhow had become a total wreck, and that the coast villages had been abandoned by the inhabitants who went inland when the *Proserpine* arrived, fearing punishment for looting the dhow.

The Sheikh, however, adopted a recalcitrant attitude, and refused to pay the sum demanded. The Government of India accordingly agreed that the Sheikh's stipend of Rs. 600 a year might be withheld pending compliance on his part, and on the understanding that such action would not be likely to result in disturbances necessitating the despatch of a punitive expedition.

Subsequently, compensation was paid to the owner of the dhow; and the Acting Consul for Italy at Aden intimated his acceptance of the amount.

In reporting the foregoing case of the stranding and looting of an Italian dhow off the Barhemi coast, the Resident mentioned that the Barhemi Sheikh was negotiating the sale of a portion of his territory to the Abdali Sultan in return for general protection and assistance. When asked about the matter the Abdali Sultan said that no agreement had been come to pending further discussion with the Barhemi Sheikh and the further consideration of the benefits which he (the Abdali) was likely to derive from the proposed purchase.

In the summer of 1909, the Resident reported that a strip of Barhemi territory, about 225 square miles in extent, along the coast to the west of Aden had been pur-

chased by the Abdali Sultan for 1,700 dollars and that he had informed both the Chiefs that pending the approval of Government the transaction was invalid in view of Article III of the Barhemi Protectorate Treaty of 1889. The Abdali Sultan stated that he omitted to consult the Resident through an oversight, and that his reason for the purchase was the inability of the Barhemi Sheikh to suppress disorder.

The Resident recommended the purchase for the approval of Government, but the Bombay Government asked him first to consider and report on the advisability of—

- (a) obtaining the consent of the Abdali Sultan to the transfer to himself of the terms of the Barhemi Treaty of 1889;
- (b) securing his assent to suitable conditions relating to the arms traffic; and
- (c) securing a promise that he will give all facilities in connection with the Aden water-supply scheme.

And with regard to (b) the Resident was asked, if he considered any conditions should be imposed on the Abdali Sultan for the regulation of the arms traffic on the coast of the Barhemi territory purchased by him, to submit his recommendations as to what those conditions should be.

In October 1909 the Abdali Sultan informed the Resident that he was willing to apply the terms of the Barhemi treaty to his new purchase, but objected to his own treaties being made applicable to the new territory; and in the following month it was reported that the Abdali Sultan, although now willing to apply the Barhemi treaty to the land recently purchased by him from the Barhemi Sheikh, objected to be held responsible for any wrecks on the coast, and also claimed one-third share of any wreck or part of a wreck, and a half share of any goods salvaged from wrecked vessels.

In May 1910 the Bombay Government reported that, on a further consideration of the matter, they considered it would be better to abandon the proposal to impose conditions on the Abdali Sultan regarding the arms traffic in connection with the purchase of a portion of the Barhemi territory. They therefore proposed to inform the Abdali Sultan that Government would be unable to recognise the purchase of Barhemi territory, unless he consented to the transfer to himself of the terms of the Barhemi Treaty of 1889 unconditionally; but that they would be willing to discuss with him thereafter the conclusion of a Salvage Agreement, which the Sultan desired should be a condition of the transfer. The Government of India approved of the terms of the communication.

On the 11th December 1906, the Secretary of State intimated that it had been represented by the War Office that the retention of the British battalion at Aden was disadvantageous from the point of view of training and the comfort of the troops, and of Army organisation, and that a very great reduction of the fixed armament was recommended. It was understood that the Admiralty did not consider Aden liable to serious attack, and that under present considerations only a small proportion of the existing moveable armament was necessary. The War Office therefore proposed to reduce one company of Royal Garrison Artillery, the detachment of Sub-marine Miners, the whole of the British battalion and one Native battalion. The Secretary of State asked for the views of the Government of India on this proposed obligatory garrison, and also on the strength of the force needed for the Hinterland in view of the policy laid down by His Majesty's Government, the latter force being considered as separate from the Aden Garrison.

On the 27th December 1906, the Government of India replied agreeing that the training, comfort and health of the British troops at Aden were detrimentally affected, but at the same time they stated that, in their opinion, the weakness of the garrison might invite attack before, or simultaneously with, a declaration of war, if no British infantry were maintained at such an important strategic coaling station. It was also pointed out that the Colonial Defence Committee had recognised the possibility of an attack on Aden being attempted as a

surprise, and having regard to the requirements of the fortress itself and of the Hinterland, where at any time trouble might arise requiring the use of British troops, the Government of India were not prepared, as at present advised, to recommend that the risk involved by the removal of the British infantry should be accepted. They also stated that an opinion could not be expressed with regard to the proposed reduction in the Garrison Artillery and Sub-marine Miners until the report of General Owen's Committee had been received and considered, and that a further communication would be sent regarding the retention of the 2nd Native Infantry Battalion.

On the 29th January 1907, the Resident at Aden reported that Sultan Kasim-bin-Ahmed, Chief of the Audali tribe, who

**Desire of the Audali Chief to enter into treaty relations with the British Government.**

was a ruler of some importance in the Dathina district occupying a commanding position on the routes in that district, had expressed a desire to enter into a treaty with the British Government. He was satisfied that the Chief was independent of either the Aulaki, Behan or Fadthli control, and was of opinion that as the Chief's uncle, Abdulla-bin-Kashim, was pressing the Chief to place himself under Turkish protection, timely sanction should be accorded to the conclusion of the usual form of Protectorate Treaty with this Chief, and the grant of a stipend of 480 dollars a year. The Bombay Government concurred in the recommendation. In reply, the Government of India stated that the action proposed would not seem to be desirable unless it could be shown that the safety of the trade routes, referred to by the Resident as passing through the Chief's territories, was a matter of serious importance to Aden, or that the danger of Turkish intervention was at all serious, which seemed improbable in view of the fact that the Yaffai and Aulaki tribes, which separated the Awadil from territory that could be regarded as in any sense Turkish, had already concluded Protectorate treaties with the British Government.

On the 2nd August 1907, the Government of Bombay replied that, as a matter of general policy, they would have strongly supported the proposed treaty with the Audali Chief, but that, in view of the policy laid down by His Majesty's Secretary of State for India in his despatch, dated the 4th May 1906, they were doubtful whether sufficiently strong reasons could be advanced for pressing the proposals. The Government of India concurred in this opinion.

On the 27th February 1907, the Political Resident at Aden reported that he

**Piracy on the Native dhow *Johara* between Mokha and Hodeida.**

had received a complaint from four Aden merchants that a native dhow named *Johara*, which was carrying about Rs. 25,000 worth of cargo had been wrecked and looted between Mokha and Hodeida. It was stated that the dhow and the goods belonged to the merchants, one of whom was a British-born subject, and the other three subjects of His Highness the Sultan of Shehr and Mokalla and British-protected persons. The Resident reported that he had addressed His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Hodeida on the subject, and had asked him to address the Turkish authorities at Hodeida on behalf of the merchant.

On the 28th June 1907, Sir N. O'Connor wrote to Sir E. Grey that the facts of the case had been brought to his notice by the Vice-Consul at Hodeida, who had requested him to support his demands to the Vali of the Yemen for the institution of a mixed commission of enquiry and for the arrest and punishment of the raiders. Sir N. O'Connor had accordingly caused the matter to be brought to the knowledge of the Porte, who instructed the Vali to form a commission of enquiry and to report the circumstances of the piracy. On the 22nd June 1908, Mr. Barclay reported to Sir E. Grey that the Mixed Commission, which had been appointed to enquire into the *Johara* piracy case, had awarded sums on the different counts amounting in all to £1,025 as damages, and that the Vice-Consul at Hodeida considered the sum satisfactory. It was reported that the Vali had then communicated with the Porte, that he had stated that the flag of the *Johara* was not British, but a red one without any distinctive mark, and that the Vice-Consul at Hodeida had admitted that her owner as well as some of the owners of the cargo were natives of Hadramaut and consequently not entitled to British protection. It was added that, after some delay, His Majesty's Embassy had induced the "Conseillers Légistes" at the Porte, to whom the whole question had been referred, to report that instructions might



be sent to pay direct to the owners of the *Johara* and her cargo the amounts awarded by the Hodeida Commission. The Grand Vizier instructed the Vali of the Yemen accordingly, and Mr. Barclay requested the Vice-Consul at Hodeida to press the Vali to pay the £1,025 awarded and to refer to him should any undue delay occur.

On the 24th July, Sir E. Grey informed Mr. Barclay that, of the four Aden merchants interested in the dhow, three, including the owner of the vessel, were subjects of Shehr and Mokalla, and that the fourth was a British-born subject. He instructed Mr. Barclay to take an opportunity, after the compensation had been paid, to emphasise to the Ottoman Government the fact that those of the Aden merchants who were the subjects of the Sultan of Shehr and Mokalla were British-protected persons.

On the 26th March 1908, the Secretary of State telegraphed that Mr. G. W. Bury, late Extra Assistant Resident, Aden, wished to explore the southern edge of the Great Red Desert in South-East Arabia on behalf of the Royal Geographical Society. His plan was to land at Maskat, follow the Oman-Mecca road to longitude 55°, then strike south-west as near as the routes and wells would permit, coming out at one of the Aden Gulf ports, from whence he would proceed by dhow to Aden and then home. The Secretary of State pointed out that, although Mr. Bury would nominally travel at his own risk and on his own responsibility, it was of course certain that the British Government would be involved if he got into trouble.

The Resident at Aden was of opinion that it would be politically undesirable to allow Mr. Bury to visit any of the British-protected States, while the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and the Political Agent, Maskat, considered that the scheme should be altogether discountenanced. Mr. Bury could not start at all from Maskat unless active pressure were put upon His Highness the Sultan; further, the latter could in no case provide for the former's safety, so that to countenance the journey would be to involve the British Government in certain trouble on the traveller's account. Moreover, even if it were a practical possibility, the journey would serve no useful purpose politically.

The Secretary of State was informed, on the 10th April 1908, that the Government of India concurred in the views of the local officers.

On the 30th April, the Secretary of State informed Mr. Bury that he regretted that permission could not be given him to undertake the exploration in South-East Arabia, as a journey such as he contemplated would involve undue risks.

On the 16th September, the Secretary of State telegraphed that Mr. Bury contemplated a scientific journey, on behalf of the British Museum, with the sanction of the Aden authorities. He would land east of Fadthli, proceed to Behan *via* the Lower and Upper Aulaki, and thence explore the western and southern confines of the Red Desert. He enquired, therefore, why the Resident had withdrawn his previous objections and what were his reasons for modifying his former refusal.

On enquiry, it appeared that the Resident had not withdrawn his objection to Mr. Bury entering the Aden Protectorate. Mr. Bury proposed to enter the desert *via* Maskat and to reach the sea by a line to the east of Shukra. From the Resident's point of view there would be no objection to this, provided it was otherwise desirable in the interests of science. The Government of India informed the Secretary of State that they adhered to the opinion previously expressed.

On the 3rd February 1909, the Secretary of State telegraphed that he had been informed that Mr. Bury had left England for the coast of South Arabia, in company with a young Englishman named Gethin, who was helping to finance the expedition. As Mr. Bury proposed to land at some point east of the Aden Protectorate, and thence to make his way northwards into the interior of Arabia, the Secretary of State considered that the local rulers along the coast should be informed that the British authorities disapproved of the tour, and that they had given no sanction to it.

On the 15th February the Government of India informed Lord Morley that, after consultation with the Government of Bombay and the Resident at Aden, they

were of opinion that the probable effect of such a message to the local Chiefs would be to endanger the property and lives of Messrs. Bury and Gethin. As the Resident thought that, with the assistance of Captain Cordeaux, Commissioner of Berbera, he could probably put effective transport difficulties in Mr. Bury's way, without endangering his safety, the Government of India proposed to authorise the Resident to act accordingly. This proposal was approved by His Majesty's Government, and the Bombay Government were requested, on the 16th February, to issue the necessary instructions to the Resident.

The Resident subsequently reported that Mr. G. W. Bury and his companion, Mr. Gethin, arrived at Aden on the 1st May by dhow from Irka. They appeared to have landed at Irka and proceeded inland as far as seven miles from Upper Haura when a sum of 500 dollars was demanded from them by the Sultan of Haura. As they were unable to pay, they were obliged to return to Irka; and they ultimately abandoned their proposed expedition.

Early in 1908 a feud arose between the Fadthli and the Upper Yaffai, owing to the murder of two Sultans of the latter tribe by some subjects of the former. The incident threatened to give rise to trouble owing to the inability of the Fadthli Sultan to effect the capture of the murderers. The Fadthli Sultan appealed to Government through the Resident to assist him with troops and money in the event of the Yaffais attacking him. But the Resident replied that he would not interfere as the Sultan had brought the trouble on himself by his failure to punish the murderers. Subsequently both the Fadthli and the Yaffai appealed for the Resident's intervention.

As in the Resident's opinion the British Government would eventually be obliged to intervene, he proposed, with the approval of Government, to try and assist in a settlement. The Bombay Government were prepared to approve of these proposals, provided that they would in no way commit the British Government to give support to either party, or, should there be any subsequent infringement of its terms, to intervene in support of any settlement that might be concluded. The Government of India reported the case to the Secretary of State for India on the 18th August, and proposed, with his concurrence, to approve of the instructions to the Resident at Aden proposed by the Bombay Government.

On the 23rd August, the Secretary of State telegraphed that the intervention of the Abdali or other tribe was clearly not desirable, and though the facts were not clear, they seemed to show that the Fadthli subjects were to blame, while, moreover, they would be unable to resist a Yaffai attack. The amicable intervention of the Resident as arbitrator might settle matters, but if the Fadthli Sultan was summoned to Aden and found to be in the wrong, he might be induced to avoid hostilities and give satisfaction to the Yaffais. This measure was to be tried, and the result reported to His Majesty's Government. The Resident accordingly invited the Sultan of Lahej, the Fadthli Sultan, and a number of leading Sheikhs of the Upper Yaffai to visit him in order, if possible, to effect a peaceful settlement of the affair; and eventually in October he reported that he had got the Fadthli Sultan to agree to pay 2,000 dollars to the Yaffai Sheikhs as compensation. As the Yaffais were getting impatient, the Resident paid the sum for the Sultan as an advance of stipend; and the Government of India, on the 20th January 1909, approved the Resident's proceedings.

Towards the end of 1908, it was reported that the British cemetery at D'thala had been desecrated. There was no evidence that the outrage was actually committed with the cognizance of the Amir, but the Government of India were of opinion that it was impossible to absolve him from responsibility for the occurrence or to permit his conduct in trying to shield the offenders to go unchallenged, without the risk of encouraging the Chiefs in the Hinterland in the belief that their Treaty obligations could be ignored with impunity whenever it suited their convenience to do so. They therefore approved, in February 1909, a proposal made by the Resident that the stipend of 100 dollars a month, which the Amir received under the 1904 Treaty in consideration of maintaining order in his territories, should be suspended for a period of six months, and



that resumption of payment should be then contingent on the Resident being fully satisfied that the Amir had done his utmost to trace and punish the offenders, and had also repaired the graves and restored the cemetery as far as possible to its original condition.

The Amir protested against the stoppage of his stipend; and in January 1910, he reported that the cemetery had been put in order again, and the missing crosses restored. He cited Sheikh Ali Mohsin Askar of the Upper Yaffai as witness to this, but the latter had already reported that all the crosses were missing. In March on the recommendation of the Resident, who said that he was satisfied that the Amir had done as much as he could to restore the cemetery, the Government of India sanctioned the payment of the portion of the Amir's stipend, which had been suspended, with effect from the 1st March 1909, being resumed with effect from the 1st March 1910.

On the 13th July 1907, the Government of Bombay submitted a request from Sultan Ghalib bin Awadth of Mokalla for permission to purchase the port of Balahaf from the Wahidi shareholders.

**Desire of the Sultan of Shehr and Mokalla to purchase the port of Balahaf.** They suggested that, in the event of the Sultan of Mokalla being able to acquire possession of the port in a friendly and peaceable way, it would be in the interests of all the parties concerned to permit him to do so. It was also reported that Sultan Mohsin, who was recognised as the titular head of the Balahaf section of the Wahidi, had been quarrelling with his cousin, Saleh-bin-Abdullah, and had withheld payment of whatever share in the revenues of the Balahaf port the latter was entitled to. Saleh-bin-Abdullah thereupon built a fort on the land approaches to Balahaf, and had practically closed the port, and Sultan Saleh-bin-Ahmed, who was the head of the other, or Bir Ali, section of the Wahidi, had taken the side of Saleh-bin-Abdullah, and made an agreement with the latter by which he secured one-eighth share in Balahaf and its dependencies, and also some right to exercise administrative interference. The Resident informed Sultan Saleh-bin-Ahmed that the above-mentioned agreement could not be sanctioned, and warned him against further intervention in Balahaf affairs.

The Government of India replied, on the 19th September, that as the Bir Ali Sheikh, Saleh-bin-Ahmed, had been warned not to interfere in Balahaf, the opposition of Saleh-bin-Abdullah to Sultan Mohsin might be expected to collapse, and in that case further action as regards a transfer of the port, to which the Wahidis were formerly reported to be most averse, might not be necessary. Moreover, in view of the fact that His Majesty's Government were anxious that as little interference as possible should be exercised in the affairs of the Hinterland, and as the policy of allowing the larger Chiefs to absorb their smaller neighbours had not been accepted by the Government of India or by His Majesty's Government, it seemed desirable, before taking action on the request of the Sultan of Shehr and Mokalla, to wait and see whether Sultan Mohsin would be able to recover and properly exercise his authority. If, however, all the Wahidis concerned applied for permission to sell the port of Balahaf, the matter would be on a different footing.

On the 8th February 1908, the Resident at Aden reported that the Kaiti Sultan had made an agreement with **Steamer service between Aden and Mokalla.** Messrs. Cowasjee, Dinshaw and Brothers of Aden, by which that firm undertook to run a bi-monthly service of steamers between Aden and Mokalla, in return for a subsidy of Rs. 300 per mensem and guarantee that no steamer belonging to any other owner should be permitted to take either cargo or passengers from Mokalla or Shehr to Aden.

In November 1905 the Government of Bombay reported that Sultan Mohsin-bin-Saleh of the Wahidi tribe of Balahaf **Balahaf affairs. The Balahaf treaty.** had signed the Protectorate treaty concluded between him and the British Government.

On the 15th December 1905, the Government of Bombay forwarded, in triplicate, for ratification by the Government of India, the treaty negotiated with

Sultan Mohsin-bin-Saleh of the Wahidi tribe of Balahaf. The treaty was ratified by the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council on the 24th April 1906. The Government of Bombay were informed on 3rd May 1906 that a clause should be inserted in future treaties expressly stating that the English version was to be regarded as the authoritative version.

In November 1905, the Marquess of Lansdowne wrote to the Italian Ambassador stating that he had received a report from the Senior Naval Officer on the Aden Division of the East Indies Stations, from which it appeared that canoes frequently left Obokh for Kadduha, south of Mokha, with from 80 to 100 rifles in each, and that, although no arms could officially leave Jibouti, there was said never to be any difficulty in obtaining a clearance from Obokh by vessels engaged in this trade. Captain Eustace added that, owing to the disarmament of the Arabs in Yemen by the Turks, the former were now endeavouring to rearm themselves and found Kadduha a very suitable place, as the Turkish troops did not stop at Mokha and never visited Kadduha. The Secretary of State telegraphed to the Resident at Aden and asked him to report, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, all the information available regarding the arms traffic, direct or indirect, from French territory, with special reference to its effect upon British Somaliland. The Resident's report was sent on the 17th January 1906; and in March the Government of India's views on this report were invited by the Secretary of State.

The Government of India telegraphed in reply, on the 22nd June, that, in the event of the conclusion of a satisfactory international agreement on the subject, they had contemplated suggesting that subsidiary measures should be taken in the direction of the institution of (1) a coast patrol, and (2) the occupation of Ras-al-Arah, and possibly other points on the coast, as measures of this kind would be necessary if a long-standing evil were to be eradicated. But, in view of the policy laid down in Mr. Morley's despatch of the 4th May 1906 (already noticed in the beginning of this summary) the Government of India felt bound to suspend further action, pending a settlement of the general question, as its decision might seriously affect the possibility of any action on their part except at Aden itself, where such action was not required. If immediate action were necessary, however, it should be restricted to a further reference to the French authorities as proposed both in regard to Jibouti and Maskat, as the traffic at the latter place would become an even more serious difficulty than it was at present, in the event of its being stopped at Jibouti.

Mr. Morley informed the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that he agreed, in the absence of a satisfactory international agreement, that it would be useless to take measures of the kind indicated in the Government of India's telegram of 22nd June 1906 for the supervision of the arms traffic. If, however, an arrangement could be arrived at with the French Government, as to the traffic at Jibouti, he was prepared to consider what preventive measures might be taken by the British authorities on the coast of the Aden Protectorate, similar to those adopted by other Powers who were parties to the international agreement. The nature of these measures required careful scrutiny, in order, as far as possible, to avoid difficulties with the local tribes, but they would not necessarily be inconsistent with the principles of the policy laid down in the despatch of the 4th May to the Government of India.

From reports received from the Resident at Aden in March, May and July 1907, it appeared that there was a brisk illicit traffic in arms and ammunition between Jibouti and the various ports of the Protectorate. The Barhemi, Attifi and Zaranik tribes were mentioned as actively engaged in the trade and Al Jah, Mutaina near Mokha, Al Gurgi and Ramadah as the places especially favoured by the latter. The tribes receive a concession of 1 dollar per rifle and 10 per cent. of the ammunition landed from Jibouti. Ras-al-Arah was the most convenient port for the traffic between Aden and Perim. The Abdali supplies, however, were generally landed at Khor Umeira and occasionally, when, for

some reason either of these ports were considered risky, consignments were landed at Imran or Al Mujahar.

In the Somaliland Intelligence Report, No. 13 of July 1907, it was reported that a certain amount of arms and ammunition filtered through from Jibouti to the Rer Haroun and Rer Ali, apparently passing through *viâ* or near Jigjiga, thence on southwards and eastwards through the Ogaden.

On the 6th September 1907, the Secretary of State requested the Government of India to take such steps as might be practicable to ensure that a more rigorous and constant vigilance should be observed by the British authorities at Shehr and Mokalla, or other places on the Arabian Coast in the neighbourhood of Aden, in regard to the arms traffic, and to report to him any instructions that might be issued. On the 5th October the Resident at Aden reported that he had ascertained from a secret agent whom he had sent to Mokalla, that the Governor exercised a fairly effective control over the arms traffic, and allowed no secret importations at Mokalla. The Resident also requested the Fadthli Sultan to check the illicit arms traffic on his coast and to confiscate and send in any arms that might be discovered passing through his ports. The Sultan promised to comply.

On the 12th October 1907, the Resident at Aden intimated that a report had been received from Perim to the effect that 100 cases of French ammunition had been landed at Ras-al-Arah for the Juledi Sheikh. The dhow concerned was said to have flown French colours, and to have been manned by a Dhankali crew.

On the 2nd January 1908, the Government of India addressed the Secretary of State in regard to the arms traffic on the Arabian Coast and in the neighbourhood, and pointed out that, in the opinion of the Resident at Aden, no measures would prove effective on the west coast, which failed to include the establishment of posts and patrols at the ports of Imran, Khor Umeira, and Ras-al-Arah. He recommended the conclusion of agreements with all the Chiefs of the east coast on the lines of those made by Colonel Kemball in the Persian Gulf in 1902, and considered that it would be necessary also to supply a reasonable amount of arms to the Chiefs for their protection, and to give them a pecuniary interest in the suppression of the traffic. The Bombay Government proposed that, in lieu of the Resident's suggestions, the co-operation of the Sultan of Lahej, with a view to stopping the traffic, should be enlisted. The Government of India stated that they were unable to concur in this proposal, since they doubted the efficacy of the Sultan's assistance to secure the end in view. They were of opinion that every attempt to induce the adoption of more effective measures would probably be met by the Sultan with demands for an increased subsidy. He would represent that the lawlessness of the tribes required the maintenance of ever increasing guards and patrols, and in effect the British Government would be paying not merely for the suppression of the arms traffic, but also for the maintenance of the Sultan's authority. The question of the means by which they should exercise control over the Sultan might also become difficult. It was further pointed out that in their telegram, dated 22nd June 1906, the Government of India had stated that, in the event of the conclusion of a satisfactory international agreement, they intended to suggest that subsidiary measures to stop the arms traffic should be taken by instituting a coast patrol and by occupying Ras-al-Arah and possibly other points on the coast. The Government of India had learnt that it was proposed to draw up local regulations on the lines of the Somaliland Firearms Regulation, and the Aden Regulation 3 of 1902, to be signed by the three parties as a corollary to the international agreement on the subject of the arms traffic concluded on 13th December 1906 between England, France and Italy. They, therefore, asked to be informed whether such Regulations were being framed, and if so, whether they should submit proposals for the subsidiary measures mentioned in their telegram of 22nd June 1906. It was added that the Government of India had no strong recommendations to make from the point of view of Indian interests, on the subject of repressive measures, since the tribesmen of the Aden Hinterland were for the most part fully armed already.

On the 20th December 1906, the Foreign Office forwarded to the Colonial Office copies of an Agreement, signed on the 13th December 1906, between France, Italy and Great Britain on the subject of the traffic in arms and ammunition on the Red Sea littoral. At the time of signing this Agreement, Sir E. Grey made a verbal reservation in the presence of the French and Italian Ambassadors to the effect that His Majesty's Government were of opinion that they were already fully entitled, quite independently of the provisions of that Article, to continue their present practice of visiting within their territorial waters in the Red Sea, all vessels of whatever description or nationality in regard to which they might desire to exercise that formality.

Sir E. Grey went on to say that His Majesty's Government on the other hand equally recognised that a like right (also independently of Article 8 in question) in regard to vessels flying the British flag, belonged to the French and Italian authorities within their respective territorial waters.

On the 24th May 1908, the Resident reported that, having received information that an unusually large consignment of arms and ammunition was about to be shipped from Jibouti to the Arabian coast in the neighbourhood of Ras-al-Arah, he had despatched, with the consent of the Admiralty, which he obtained direct, H.M.S. *Pandoro* with R.I.M.S. *Dalhousie*, and two Italian armed dhows to endeavour to intercept it. Major Merewether accompanied as Political Officer. In spite of every precaution having been taken, no capture of arms was however effected. During the cruise an Arab belonging to the crew of a dhow, which refused to heave to for search, was wounded. The man was placed in hospital at Aden. Information was obtained by the expedition which was expected to prove of great value in the future. It appeared that two dhows laden with arms and ammunition had effected a landing at or near Ras-al-Arah three days before the expedition started, and, had a man-of-war been on the Aden station, as the Resident had suggested on more than one occasion, she could have gone out immediately on receipt of the first information and the capture of the dhows would probably have resulted.

On the 13th October, the Marquis di San Guiliano, the Italian Ambassador, addressed a note to Sir E. Grey, pointing out that Article 6 of the Tripartite Agreement of the 13th December 1906, relative to the arms traffic in the Red Sea stipulated that the three contracting Governments should communicate to one another every year a list of the dhows authorized to carry their respective flags. It now happened that, as the matricular register was necessarily modified every day, the list of dhows drawn up on January 1st ceased to be accurate almost at once. This arose not only from new registrations, wrecks, breaking up of vessels and the continual changes in the names of the dhows, but also from the fact that the certificates of nationality, being issued for one year only, tended towards daily expirations which were seldom followed immediately by the renewal of the same certificates. It therefore seemed advisable that the three Governments should come to an agreement together as to the line to be followed in cases, when, on visiting dhows, it was found that discrepancies existed between the documents on board and the lists of dhows exchanged by the Governments at the beginning of the year. An arrangement, which appeared in some degree to meet the case, would be for the three Governments, instead of communicating to one another the lists which for the aforesaid reasons could only be regarded as superfluous, to communicate instead to one another the forms of the certificates of nationality of their respective dhows and the accessory documents, provided with all the proofs of authenticity which had to appear on them.

After consultation with the Government of Bombay and the Resident at Aden, the Government of India informed His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, on the 23rd January 1909, that the Italian proposal might be adopted with advantage.

The Italian Government subsequently communicated to His Majesty's Government specimens of the identification forms issued to Italian dhows, and asked for copies of corresponding British documents. Under instructions from His Majesty's Government, the Resident at Aden was requested on the

25th March 1909 to communicate with the Governor of the British East African Protectorate and His Majesty's Agent and Consul-General, Zanzibar, as to the British forms.

On the 3rd May 1910, the Secretary of State telegraphed that the Governor of East African Protectorate and the British Agent at Zanzibar were agreed as to the forms of dhow certificates, but that an arrangement had not yet been arrived at with Aden; he also communicated a suggestion made by the Governor of the East Africa Protectorate not to include Aden in the arrangement. The Government of India recommended that Aden should be included in the arrangement, and agreed to adopt the Zanzibar form of authority to carry the British ensign, but they thought that no change was necessary in the other Aden forms.

The matter was not advanced any further towards a settlement during the period under review. Meanwhile, at an interview early in October 1909, Sir F. Bertie spoke to M. Pichon on the attitude of the French Government in respect of the arms traffic question. He told him that arms were being poured into Afghanistan from Jibouti and other places through Maskat and the Persian Gulf, to the danger of peace on the Indian frontier. Owing to the opposition of the French delegates at the conference, no arrangement had been come to for controlling the traffic, but the French Government could not continue to refuse to agree to the precautions which the other Powers were ready to adopt against the indiscriminate supply of arms to wild tribes. It would be difficult to assure Parliament that the conduct of France had been satisfactory. M. Pichon replied that the settlement of the question depended on His Majesty's Government. If they gave proper compensation for the measures which they wished France to adopt, the matter could be arranged. Negotiations for the purpose had been carried on, but had not been successful, because His Majesty's Government had been unwilling to agree to the compensation required for the surrender by France of an existing right. Sir F. Bertie replied that he could not see that any compensation would be due to France for doing what the other Powers were willing to do. M. Pichon laid stress on the necessity for satisfying the French Parliament that a proper *quid pro quo* had been obtained for the surrender of a right commercially important, and insisted that compensation in some form or other must be made. He promised, however, to examine the question thoroughly with every desire to meet the wishes of His Majesty's Government, so far as he could consistently with a due regard for French interests.

Sir E. Grey subsequently requested Sir F. Bertie to take an opportunity of reminding M. Pichon that the Arms Conference would reassemble on the 3rd December; and he also pointed out that the fulfilment, by a friendly Power, with special engagements towards England, of a moral obligation recognised and accepted as such by other Powers, could hardly be regarded as presenting a basis for a claim to compensation.

The subject of the arms traffic in the Persian Gulf region has been dealt with separately in the Persian Summary, Chapter 2.

On the 18th January 1908, the Secretary of State asked the Government of Bombay to furnish any information

**Utilisation of Aden by the Somaliland Mulla as a base for working the supply of arms and ammunition for his raids.**

that the Resident at Aden might be able to supply with reference to a statement made by Captain Eustace, Commanding H. M. S. *Fox*, to the effect that the Somali Mulla utilised Aden as a base, from which his Minister, Deria Ralla, could work the supply of arms and ammunition for his raids. On the 23rd March, the Government of Bombay forwarded to the Secretary of State a report from the Resident at Aden, stating that, whilst it was quite possible that Aden was a convenient centre for the business transactions of the Mulla's agents, he had no actual information to the effect that Deria Ralla had utilised it for the purpose mentioned. The Resident remarked that the police examination, to which native vessels were subjected on entering the Port of Aden, was probably an effective deterrent to any actual passage of arms and ammunition through Aden, and that the transport of arms was almost, if not entirely,

restricted to the limits of the Protectorate. Arms and ammunition continued to enter the Protectorate on the littoral lying to the west of Aden, and it was probable that a proportion of these found their way across country to Eastern Ports and thence down to Somaliland, some direct traffic might also exist to Eastern Ports from both Sur and Jibouti.

On the 13th February 1908, His Britannic Majesty's Commissioner, Somaliland Protectorate, addressed the Political Resident, Aden, and requested his co-operation, in the absence of a ship of war on the Aden station, in temporarily prohibiting Warsangli dhows from trading with, or obtaining supplies from, Aden or any other port in the Aden Protectorate, until the Warsangli Sultan had furnished a satisfactory explanation for certain acts of violence and aggression towards the crew of one of the Somaliland Protectorate armed dhows at Las Khorae. He further requested that any Warsangli dhows then in Aden might be subjected to a rigorous search before port clearance papers were granted to them, as there was reason to believe that these dhows originally visited Aden with the object of procuring arms and ammunition.

The Resident at Aden issued orders accordingly, and His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief also made arrangements for the despatch of H. M. S. *Philcmel* to Aden from the Mediterranean.

On the 2nd May, His Majesty's Commissioner, Somaliland Protectorate, informed the Resident that, as a deputation of Warsangli elders had come in to answer for their unsatisfactory attitude towards the Administration, the prohibitory order against their dhows might be removed. In view, however, of recent suspicions as to their trading in arms and ammunition he requested that Warsangli dhows might still be subjected to search before leaving Aden. The necessary orders were issued by the Resident on the 14th May.

## TURKISH ARABIA.

During the period covered by this Summary, British interests in Turkish Arabia were represented as follows:—

### Personnel.

*Baghdad*.—Major J. Ramsay, C.I.E., Political Resident and Consul-General, up to the 8th November 1909, when he was succeeded by Mr. J. G. Lorimer, C.I.E.

*Basrah*.—Mr. F. E. Crow (Consul).

*Hofeidah*.—Assistant Surgeon G. A. Richardson (Vice-Consul).

*Jeddah*.—Mr. J. F. Jones (Consul) and Assistant Surgeon Sheikh Muhammad Hussein, Khan Bahadur (Vice-Consul). The Consul and Vice-Consul were succeeded, respectively, by Mr. J. H. Monahan on the 1st March 1907 and Assistant Surgeon Abdur Rahman in June 1909.

*Kerbala*.—Mr. M. Muhammad Hussein Mohsin.

One of the earliest matters to attract His Excellency's attention in these parts was the policy to be pursued by the Indian Government in regard to the eventual

### The Baghdad Railway.

development of the Baghdad railway scheme. In July 1906 Lord Minto's Government expressed at length to the Secretary of State their views regarding the Indian interests involved in the project. Briefly stated, their views were that when once definite construction of the line commenced, a more or less gradual process of interference by Germany would result in that country obtaining the administration of those portions of the Turkish Empire through which the railway would pass, and thus put her in the course of time in complete control of this vast and important tract; and thereby create in this and other subsidiary ways (which were indicated) a situation of considerable embarrassment and danger to Indian interests; consequently a more active policy in regard to the project was necessary, and that "as it was hopeless to attempt to block the scheme, it became imperative to secure an interest in the undertaking so as to minimise the risk of its falling under the control of a single power or being utilised as a means of overthrowing the present predominant position held by the British Government in the Gulf."



A full summary of the Government of India's despatch, and of the course of the negotiations in Europe on the question during the quinquennium under review is printed in Appendix I.

It will be seen that the scheme did not assume a definite shape up to the end of Lord Minto's Viceroyalty; but in anticipation of its eventual development some important steps were taken by the Government of India to secure the position of Great Britain, in the event of Kuwait being finally selected as the terminus of the line. These steps as already shown elsewhere were the conclusion of an Agreement with the Sheikh of Kuwait for the purchase of the foreshore at Bunder Shweikh, with a right of pre-emption of the foreshore in the direction of Ras Kathama (see Persian summary under Kuwait).

Other instances of measures taken by Great Britain to defend her position in these parts, came to notice in connexion with disturbances by lawless Arabs,

*Blosse Lynch case.*

which threatened damage to British trading interests on the River Tigris. In February 1906 Messrs. Lynch's dock and coal depôt, some four miles above Basrah, was attacked by a party of Arabs and negroes, who besides wounding some servants, killed an English engineer in the employ of the firm, Mr. Glanville. In consequence of this incident H. M. S. *Lapwing* was ordered to Basrah, and the Commander of the vessel obtained a guarantee from the Turkish Governor that a Turkish guard should remain on the firm's premises day and night till further orders, and that the Turkish authorities should bear the cost of its maintenance. The Turkish Government took steps to detect and punish the perpetrators of the murder, and eventually sentences of death and penal servitude were passed on various individuals found guilty of the crime; while £500 was paid by order of an Imperial *Irâdê* as compensation to Mr. Glanville's relatives. Some further instances of attacks by Arabs on Lynch's steamers also occurred during 1906, and steps were taken to urge the Porte to fulfil their obligations for the proper policing of the river. Later, in 1908, another of Messrs. Lynch's steamers—the *Blosse Lynch*—was fired on by Arabs near Amara; and owing to the general insecurity prevailing the Tigris mail service had to be suspended temporarily. In response to a representation to them in the matter, the Porte gave an assurance that all possible measures were being taken to maintain security of navigation, that troops had been sent to the spot, and that an inquiry was to be held with a view to punishing the guilty parties. The Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company subsequently brought a claim against the Ottoman Government on account of the attack on the *Blosse Lynch*; but His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople drew attention to the fact that, under the new system of Government which had been inaugurated in the Ottoman Empire, it would be possible to count much more than in the past on the good-will and probity of the authorities in dealing with questions of the kind, but that at the same time the change was attended with a considerable revival of Turkish national feeling and, in consequence with a tendency to restrict the privileged position of foreigners. His Excellency pointed out that the fact that the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company's steamers plied on the internal waters of Turkey under a foreign flag was, therefore, not unlikely, in present circumstances, to be viewed as an infringement of the sovereign rights of the Ottoman Government, and, further, that the Firman, on which the rights of the company were based, was loosely worded, but certainly gave the right to navigate on the Euphrates, and not on the Tigris. In these circumstances it seemed to Sir G. Lowther advisable, in the interests of the company, that they should limit their claim to actual losses incurred, and that they should rather endeavour to gain the good-will of the new Ottoman Government than ask for the intervention of His Majesty's Embassy at Constantinople. It might even well be considered whether the unsettled state of the country and the consequent closing of the river to sailing vessels during several months did not to some extent bring profit to the company, and, if so, whether it was necessary to insist at all on the question of compensation for the loss.

Sir E. Grey, who entirely concurred in the observations of Sir G. Lowther, consequently thought it best, in the interests of the company, to instruct His Excellency not to press their claim officially on the Sublime Porte, but to recall it to their notice in a friendly manner, if, on consideration, the company still

wished this done, and to suggest, when opportunity offered, that the Valis of Baghdad and Basrah should be warned of the serious consequences which might follow a further incident such as the attack on the *Blosse Lynch*. It was reasonable to expect that such a warning would have more effect in the present circumstances than it would have had a short time ago.

On the 14th November 1908, His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople reported that he had notified to the Turkish Minister of the Interior that Messrs. Lynch had waived their claim for damages on account of the attack on the *Blosse Lynch* on the understanding that the local authorities at Baghdad and Basrah would take steps to prevent the recurrence of such incidents in future. Hakki Bey said that the present Vali of Baghdad was an honest and energetic official who would not, like his predecessor, foment the tribal trouble in which the attack on the steamer originated. He added that it was proposed to increase the local forces at Baghdad to enable them to cope with tribal disturbances.

On the 24th May 1909 the Political Resident reported that steamers were running as usual on the Tigris.

In connection with a case of theft at Kerbala by a British subject, Colonel Newmarch represented to the British Ambassador at Constantinople that the case

was one in which the Consular court could claim jurisdiction, and that in any circumstances the British Consul should be authorized to demand the custody of all British subjects, before, during, and after trial in the Turkish courts. On receipt of instructions from the Ambassador, Colonel Newmarch eventually informed the local authorities that the case would be left in the Turkish Court, on the understanding that the British Consul-General could claim jurisdiction at any stage of the proceedings, if necessary. As regards the question of custody, the Ambassador informed Colonel Newmarch that it was impossible to enforce the principle which he advocated throughout Turkey, and that to attempt to do so would be opposed to the policy of His Majesty's Government. Colonel Newmarch again addressed the Ambassador with regard to the subject, and in the meanwhile the local authorities surrendered to him for custody two British subjects accused of murder, thus admitting the right which the Resident sought to establish.

In September 1906, the Political Resident in Turkish Arabia forwarded an extract from a despatch addressed to him by His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople enquiring whether he considered that the condition of the Euphrates and the Tigris above Baghdad was such as to warrant the belief that a line of steamships navigating the upper waters of these rivers would have any prospect of financial success. Major Ramsay reported that he could not find the information required in the records of his office, and he accordingly suggested to the Government of India that Lieutenant Hamilton, Commander of the *Comet*, should visit Mosul and return to Baghdad by raft, with a view to reporting on the navigable capacity of the Tigris between Mosul and Baghdad. The Government of India approved the proposal, but it was subsequently found necessary to postpone the matter for a year, as Lieutenant Hamilton could not at the time be spared from the *Comet*. Major Ramsay stated that, if when a suitable moment for the journey arrived, he saw any local difficulties he would communicate with His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople on the subject.

Major Ramsay subsequently reported that a detailed survey of the river between Mosul and Baghdad had already been made by the officers of the Turkish Government, but that he had been unable to obtain full details of the survey, as the matter was treated as strictly confidential by the local officials. He suggested that His Majesty's Ambassador might perhaps be able to obtain at Constantinople the information collected by the Turkish survey party, and proposed with reference to this possibility to defer sending the Commander of the *Comet* to Mosul. His Majesty's Ambassador approved the proposal.

Early in 1907 with the Government of India's approval a survey of the River Tigris from Basrah to Baghdad was undertaken from the R. I. M. S. *Comet*.



On the 28th January 1907, Sir N. O'Connor reported to Sir E. Grey that, in the course of an audience which he had had with the Sultan of Turkey, he had referred to the loss caused to British trade by the refusal to allow the Euphrates and Tigris

**Running of extra steamers on the Tigris by the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company.**

Steam Navigation Company to run a third steamer on the Tigris. Sir O'Connor pointed out that there was such a congestion of traffic on the river that upwards of 40,000 packages were delayed at Basrah and that the company had been obliged to stop all further consignments from Europe for the present as they were unable to deal with the goods already collected at Basrah. The Sultan did not give a definite answer, but Sir O'Connor gathered that he would be able to count more or less on the Sultan's good-will and support in the matter. On the 11th March 1907, the Political Resident in Turkish Arabia reported that he had been informed by an agent of the company that sanction had been obtained to run a third steamer on the Tigris, subject to the condition that she should fly the Turkish flag under steam.

In the spring of 1910 it was reported that the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company intended to place a new screw river steamer *Dijleh* on the Upper Karun.

In 1907 His Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdad addressed the Board of Trade urging that a British Bank should be established there. Sir N. O'Connor believed

**British Bank at Baghdad.**

that the Ottoman Bank would welcome the establishment of such a bank, as it would divide the responsibility of advances and, in their opinion, be generally beneficial to both institutions as well as to the development of trade.

On the 12th September 1907, the Political Resident in Turkish Arabia informed His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople that a carriage service between

**Carriage service between Baghdad and Aleppo.**

Baghdad and Aleppo had been started on the 1st September 1907, and that the carriage which left Aleppo on that date had completed the journey in about eight and a half days, while the carriage in the opposite direction had taken a day longer. Major Ramsay further stated that the company were only able to run two carriages each way every other day at present, but that they hoped to run three every other day before long. Major Ramsay added that the company hoped to obtain the mail contract after the ensuing spring. On the 25th November 1907, the Political Resident in Turkish Arabia reported that he had heard that the carriages were taking from ten to twelve days between Baghdad and Aleppo, and that they only ran about once in four days.

On the 10th August 1908, the Political Resident in Turkish Arabia reported

**Effect of the new constitution at Baghdad.**

that he had received a telegram from His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople informing him that he had congratulated the Ottoman Government on the revival of the Turkish constitution, and authorizing him to let it be known that the new movement would receive the full support of the British Government as long as it made for reform and good government. Colonel Ramsay accordingly took steps to make known the sympathy of His Majesty's Government with the new *régime*, and also offered his congratulations to the Vali. He stated that, as far as Baghdad was concerned, the immediate result of the newly granted freedom was that the office of Censor had been practically, if not technically, abolished, that there was now absolute freedom of speech, and that telegrams regarding political matters were accepted by the Telegraph Office without objection. It was added that the younger portion of the population was excited but orderly, while the older people seemed a little suspicious as to what such sudden changes might mean.

On the 9th November, the Political Resident held a reception on the occasion of His Majesty's birthday. Hitherto the only Turkish subjects seen at these receptions had been as a rule the Vali and sometimes the Commander-in-Chief. This year, however, the reception was attended by a deputation of persons selected by various classes of Turkish Ottoman society, including representatives of the Ottoman Club, the Committee of Union and Progress, the Baghdad Press, the officers,

the doctors, the Chamber of Commerce, the Kurdish society, and the Ulemas. An address was read in Turkish expressing gratitude at the action of Great Britain in connection with the reform movement. The members of the deputation asked if there would be any objection to their sending a congratulatory telegram to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The Political Resident replied that he knew of none.

On the 2nd November 1908, Colonel Ramsay informed His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople that His Highness the Mir of Khairpur, a Native Chief of India, who was on his way to Baghdad, had chartered the S. S. *Blosse Lynch* for his journey, and was anxious that this vessel should take him to Khadimain, a place on the Tigris, five miles above Baghdad. Colonel Ramsay sent his Dragoman to see if this arrangement could be made, but the local authorities, while anxious to give the Chief every facility, hesitated to allow one of Messrs. Lynch's steamers to go above Baghdad, unless it was expressly stated that it would not be treated as a precedent. A satisfactory arrangement was subsequently arrived at however without raising any question as to Messrs. Lynch's rights.

The Mir was treated with great consideration by the Turkish authorities.

Sir William Willcocks who had prepared several large schemes for irrigation works both on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, left Baghdad for Constantinople in October 1909 with the object of getting the financial arrangements for the works put on to a proper footing. In the following month news reached Baghdad that a favourable view had been taken at Constantinople of Sir William Willcocks' schemes for irrigation in Mesopotamia, and that negotiations were in progress for a loan of 12 millions.

Sir William returned to Baghdad from Europe on the 14th January 1910. He telegraphed to the Ottoman Minister of Public Works, suggesting that he should be authorised to expend £ T 60,000 from his present credit of £ T. 150,000 on constructing and equipping a 30-inch gauge railway from Baghdad to the neighbourhood of Fallujah on the Euphrates. Such a railway would greatly facilitate his operations on that side, especially if four tugs were also supplied for distributing on barges to the different works where they were required, the materials and stores received at the rail-head.

In March 1910 it was reported that the works immediately contemplated were (a) the repair of the old Hindiyah Barrage, (b) the construction of a new Hindiyah Barrage, (c) the construction of a regulator at the head of the Saqlawiyah, and (d) the opening of an escape into the Habbaniyah lake. Sir William Willcocks' scheme for a light railway from Baghdad to Fallujah, to facilitate irrigation operations, had not, it was understood, been very favourably received by the Ministry of Public Works at Constantinople.

Sir William had also had great difficulty in obtaining payment from his sanctioned allotments of the sums which he required. The Political Resident telegraphed to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople in February 1910, at Sir William's request, explaining the circumstances, and asking for the good offices of the Embassy, and eventually £ T. 22,000 was received.

In April 1910 news was received that work had now actually begun upon three of Sir William Willcocks' principal Euphrates projects, *viz.*, the new *Hindiyah* Barrage, the *Habbaniyah* flood-escape near Rumadi, and the *Saqlawiyah* regulator near *Fallujah*. Repairs to the old *Hindiyah* Barrage were also in progress.

The Political Resident visited the new *Hindiyah* works on the 7th of March, and was surprised to find how much earthwork had already been done. The new barrage is to be constructed on dry land, to the east of the present river. It will have very deep foundations, and the river will be brought to it afterwards by excavating a new bed and blocking up the old one. At the new barrage the water will be divided; and two new channels, one of which is already being dug, will carry it thence into the present *Hilla* and *Hindiyah* branches.

The number of Arab labourers on the new *Hindiyah* works rose during April 1910 to about 3,000. These men were all armed, and a fracas which arose between

two gangs unfortunately resulted in the death of three workmen. As the guard of the European engineer consists of only about 10 gendarmes, Sir William Willcocks is naturally apprehensive as to what might happen in case payment for work actually done should have to be suspended from sudden failure of funds.

Sir William intended to leave for Constantinople, overland, on the 5th April and will not return until the autumn. In his absence Mr. Medlicott, his Chief Engineer, will be in charge.

The Political Resident reported in June 1910, that the attitude of the new local administration towards Sir William Willcocks' management of the irrigation works was not favourable. On the 24th May 1910, Mr. Manahim S. Daniel, a leading Jewish landowner of the Wilayat, who for personal reasons is deeply interested in the success of the works, informed Mr. Lorimer in confidence that Nazim Pasha, the Turkish Governor, had constituted a committee, under his own presidentship, to report on Sir William's proceedings up to the present time, and to make recommendations. The members of this Committee were the Daftardar of the Wilayat, the Nakib of Baghdad, and Mr. Lorimer's informant himself. The first meeting of the committee was held on the 22nd of May 1910, and it appeared to Mr. Daniel from the proceedings that the Wali intended eventually dictating a deliverance to the effect that the works should be placed under the control of the authorities of the Wilayat. Mr. Daniel enquired whether Mr. Lorimer could not intervene to prevent mischief. Mr. Lorimer replied that he had no *locus standi* in the matter, but that, if the Wali were to consult him, he would willingly give him his opinion. When Mr. Lorimer saw Mr. Daniel again, on or about the 3rd June 1910, he was informed that no further meetings of the committee had been held.

Meanwhile, an indigenous Turkish scheme for the irrigation of the country about Arbil from the Upper Zab, and that about Kirkuk from the Lower Zab, had been under consideration, and had been reported on by Husni Bey, the engineer of the Musal Wilayat. From what Mr. Lorimer saw afterwards of the country adjoining the two Zabs, he doubted whether a useful scheme for either river could be undertaken except at very heavy expense.

## BALUCHISTAN.

Their Royal Highnesses the Prince and Princess of Wales arrived at Quetta on the 10th March 1906 and left for Karachi on the 16th idem. During his stay at Quetta, His Royal Highness received visits from the Khan of Kalat and the Jam of Las Bela, and held a Durbar at the Sandeman Memorial Hall, which was attended by the Chiefs, Sardars, Maliks, and Motabirs of Baluchistan. Before leaving Quetta His Royal Highness paid a visit to the frontier station of Chaman and presented colours to 127th Baluch Light Infantry.

Visit of Their Royal Highnesses the Prince and Princess of Wales.

His Excellency the Viceroy visited Quetta in October 1906. During his stay there, which lasted from the 8th to the 17th, he received visits from the Khan of Kalat and the Jam of Las Bela, and paid a return visit to the former. On the 9th he held a Durbar, which was attended by the Khan of Kalat and his brother, Mir Bahram Khan, the Jam of Las Bela, the Sarawan and Jhalawan Sardars and Notables of Kalat and Las Bela, the Saiyids and Maliks of Quetta and Pishin, and the Sardars of the Sibi, Loralai, Zhob and Chagai districts. The Marri and Bugti Chiefs were unable to be present owing to their being engaged on a *jirga* in connection with the Phailawagh land dispute, but were accorded an interview separately.

### Quetta Durbar.

During the Durbar the gentlemen on whom titles had been conferred on the occasion of His Majesty the King-Emperor's birthday were presented to, and received their *samads* at the hands of, His Excellency the Viceroy. His Excellency also invested certain men of the Zhob Levy Corps, who had distinguished themselves on the occasion of the attack on the Gudawana post on the night of the 14th December 1905, with the badges of the 3rd class of the Indian Order of Merit, and presented *khillats* to others.

Towards the end of Lord Curzon's term of office, Mr. Tucker, Officiating Agent to the Governor General, submitted certain proposals for the redistribution of levies as the result of previous instructions from the Government of India ordering a general enquiry into the levy system of Baluchistan with a view to securing greater efficiency and to meet the changed conditions due to the withdrawal of regular troops from certain outposts under the scheme for the redistribution of the army in India.

Mr. Tucker's report showed that no changes were called for either in the strength or in the distribution of the levies in the Chagai and the Sibi districts or the Kalat Agency, and his recommendations, which were, therefore, confined to the Zhob Agency and the Loralai and Quetta-Pishin districts, were as under:—

- (a) an increase of one British officer to the Zhob Levy Corps;
- (b) to concentrate the Zhob Levies so as to have a garrison of not less than 25 men in each post, and to abandon or hand over to the district levies or the regular police, the posts which would be vacated as a consequence of this concentration;
- (c) an increase to the police and district levies of the Zhob Agency;
- (d) an increase to the police and district levies in the Loralai District involving, among other items, the appointment of a native levy officer and an additional Assistant District Superintendent of Police;
- (e) an increase to the district levies in the Quetta-Pishin district; and
- (f) the extension of the telegraph line from Girdao to Hasan Nikka on the border of the Zhob Agency.

The extra expenditure was estimated roughly to be Rs. 75,000 per annum.

After consultation with the military authorities who concurred in the proposals, Mr. Tucker was informed in November 1905, that the Government of India approved of his proposals, and he was asked to submit the usual proposition statements showing in detail the increases proposed, and the extra expenditure, with a view to final orders being passed.

The statements, in so far as the district levies of Zhob, Loralai and Quetta-Pishin were concerned, were received in May 1906, and showed that for this part of the scheme the extra cost would be Rs. 2,831 per mensem. These proposals were under consideration when Mr. Tucker pressed for the appointment of an additional British officer for the Zhob Levy Corps. As this proposal was independent of the increase recommended in the district levies and police, and was a necessary consequence of the redistribution of the Zhob Levy Corps posts and of the withdrawal of the regular cavalry from Fort Sandeman, which had already been effected, it was thought desirable to consider it separately. The Government of India were of opinion that the reduction of the regular garrison in Zhob and the increase of responsibility thrown upon the Corps for the protection of the border rendered it imperative that the levies should be adequately trained and that inspections of the outlying posts should be regular and frequent, and they accordingly addressed the Secretary of State in August 1906, and requested his sanction to an increase of the Corps by one British officer. In September the Secretary of State replied that he would defer considering the recommendation made in regard to this appointment till he was in a position to consider, as a whole, the complete scheme for the replacement of regulars in Baluchistan. The proposals for increases to the district levies were ripe for submission to the Secretary of State in November 1906, but, in accordance with his orders, they were held up, till the part of the scheme relating to the revision of the Police was also ready for submission.

In July 1906, Mr. Tucker submitted proposals for the revision of the Police Force in Baluchistan. His proposals comprised:—

- (a) an increase to the Police in Zhob and the Loralai, Quetta-Pishin and Sibi districts, required in connection with the military redistribution scheme and for the replacement of various military sub-treasury guards by police (*vide* the foregoing paragraph);

- (b) an increase to the Quetta Cantonment police ; and
- (c) the reorganisation of the inferior establishment of the Baluchistan police under the orders passed by the Government of India on the report of the Indian Police Commission.

These proposals were still under consideration, when in March 1907, owing to the extension of the Quetta Cantonment and the addition to the European population owing to the arrival of the families of the officers appointed to the new Staff College, the Government of India sanctioned the entertainment, provisionally, of one European, in place of a native Inspector, four additional sergeants, and 28 constables on the existing rates of pay, pending a final decision on the whole scheme.

In July 1907, the Government of India indicated certain modifications which were required in Mr. Tucker's proposals in the light of the recommendations of the Police Commission ; and asked for revised proposals, with statements showing financial incidence.

Meanwhile in October, at the urgent request of the Agent to the Governor-General, the Government of India sanctioned, as a tentative measure, pending consideration of the main scheme, an addition of 27 sergeants, and 4 mounted and 88 foot constables to the cantonment police to meet the requirements of the rapidly growing cantonment of Quetta. The Agent to the Governor-General was also authorised to make, in anticipation of sanction, such further additions to the Quetta Cantonment police as might be absolutely necessary from time to time, subject to a report to Government and adherence to the prescribed rates of pay.

In November 1908 the Agent to the Governor-General submitted the revised proposals for police reorganisation which had been called for in July 1907 ; but certain further explanation of them was required, and they were accordingly returned for the purpose, and were not received in their final form until January 1910.

The scheme has been generally approved, but the question of recommending the revised proposals to the Secretary of State was still under consideration at the close of the period under review.

Meanwhile sanction has been accorded, in anticipation of the approval of the Secretary of State, and without prejudice to any decision which may be arrived at on the general question of revision, to the grant to the existing establishment of Duffadars, Sowars, Head Constables, and Constables of increased rates of pay as proposed by the Agent to the Governor-General.

Having regard to the frequent recommendations made since 1901 by the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, to raise the status and rank of the appointment of Assistant Political Agent, Chagai, to that of a Political Agency, owing to the extent and independence of the charge and to the steadily increasing importance of the district, the Chagai charge was, in 1906, converted, under the scheme for the Reorganisation of the Political Department, into a Political Agency.

In connection with the conversion alluded to in the foregoing paragraph the Government of India in August 1906 considered the question of transferring the Kharan Chiefship from the political control of the Political Agent, Kalat, to that of the Political Agent, Chagai. They were of opinion that the proposed transfer would be an advantage from every point of view. The Kharan Chief had about that time proved somewhat recalcitrant, and had resented his nominal inclusion among the Sarawan Sardars and it was thought that there would be more chance of bringing him into line, both as regards his possessions in Panjgur and his attitude towards the arms traffic, if his connection with Kalat was definitely severed, and there was a Political Agent to look after him properly. Mr. Tucker was accordingly invited to express his opinion on the suggested re-arrangement, and was asked, if he concurred in the views of the Government of India, to submit such detailed proposals as might be necessary to give effect to it. In November 1906, Mr. Tucker replied that he was not prepared to make any definite recommendation regarding this important question, until a

great deal more information had been obtained, and he thought that this could only be done by the deputation of an officer to make a tour in Kharan for three or four months. Owing to the shortage of officers it was found quite impossible to spare one for the proposed enquiry, and Mr. Tucker was informed that, in the circumstances, it had been decided to drop it for the present and to let matters remain in *statu quo* until the autumn of 1907.

The consideration of the proposal to transfer Kharan from the control of the Kalat Agency to that of Chagai brought to light the fact that great uncertainty existed as to the exact limits of the jurisdiction of Sir Nauroz Khan, K.C.I.E., the Kharan Sardar, and that there was a tendency on his part to increase his claims. The Government of India, therefore, decided in September 1907, to place an officer, with the necessary establishment, on special duty for a period of six months thoroughly to investigate all outstanding Kharan matters of importance, such as the boundary of the State, the limits of the Sardar's ownership and jurisdiction, the establishment of the Mekran Levy Corps on his boundaries, the subsidy for the passage of the Panjgur-Nok Kundi telegraph line through Kharan territory, etc., and finally to embody the results of the enquiry in a new agreement with the Sardar. Major J. F. Whyte was selected for the appointment and took up his duties on the 27th October 1907.

After considerable delay from one cause and another, Major Whyte completed his inquiry and returned to Quetta in the end of March 1909.

The Kharan Sardar died on the 2nd June 1909; and his eldest son, Mir Muhammad Yaqub Khan, was recognised by the Government of India as the successor to the chiefship.

On the 17th October 1909 the Government of India sanctioned proposals for a new agreement with the Sardar of Kharan, in lieu of that which was concluded with the Sardar's late father in 1885. The recommendations made by Major Whyte as a result of his enquiry into Kharan affairs were accepted as the basis for the terms of the agreement, which deals with the rights and claims of the Kharan Sardar in Mekran, Rakshan and Ragai; the settlement of the Kharan-Mekran and Kharan-Chagai boundaries; an assurance on the part of the Kharan Sardar that he will not permit traffic in arms through or in his territory, or participate in the traffic himself; and the grant of a subsidy to the Sardar for the protection of the section of the Panjgur-Nok Kundi telegraph line lying within his territory.

The agreement which was concluded on the 21st October 1909, and was subsequently confirmed by the Government of India is printed as Appendix II.

On the return of the Kharan Chief to Kharan he wrote to the Political Agent, Kalat, and also to the Hon'ble the Agent to the Governor-General informing them of his safe arrival at Kharan, and complaining that the British Government had treated him harshly in taking from him a letter of responsibility, and that as the British Government had never subjected any other Chief to such treatment, he felt himself humiliated. He further stated that he had hopes of receiving high favours from Government, and trusted that the British Government would not refuse to show him kindness. This change of attitude was due to the influence of mischievous advisers in Kharan who were not well disposed to the Chief. Unless it had been possible to conclude an agreement with the Kharan Chief before he left Quetta, the influence of these men would have made any attempt to draw up a suitable agreement unsuccessful. The Chief's own real grievance was the fact of his having had to return to Government his father's insignia of the Order of the K.C.I.E. His evil advisers tried to make him believe that the distinction was a hereditary one. A suitable answer was sent to the Chief by the Hon'ble the Agent to the Governor General.

In June 1910, the Agent to the Governor-General reported that latterly the attitude of the Khan of Kharan had been very unsatisfactory. He was entirely in the hands of a few evil advisers, notably Mouladad, his father's Shahgassi, who, it was understood, in order to avenge certain indignities which he had suffered at the hands of the late Chief, Naoroz Khan, aimed at injuring the present Chief. His men had recently attempted by force to oppose the visit of the Political Agent, Chageh, to Geden Kalag near the Nushki trade route; and in this and other cases the Chief had exhibited an aggressive attitude.



In fact his whole conduct of late has been so extraordinary that the Agent to the Governor-General has realised the necessity of visiting Kharan next autumn in order to put matters right. In the meanwhile everything is being done to prevent the Chief from committing himself further.

In 1904, the Political Agent of Sibi, Major Tighe, brought about the settlement of a long-standing dispute between the Marri and Bugti tribes regarding the boundary of a plot of land in the vicinity of Phailawagh. The settlement, however, was not accepted by the Marri tribe who continued to press for a re-opening of the case.

In August 1906, the Government of India, acting on the recommendation of the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, agreed to allow the case to be re-opened to the extent that, if the two Chiefs were able to come to an amicable settlement of the dispute, such settlement would be approved and confirmed, otherwise the original award given by Major Tighe in 1904 would be upheld.

In October 1906, Major Macdonald, the Political Agent, reported the conclusion of an agreement, by the Chiefs and headmen of the two tribes, under which a modification of the division of the land, as effected under the previous settlement, was agreed to, and a new demarcation of the boundary was required. On the 19th November, Major Macdonald when proceeding to the Marri country to effect the demarcation, met with unexpected opposition from the Loharani section of the tribe who refused to obey the orders of their Chief and maliks, and assembled at Kahan in large numbers as a demonstration against the new agreement. This demonstration was afterwards said to have been brought about by intriguers with the object of discrediting their Chief.

The responsibilities of the Marri Chief under the agreement were duly impressed upon him, but as he stated that he could not control his tribesmen, two squadrons of cavalry and 400 infantry were sent to the assistance of Major Macdonald who, in December 1906, demarcated the new boundary. The principal ringleaders of the opposition were secured, tried by *jirga* and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment, while the instigators of the excitement were expelled from the Sibi district.

In September 1907, a settlement was arrived at in the troublesome dispute between the Marri and Bugti tribes over the Phailawagh lands. As subsequent events showed, it was a mistake to have allowed the settlement effected in 1904 to be re-opened at the instance of the Marris. Nawab Khair Baksh, the Marri Chief, and his advisers were very leniently dealt with by the *jirga*, which tried the case in March 1907, and the Chief instead of being grateful, was foolish enough to think that the case would be once more re-opened, and adopted a recalcitrant attitude. He twice refused to come in when summoned by the Political Agent, Sibi, and also ignored a similar summons from the Agent to the Governor-General himself; and he failed to produce the security of Rs. 12,000 for the good conduct of his tribe, which, under the *jirga* award, he was called upon to furnish. The Chief seemed to be entirely in the hands of two foolish advisers, but fortunately the majority of his headmen were not in sympathy with his conduct. Sir Henry McMahon, therefore, took the tribe into his confidence and consulted them as to the measures to be taken in the matter. He fully explained the circumstances of the case to the Marri headmen and expressed determination to take very serious notice of their Chief's conduct unless they could suggest some satisfactory solution of the difficulty. They begged that Nawab Khair Baksh Khan should be given one more chance, and they entreated to be allowed to go back and use their influence to induce him to come in and beg for forgiveness.

The headmen represented matters very clearly and forcibly to their Chief and expressed their intention of bringing him in to the Agent to the Governor-General by force, if he did not consent to come in voluntarily. This had the desired effect, and on the 8th September he came in, accompanied by his headmen, and, at an interview with the Agent to the Governor-General at Quetta, the Nawab humbly apologised for his recent behaviour. Sir Henry McMahon accepted his apology and consented to forgive him. Personal securities were then taken from both the Marri and the Bugti Chiefs in the sum of Rs. 12,000 each for the maintenance of peace in their borders for a term of three years; and the Marri Chief specifically bound himself to be responsible for the good behaviour of the Jantalli

Loharanis, who took a prominent part in the demonstration against demarcation. In addition, the Loharani section as a whole were fined Rs. 10,000 for the recovery of which the Chief and his headmen accepted responsibility; and certain lands belonging to the section were at the same time hypothecated to Government until such time as the fine was paid.

In March 1908, the settlement was sealed by a complete reconciliation between the Marri and Bugti Chiefs, which was effected through the efforts of a special *jirga* convened for the purpose by the Agent to the Governor-General; and the members of the Marri tribe, who were exiled from the Sibi district in accordance with the finding of the *jirga* of 1907, were pardoned by the Bugti Chief and, on depositing cash securities for future good behaviour, were allowed to return to their homes.

At the end of October 1905, a gang of eight trans-border Pathans looted a bunnia's shop at a place called Dornoch about two miles from Nushki, wounded the bunnia, and fled in the direction of Shorawak. A pursuit party of twelve of the Chagai Levies overtook the raiders two miles across the Afghan frontier, killed two of them, wounded two and took two prisoners, the other two escaping. This fine performance of the levies, who had only recently been raised, was, however, completely marred by the brutal manner in which they mutilated some of the robbers by cutting off a hand from each of the dead men and from one of the wounded, their excuse being that their story would not be believed without proof.

Anticipating a complaint from the Amir, His Excellency the Viceroy wrote to His Highness at the end of November, expressing his regret that servants of the British Government should have behaved in so brutal a manner; assuring His Highness that they would be suitably punished; and offering a sum of Rs. 2,000 as compensation to the wounded man who was mutilated.

The Amir replied at the end of December denying that the report of the occurrence as given by the British frontier officers was correct; and stating that the men were innocent labourers returning to their homes in Afghanistan from work on the Nushki Railway, and that they were attacked in Afghan territory by the levies without cause. His Highness also put forward a claim for compensation for the violation of the boundary.

A further report, accompanied by the proceedings of the trial of the two men who were captured, was then obtained from the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan; and in March His Excellency the Viceroy informed the Amir that there was full and conclusive evidence that the men attacked by the levies were concerned in the raid; that the proceedings of the trial (a copy of which was sent to His Highness) established beyond doubt the guilt of the gang, and that they were actually in possession of the stolen property when they were overtaken by the levies, and that they brought about the attack by opening fire on the levies. His Excellency added that the Jemadar in command and his levies had been dismissed from the service of Government for the act of mutilation perpetrated by them, and that compensation had been offered for the wounded man, but the suggestion made by His Highness that compensation should be given for the violation of the boundary could not be entertained. It was true that the levies in hot pursuit of the offenders did cross the frontier, but if they had not done so, they would not have captured the thieves and proof of their guilt could not have been furnished to His Highness, and though there had been a technical breach of international law, which was regretted, in the circumstances of the case, and having regard to the fact that there was no Afghan post or officers in the immediate vicinity to whom the levies could apply to secure the arrest of the thieves, His Excellency trusted that His Highness in the interests of the maintenance of order and suppression of crime upon the frontier, would agree that it was unnecessary to lay further stress upon this technical breach. His Excellency also suggested that, as a means of putting a stop to troublesome raids by bad characters on either side of the border, who at present often escaped punishment by concocting a false story of the facts of the case after they had evaded arrest by crossing the border, it might be possible to arrange for a reciprocal arrest of offenders by pursuit parties following up an actual hue and cry, provided that no such arrests should be attempted except in the close vicinity of the border, and in places where there were no officers at hand to whom the pursuers could apply for



assistance: offenders so arrested being taken without delay to the nearest Afghan or British post, as the case might be and handed over to the officer in charge for safe custody, pending a reference to the two Governments regarding the further disposal of the case.

Nothing further was heard of the matter.

On the 1st May 1906, while Nawab Bangal Khan and Sardar Bahadur

Dispute between rival factions of the Jomezai tribe in Zhob resulting in the death of Nawab Bangal Khan.

Muhammad Akbar Khan, the two rival heads of the Jomezai tribe in the Zhob district, were discussing certain matters at Killa Saifulla with the Extra Assis-

tant Commissioner, Zarif Khan, the son of Nawab Bangal Khan, drew a revolver and fired three times at Muhammad Akbar Khan who fell wounded. In the confusion and struggle which ensued Nawab Bangal Khan was shot three times in the body and mortally wounded by another man, named Baran, who also was shot and wounded by sword cuts. Nawab Bangal Khan died the same night, but the others eventually recovered.

A guard of the 126th Baluchistan Infantry turned out promptly on hearing the firing and the persons concerned in the affray were arrested and confined. The Political Agent took security from the principal relations of the two Chiefs to prevent further trouble, and as a further precaution a party of cavalry was called in from Loralai. The affair was due to rivalry and a blood-feud of long standing between the two Chiefs and their relations. The persons concerned were tried by *jirga*, in September 1906, who awarded Rs. 5,000 and other compensation to the Ishak Kahols as blood-money for the murder of the Nawab, and Rs. 2,500 to the Nawab Kahols as compensation for Sardar Muhammad Akbar Khan's wound. They also considered that, as the latter had been instrumental by his conduct in the shaping of events which led to the murder, he could not in safety return to Zhob, and they recommended that, he should not be allowed to do so. Owing to the highly strained relations between the two rival factions, and the very heated feeling of the whole country on account of the death of Nawab Bangal Khan, the most beloved and respected Chief in Zhob, orders on the case were deferred until there was a chance of settlement with a reasonable hope of finality.

In June 1907, the death of the Nawab's step-brother, Oma Khan, from the effects of his confinement in prison, further complicated the case, as the responsibility for this was thrown by the Ishak Kahols on the Nawab Kahols, and it was considered inadvisable to delay the settlement of the case any longer. A *jirga* of influential Sardars of Baluchistan and Dera Ghazi Khan was accordingly summoned to adjudicate upon recent developments of the case. They came to the decision that it was no longer possible for the Ishak Kohals and Nawab Kahols to reside together, and that certain leading members of the latter, including Muhammad Akbar Khan, must live elsewhere until they could return without affecting the peace of the country. They also decided that Muhammad Akbar Khan could no longer retain the sardarship of the Kakar tribe, and that it must return to the Ishak Kahol, the elder and rightful branch of the Jomezai family. Of the two members of the family who had a right to succeed, *i.e.*, Zarghun Khan, son of Shahbaz Khan, the last rightful Sardar of the tribe, and Zarif Khatn, son of Nawab Bangal Khan, the latter, it was held alone had sufficient support and backing to enable him to rule the tribe. The *jirga* also proposed a redistribution of the tribal allowances to provide for the change in the sardarship and for the maintenance of those who were to live in exile for the time being.

At a Durbar held at Quetta on the 31st July, Sir Henry McMahon announced and formally confirmed the decision of the *jirga* and proclaimed Zarif Khan as Sardar of the Kakar tribe. The announcement was received with general satisfaction. The Government of India approved the decision of the *jirga*, but suggested that Zarif Khan's appointment to the sardarship should be tacitly regarded as provisional, so that, in the event of his not justifying the selection, and of Zarghun Khan or his heir showing fitness for the post, there need be no hesitation in reverting to the rightful line of succession.

Sardar Zarif Khan, the new Sardar, died at Killa Saifulla on the 16th January 1908 of consumption, and was succeeded by his brother, Sardar Muhammad

Khan. The appointment was announced by the Agent to the Governor-General at the annual Sibi Durbar, and was approved by the Government of India, who also sanctioned a fresh distribution of the allowances, etc., to meet the change.

In August 1905, the Secretary of State sanctioned the increase of the Chagai

**Augmentation of the Chagai Levies.**

Levies from 176 to 270, including 42 sowars for Robat, at an annual cost of Rs. 34,840, and an initial expenditure of Rs. 11,280. In April 1906, Mr. Tucker drew the attention of the Government of India to the fact that, owing to the deputation of six men from the Chagai Levies to form an escort for Lieutenant G. D. Ogilvie on his proceeding to Bam in South-East Persia to take up the post of Vice-Consul there, and to the absence of 23 men in Seistan in connection with the plague riots, the levies had been temporarily reduced to a strength which was undesirably low. He also observed that, although the absence of the 23 levies in Seistan was temporary only, it was clear that other similar occasions for their services might arise in future, while demands such as those made on behalf of Mr. Ogilvie might recur, and might even be of a permanent character. He further pointed out that, when the levies were enlisted the possibility of their deputation on foreign service of this kind was not in contemplation. Mr. Tucker accordingly recommended that the Chagai first class levies should be further increased by the enlistment of 50 men under a Native officer.

The Government of India agreed with Mr. Tucker that events had established the desirability of further strengthening the Robat post to a normal strength of approximately 75 men, so that a body of 50 mounted men might be available there for immediate despatch to Seistan should necessity arise; but they were of opinion that it might be possible to meet requirements by a redistribution of the existing material and by replacing "second class" by "first class" levies, without adding to the numbers of the Chagai Levy establishment as a whole. Mr. Tucker was accordingly requested to consider this suggestion carefully, and to submit revised proposals on these lines. His reply, which was received in November 1906, showed that the suggestion as it stood was impracticable. He, however, submitted revised proposals comprising the reduction of three of the existing "second class" or "district" levies, and the enlistment of 1 jemadar, 1 dafadar, and 30 "first class" levies at Robat, without additional clerical or menial establishment, and involving an initial expenditure of Rs. 3,840 and an annual recurring expenditure of Rs. 10,404.

After consultation with the Military authorities the Government of India accepted Mr. Tucker's proposals, and in March 1907 they strongly recommended them to the Secretary of State for sanction.

In May 1907, the sanction of His Majesty's Government was received, and the additional men were recruited shortly afterwards.

In December 1906, Mr. Tucker submitted proposals for the redistribution

**Formation of the Mekran Levy Corps.**

of the Mekran Levy Corps, and for the augmentation of the Corps by one British officer, 100 cavalry and 110 infantry. As a part of the scheme, Mr. Tucker proposed that the military escort now furnished to the Kalat Agency should be replaced by an escort of 85 men from the Mekran Levy Corps. The grounds on which his proposal was based were:—

- (1) that Kalat and Mastung, while remote from the Quetta Cantonment, are near to the homes of the men of the Mekran Levy Corps, with whom service at these places would be popular;
- (2) that the withdrawal of the regular escort would be welcome to the local military authorities, and be a step in accordance with the general policy of the Government of India;
- (3) that the opening of the railway from Quetta to Mastung brings Kalat much nearer to Quetta, and that in the event of necessity a small party of troops could be railed to Mastung in a few hours.

After consultation with the military authorities the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan was informed that the Government of India considered it desirable that this part of the scheme should be excluded from his proposals,

and dealt with separately on its merits. He was told that in dealing with the question the advisability of entrusting entirely to Brahuis the safety of British officers, in a centre liable to disturbances, and the composition of the force to be stationed at Kalat and Mastung, would require very careful consideration. The events which occurred at Kalat in the spring of 1905 also appeared to indicate the desirability of retaining a guard of regulars at that place for the present. He was further informed that an additional British officer for the Corps was not considered necessary. So long as there was a Nazim in charge of the internal administration of Mekran, the Government of India were of opinion that the Assistant Political Agent and the Adjutant should be sufficient for the proper management of the Corps and the control of the border. He was therefore asked to submit revised proposals for an increase to the Corps in accordance with the above views, together with a revised proposition statement showing their exact financial effect.

These revised proposals eventually reached the Government of India in November 1907. They involved an addition to the Corps of 62 cavalry and 53 infantry and a small clerical and menial establishment, at a cost of Rs. 34,510 annual recurring and Rs. 29,780 initial, the latter sum comprising Rs. 15,000 for the construction of new posts, Rs. 2,480 on account of the Government contribution towards the equipment of the additional cavalry, and an advance of Rs. 12,300 to the Corps for the purchase of remounts and regimental stores and grain, which would be recovered by deductions from the pay of the men.

The Government of India were of opinion that it was necessary to have a sufficiently strong Levy Corps in Mekran both to check the importation of arms which were finding their way through Persian Baluchistan into Mekran freely, and adequately to deal with any disorder which might occur. They, therefore, supported the Agent to the Governor-General's proposals and recommended them to the Secretary of State for his favourable consideration.

His Majesty's Government accorded their sanction in a despatch dated the 26th July 1908; and the Agent to the Governor-General, Baluchistan, was instructed to carry out the proposals.

At the end of June 1906, differences arose between the Mir Haji Mengals and the Jamots in the Jhalawan country which culminated in an attack by the former on a Jamot village and other skirmishes. The total loss on the Mengal side amounted to two killed and four wounded, and on the other side to four killed and four wounded. The Political Agent visited the site of the disturbances and settled the dispute, imposing suitable punishment on the offenders.

As the state of affairs in the Jhalawan country had been unsatisfactory for some time owing to the lawlessness and aggressiveness displayed by the Mengal tribe, and to the failure of Mir Wali Muhammad (who had been appointed Vakil in 1903 when Sardar Shakar Khan voluntarily resigned the control of the Mengals) to maintain order, the Political Agent, Kalat, made a tour in the Jhalawan country in the spring of 1907, with the object of—

- (a) carrying out certain measures for the better administration of the Mengal tribes, namely, the removal of Mir Wali Muhammad from his office as Vakil and from Jhalawan, the re-instatement of Sardar Shakar Khan as Chief of the Mengals, the establishment of a new post at Wadh, with a son of the Sardar as Thanadar, and the distribution of the *thana* service amongst the *motabirs* of the tribe; and
- (b) the enforcement of the award of the Sibi *jirga* in the case of the dispute between the Mengals and Jamots, and recovery of blood money from the Mengals.

Major Benn successfully attained these objects; and, at the same time, set in train negotiations which eventually resulted in a reconciliation between Mir Wali Muhammad and the Jam of Las Bela (who had been long at feud) by the marriage of the former's daughter to the Jam.

Owing to the mismanagement of tribal affairs by Sardar Shakar Khan, the head of the senior branch of the Mengal tribe who had been reinstated as

Chief of the tribe in 1907, a representative *jirga* of the Sarawan and Jhalawan tribes, which met at Kalat on the 19th July 1908, decided, after long and careful consideration, that the chiefship should be transferred to Haji Ibrahim Khan, the head of the junior branch of the ruling family. The Khan of Kalat having expressed his approval of the changes, Sardar Shakar Khan was sent to Quetta, and a deputation of Sardars started for Wadh to invest the new Chief with the usual *khillat* from the Khan of Kalat, and to instal him.

The entrance of the deputation into the country was opposed by some of the followers of the old Chief who collected *lashkars* and threatened to attack Haji Ibrahim Khan's villages and the Khan of Kalat's post at Khozdar. The rebel force actually arrived within two miles of the latter place, but the Native Assistant, Jhalawan, with the assistance of some Jhalawan Sardars, succeeded in inducing it to withdraw. Unfortunately, at this juncture, the old standing Mengal-Jamot feud was revived by the murder on the Las Bela border of Duffadar Ali Muhammad, Mengal, of the Samotri *thana*, his son and another Mengal; the Jam of Las Bela despatched a force of police to arrest the offenders and at his request, as it seemed probable that the disaffected Mengals would make reprisals, a force of 200 infantry from Karachi was ordered to proceed to Las Bela as a precautionary measure. The Agent to the Governor-General, Baluchistan, at the same time, arranged for a force of 300 infantry, 2 guns, and a squadron of cavalry to proceed from Quetta to Kalat.

In the meantime, the principal men of the rebel force had tendered their submission to Haji Ibrahim Khan, the new Sardar who had collected a large force, but Mir Alam Khan and Mir Jhangi Khan with whom he was about to open negotiations alarmed by a mischievous report that British troops were approaching Wadh took refuge with their followers in the Pabb hills, whence they sent a message that they would not oppose the British force, but would return after its departure and attack the new Sardar.

On the 24th August, the Agent to the Governor-General, Baluchistan, reported that a rebel force which had collected on the Las Bela border had been driven back from the passes by the Jam's forces, but that, as a precautionary measure, he had increased the strength of the British troops in Las Bela to a total of 300 infantry which, he considered, would be ample to protect the place, and to provide a small column to proceed northwards hereafter if necessary. At the same time Sir Henry McMahon reported that, as he had effected all the useful results which delay could attain, and as further delay would produce a bad impression, he had authorized the Political Agent, Kalat, to leave Kalat for Wadh, with 300 infantry, two guns, and half a squadron cavalry of the Kalat column, which he considered an adequate escort, to settle the disturbances. Major Benn left Kalat on the 31st August.

The Agent to the Governor-General's instructions to the Political Agent, which the Government of India approved, were :—(a) that he was to be guided on arrival at Wadh by local conditions, and he should instal the new Sardar in accordance with the *jirga* award and the Khan of Kalat's approval thereof, if satisfied that he had sufficient tribal support to maintain his position; (b) that he should make every effort to effect an amicable settlement between rebel leaders and the new Sardar with due regard to the latter's authority and British prestige, and, if necessary, he should arrange with the new Sardar and the Jhalawan Sardars for the submission or suppression of the rebel leaders; (c) that he should also arrange for the settlement of the Mengal-Jamot trouble, or, if an immediate settlement was not possible, endeavour to ensure the peaceful attitude of both parties pending a settlement; (d) that the active intervention of British troops must be avoided, if possible, and that no settlement involving the further detention of British troops in Mengal or Las Bela territory was likely to be approved; and (e) that he should take with him as many representative Jhalawan and Sarawan Sardars as possible and take care that the Khan of Kalat was fully identified with any settlement in which the Mengals were concerned.

Early in September, in compliance with a request from the Political Agent, Kalat, for more troops to be sent to Kalat as a support for the column accompany-

ing him to Wadh, the Agent to the Governor-General, Baluchistan, arranged for the despatch of an additional force of 500 infantry and two guns from Quetta to Kalat.

The Political Agent, with his escort, arrived at Wadh on the 12th September without opposition, and found that Mir Haji Ibrahim Khan, the new Mengal Sardar, had the support of the majority of the tribal sections. Major Benn reported that negotiations had commenced with the rebel leaders, to whom the situation appeared to have been falsely represented, and that there were indications that the Khan of Kalat and His Highness's Naib at Khozdar were encouraging the rebel faction to hold out—a charge which the Khan stoutly denied.

The rebel leaders came in at the end of the month and were presented to the Political Agent by the new Sardar, Mir Haji Ibrahim Khan, who asked that they might be pardoned. The Political Agent having satisfied himself that the reconciliation effected between the parties was genuine, and that the rebels had taken an oath of allegiance to the new Sardar, accepted their submission. On the 8th October, he held a public durbar at which he formally installed Mir Haji Ibrahim Khan as Sardar of the Mengal tribe, and presented him with the customary *khillat* from the Khan of Kalat. The Sarawan and Jhalawan Chiefs, Mengal *motabirs*, and other local Mengals numbering about 200 attended the durbar.

The Political Agent left Wadh for Kalat on 11th October 1908 having made arrangements for a satisfactory settlement of the case, which was finally closed in February 1909 by the disposal by arbitration at Uthal of the Mengal-Jamot murder case.

But the state of affairs in the Mengal country continued to be unsatisfactory ; and the Sardar was unable not only to collect his own revenue, but to carry out orders for the recovery of Government fines and compensation money due from certain sections of his tribe.

At a Darbar held by the Political Agent on the 22nd February 1910, the Jhalawan Sardars were reminded that the allowances which they enjoyed were fixed on the clear understanding that, in return, they undertook the responsibility of maintaining peace and order in the Jhalawan country, and that, if it were found that they were unable to fulfil their engagements, it might be necessary to reconsider the arrangements under which they now received their present pay. Some of the Sardars subsequently promised to assist the Native Assistant, Jhalawan, to bring in their recalcitrant colleagues.

There is nothing further of interest to note in regard to Jhalawan affairs during the period under review.

On the 2nd October 1906, an Afghan official named Habib Jan, with a following, most of whom were armed, crossed the frontier into British territory near Isa Chah and went on to Zahro. On the following day he returned to Kani on his own side of the border. Thence he again entered British territory and seized a caravan of 71 camels belonging to a Mengal. On the next day he returned to the border seizing on his way two camels and three donkeys belonging to Mir Chandan Khan's village. The villagers followed Habib Jan's party and exchanged shots, but without any result, and the Afghans made good their escape to their own territory, whence Habib Jan sent a threatening message to Mir Chandan Khan.

The Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan sent particulars of the occurrence to the British Representative at Kandahar with instructions to point out orally to the Governor that the action of Habib Jan had been a serious violation of the frontier. The British Representative saw the Governor, who had already received news of the occurrence, though it had been represented to him in quite a different light. He averred that Habib Jan had done no wrong, that he had not entered British territory, and that the place where the caravan had been seized was on the Afghan side of the border, or at any rate in disputed territory. He further positively asserted that the Shorawak-Nushki boundary had never been settled, more especially in the vicinity of Zahro, Darzai and Band-i-Chandan Khan, and that the establishment of a British post at Zahro

was an encroachment on Afghan territory. The British Representative further reported that the camels carried off by Habib Jan had been branded under the Governor's orders with the brand used for animals to be auctioned, which implied that the Governor, having enquired into the case, had decided that the animals were to be confiscated and sold.

On the 8th December 1906, His Excellency the Viceroy addressed the Amir on the subject, pointing out that Habib Jan's action in crossing the border with an armed following and his proceedings in British territory constituted a serious violation of the boundary line which was demarcated by Sir Henry McMahon and Sardar Muhammad Umar Khan in 1896, and asked His Majesty to institute early enquiries and to issue orders to his frontier officials with a view to the return of the captured caravan and to the prevention of the recurrence of similar incidents. It was further explained to the Amir that the portion of the frontier which had been violated by Habib Jan was between Partos Nawar and Kani, which are marked in the map attached to the Agreement of 1896 by boundary pillars Nos. 156 and 157, between which the boundary runs in a straight line for 38 miles through a sandy desert, and that owing to the absence of intervening pillars and to the detailed description of the boundary line not having been inserted in the final Agreement, the Afghan officials in Shorawak have always disputed the position of the boundary in this locality. His Excellency therefore proposed that, during the ensuing cold weather, the opportunity might be taken to erect a few subsidiary pillars along the straight line between Partos Nawar and Kani.

On the 20th December 1906, the Amir replied that he had issued orders to the Governor of Kandahar to submit an early report on the facts of the case in order to enable him to send a complete answer to His Excellency's letter; and that as regards the erection of subsidiary pillars between Partos Nawar and Kani he would on his return to Kabul from his visit to India, nominate and appoint an official for the erection of the pillars during the winter of 1907-08, and would inform His Excellency in order that a British official might also be appointed.

At the end of August 1907, an Afghan official named Ali Gohar Khan arrived at Sher Shah Nawar on the Baluch-Afghan frontier with a party of sowars. As it was believed that he had instructions to establish posts at Zahro, Isa Chah, etc., with the object of including within the Afghan frontier the portion of the boundary between Partos Nawar and Kani, which had given rise to the incident of the previous year, a Native officer and 18 men of the Chagai Levies were sent to Chandan Khan Band to watch events; and subsequently, under instructions from the Political Agent, Ali Gohar Khan was interviewed by the Tahsildar of Nushki, who pointed out to him that Sher Shah Nawar was well within the British border and requested him to withdraw on pain of being ejected by force. At first Ali Gohar Khan declined to withdraw on the ground that Zahro and the other places were within Afghan territory, and that he held orders under the seal of the Governor of Kandahar to this effect. He showed the Tahsildar a letter to him from the Governor superscribed:—"Ali Gohar Khan, Kardar, district Baluchistan, from Shorawak to Zahro and Koh Siah," but he would not acquaint the Tahsildar with the contents of the latter. Eventually he said that he would return to Partos Nawar and refer to Kandahar for instructions.

Owing to the great difficulties which would be experienced in demarcating by pillars this portion of the boundary, which runs through a dreary and sandy waste, the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan suggested that, in bringing Ali Gohar Khan's proceedings to the notice of the Amir, the question of demarcation, which had been proposed to the Amir the previous year, should definitely be abandoned, and that His Majesty should be asked to have his local officers instructed as to the precise position of the boundary line relatively to the adjacent wells and *nawars* on both sides, with a view to avoiding violation of the frontier in future. The Government of India, however, decided that, in view of the possibility that any letter, however expressed, might result in the Amir insisting on demarcation, and as it was undesirable at that time to have under discussion with him more cases of this kind than could be avoided, no action should be taken, and that the matter should be left until the Amir himself raised



it; but that if any further violation of the frontier in this locality were attempted the question would have to be reconsidered.

Nothing further was heard of the matter.

In December 1906, the British Consul in Seistan reported that a dispute had

**Persian claims to Kacha and Piran on the Perso-Baluch border.**

arisen concerning two plots of culturable land on the vaguely defined boundary between Baluchistan and Sarhad at Piran and Kacha, about 30 miles south of Koh-i-Malik Siah; and that a small party of Sarbazes under an officer belonging to the Koh-i-Malik Siah detachment had visited Piran, expelled the occupants who belonged to the Chagai Levies, and made over the land to Persian subjects.

From enquiries made it appeared that the British claim to Kacha was indisputable as we had had a post there on and off for ten years, and that at Piran, although the land cultivated by the Chagai levies had been slightly extended in 1906, they had been dispossessed not only of this, but also of other plots which they had cultivated since 1905, while previous to November 1906, when cultivators from the Persian village of Duzdap were settled at Piran, there had been no Persian cultivation at this spot.

The matter was reported to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran to whom it was pointed out that, as the principles underlying the settlement of the question of the Perso-Baluch boundary, which was arrived at with the Persian Government by Sir A. Hardinge at Tehran in 1905, were that the boundary should not be specifically defined, that the *status quo*, which meant the then existing conditions of occupation by either side, should be adhered to, and that no further claim should be made by either side, the action of the Persian Sarbazes in expelling our cultivators was unwarrantable, and it was proposed, unless Sir C. Spring Rice saw any objection, to issue orders for the restoration of the *status quo*.

Subsequently, under the orders of the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, the Chagai levies were again posted at Kacha and Piran, and the Zarezai cultivators resumed the lands of which they were in possession at the latter place before their ejection by the Persians. The Government of India decided not to take any further action as it was undesirable to reopen the boundary question, but the Agent to the Governor-General was told that future aggression on the part of the Persians should not be permitted.

Early in August 1907, the Karguzar of Seistan addressed His Majesty's Consul regarding the re-occupation of Kacha and Piran by British subjects, and requested their removal. It was decided to take no notice of the communication. There were 30 rifles at Piran and 50 at Kacha, and the contingency of the Persians approaching either place in force was remote. At the end of the month a Persian Sultan (Captain) named Muhammad Azim, from the Persian garrison at Koh-i-Malik Siah, visited Kacha and Piran. He was civilly entertained by the Native officers in charge of the posts, whom he informed that he had orders from Seistan to visit the places to ascertain whether it was a fact that British troops had been stationed there, and that forts had been built. He said that the former was true but the latter was not, and seemed to have a very hazy idea of the boundary in the neighbourhood, which he had been given to understand was the trade route, and that consequently both Kacha and Piran were well within Persian territory. The sequel of this visit was a communication from the Seistan Karguzar to the Political Agent, Chagai, stating that he had received information that British troops were occupying Kacha and Piran in Persian territory and asking for their withdrawal. The receipt of the letter was acknowledged, but it was decided to take no further action unless the Persian Government raised the question.

Nothing further happened till April 1908, when a further attempt was made to revive Persian claims to Kacha and Piran. Acting on reports from Seistan, which were probably due to officiousness on the part of M. Mornard of the Persian Customs Administration, who had recently visited Koh-i-Malik Siah, and was about to visit Kacha, or to the mischief-making proclivities of the Karguzar

of Seistan, the Persian Government complained to His Britannic Majesty's Legation at Tehran of British encroachments at Kacha and Piran and certain other places in the vicinity. As the operations of a survey party working on the Perso-Baluch frontier had apparently given rise to the rumours, the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan was asked to ascertain and telegraph the facts of the case.

On the 2nd May, Sir H. McMahon reported that there was no justification for the complaint made by the Persian Government. It was accordingly decided to take no further action in the matter, unless and until the Persian complaints assumed a more definite shape.

Subsequently, however, the Persian Government complained to His Majesty's Legation at Tehran that British officers on the Baluchistan border had interfered with the customs-houses at Kacha and Piran. There were no customs-houses at Kacha and Piran, and the complaint was inexplicable except as a clumsy attempt to reopen the boundary question.

From a conversation which Major Kennion (His Majesty's Consul for Seistan and Kain) had with M. Bottieau, Director of Customs, on the subject, it appeared that the only report which the latter had sent was to the effect that M. Mornard had observed certain buildings at Kacha which he believed to be in Persian territory. Major Kennion presumed that they were the buildings for the Robat troops. As regards the complaint of British interference with the Customs, M. Bottieau said that he had made no complaint or report of any sort. He admitted, however, that it was possible that his Persian subordinates had done so. From the wording of the reports sent to the British Minister by the Persian Government and their vagueness, they probably came from a Persian source, and were merely the outcome of a desire of some ignorant Persian Customs employé to exhibit his zeal.

In January 1909, His Majesty's Minister at Tehran informed the Persian Government officially that there had been, as far as could be ascertained, no violation of Persian territory at Kacha, and that the buildings referred to were doubtless those destined for the use of the troops at Robat during the summer, a matter which had already been fully explained to the Persian Government in 1907. The Minister also said that, as regards the alleged interference with the customs arrangements, His Majesty's Consul, Seistan, had received the assurance of the Director of Customs that he had made no complaint on the subject. It could only be concluded therefore that the reports which had reached the Persian Government had been circulated by unauthorised persons.

Early in March 1907 the Director, Persian Gulf Section, Indo-European Telegraph Department, received telegraphic orders from London sanctioning the construction of a telegraph line from Panjgur to Nok Kundi (on the Nushki-Seistan route), in continuation of the line from Karachi to Panjgur which was completed in 1906. The route to be followed lay from Chitkan (Panjgur) *viâ* Ladgasht and the Tank-i-Grawag and Rug passes to Nok Kundi, a distance of 191½ miles.

Subsequently the Panjgur-Nok Kundi telegraph line was carried on to Robat, and through communication between Karachi and Tehran by this route was established early in November 1907.

Certain Persian *motabirs* of Dizak protested against the line under the mistaken idea that a portion of it passed through Persian territory; and one of them even threatened to oppose its construction, but nothing untoward occurred.

On the recommendation of the Hon'ble the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, the Government of India have sanctioned the payment from the revenues of the Indo-European Telegraph Department of (a) a subsidy of Rs. 1,200 a year to the Jam of Las Bela for the protection of the Sheikhrāj-Kumb-i-Shirin section of the new Indo-European Telegraph line in Baluchistan; and (b) the sum of Rs. 800 a year, to be placed at

Telegraph extension from Panjgur to Nok Kundi.

Protection of the Indo-European Telegraph line in Baluchistan.



the disposal of the Political Agent, Mekran, for distribution to the tribal Chiefs, in the form of occasional presents and *khilats*, as rewards for good service in protecting the Kumb-i-Shirin-Tank-i-Grawag section of the line.

Towards the end of March 1907, two Native officers of the 106th Hazara Pioneers, who had gone out, accompanied by two sepoys, in the direction of the Chaman border to shoot sand grouse, were set upon by two horsemen, one of whom was recognised as a notorious thief living in Afghan territory. The horsemen, with the assistance of some shepherds, robbed the Native officers of their shot-guns, wearing apparel, and sixty-one rupees in notes and cash. The sepoys, who were unarmed, were not molested.

In April, the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan wrote to the Governor of Kandahar and asked for the restoration of the stolen property, and the punishment of the offenders. In December, after several reminders, the Governor informed the British Representative that the matter was still under enquiry, and that he would reply to the Agent to the Governor-General's letter as soon as possible. At a subsequent interview, however, he told the British Representative that he was not authorised to correspond with the Agent to the Governor-General and had referred the case to the Amir for orders, pending the receipt of which he could take no further action. He also stated that as far as he knew the accused had denied having robbed the Native officers. The result of the Governor's reference to Kabul is not yet known.

No reply from the Governor of Kandahar has been received by the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan to his complaint in regard to the attack by Afghans on native officers near the Chaman border. The British representative, who had been reminding the Governor about the case, received a letter from him on the 5th November 1908 saying that no information had yet been received from the Afghan frontier officials who had been called on for a report. The Governor went on to discredit the report made by the native officers, and concluded by saying that he had issued fresh instructions to the frontier officials.

In July 1907, the Government of India, on the recommendation of the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, and after enquiry, through the India Office, London, as to the respectability of the prospective licensees, sanctioned the grant by the Jam of Las Bela to Messrs. Milne and Cates, of an exploring license in respect of the island of Churna. The Jam of Las Bela to Mr. James Milne, Chartered Accountant, and Mr. Magnes Cates, Ship-broker and Mineralogist, both of Bristol, of an exploring license in respect of the island of Churna, a part of the territories of the Las Bela State.

In October 1907, the Government of India sanctioned the grant by the Jam of Las Bela to a syndicate of firms of good standing in Karachi, of a prospecting license for minerals in respect of a tract of country measuring 750 square miles in the Las Bela State.

On the 20th October 1908, His Majesty's Secretary of State for India telegraphed that Professor Erich Zugmayer of the Royal Bavarian Academy of Science, who had visited Chinese Turkestan and Tibet in 1906 for purposes of scientific research, was desirous of undertaking a similar journey in the coming winter in Southern Baluchistan. He proposed to arrive at Karachi at the beginning of December, and, after training an expeditionary party in the Khirtar Hills for a month, to march along the coast to Pasni, thence proceeding to Quetta and the city of Kalat. The German Government asked for facilities on behalf of Professor Zugmayer, but, in view of the fact that permission had recently been refused to Commandant de Lacoste to travel through almost the same country, the Government of India informed the Secretary of State on the 29th *idem* that it would be inadvisable to accord sanction in this case; the more so, as at first sight it appeared that the object of the party might be to prospect for minerals, the proposed training ground in the Khirtar Hills being situated near a tract for

which a prospecting license had been given in 1907 to a syndicate, one member of which is a German.

In March 1908, His Majesty's Government enquired, at the instance of the French Ambassador in London, whether the Government of India would have any objection to Commandant de Lacoste undertaking a journey of exploration in Southern Baluchistan, and to the grant to him of the same facilities as were accorded for his journey in India in 1906.

The Government of India replied that, in view of the fact that, on his last journey on the Indian frontier, Commandant de Lacoste passed off as a Frenchman his companion Zabicha, who was strongly suspected of being a Russian Agent, and with reference to the correspondence regarding Captain Polovtsoff's journey on the Indian frontier, they deprecated the grant of permission for the proposed journey, and suggested that the unsettled state of the country owing to the brisk illicit arms traffic, which rendered it unsafe for Europeans to travel there by themselves, might be put forward as the excuse for refusal. His Majesty's Government accordingly informed the French Ambassador that they were unable to grant permission for the proposed journey.

In reply to a telegraphic enquiry from His Majesty's Secretary of State as to whether the Government of India saw any objection to Colonel Novitzky, of the Russian General Staff, being permitted to travel from Persia to India by the Nushki trade route, the Government of India telegraphed, on the 5th August 1909, that Colonel Novitzky was apparently identical with the Captain of the same name who visited India in 1898, and, as the sole object of the proposed journey appeared to be reconnaissance, they recommended that, as in the cases of Commandant de Lacoste and Professor Zugmayer, permission should be refused on the ground that owing to the arms traffic the trade route is unsafe.

In May 1908, the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan reported that pillars Nos. X and XV of the Baluch-Afghan boundary on the Zhob frontier had been demolished by local Afghan officials; and that the slab bearing the number of the latter pillar had been carried off by them. Steps had been taken to rebuild the pillars, and a formal remonstrance had been made to the border Afghan officials.

The Governor of Kandahar in reporting the matter to the Amir stated that a British officer entered Afghan territory on the Hotak border, between Maruf and Kalat-i-Ghilzai with 200 troops and erected new boundary pillars far inside Afghan limits, and, although the true facts were explained to him by the British Representative at Kandahar, the Governor persisted in holding that this part of the boundary had never been demarcated and that the pillars erected were entirely new, thus constituting an encroachment on Afghan territory.

The Government of India decided to take no action unless a specific complaint was made by the Amir on the subject, or the boundary-pillars were again tampered with by the Afghans.

#### Death of the ex-Khan of Kalat.

Mir Sir Khudadad Khan, G.C.S.I., ex-Khan of Kalat, died at Pishin on the 20th May 1909.

Subsequently, all the relations of the deceased ex-Khan wrote to the Agent to the Governor-General informing him that they had unanimously selected Mir Azam Jan as the head of the family.

In January 1910, on the recommendation of the Hon'ble the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, the Government of India sanctioned the establishment of a reserve of 50 Martini-Henry carbines, with 100 rounds of ammunition per carbine, for issue to levies and tribesmen of known loyalty in the Chaman and Pishin sub-divisions in cases of emergency.

On the recommendation of the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, who had received information that at

**Distribution of Martini-Henry carbines and ammunition among the tribal Sardars of the Loralai district.**

least two bands of outlaws were meditating an early incursion into the Loralai district, the Government of India sanctioned in April 1910 the issue to the Political Agent of 30 Martini-Henry carbines, together with 200 rounds of ammunition per carbine, for distribution amongst the tribal Sardars of the two largest tribes (the Luni and Musakhel) in his district, to enable them to meet such gangs of raiders as might from time to time appear.

In January 1910 the Agent to the Governor-General reported that the Jam

**Change of administration in Las Bela.**

of Las Bela was very hypochondriacal, and in a constant state of alarm about his health to an extent which seemed at times to bring about a derangement of his faculties.

In February the Jam wrote to the Agent to the Governor-General, expressing a wish to abdicate and asking for an allowance of Rs. 10,000 a month during his lifetime; failing this, that some allowances should be made for the maintenance of the other members of the family and that he should be given a jagir in British territory; or, if neither of the above requests were granted, that he might be allowed to live at Quetta during the summer and in his own territory during the winter, all State affairs being carried on by the Wazir.

He was informed that the Political Agent, Kalat, who was going to see him at Sonmiani, would talk over the matter with him, and that the Agent to the Governor-General would do nothing until the question had been fully discussed between him and the Political Agent.

In April the Jam went to Quetta to interview Sir Henry McMahon, and submitted a petition to him, asking that Khan Bahadur Ahmad Yar Khan might be sent back to Las Bela as his Wazir; that his brother, Mir Abdul Karim, might be removed from Las Bela; and that he might be allowed to reside outside his territory for a period of 12 months in order to receive medical treatment. The Agent to the Governor-General was unable to accede to the first request, but sanctioned the other two. Mir Abdul Karim, who had already left Las Bela at the request of the Political Agent, was told that he should not return there without permission; and the Jam was allowed to remain on at Quetta where it was hoped that, with competent medical treatment, and complete rest, he would be able later on to resume the administration of his State. The Government of India approved the action taken by the Agent to the Governor-General.

**Opening of the Quetta-Nushki railway.**

The Quetta-Nushki section of the North-Western Railway was opened for general traffic on the 15th November 1905.

In several communications Mr. Tucker represented the desirability of moving the Nushki civil station, basing his recommendation primarily on the impurity of the Nushki water-supply, the distance of Nushki from the rail-head, the dilapidated condition of existing buildings, and the prejudicial effect of present conditions on the development of the trade route. In September 1906, he definitely proposed the transfer of the tahsil and rail-head to Ahmadwal, the cost involved being estimated at not less than six lakhs of rupees. Subsequently in February 1907, after exhaustive analyses had been made of the different sources of water-supply, which proved that all were more or less unsatisfactory, Mr. Tucker came to the conclusion that, if a transfer to Ahmadwal could not be sanctioned, it would be as well to let the civil station remain where it was at present, reconstructing the requisite buildings, and making the best of an admittedly unsatisfactory situation. Sir Henry McMahon also, on more than one occasion, expressed himself as strongly in favour of the proposal to remove both the civil station and rail-head to Ahmadwal.

In July 1907, the Government of India decided, after a full consideration of the case, that there was not sufficient justification for the expenditure of so large a sum as six lakhs, involved by the proposed transfer of the Nushki tahsil and rail-head, even if it were at all certain that the transfer would cost that amount only. They were also of opinion that it had not been satisfactorily established that Ahmadwal would be an ideal place for the new civil station or

for the permanent terminus of the railway, and that, in the circumstances, the Nushki civil station and the rail-head should remain where they were for the present. They, however, accepted the necessity for an expenditure of Rs. 84,000 on account of new buildings at Nushki and Rs. 75,000 for the provision of a piped water-supply for the place which the foregoing decision entailed; and the Agent to the Governor-General was accordingly instructed to prepare and submit the necessary plans and estimates.

Owing to the impossibility of the Political Agent, Chagai, residing at his head-quarters—Nushki—during the summer months, he was granted permission in 1905 to spend the summer at Quetta pending a decision on the question of the permanent location of the head-quarters of his Agency. There were objections to this arrangement, which entailed the absence of the Political Agent from his district for several months in each year, and when it was decided not to move the head-quarters from Nushki, the Agent to the Governor-General was instructed to consider the question of providing summer head-quarters for the Political Agent in his own Agency.

Several likely sites on the range of hills in the vicinity of Nushki were examined but proved unsuitable, and eventually a more distant site was selected at Barabchah on the Baluch-Afghan frontier which, if a permanent supply of water could be secured, would, it was thought, prove suitable. The Government of India agreed to the Political Agent being permitted to reside at Barabchah during the summer of 1908 if the water-supply proved sufficient, and sanctioned an expenditure of Rs. 5,000 for completing a *karez* which had been commenced there as an experiment. The experimental *Karez* eventually proved a failure, however, and the question has not further been pursued.

## NEPAL.

British interests in Nepal were represented during the period of this summary

### Personnel.

by Lieutenant-Colonel F. W. P. MacDonald, who officiated as Resident in the place of Lieutenant-Colonel J. Manners-Smith, V.C., C.I.E.

Lord Minto's Viceroyalty has been marked by a great development in the political importance of Nepal due to the rapid extension of Chinese authority along her northern borders. A full account of this movement and of the assurance given to Nepal by His Majesty's Government in respect of it, will be found in the Tibet Summary. A few miscellaneous matters will merely be dealt with here.

According to custom, the Maharaja-Dhiraj of Nepal deputed a high official, Commanding Colonel Bahadur Jang, Rana Bahadur, to proceed to Calcutta and convey to the Viceroy a letter of congratulation from His Highness on His Excellency's assumption of office. The usual ceremonial presents were also sent. On the 24th January, the Viceroy received Colonel Bahadur Jang at Government House, when the letter and presents were submitted to His Excellency. The usual reply, together with return presents, was sent by His Excellency to the Maharaja-Dhiraj.

In November 1905, the Government of the United Provinces submitted an application from Maharaja Deb Shamsher Jang, ex-Prime Minister of Nepal, asking

### The ex-Prime Minister of Nepal.

for permission to visit Dwarka and certain other places in India during the cold weather. The Local Government undertook, if permission were granted, to have the Maharaja's movements quietly watched with the object of preventing him from approaching the Nepal frontier or from engaging in intrigue. The Government of India granted the required permission subject to this condition, and instructed the Government of the United Provinces to inform the Local Governments concerned of the impending tour, and of the conditions under which the Maharaja had been permitted to travel.

On the 6th January 1906, His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General at Chengtu transmitted to the Government of India a translation of a memorial which had appeared in a Gazette and which had been addressed by the Chinese Resident at Lhasa to the Emperor of China. The

The Nepalese quinquennial Mission to China.

memorial submitted a request from the Nepalese Government to the Amban for permission to despatch a Gurkha Mission to Peking with the customary quinquennial tribute. It was stated that it had not been possible to despatch a Mission since the year 1887 on account of famines in the districts of Shansi and Shensi and the consequent impossibility of furnishing the requisite transport. As these obstacles had ceased to exist, the Gurkhas were anxious to be allowed to send the Mission without delay.

The Nepalese Representative at Lhasa reported that a Chinese official informed him that the Amban had been instructed by the Chinese Government to inform the Nepalese Government that they might now send the usual quinquennial Mission to Peking.

The Prime Minister of Nepal informed the Resident, in reply to enquiries, that it was true that a Mission was to be sent to China, although he had received no official intimation from the Amban himself on the subject of the necessary conveyance and transport. He anticipated that the Mission would start from Nepal in July or August. The Minister observed that the practice of sending a Mission was inaugurated soon after the war between Nepal and China in 1792 A.D., and that it had since been kept up more for its commercial advantages than for anything else. He stated that the few presents carried by the Mission to Peking were not of much value and that they were certainly not of the nature of tribute. The Mission was, according to the Minister, merely a means whereby the party was enabled to gain access into the country under advantageous circumstances, and to dispose, with great profit, of the large quantity of goods which they take with them. All goods belonging to the party were carried free from the Nepal frontier to Peking and back, by the transport provided by the Chinese Government which also supplied for the party all the necessaries required by them on the road. The Minister expressed astonishment at finding, in the Amban's memorial to the Chinese Emperor, that the presents had been described as a tribute from Nepal. He stated that in the customary letter from Nepal to the Emperor, the word "Saugat" meaning "present" had been distinctly written. He added that the relations of Nepal with Tibet, and the trade and other facilities which the Gurkhas enjoy in that country, made it incumbent upon Nepal to keep up the harmless and friendly practice of despatching a Mission to China.

The Mission arrived at Peking in April 1908 and departed again in September.

In July 1906, the Resident in Nepal suggested that it would be to the advantage of the Government of India to

Supply of Martini-Henry rifles and machinery to the Nepal Durbar.

assist the Nepal Durbar in their efforts to raise their army to a higher standard of

efficiency, and recommended the following proposals for sanction :—

- (1) That as a mark of satisfaction for the services rendered to Government by the Durbar with reference to the supply of recruits, a present of 5,000 Martini-Henry rifles should be made to the Durbar. This was the number which the Resident understood that the Durbar were anxious to be allowed to purchase.
- (2) That the Durbar should be invited to send Military Attachés freely to the Indian Army to learn modern methods of training and organisation in all details, and that they should be offered nominations to the Staff College, and be allowed to send their officers to any course of instruction in India they might desire to attend.

With regard to the second proposal, which did not appear to have originated with the Nepal Durbar, the Resident was informed that the question raised was one of far-reaching importance, and that, for reasons which it was unnecessary to particularize, his suggestions did not at present commend themselves to the Government of India. He was, therefore, instructed to say nothing to the Durbar on the subject. The remaining suggestion that 5,000 Martini-Henry rifles should be presented free of charge to the Durbar appeared to be free from objection on the ground of principle, as with reference to the existing arrangements for the supply of warlike material to the State, the Government of India had already in the past expressed their willingness to comply with such requisitions for additional arms as might appear to them to be reasonable. Moreover, the

Government of India concurred with the Resident in thinking that it would be appropriate to offer the Durbar a substantial present in recognition of their loyal co-operation in the matter of the supply of recruits for Gurkha regiments. They, however, preferred that not more than 2,500 rifles should be given at the present moment, and the Resident in Nepal was accordingly authorised to offer this number to the Durbar.

The offer was accepted by the Prime Minister, on behalf of the Durbar, with sincere thanks.

On the 26th September 1907 the Resident in Nepal reported that the Durbar were anxious to be allowed to import certain machinery for the manufacture of arms and ammunition, and were prepared to guarantee a limited outturn if the requirements of the Army in the way of modern rifles could be supplied direct by Government.

The Durbar, however, expressed their willingness to waive this request if they were permitted to purchase 10,000 Martini-Henry rifles from the Government of India, and to purchase for the future such component parts of rifles as might be required to repair broken or damaged rifles in their possession.

Consideration of the question of the supply of machinery was postponed. As regards the arms the Resident was requested to intimate to the Prime Minister that the Government of India were prepared to make a further gift of 2,500 rifles to the Durbar to make up the balance of the 5,000 Martini-Henry rifles, which the Government of India understood the Durbar in 1906 had estimated to be their immediate requirements.

The Government of India entertained some doubts as to the desirability of giving or selling a large supply of arms to Nepal at the moment when the Minister was leaving for England, but if, on his return from England, the Durbar still wished to press their request, the Government of India would be prepared to give the question of a further supply their full consideration.

On the 27th February 1908, the Resident in Nepal forwarded a *kharita* from the Maharaja-Dhiraj to His Excellency the Viceroy, conveying the sincerest thanks of the Durbar for the further gift of 2,500 Martini-Henry rifles.

On the 31st March 1908, the Secretary of State telegraphed saying that it seemed to him politic for the Government of India to inform the Prime Minister, before he started for England, that the balance of the 10,000 rifles asked for by him in September 1907, would be given to him on his return to India, since if the Prime Minister mentioned the matter in England, and if the concession were made subsequently, Sir Chandra would attribute it to the intervention of the Home Government, and the promise of the arms now would have the further advantage of making the Prime Minister less anxious, while in England, to make arrangements with manufacturers, independently of Government, for the supply of arms, and possibly machinery to Nepal.

On the 5th April, the Minister was informed accordingly, and on the 8th April Sir Chandra sent a cordial letter of thanks to His Excellency the Viceroy. Orders were issued to the Ordnance authorities on the 9th October for the supply of the arms; and on the 11th January 1909, His Excellency the Prime Minister reported the receipt of the last consignment and thanked His Excellency the Viceroy for the gift.

In 1888 the Resident in Nepal was requested by the Officers Commanding certain Gurkha regiments to inform Gurkha sepoys residing in Nepal, that they were not eligible either for the active or the garrison reserve, unless they resided in British territory. The Resident brought to notice, however, that if these orders were enforced the Gurkha reserve would be a very small one, as few pensioners would be likely of their own free will to take up their abode in British territory, while the Nepal Durbar would, in any case, take steps to prevent them from leaving the country after they had once returned to it. It was accordingly decided by the military authorities that, as an experimental measure, the men of the reserves of the 1st Battalion,

2nd Gurkhas, residing in Nepal, should be permitted to continue residing there, their names being, at the same time, retained on the reserve rolls. No further enrolment was, however, to be made in the reserves of men who intended residing out of India.

In 1893, the Nepal Minister complained that the British reservists living in Nepal refused to be enlisted in the Nepal Army, or to go through the usual annual course of military instruction at Katmandu. He stated that, if the system of keeping British reservists in Nepal were continued, it would constitute a danger to himself, as his enemies would use it as a handle for attack. He accordingly requested that the system might be abolished. The Government of India recognised the Minister's objections as reasonable, and issued the necessary orders warning Gurkha sepoys on entering the reserve that, if they left British territory, they would, *ipso facto*, cease to belong to the reserve.

Recently, however, the military authorities, while considering the question of reserves for the army generally, arrived at the conclusion that it was very desirable, if possible, to maintain a Gurkha reserve of 1,800 men. As so large a reserve could not possibly be formed unless the orders prohibiting reservists from residing in Nepal were rescinded, the Nepal Durbar were approached with a view to ascertaining whether the objections raised in 1893, to the residence of British reservists in Nepal, were still regarded as valid.

During the Commander-in-Chief's recent visit to Nepal, the question was discussed by His Excellency with the Minister, Sir Chandra Shamsher Jung, and the latter expressed himself as quite willing to agree to the proposal that the reservists should be permitted to reside in Nepal territory, and gave an assurance that no difficulties would be raised in the matter by the Durbar. In order, however, that the merits of the scheme might be determined after practical experience, the Minister wished it to be regarded as experimental for the next two years, when, if successful, it would be for the consideration of the Government of India and the Nepal Durbar, whether the numbers of the reserve should be increased. The Resident in Nepal, who was addressed on the subject, also reported that the Nepal Durbar would not object to the action which it was proposed to take, as an experimental measure, in regard to the reserve. He stated, however, that the Minister did not wish to have to bring up the matter for discussion in the Nepal State Council.

The necessary orders were accordingly issued by the military authorities for the development of the reserve. In 1910, the Nepal Durbar agreed to the reserve being placed on a permanent footing, and to its strength being increased when the Government of India considered it expedient, to 2,000 men.

His Excellency Lord Kitchener arrived at Katmandu on a visit on the 7th November 1906. At a Durbar held on the

Visit of His Excellency Lord Kitchener to Nepal.

10th November 1906, the Prime Minister made a speech which was remarkable for the

policy of progress which it foreshadowed. In replying, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief announced the appointment by His Majesty the King of Sir Chandra Shamsher to the honorary rank of Major-General in the British Army, and of Colonel in the 4th Gurkha Rifles.

This appointment had been strongly recommended by the Government of India and approved by His Majesty's Government, on account of the great assistance rendered by Sir Chandra Shamsher during the recent Tibet Expedition, and with a view to the encouragement of recruiting in Nepal. The Prime Minister acknowledged the honour in grateful terms and begged in return, on behalf of the Maharaja-Dhiraj and the Nepal Durbar, that Lord Kitchener would accept the appointment of General in the Nepal Army. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief signified his pleased assent to the proposal.

In a Memorandum, dated the 23rd January 1907, to the address of His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, Sir

Proposed scientific expedition to Mount Everest.

George Taubman Goldie, President of the Royal Geographical Society, asked that

facilities might be given by the Government of India for a scientific expedition, which it was proposed to send to Mount Everest, under the command of Major the



Honourable Charles Bruce, 5th Gurkha Rifles, on behalf of the Royal Geographical Society. The intention was that the party should travel from Darjeeling north to Kampadzong, on the Tibetan side of the Indian frontier, and it was stated that as the expedition would turn its back on Lhasa directly it left Indian territory, and as the regions through which it would pass were very sparsely populated, there would be no question of Tibetan timidity being aroused, or of any friction occurring during the journey. In reply, His Majesty's Secretary of State for India informed the President of the Royal Geographical Society that it was not possible consistently with the interests of the policy of His Majesty's Government, to give encouragement or help to exploration in Tibet. Mr. Morley stated there had been no change in the political situation since March 1906, to modify the considerations of high Imperial policy which had led His Majesty's Government to decide that it was inexpedient to raise the question of facilities for travellers in Tibet with the authorities at Lhasa. Further, in his opinion, there could be no doubt that a British expedition proceeding by the route proposed through Tibetan territory, and without previous notice to the Lhasa Government, would raise the question, which His Majesty's Government wished to avoid, in a more embarrassing form than if an application were made to the Tibetan Government for their consent.

Shortly afterwards the Prime Minister of Nepal visited Calcutta and in the course of an interview with the Foreign Secretary, the subject of the proposed expedition was incidentally discussed.

Subsequently (April 27), with reference to this conversation, the Resident reported that the Prime Minister had sent out two parties of men to try and locate the exact position of Mount Everest, but that they had been unsuccessful in identifying the peak, and had not been able to report whether it was situated in Nepal territory. The Prime Minister informed the Resident that he personally was willing to consent to an exploration being made through the north-eastern portion of Nepal, but that the opinion in Nepal was so strong still against any relaxation of the policy of isolation that it would not be safe for him to make even this solitary concession, unless a distinct assurance could be given that it would not be considered a precedent.

On the 11th June 1907 the Resident in Nepal was informed that the Government of India would have no objection to give the assurance for which the Prime Minister had asked, and that they would be grateful for any further information that the Prime Minister might be able to procure regarding the position of Mount Everest. The Resident replied that the Prime Minister was doubtful as to whether his own officials would be able to identify the peak for certain, or be able to give a reliable report about its position. He was willing, however, to consider any plan that might be suggested for carrying out the wishes of the Government of India in the matter.

Subsequently, as the result of a suggestion made by the Resident, a native surveyor was deputed, with the consent of the Prime Minister, to Nepal to report on the actual position of Mount Everest and the routes leading thereto. The surveyor reached Katmandu on the 6th September. He was unable, however, to determine exactly whether the peak lay in Tibetan or Nepalese territory, but from data collected by him, the Government of India were inclined to think that if not the whole peak, at least the southern and western slopes of Mount Everest were in Nepal, and that an exploration party could encircle the mountain without entering recognised Tibet.

The Resident in Nepal was accordingly asked to ascertain the views of the Durbar in the matter of the proposed exploration of the mountain by a small party under Major the Hon'ble C. G. Bruce, 1-5th Gurkhas. The Prime Minister of Nepal, who some time previously seemed to be in favour of the expedition, had apparently changed his mind, as he not only raised numerous difficulties but proposed certain conditions which it was impossible to accept, and it was decided therefore to abandon all idea of the expedition.

On the 20th May 1907 the Resident in Nepal reported that the Prime Minister

**Gurkha Reserve Scheme.**

had informed him that two cases had occurred of men taking service in the Nepal Army without reporting the fact that they were members of the reserve. The



Prime Minister suggested that, in order to enable him to prevent this, the Durbar should be furnished every six months with the name, descriptive roll, etc., of all Gurkha sepoy who joined the reserve, and the name of the regiments to which they were attached. In reply, the Resident was informed that the Government of India concurred in the Prime Minister's opinion, and that the necessary orders had been issued to the military authorities.

On the 17th April 1908, His Excellency Sir Chandra Shamsher Jung, Prime Minister of Nepal, sailed from Bombay on a visit to England accompanied by Major Manners-Smith, V. C., Resident in Nepal.

On his return from England, His Excellency landed at Tuticorin, in the Madras Presidency, on the 18th August 1908, and after visiting Rameshwaram, left Negapatam, by steamer, on the morning of the 21st August, and arrived at Calcutta on the 24th idem. His Excellency left Calcutta the same night for Nepal. The usual honours and salutes were accorded to him on the outward and return journeys. The cost of his entertainment in England was borne by the Imperial Exchequer.

On the 25th August, the Prime Minister reported his safe arrival in Nepalese territory, and at the same time thanked the Government of India for the satisfactory arrangements made *en route* in India. The Resident was asked to convey to the Maharaja-Dhiraj and the Prime Minister, His Excellency the Viceroy's sincere congratulations on the latter's safe return to Nepal, and on the success of the visit, which it was hoped would draw still closer the ties of friendship between Nepal and the British Government and people.

In reply to a reference from His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, regarding an application from the Norwegian Minister for permission for two Norwegian gentlemen to enter Nepal territory, for the purpose of ascending Mount Kinchenjunga, the Government of India in November 1909 expressed regret that they were unable to meet the wishes of the mountaineers as the Nepal Durbar strongly objected to all exploration by Europeans in Nepal; and only last year a similar expedition by British subjects had to be abandoned owing to the attitude of the Prime Minister.

In reply to an application from the Acting Consul-General for Japan at Calcutta requesting that permission might be obtained from the Nepal Durbar for Count Kozui Otani and two other Japanese gentlemen to enter Nepal territory, crossing the Indian frontier by the Charia Gat pass, for purposes of archæological research, the Government of India replied on the 22nd December 1909, that as the Durbar had lately objected on more than one occasion to foreigners entering Nepal for purposes of exploration, they were unable to accede to the request.

On the 8th January 1910, the Acting Consul-General for Japan enquired whether the Nepal Durbar would have any objection to Count Otani sending Mr. V. Aoki to Katmandu, by the direct route, for Sanskrit Buddhist manuscripts. He was informed in reply, that as the Nepal Durbar had lately objected to foreigners entering Nepal, the Government of India regretted that they were unable to accede to his request, but that if the Count were to inform the Resident in Nepal what manuscripts he wanted, the latter would no doubt try and get copies made if the originals were available at Katmandu.

The Treaty provisions about extraditional arrangements between the Nepal Durbar and the British Government are briefly :—

Dakalties on the border between the United Provinces and Nepal.

- (1) that the two Governments will act on a system of strict reciprocity ;
- (2) that neither Government shall be bound to surrender any person not being a subject of the Government making the requisition ;

- (3) that the offences for which surrender of an accused person can be demanded are murder, attempt at murder, rape, maiming, thagi, dakaiti, highway robbery, poisoning, burglary, arson, cattle stealing, embezzlement by public officers, serious theft, and escaping from custody while undergoing punishment for any of the extraditable offences.

In June 1909, the Government of the United Provinces represented that great difficulties were experienced in bringing to justice the criminals who commit dakaities in British territories and escape into Nepal; in recovering stolen property concealed in Nepalese houses and in exercising control over suspects taking refuge in Nepal against whom no actual evidence was available, since the law of Nepal did not allow of interference with any person not convicted or declared to be of bad reputation. The special officer appointed by that Government to enquire into the cases of dakaities committed in the year 1908 reported that 199 persons were implicated, of whom 51 had been arrested and the remaining 148 were still at large. The United Provinces Government therefore requested that the Durbar might be asked for the arrest and surrender of the 148 fugitives and invited to cultivate closer co-operation with the authorities of the British Government in suppressing border crime by

- (a) a relaxation of Nepal rules with reference to house search;
- (b) the surveillance in Nepal of wandering criminal tribes;
- (c) the holding of roll-calls in the suspected villages immediately after the occurrence of a dakaiti with a view to discovering who are absent;
- (d) the maintenance and interchange of border gang registers and descriptive and bad character rolls;
- (e) the introduction of direct correspondence between Station Officers and Superintendents of Police of both sides;
- (f) giving permission to the police to cross the frontier and arrest offenders.

These proposals were broached to the Nepal Durbar, who in reply promised to arrest the 148 persons mentioned above and bring them to trial in Nepal or to hand them over to the British authorities according to their nationality. The Durbar also framed a set of rules to be introduced as an experimental measure on the United Provinces-Nepal border, and suggested, for the sake of uniformity, that they might also be observed on the Bengal-Nepal border.

With the exception of the proposal about house search, in regard to which the Durbar consented only to a very slight relaxation of the law, the rules seemed sufficient to meet the requirements of the United Provinces Government and were provisionally accepted by the Government of India in March 1910, with the consent of the United Provinces and Bengal Governments. The police of both sides were instructed and warned by their respective Governments that when crossing into foreign territory in conformity with the rules, they should take with them as few persons as possible and treat the local officials and subjects of the foreign territory with civility.

The Resident in Nepal and the Local Governments concerned have been asked to furnish the Government of India with an expression of their opinions on the working of the rules after they have been in force for a period of four months, together with any suggestions which it might be desired to offer.

#### TIBET.

The Tashi Lama accepted Lord Curzon's invitation in October, 1905, to come to Calcutta in December on the occasion of the visit of Their Royal Highnesses the Prince and Princess of Wales to that city.

The Tashi Lama left Shigatse on the 8th November and arrived at Rawalpindi on the 7th December. During his stay there he visited the Buddhist shrines in the vicinity, and saw the review of troops held before the Prince of Wales. He was also accorded the honour of an informal interview there by His Royal Highness. After leaving Rawalpindi, the Lama visited Agra, Benares,

Gya and Patna, and finally arrived in Calcutta on the 26th December. He was accorded an enthusiastic reception at Gaya. It was decided that, during his stay in Calcutta, he should be accorded the honours granted to an Indian Ruling Chief receiving a salute of 17 guns.

The Tongsa Penlop of Bhutan, who was visiting Calcutta at the same time, received the honours usually granted to a 15-gun Chief.

The Tashi Lama, the Maharaja of Sikkim, and the Tongsa Penlop, during their stay in Calcutta, paid formal visits respectively to His Excellency the Viceroy and His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, and received the honour of return visits.

The Tashi Lama was entertained at Hastings House and attended various public functions during his visit. He was present at the laying of the Victoria Memorial foundation-stone at a State garden party at Government House. On the 10th January he paid a private visit to the Viceroy; and during the interview he preferred three requests:—

- (1) that he might be given a letter promising him some assistance in the event of the Government of China or Lhasa adopting a hostile attitude in consequence of his friendship with the Government of India;
- (2) that should he be attacked, the Government of India would undertake to lend him firearms;
- (3) that the officers at Gyantse might be instructed to maintain their present friendly relations with him and forward his letters, and that in case of necessity he might be permitted to send a letter to India by a special messenger.

His Excellency replied that communications had passed between the Chinese Government and the British Minister at Peking, and that the Chinese had said that the Lama was regarded by them purely as a holy personage of high religious standing, and that they presumed his visit to India was only of a ceremonial and friendly nature; but that they would refuse to recognize any treaty or agreement of a political nature, should such thing be contemplated.

His Excellency then told the Lama that the British Minister had explained to the Chinese Government that his visit was purely of a ceremonial nature to greet His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales and His Excellency the Viceroy and to see the Buddhist shrines of Hindustan, and that nothing of a political nature was contemplated. In these circumstances, it was most improbable that the Chinese would proceed to any acts of oppression against the Lama on account of his visit, but that should such an improbable event occur, the good offices of the British Government would doubtless be exerted with China on his behalf. As to his second request for arms, the Tashi Lama was informed that the contingency of an attack being directed against him was so remote that it could not be considered at present.

His third request was quite reasonable, and he was told that instructions would be issued as he desired, though ordinarily the Trade Agent at Gyantse would be the best and quickest channel of communication.

The Lama, professing himself to be quite satisfied, withdrew his request for a letter and agreed that the proposed instructions to the Trade Agent at Gyantse to be friendly were quite sufficient.

The Viceroy hoped that he would exercise his great influence, as the highest spiritual authority in Tibet with the Tibetans, to strengthen the relations with the British Government that now happily prevailed. The Tashi Lama replied that this would be his constant endeavour. He then asked His Excellency to try and improve the conditions at Buddh Gaya in order to facilitate the worship of Buddhist pilgrims there. His Excellency replied that he fully sympathized with the Lama in this matter and would take the subject into consideration.

These replies by Lord Minto to the Lama's representations were approved by His Majesty's Government.

The Tashi Lama left Calcutta on the 11th January 1906, and reached Shigatse on the 19th February.

Subsequently the Tashi Lama received from the Emperor of China the following reply to a letter which he had despatched to Peking during his stay at Calcutta :—

“ In going to India without previously obtaining my leave you acted very wrongly. I am, however, glad to hear that you are soon returning to Tibet, and that you will continue to serve me loyally as before. In these circumstances, no punishment will be imposed. ”

In May 1909, it was reported to the Political Officer in Sikkim that a Grand Secretary to the Lhasa Government had been deputed in December 1908 by the Dalai Lama to ascertain the reasons of the Tashi Lama's visit to India during 1905-06. This information, and a communication made to the Maharaja Kumar of Sikkim by the Tashi Lama, indicated an intention on the part of the Chinese and Tibetan authorities to adopt a hostile attitude towards the Tashi Lama on account of his friendliness towards the British Government ; and the Secretary of State was accordingly asked to instruct Sir J. N. Jordan, His Majesty's Minister at Peking, to secure for the Tashi Lama the friendly offices of the Chinese Government.

Just on the eve of Lord Curzon's departure from India the negotiations held in Calcutta between British and Chinese Commissioners for the purpose of securing China's confirmation of the Convention signed at Lhasa in September, 1904, were finally broken off (November 14, 1905) owing to the Chinese Envoy, Mr. Chang, expressing himself unable to accept the terms propounded by the Government of India in their draft Adhesion Agreement.

On the 8th December the Chinese Minister in London was informed that His Majesty's Government were unable to comply with the request made by the Chinese Government through him that the Adhesion negotiations should be continued at Calcutta ; and eventually a draft convention in Chinese was handed to Sir E. Satow at Peking by Tang Shooyi, with a request from Prince Ching that it should be communicated to His Majesty's Government. This step was duly taken. It is unnecessary here to notice the terms of the draft convention, or the course of the subsequent correspondence and negotiations to which it gave rise ; these are related in full in Appendix III ; it is sufficient to State that negotiations were reopened at Peking, and that on the 27th April 1906 the Secretary of State telegraphed that an Adhesion Agreement with China had been signed that day by Sir E. Satow. The terms of the Convention, excluding the preamble were as follows :

#### ARTICLE I.

The Convention concluded on September 7th, 1904, by Great Britain and Tibet, the texts of which in English and Chinese are attached to the present Convention as an annexe, is hereby confirmed, subject to the modification stated in the declaration appended thereto, and both of the High Contracting Parties engage to take at all times such steps as may be necessary to secure the due fulfilment of the terms specified therein.

#### ARTICLE II.

The Government of Great Britain engages not to annex Tibetan territory or to interfere in the administration of Tibet. The Government of China also undertakes not to permit any other foreign State to interfere with the territory or internal administration of Tibet.

#### ARTICLE III.

The concessions which are mentioned in Article 9 (d) of the Convention concluded on September 7th, 1904, by Great Britain and Tibet are denied to any state or to the subject of any state other than China, but it has been arranged with China that at the trade marts specified in Article 2 of the aforesaid Convention Great Britain shall be entitled to lay down telegraph lines connecting with India.

#### ARTICLE IV.

The provisions of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and Regulations of 1893 shall, subject to the terms of this present Convention and annexe thereto, remain in full force.

## ARTICLE V.

The English and Chinese texts of the present Convention have been carefully compared and found to correspond, but in the event of there being any difference of meaning between them the English text shall be authoritative.

## ARTICLE VI.

This Convention shall be ratified by the Sovereigns of both countries and ratifications shall be exchanged at London within three months after the date of signature by the Plenipotentiaries of both powers.

From information received from Lhasa, it appeared that the Tibetans had taken no action in regard to the collection of the indemnity due to the British Government, as they anticipated that they would be relieved of the necessity of paying it, in consequence of the negotiations with the Chinese Envoy in Calcutta in regard to an Adhesion Agreement (see above). When it was known that these negotiations had broken down, the Lhasa authorities were much perturbed, but they believed that the Emperor of China would probably come to their assistance and pay the money.

From reports received from the British Trade Agent at Gyantse and the Political Officer in Chumbi it appeared that a proclamation had been widely scattered in Tibet, and in the Chumbi valley by the Chinese officials announcing the intention of the Chinese Government to pay the indemnity on behalf of Tibet.

On the 6th December 1905, Sir E. Satow was instructed to inform the Chinese Government that the proposed arrangement for payment by them of the indemnity due from Tibet could not be entertained unless the British draft Adhesion Agreement to the Lhasa Convention were concluded, and on the 9th December the Political Officer in Sikkim was told to inform the Lhasa authorities that the first instalment of the Tibet Treaty, being due on the 1st January 1906, should be paid at Gyantse to the British Trade Agent. This action was duly taken; and on the 31st December the Trade Agent at Gyantse telegraphed that the Ti-Rimpoche had replied to the effect that Tibet had no great revenue, and that the Amban had said the matter would be discussed between the British and Chinese Governments. The Government of India thereupon suggested to the Secretary of State that they should again inform the Tibetan Government that they would be held responsible under the Lhasa Treaty for the payment of the indemnity and that the matter might then remain *in statu quo* until the question of the resumption of the Adhesion negotiations with China had been settled. The Secretary of State approved this course and added that the communication to Tibet would not preclude the eventual acceptance of payment from China if an agreement were ultimately arrived at with that Government.

On the 13th February 1906, the Sechung Sha-pé, a member of the Lhasa Executive Council, arrived at Gyantse on his way to Calcutta where, he said, he was, under orders from the Chinese Amban, to receive the amount of the indemnity from Mr. Chang, the Chinese Envoy, and pay it to the Government of India. The Trade Agent at Gyantse was instructed to inform the Sha-pé that the amount in question had to be paid at Gyantse, but the Sha-pé replied that his orders were peremptory on the point, and must be followed. The Government of India informed the Secretary of State of the facts; and added that they would have no objection, provided China would accept the draft Adhesion Convention, to receive payment at Calcutta, but that otherwise the Sha-pé should, in their opinion, pay at Gyantse, as already arranged.

His Majesty's Government agreed with the Government of India that if China accepted the Adhesion Convention, and thereafter did not pay the indemnity direct, payment of the indemnity might, in the future, be accepted from the Sha-pé at Calcutta. At the same time, the British Government could not refuse direct payment by China after the conclusion of the Adhesion Convention. The Secretary of State gave instructions, however, that in the event of the arrangement with the China not being effected, and of the Sha-pé tendering the money at Calcutta, the fact should be reported to His Majesty's Government and

no action should be taken pending receipt of instructions. As regards the Sha-pé's journey to Calcutta, His Majesty's Government agreed that, although he should not be recognized as having an official mission, he should be treated courteously and should receive all reasonable facilities. Arrangements were to be made in the Chumbi valley by which, without abandonment of the principle that the villagers must be paid for transport supplied, the Sha-pé should not be detained on that account. Sir E. Satow was asked, at the same time, whether he could not make use of the difficulty with regard to the acceptance from the Sha-pé at Calcutta of the instalment of indemnity in order to hasten the adhesion of China to the draft Agreement.

The Sha-pé eventually reached Calcutta, and as no conclusion had been come to with China regarding the Adhesion Agreement, the Government of India proposed (March 17) that they should request him to make payment at Gyantse of the sum due. This proposal was accepted by the Home Government, and the Sha-pé was informed accordingly. But he now raised questions as to the exact amount of the instalment due: one lakh, he said was the amount fixed by treaty, but subsequently the British Government had reduced the indemnity from 75 lakhs payable in 75 annual instalments to 25 lakhs payable in three annual instalments; hence the amount of the first instalment due was Rs. 8,33,333 and not one lakh. A reference was accordingly made to the Secretary of State, who telegraphed on the 5th April that pending the development of the Peking Adhesion negotiations which then showed signs of an early settlement, a reply to the Sha-pé's inquiries about payment should be deferred.

The Adhesion Agreement as shown elsewhere (page 67) was signed on the 27th April, and the Government of India were informed (May 4th) that Sir E. Satow had been instructed to intimate to the Chinese Government that His Majesty's Government had no objection to the payment of the indemnity in three instalments, and that the first instalment of 8½ lakhs would be accepted from Sechung Sha-pé at either Calcutta or Gyantse. The Sha-pé paid the sum at Calcutta on the 28th May.

In the following December, just as the second instalment, payable on the 1st January 1907, was falling due, the Chinese Government expressed their wish to pay the amount by telegraphic transfer from Shanghai, and His Majesty's Government accepted the arrangement. But subsequently it became known that Mr. Chang, who had meanwhile gone to Tibet (page 76), had been preventing direct communication between British and Tibetans at the trade marts, and in this, and other ways, had been endeavouring to destroy the position gained by Great Britain, as the result of her mission to Lhasa.

Accordingly His Majesty's Minister at Peking was informed that it was now found necessary to suspend arrangements for the payment of the indemnity instalment direct by the Chinese, as payment had not been made, and to require payment through a Tibetan official at Gyantse, as provided for by the actual terms of the Lhasa Convention. These orders were however too late; for the second instalment of the indemnity had already been paid by cheque on the 18th February 1907 by the Hong-Kong and Shanghai Bank to the Comptroller-General, Calcutta.

In December 1907, when the third instalment, payable on the 1st January

#### Evacuation of the Chumbi Valley.

1908, of the Tibet indemnity was about to fall due, the Wai-wu-pu, in a note, dated the 23rd December 1907, addressed His Majesty's Minister at Peking, pointing out that under article 7 of the Lhasa Convention, the British Government were to occupy the Chumbi Valley until the indemnity had been paid and until the trade marts had been effectively opened for three years, whichever date might be the later, and that, according to the provision in the Declaration appended to the Convention, the British occupation of the valley was to cease after the due payment of three annual instalments of the said indemnity. They recalled the subsequent declaration by His Majesty's Government that the 1st January 1905 was to be regarded as the date of the effective opening of the trade marts, and added that the third instalment of the indemnity would fall due on the 1st January 1908, on which date they had made arrangements for its payment through the Hong-Kong and Shanghai Bank. The Chinese Government, therefore, requested that His

Majesty's Government might accordingly be requested, by telegraph, to withdraw the British troops in temporary occupation of the Chumbi Valley on the 1st of January 1908.

On the 27th December, Mr. Chang, the Chinese Commissioner in India, wrote to Sir L. Dane, Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, asking to whom he should pay the third instalment of the indemnity, which had been remitted to him, with instructions to pay it to the Government of India. The Government of India, in informing the Secretary of State of the fact, strongly urged that, in view of the recent evidences of a policy on the part of China to exclude Tibetans from having direct relations with the British, payment of the instalment should be required direct from the Tsarong Sha-pé—the Tibetan official—and not from the Chinese Government. The Secretary of State approved this proposal (January 8, 1908); and Mr. Chang was informed accordingly. Thereupon both Mr. Chang and the Tsarong Sha-pé at once expressed their inability, in view of their explicit instructions on the point, to comply with the procedure proposed; and the Secretary of State was informed to this effect.

Meantime the Government of India communicated to the Home Government their views as to the transfer of the administration of the Chumbi Valley to the Tibetans. Their views were briefly that the transfer should at least be deferred until they had some guarantee in the new Trade Regulations (see page 99) that the marts would be effectively opened and that they would remain so. If the transfer were permitted before the signature of the Trade Regulations, Great Britain would lose the chief lever which they possessed for securing the real compliance of China with the terms of the Lhasa Convention.

On the 9th January 1908 the Secretary of State telegraphed to His Majesty's Minister at Peking that the Wai-wu-pu's note of the 23rd December had ignored the condition requiring that the Tibetans should have fully complied with the terms of the Lhasa Convention in all other respects. The obstruction to Indian traders at Gyantse and to the telegraphic and postal communication, which had occurred since Mr. Chang's visit to Tibet, would have entitled His Majesty's Government to have raised the question as to whether this condition had been strictly observed. His Majesty's Government, of course, considered that the stipulated conditions should be observed after, as well as before, the evacuation of the Chumbi Valley, and the attitude of Mr. Chang, with regard to the preamble to the revised Tibet Trade Regulations, had made it appear doubtful whether the undertaking of China to uphold the Lhasa Convention would be loyally fulfilled. His Majesty's Government were, however, prepared, on their part, to carry out the undertaking to evacuate the valley and, in view of the fact that the Wai-wu-pu had now agreed to a satisfactory preamble, to send instructions to the Government of India to that effect. In return, His Majesty's Government expected that their wishes would be met with regard to the Trade Regulations now under discussion, and hoped that, with a view to the speedy conclusion of the negotiations, they would send conciliatory instructions to Mr. Chang. Sir J. Jordan was accordingly requested to make the necessary communication to the Wai-wu-pu; and the Government of India were informed of the terms of the communication to China, and asked to take such action as was necessary to give effect to the decision.

On the 27th January Sir L. Dane received a formal visit from the Tsarong Sha-pé, accompanied by two Tibetan officers. The Sha-pé handed to Sir L. Dane a cheque signed by Mr. Chang for the third and last instalment of the indemnity. The fact was reported to the Secretary of State, with an intimation from the Government of India that they were issuing the necessary orders for the withdrawal of the troops from the Chumbi Valley.

On the 28th January the Political Officer in Sikkim was informed by the Government of India that the designation of the Assistant Political Officer in Chumbi would in future be "British Trade Agent at Yatung."

On the 8th February 1908, Captain Campbell, British Trade Agent at Yatung, reported that the British troops had evacuated the Chumbi Valley on that day. Mr. Chang had informed the local Chinese officials that immediately on the withdrawal of the British garrison from the valley Chinese authority would be restored



and that the Pishi Depon would manage the Tibetan officials. On the 9th February the Popon, Tungling, Customs Commissioner, and Depon called on Captain Campbell and announced that they had received instructions from Mr. Chang that the administration of the valley was to be handed over by the British. On the 10th February the Government of India instructed Captain Campbell to inform the Jongpens and headmen that he had ceased to control the administration of the Chumbi Valley, which now rested with them. He was also told to send a copy of his message to the Chinese Popon. On the same day a proclamation was posted by the Chinese Popon at Pipatang to the effect that the administration of the valley had been vested in the Chinese. On the 12th February the Secretary of State was informed of the evacuation of Chumbi and the steps taken by the Government of India with regard to the transfer of the administration to the Tibetan authorities.

Prior to the evacuation of the Chumbi Valley, there were two dispensaries in the valley, at Chumbi and at Phari. On the withdrawal of the British garrisons a military hospital assistant was left behind as a temporary measure, and was placed in charge of the civil dispensary at Chumbi, the Phari dispensary being closed. It was then proposed that the free dispensary at Chumbi should be permanently retained in order to continue to treat a local population of some 4,000 in the valley, the traders and others on the main trade route between India and Tibet, and to attend to the Government officials at Yatung. It was also suggested that the medical officer at Gyantse should be granted general permission to carry out half-yearly inspections of the dispensary. It was originally recommended that an indoor ward should be established in the dispensary, but this proposal was dropped for reasons of economy, and because it was not considered to be of great political importance. The rest of the scheme was sanctioned, with certain modifications, which included the substitution of a military for a civil hospital assistant and an issue of free rations to menials in place of ration allowances.

The Dalai Lama, after his flight from Lhasa at the time of the arrival there of the British Mission in August 1904, proceeded direct to Urga in Mongolia, near the Russian frontier, where he became the recipient of marked attention from the Russian Minister at Peking, and received a telegram of appreciation from the Czar.

Subsequent reports were conflicting as to his exact whereabouts. From documentary evidence received from Lhasa it appeared that the Amban had petitioned the Emperor of China to permit the Dalai Lama to return to Lhasa and resume his former position there. The Amban subsequently informed the Tibetan authorities that the Emperor had approved of the Dalai Lama's return to Tibet, and had issued an Imperial order directing that every assistance should be rendered to him *en route* to Lhasa. The Amban expected orders later with regard to the Dalai Lama's reinstatement, but in the meantime instructed the Lhasa authorities to make all necessary preparations for his return.

On the 20th March 1906, the Secretary of State telegraphed that information had been volunteered to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires by the Russian Government, to the effect that the Czar had recently received Dorjief who brought presents and a message from the Dalai Lama asking for protection in case his life were in danger. A vague message of thanks was given. The Dalai Lama was said to be staying with a Mongolian Prince and was desirous of returning to the Tibetan capital.

In the following November Dorjief was reported to be in St. Petersburg. The Russian Government, however, maintained a very friendly attitude towards Great Britain in regard to the Dalai Lama. In the end of April 1906, after a friendly exchange of views regarding the Lama between Sir A. Nicolson and Count Lamsdorff, the latter stated that he was absolutely opposed to intervention in Tibet and that the Dalai Lama clearly understood that he was expected to keep quiet and that he could count upon no support or assistance from the Russian Government. Again in November 1906 Sir A. Nicolson reported that the Russian

Government had let the Dalai Lama understand that his return to Lhasa was undesirable at present and that no one over whom they had any control would be permitted to accompany him, if he did return.

The Chinese Government also gave several assurances during 1906 to the British Minister at Peking that they had no intention yet of allowing the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet.

In July 1908, the Dalai Lama, who had been staying for some time in Shansi near the Peking Province, was ordered by a Decree to proceed to Peking for an audience. The Dalai Lama arrived at Peking on the 28th September 1908, accompanied by Dorjief and others.

A detailed account of his proceedings in Peking is given as Appendix IV, but the following few facts are of interest. His Holiness exchanged visits with the various Legations; and gave several evidences of being well disposed towards the British. He also presented to the British Minister a "hata" or scarf for transmission to His Britannic Majesty, with a message of respectful greetings.

It may be mentioned that His Majesty ultimately sent a gracious message to the Dalai Lama in reply, but that in view of the inexpediency of making it an occasion for controversy as to whether a copy of it should be communicated to the Chinese Resident at Lhasa, and of the fact that the Lama's presents were of a conventional character, it was decided not to communicate the message to the Lama.

Under instructions from the Home Government, Sir J. Jordan informed the Chinese Government that the British Government did not desire to put any obstacles in the way of the return of the Dalai Lama to Tibet. An Imperial Decree was issued conferring on His Holiness an honorific title, and commanding him to return to Tibet. This document contained an unequivocal declaration on the part of China that she regarded Tibet as within her sovereignty. His Holiness left Peking by rail, travelling towards Chenchow, on the 21st December 1908, and expecting to arrive in Lhasa in May 1909. He eventually arrived in Nagchuka on 17th September 1909, and at Lhasa on the 21st December 1909.

In the beginning of 1906 the British and Russian Governments were in negotiation, with a view to arriving at a mutual understanding in regard to Tibet. On the 8th June 1906, Sir A. Nicolson, in order to facilitate discussions on the subject, communicated informally and privately to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, the following points, approved by His Majesty's Government, as the bases of the British demands:—

"(1) The Russian Government should recognize, as Great Britain has done, the suzerainty of China over Tibet, and should engage to respect the territorial integrity of Tibet, and to abstain from all interference in its internal administration.

(2) The Russian Government should recognize that, by reasons of its geographical position, Great Britain has a special interest in seeing that the external relations of Tibet are not disturbed by any other Power.

(3) The British and Russian Governments should severally engage not to send a representative to Lhasa."

(4) The British and Russian Governments should agree not to seek or obtain, whether for themselves or their subjects, any concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining, or other rights in Tibet.

(5) The British and Russian Governments should agree that no Tibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to them, or to any of their subjects."

It was also added that no Russian official should be present in Tibet in any capacity whatever.

On the 7th October, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs supplied Sir A. Nicolson, with a draft Convention of five articles, of which articles 1, 3, 4, and 5

were identical with points 1, 3, 4, and 5 mentioned above. Article 2 of the Russian draft Convention was as follows :—

“ In conformity with the recognition of the principle of the suzerainty of China over Tibet, Great Britain and Russia mutually engage not to treat with Tibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government. This engagement does not exclude the direct relations between the British commercial agents and local Tibetan authorities, provided for in the Convention of 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet. It is clearly understood that Buddhists, whether Russian or British subjects, retain the right of having direct relations on religious matters with the Dalai Lama and other representatives of Buddhism in Tibet.”

No mention was made in this article of the subject dealt with in point 2 of Sir A. Nicolson's instructions, namely, the special interests of Great Britain with regard to the foreign relations of Tibet.

The Russian Minister had previously asked, that in any agreement which might eventually be drawn up, no specific mention should be made of the exclusion of Russian officials from Tibet. Sir A. Nicolson thought that the end desired could be obtained by an exchange of notes, or by some other means.

On the 29th October, His Majesty's Secretary of State for India telegraphed that the Foreign Office proposed to instruct His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg to point out that Article I of the Adhesion Agreement provided that both Great Britain and China should take such steps at all times as might be necessary to secure due fulfilment of the terms specified in the Lhasa Convention, and to inform the Russian Government that, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, the direct relations between British commercial agents and Tibetan local authorities, allowed by Article II of the Russian draft, should extend to and include any communications that it might become necessary to make to the Tibetan Government through the Tibetan local authorities with regard to the observance by Tibet of the Lhasa Convention. His Majesty's Government were of opinion that, in order to prevent misunderstanding, words to that effect should be inserted in the article. Further, in view of the fact, that, except as regards China and various Native States, Tibet was coterminous only with India, the Foreign Office proposed to add that His Majesty's Government attached importance to the retention in the article of words recognizing the special interest of Great Britain as regards the foreign relations of Tibet. In respect to communications between Buriats and the Dalai Lama, it was proposed to instruct Sir A. Nicolson to endeavour to procure the acceptance by the Russian Government of words to the effect that the two Governments would take such steps as might be necessary and possible to prevent these communications from assuming any political character. If it appeared that political communications were passing through the instrumentality of pilgrims, this fact would greatly strengthen the grounds for making representations to the Russian Government. The Government of India were asked to submit their views on these proposals.

The Government of India replied that they agreed as regards the necessity for all the three additions which the Foreign Office proposed to make to Article II of the Russian draft. They remarked with reference to the first addition, that they interpreted Article V of the Lhasa Convention as securing their right to send letters, if necessary, to the Tibetan Government through the Trade Agent and not merely to the local Tibetan authorities as allowed by Article II of the Russian draft. With reference to the third addition proposed, the Government of India stated that they were not aware that political communications were passing at the present moment through the instrumentality of pilgrims. They considered that in the past, political communications had certainly passed through the instrumentality of Dorjjeff, in spite of the fact that his missions to Russia in 1900 and 1901 were expressly stated by the Russian Government, in reply to an enquiry from His Majesty's Government, to be of a religious character. The Government of India were of opinion that religious communications between the Buriats and the Dalai Lama would always afford an opportunity for Russian intrigues ; and though they did not see that such intrigues could be prevented, yet they thought that it

would be something gained if it were agreed by both Governments that no communications from either Government or its officers should be sent to any Tibetan authority through pilgrims.

After prolonged discussion between His Majesty's Government and Russia an Arrangement respecting Tibet was signed on the 31st August 1907, when notes were also exchanged between Sir A. Nicolson and M. Isvolsky on the subject of the prohibition of scientific missions from entering Tibet.

The following is the text of the Arrangement :—

The Governments of Great Britain and Russia recognising the suzerain rights of China in Tibet, and considering the fact that Great Britain, by reason of her geographical position, has a special interest in the maintenance of the *status quo* in the external relations of Tibet, have made the following Arrangements :—

#### ARTICLE I.

The two High Contracting Parties engage to respect the territorial integrity of Tibet to abstain from all interference in the internal administration.

#### ARTICLE II.

In conformity with the admitted principle of the suzerainty of China over Tibet, Great Britain and Russia engage not to enter into negotiations with Tibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government. This engagement does not exclude the direct relations between British Commercial Agents and the Tibetan Authorities provided for in Article V of the Convention between Great Britain and Tibet of the 7th September 1904, and confirmed by the Convention between Great Britain and China of the 27th April 1906; nor does it modify the engagements entered into by Great Britain and China in Article I of the said Convention of 1906.

It is clearly understood that Buddhists, subjects of Great Britain or of Russia, may enter into direct relations on strictly religious matters with the Dalai Lama and the other representatives of Buddhism in Tibet; the Governments of Great Britain and Russia engage, as far as they are concerned, not to allow those relations to infringe the stipulations of the present arrangement.

#### ARTICLE III.

The British and Russian Governments, respectively, engage not to send Representatives to Lhasa.

#### ARTICLE IV.

The two High Contracting Parties engage neither to seek nor to obtain, whether for themselves or their subjects, any Concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, and mines, or other rights in Tibet.

#### ARTICLE V.

The two Governments agree that no part of the revenues of Tibet, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to Great Britain or Russia or to any of their subjects.

#### Annexe to the Arrangements between Great Britain and Russia concerning Tibet.

Great Britain re-affirms the declaration, signed by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India and appended to the ratification of the Convention of the 7th September 1904, to the effect that the occupation of the Chumb Valley by British forces shall cease after the payment of three annual instalments of the indemnity of 25,00,000 rupees, provided that the trade marts mentioned in Article II of the Convention have been effectively opened for three years, and that in the meantime the Tibetan Authorities have faithfully complied in all respects with the terms of the said Convention of 1904. It is clearly understood that if the occupation of the Chumbi Valley by the British forces has, for any reason, not been terminated at the time anticipated in the above Declaration, the British and Russian Governments will enter upon a friendly exchange of views on this subject.

The following is the text of the notes that were also exchanged between Sir A. Nicolson and M. Isvolsky :—

*From Sir A. Nicolson to M. Isvolsky.*

With reference to the Arrangement regarding Tibet, signed to-day, I have the honour to make the following Declaration to Your Excellency :—

“His Britannic Majesty's Government think it desirable, so far as they are concerned, not to allow, unless by a previous agreement with the Russian Government, for a period of three

years from the date of the present communication, the entry into Tibet of any scientific mission whatever, on condition that a like assurance is given on the part of the Imperial Russian Government.

“ His Britannic Majesty’s Government propose, moreover, to approach the Chinese Government with a view to induce them to accept a similar obligation for a corresponding period ; the Russian Government will, as a matter of course, take similar action.

“ At the expiration of the term of three years above mentioned His Britannic Majesty’s Government will, if necessary, consult with the Russian Government as to the desirability of any ulterior measures with regard to scientific expeditions to Tibet.”

*From M. Isvolsky to Sir A. Nicolson.*

In reply to Your Excellency’s note of even date, I have the honour to declare that the Imperial Russian Government think it desirable, so far as they are concerned, not to allow, unless by a previous agreement with the British Government, for a period of three years from the date of the present communication, the entry into Tibet of any scientific mission whatever.

Like the British Government, the Imperial Government propose to approach the Chinese Government with a view to induce them to accept a similar obligation for a corresponding period.

It is understood that at the expiration of the term of three years the two Governments will, if necessary, consult with each other as to the desirability of any ulterior measures with regard to scientific expeditions to Tibet.

Ratifications of the Conventions with Russia were exchanged at St. Petersburg on the 23rd September. On the 27th Sir J. Jordan telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey that he and the Russian Minister at Peking had communicated separately that day to the Wai-wu-pu the text of the Arrangement, and had also furnished them unofficially with the draft of a proposed note regarding the interdiction of scientific missions to Tibet. The Wai-wu-pu were also informed at the same time that, if they accepted the note, a formal communication on the subject would be made to them.

Sir J. Jordan telegraphed, on the 5th October, that the Wai-wu-pu had handed to the Russian Minister and himself an identic memorandum which stated that China had not in the past permitted foreigners of any description to travel in Tibet, and that this course would be adhered to in the future. The Wai-wu-pu observed that no change had been made in the limits of Tibet and that the old limits should be regarded as authoritative. They added that there was no necessity to furnish a definition of the limits and that there was no need of a formal communication on the subject.

On the 11th October Sir J. Jordan was informed that His Majesty’s Government did not propose to pursue the question further unless he saw any reason for so doing.

On the 15th June 1906, His Britannic Majesty’s Chargé d’Affaires, Peking, telegraphed that the Wai-wu-pu had informed him that Mr. Chang, late Chinese Commissioner, proposed to start from Simla shortly for Gartok, whence he would return to India and proceed into Tibet *viâ* Darjeeling to arrange the opening of trade marts there. They requested that due facilities might be accorded *viâ* Darjeeling.

Subsequently Mr. Chang had an interview at Calcutta with Sir L. Dane, the Foreign Secretary, to discuss the question of his mission to the trade marts in Tibet. Sir L. Dane impressed upon the Chinese Commissioner the difficulties of the road from Simla to Gartok, and the insignificance of the latter place, with the result that Mr. Chang abandoned that trip, and eventually left Simla on the 17th July *en route* for Chumbi, *viâ* Darjeeling.

On the 26th September, Lieutenant Campbell, Assistant Political Officer in Chumbi, reported that Mr. Chang and party had arrived in the valley ; and it appears that these two officers at once came to loggerheads ; for the very same day they both telegraphed to the Government of India complaining the one of the other. Mr. Chang accused Lieutenant Campbell of incivility and withholding facilities while Lieutenant Campbell stated that Mr. Chang and party had behaved in an

overbearing manner, intimidating the local Tibetans and endeavouring to procure supplies without payment.

Mr. Bell, Political Officer, Sikkim, arrived in Chumbi the following day, and after inquiry into the matter, came to the conclusion that Mr. Chang, after entering Chumbi, had endeavoured to ignore British occupation and to assert Chinese authority, and that as he was not allowed to do this, he shifted his ground and complained of discourtesy. The incident, however, appeared to be closed, and Mr. Bell hoped that cordial relations would soon be resumed.

It was not long, however, before difficulties again arose. In December reports were received from the British Trade Agent at Gyantse to the effect that Mr. Gow, a Chinese official posted by Mr. Chang at Gyantse, had threatened to stop Tibetans furnishing supplies to the Trade Agency, except at prices fixed by himself, and that he had claimed the right to act as intermediary in all transactions between British officers and Tibetans. The British Trade Agent at Gyantse also reported that the Jongpens had informed him officially that Mr. Chang had left orders at Gyantse that all dealings between the British and Tibetans were to be conducted through the medium of Mr. Gow. Further, it was reported by the British Minister at Peking that Mr. Chang in explaining to the Wai-wu-pu his recent action in Chumbi, had stated that he had come to an arrangement with Mr. Bell, whereby all difficulties between Tibetans and British subjects were to be settled with the Chinese Trade Agent as they arose, and the price of supplies was to be notified to the British authorities by the Chinese Agent.

The Government of India reported all these facts to His Majesty's Government; who instructed Sir J. Jordan to make them the subject of diplomatic representation to the Chinese Government.

Later (February 3, 1907), the Government of India telegraphed to the Home Government the receipt of further reports to the effect that the Amban Yu Tai, who was the Amban concerned in the negotiation of the Tibet Convention of 1904, had been relieved of office on the 12th January and imprisoned in chains. Yu Tai's secretary had also been imprisoned. The former Shigatse and Chumbi Popons and two other Chinese had been degraded, while the Teling Depon, an opponent of the Mission at Khamba Jong, had become a most influential personage in Lhasa and constantly urged a renewal of hostilities.

Further, similar action was apparently being taken against the Tibetan officials concerned with the recent negotiations. The Yutok Shapé and General Tang Me had been degraded and deprived of office by the Chinese, and the Sechung Shapé was threatened with similar punishment. A delegate from Lhasa, who had been at Gyantse since the 28th January, had failed to call on Captain O'Connor. The Tashi Lama had also written to Captain O'Connor that he had received a letter from Mr. Chang to the effect that the Chinese would permit no further visits of British officers to Shigatse.

Mr. Chang too had written to Sir L. Dane stating that he had appointed Chinese officers as Chinese Trade and Diplomatic Representatives at the trade marts; which looked like an attempt to evade the provisions of Article V of the Convention of 1904, whereby Tibetan Agents were to be appointed at the marts by the Tibetan Government, and as a possible move towards turning these marts into Treaty Ports, which would entirely defeat the objects of British policy in Tibet.

□ The Government of India considered that these incidents, read in continuation of the facts previously reported to His Majesty's Government on the subject of Mr. Chang's continued refusal to allow direct communication between the British and Tibetans at the trade marts, afforded indubitable proof of his determination to upset the *status quo* and destroy the position gained by the British as a result of the Mission; and they made certain suggestions to His Majesty's Government, which, with the latter's reply, need not be further noticed here.

The foregoing reports from the Government of India were repeated to the British Minister at Peking, with an intimation that His Majesty's Government were anxious that the matters reported by the Government of India should be put right, if possible, through the Chinese Government, rather than by separate action in Tibet. The Minister was instructed to call the attention of the

Chinese Government to the report of the action taken by Mr. Chang and to point out to them that any punishment of officials for having been concerned in the negotiation of the Convention with the British Government was not compatible with the recognition of the Convention by China. He was also requested to represent strongly that as the visit of the Tashi Lama to Calcutta was purely a ceremonial one to meet the Prince of Wales, any action against him, which punished him for that visit as if it had been an offence, would not be consistent with the courteous and cordial relations between His Majesty's Government and China.

The object of His Majesty's Government in entering into the Adhesion Convention was that the maintenance of their Convention with Tibet should not be prejudicial to China. They had, therefore, recognized frankly the position of China, as regards Tibet, and expected, in return, that the Chinese Government would use their influence to secure due observance of His Majesty's Government's Convention with Tibet. In view of Mr. Chang's action it was necessary to have a clear understanding that this would be done. Sir J. Jordan was instructed also to represent that His Majesty's Government could not regard Chinese officials as having taken the place of the Tibetan Agents to be appointed at the trade marts, and he was to enquire what was the exact status of the officers appointed at the trade marts by Mr. Chang. His Majesty's Government could not permit interference by Chinese officers with the freedom of the dealings between their Trade Agent at Gyantse and the Tibetan Agent. Finally, Sir J. Jordan was informed that His Majesty's Government would prefer to see all these matters adjusted satisfactorily in accord with China, and, pending the reply of the Chinese Government, they would not address any request direct to the Tibetan Government, as, under the Convention, they would be entitled to do.

On the 27th February, Sir J. Jordan telegraphed that he had communicated with the Wai-wu-pu in accordance with Sir E. Grey's instructions and had received a written reply from them in which it was stated that Mr. Chang had been commissioned by Imperial Decree to investigate charges against Government officers. The Amban Yu Tai had been found guilty of corruption: his secretary, some Tibetan officials and others had also incurred punishment for acts of corruption; and, although no one had been imprisoned and no one punished for having been concerned in the treaty negotiations, they were all under surveillance, pending judgment. There was no intention of punishing the Tashi Lama for his visit to India, which was of a ceremonial character and the expenses of which had moreover been defrayed by Mr. Chang who had also received the Lama's warm thanks for attentions paid to him during his illness at Darjeeling. The Chinese officials employed by Mr. Chang had been appointed for the sole purpose of carrying out the opening of the trade marts in accordance with the treaty, and they had been instructed to maintain courteous relations with the British and Tibetan officials. The Wai-wu-pu further intimated that the Chinese Government were, under the treaty, obliged to take appropriate steps to secure the due opening of the trade marts, and that the general tenor of the instructions issued by them to Mr. Chang had been based on this obligation. As there had been some misunderstanding, owing, possibly, to the condensed language of telegrams, further instructions would be issued by the Wai-wu-pu to ensure that the terms of the British-Chinese Convention of 1906 should be carried out in all respects, in amicable consultation with the British authorities. In conclusion, the Wai-wu-pu expressed the hope that, as the result of these further instructions, the relations between the agents of the two Governments in Tibet would be more cordial.

In March 1907 Captain O'Connor reported that Mr. Gow had repeated his obstructive tactics, and that a complete deadlock had been reached at Gyantse. The local Tibetan authorities had refused point blank to deal directly with him in any matter and had referred him to Mr. Gow as the proper person to communicate with under clause VI of the Trade Regulations of 1893.

In repeating this information to the Secretary of State, on the 12th March, the Government of India added that the reference to Article VI of the Trade Regulations made by the Jongpens was a mere quibble, as these Regulations must be interpreted in the light of the Lhasa Convention and the history of the Mission and subsequent events. It was the failure of the Chinese to secure the compliance



of the Tibetans with the terms of the Convention of 1890 and the Regulations of 1893 that had compelled the British Government to deal direct with the Lhasa Government about these questions, and it would be very difficult to recognize the Chinese authorities in Tibet unless they evinced a more conciliatory and accommodating attitude. Mr. Morley was further informed that the Government of India were quite prepared to commence the discussion of the revision of the Trade Regulations as soon as the Tibetan Government appointed their representatives, but they begged that the latter might do this in direct communication with the Government of India, as it was possible that the Lhasa Government might repudiate all arrangements, as they did the 1893 Regulations, if the Chinese were permitted to appoint the Tibetan representatives.

But His Majesty's Government decided that the situation, thus reported, should be dealt with by negotiation with the Chinese Government at Peking.

Sir J. Jordan was accordingly addressed in the matter, and instructed to inform the Chinese Government that His Majesty's Government must insist firmly on the right of direct communication between the British Agent and the local Tibetan authorities, and Sir J. Jordan was further directed to urge the Chinese Government to send very clear instructions in this sense to Mr. Chang. It was added that the attitude of the Trade Agent at Gyantse must naturally depend on complete compliance of Chinese and Tibetan officials with the Treaty stipulations of their Governments towards Great Britain. In repeating the message to the Government of India, Mr. Morley requested that a conciliatory and amicable attitude might be maintained by Captain O'Connor.

The Chinese Government in reply to this communication, fully admitted the right of the British Trade Agent to direct communication with the Tibetans, and said that explicit instructions in this sense had been sent to Mr. Chang. Further, they suggested the establishment of friendly personal relations between the British and Chinese Agents at Gyantse as the best means of improving the position; and explained that Captain O'Connor, being the new-comer at Gyantse, should make the first call upon Mr. Gow, according to Chinese etiquette.

With reference to this reply from China, the Government of India telegraphed on April 15, 1907, to the Secretary of State expressing their concurrence with the Wai-wu-pu as to the advisability of establishing amicable relations between the British and Chinese officers at Gyantse. They, however, suggested that before any steps were taken in this direction by Captain O'Connor, full effect should be given by the Chinese officers in Tibet to the instructions already issued to them by the Wai-wu-pu, as to the freedom of communications between British officials and Tibetans. The Government of India had not heard that any steps had been taken by Mr. Chang to rescind the orders prohibiting the Jongpens from dealing direct with Captain O'Connor. They, moreover, regarded it as very undesirable that any British officer should call on Mr. Gow, until he had withdrawn the charges of high-handedness, robbery, and breach of treaty, which he had made in the rude letters addressed by him to Mr. Bell, Acting Political Officer in Sikkim, and Lieutenant Bailey, Acting British Trade Agent at Gyantse. They, further, suggested to Mr. Morley that Sir J. Jordan should be asked to ascertain the real rank of Mr. Gow, and to furnish his opinion as to whether, from the point of view of Chinese etiquette, it would be appropriate for an officer of the status of a Consul, such as they considered the Trade Agent to be, to pay a first call upon him. In the opinion of the Government of India, the simplest solution of the difficulty seemed to be that the Chinese Government should recall Mr. Gow from Gyantse, and appoint a new officer in his place, with instructions to carry out recent orders and to observe the ordinary rules of courtesy in correspondence with the Trade Agent. Captain O'Connor would then be instructed by the Government of India to use every endeavour to maintain friendly relations with the new Chinese officer, who as the new-comer, would naturally pay the first call. On the 22nd April Mr. Morley telegraphed that, with regard to the exchange of visits between Captain O'Connor and Mr. Gow, Sir J. Jordan had been instructed to inform the Chinese Government that His Majesty's Government had no objection to Captain O'Connor making the first call as a matter of courtesy, but they could not authorize him to do so until they had learnt that the orders issued by the Chinese Government that

no obstacles should be placed in the way of direct relations between the British and Tibetans at Gyantse had been fulfilled.

But the Chinese Government continued to urge that they had issued the necessary orders; and that the situation would improve if Captain O'Connor called on Mr. Gow. At this point, His Majesty's Government offered spontaneously, provided freedom of communications was restored, to agree not to insist upon the immediate appointment, under the terms of the Treaty, of Tibetan Agents at the trade marts. But the situation did not improve; and at one time Captain O'Connor reported that he feared a possible collision between the Chinese or Tibetans and the employés of the British Trade Agency.

On the 27th June 1907 Sir E. Grey telegraphed to Sir J. Jordan that it seemed clear that the local Chinese officials would not obey the orders of the Chinese Government as to free communications between the British Trade Agent and Tibetan officials and inhabitants of Gyantse. As it was not the intention of His Majesty's Government either to strengthen the escort at Gyantse or to send an envoy to Lhasa to deal with the Tibetan Government independently of Chinese intervention, Sir J. Jordan was instructed to make a further very serious representation to the Chinese Government, and to point out that, while both Governments equally desired the evacuation of the Chumbi Valley on the 1st January 1908, it was even more to China's interest than Great Britain's that the normal conditions contemplated by the Convention should be established at Gyantse. Once such conditions were established no further difficulty need be anticipated, as all that His Majesty's Government wanted was free trade, British political interests being secured by the other clauses of the Convention. Sir J. Jordan was also to draw the attention of the Chinese Government to the fact that no friction had existed between Captain O'Connor and the local Tibetans before Mr. Chang and Mr. Gow began to intervene. His Majesty's Government did not contemplate taking military steps, but Sir J. Jordan was requested to inform the Chinese Government that His Majesty's Government might have to withdraw the arrangement by which they allowed China to pay the indemnity and that, in that event, they would themselves inform the Lhasa Government of their change of front towards China in the matter and warn them to be ready to make payment direct without Chinese intervention when the time came in January 1908. Sir J. Jordan was also asked whether it would be possible to induce the Chinese Government to remove Mr. Gow entirely from employment in Tibet. The policy of His Majesty's Government in Tibet was neither to push trade nor to assert political influence, but to reduce establishments at the marts to the lowest minimum consistent with the maintenance of the Convention. They thought that a Native Agent might ultimately be appointed to Gyantse if things went quietly. China appeared to be trifling with her obligations in the matter of Tibet as in railway and other concessions, and His Majesty's Government were ready to bring pressure to bear on her, but it was difficult to do so without having some action in view which would be practical. They were prepared to consider the means of making China take a serious view of all her obligations to Great Britain, if Sir J. Jordan could suggest any action which might have the desired effect.

On the 5th July Sir J. Jordan telegraphed to Sir E. Grey that the Wai-wu-pu had asked him to assure His Majesty's Government that they desired to treat Tibetan questions in a spirit of friendly co-operation, and had decided to recall Mr. Gow, who was stationed at Gyantse, to China.

Mr. Gow left for India, *en route* to China, on the 15th August 1907, with orders to report himself to the Wai-wu-pu.

Mr. Gow was replaced at Gyantse by Mr. Lin Tien Hai (Leotenhy).

But every indication remained that China was intent on establishing an effective control over Tibet.

During the next twelve months her military activity in the country was very noticeable. Large consignments of rifles and ammunition were reported to have arrived in Lhasa; and gunsmiths were said to be coming from China to work in the Lhasa arsenal. Considerable additions were made to the strength of the Tibetan Army, the new recruits being placed under drill instructors specially deputed from China. At the same time the Chinese garrison in Lhasa was increased.

In March 1908 it was reported that Chao Erh Feng the Acting Viceroy of Szechuan, had been appointed Amban in Tibet. In the following September news was received that he had been relieved of his duties in Szechuan and was free to enter upon those of his double post, Warden of the Tibetan Marches and Minister Resident in Tibet. From the instructions which had been issued to him it appeared that the policy of consolidating Chinese power in Tibet was to be pursued with vigour in future.

In November 1908 it was reported that Chao Erh Feng was at Ta-chien-lu. It appeared from information supplied by Mr. Muir of the China Inland Mission that considerable unrest existed in the neighbourhood of Batang, and it was possible that an advance of Chao Erh Feng upon his journey to Lhasa, unless he was accompanied by forces much stronger than those he had, might be the signal of widespread and serious disturbances among the tribesmen. This information was substantiated to a certain extent by a report forwarded to his Government, by the Nepalese Representative at Lhasa, to the effect that the Tibetan Government were collecting troops in the Kham district in Eastern Tibet with the object of impressing upon Chao Erh Feng that his advance towards Lhasa with Chinese troops would be opposed by the Tibetans, who apprehended that the presence of such troops in Lhasa would mean the loss of Tibetan authority in the country.

Previous to this, news had been received by the Political Officer in Sikkim that there were 3,000 Chinese troops in Eastern Tibet who had treated the wide tract of country occupied by them as a part of China proper, taking the revenues which formerly went to Lhasa. Mr. Muir of the China Inland Mission who had made a journey to Latang and Batang in 1907, reported that the telegraph line had been extended to Batang, that rest-houses had been erected at intervals along the route, that Chinese Magistrates had in most places superseded the native officers, and that the lamaseries had nearly all been converted into barracks.

Later reports confirmed the information that considerable unrest existed in Batang; and early in 1909 there were some conflicts between Chinese and Tibetan forces.

In the autumn of 1909 the Nepalese Representative in Lhasa reported that the Chinese authorities there had approached him with a proposal that they might be allowed to enlist about 300 Nepalese of mixed parentage for service with the Chinese troops. The Nepalese Representative referred the proposal to his Government who informed him that he should not agree to it, nor hold out hopes of any assistance; also that he should try to discourage the voluntary enlistment of Nepalese of the class referred to. In referring the matter, the Nepalese Representative also suggested that, if the Chinese approached him again on the subject, he might be allowed to inform them that, as Nepalese of mixed parentage are not fitted for military service, the Nepal Durbar might be willing to send up to Lhasa 5,000 or 6,000 of their trained troops to maintain law and order. The Prime Minister was of opinion that there would be no harm if such a communication were made, as there was no possibility of the Tibetans agreeing, even if the Chinese were prepared to accept the proposal. His Excellency, however, consulted the Resident, who considered that, if the Durbar offered troops for service in Tibet, it would be tantamount to a proffer of service in subordination to the Chinese throne. The Resident also explained that there was the danger of the Chinese, while possibly declining the offer of a large number of troops, asking for the assistance of a smaller number of men, a request which it would then be difficult to refuse. In accordance with the advice offered by the Resident the Prime Minister instructed the Representative to refrain from making any suggestion regarding the employment of Nepalese troops in Tibet.

Soon after this, Mr. Liang approached His Majesty's Minister at Peking regarding the serious opposition that he alleged Chao Erh Feng was encountering in his operations in the Tibetan marches. It was felt necessary to send Chinese troops to Lhasa to strengthen the position of the Chinese Govern-

ment there, but to get the troops overland from China was an expensive and serious undertaking and it had occurred to Mr. Liang that the Government of India might be willing to authorise the passage of one or two thousand Chinese troops to Lhasa through India. He therefore asked Sir J. N. Jordan to ascertain for him what would be the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards such a proposal, if formally submitted to them by the Chinese Government. Sir J. N. Jordan replied that he would not refuse to submit the proposal if made officially, though it was a very unusual one. And the Government of India informed His Majesty's Government that they hoped that the proposal would not be entertained, as their relations with Nepal and Bhutan would be seriously affected by any such action as that proposed.

Subsequently Sir J. Jordan was instructed that if he considered it desirable he might tell Mr. Liang, at any suitable moment, that it would be quite useless for the Chinese Government to approach His Majesty's Government formally for permission to send Chinese troops through India to Tibet, since there were great practical difficulties in the way of the British Government entertaining such a proposal.

On the 3rd January 1910, the Nepalese Representative at Lhasa reported to his Government that authentic news had reached Lhasa recently that Chao Erh Feng with a force of two thousand Chinese soldiers had arrived at Chiamdo and had written to the Tibetan officials informing them of his intention to send into Tibet half of this force, and threatening that should the Tibetans offer resistance they would be annihilated. The letter of the Representative also indicated that considerable tension still existed between Tibetans and Chinese officials at Lhasa.

About the same time the Tibetan Trade Agent at Yatung informed the British Trade Agent that 700 Tibetan troops from Gyantse and one thousand from Shigatse had left for Lhasa, and that he estimated that, in order to stop the advance of the Chinese troops, the Lhasa Government had mobilised 10,000 troops who were stationed at different strategic points.

Towards the end of January an official deputed by the Dalai Lama and Council, called on the British Trade Agent at Gyantse and informed him that there was no doubt that there would be bloodshed if the Chinese troops who were at Chiamdo in Eastern Tibet persisted in coming to Lhasa, as the Tibetan troops were massed at a distance of only half a day's march. It was believed by the Dalai Lama and Council that the authorities at Peking were unaware of the actions of the Chinese troops in Eastern Tibet, and they therefore wished the Wai-wu-pu to be informed of the state of affairs. The British Trade Agent replied that though the Government of India were on friendly relations with Tibet they could not actively interfere in the affairs of Tibet and China.

Reports sent by the Nepalese Representative at Lhasa also indicated that the Tibetans were prepared to oppose the advance of Chinese troops into Tibet. As a matter of fact, the Tibetan authorities at Lhasa had, at the instance of the Dalai Lama, addressed a letter to the Prime Minister of Nepal, asking for Nepalese drill instructors to train their troops and to be allowed to send some of their troops to Nepal for training, also to be supplied with arms and ammunition on payment or on loan. The Prime Minister was of opinion that the Tibetans were deserving of moral support in their struggle against the Chinese, but considered that their proposal for assistance in the shape of arms and men was quite "quixotic." He was considerably concerned at the position of affairs, and asked for the views of the Resident in Nepal and the Government of India before replying to the communication from the Tibetan authorities. The Resident suggested that, as the Chinese Government were experiencing difficulties in the way of sending troops to Tibet, they might agree to the employment in Tibet of a military force from Nepal to assist both the Chinese Amban at Lhasa and the Tibetan authorities to establish law and order, until such time as the Tibetans were able to organize their own forces and undertake full responsibility for their internal affairs.

According to a proclamation issued by the Chinese Resident at Lhasa, the Chinese troops which were to be sent to Lhasa were to be employed on police

duties at the marts and on the routes to the marts, thus securing the removal of British troops from Tibet as provided for in Article XII of the Tibet Trade Regulations, 1908. The Tibetans, however, believed that the real intention of the Chinese was to strengthen their position and increase their authority in Tibet.

Rumours were also current in Lhasa that an agreement existed between the Governments of Great Britain and Russia to discuss Tibetan affairs in three years' time and that this period had now expired. The rumours were having a disquieting effect, and the Nepalese Representative had asked his Government whether any such agreement existed. The Prime Minister of Nepal was not unaware of the existence of the "Arrangement" between Great Britain and Russia, but the Resident in Nepal thought that he did not know anything about the understanding subsidiary to the "Arrangement," as to scientific missions to Tibet.

In reporting this information to the Secretary of State, the Government of India expressed the view that the situation was serious and that the apprehensions of Nepal were reasonable. The Tibetan troops, who were commanded by the brother of the Maharani of Sikkim, would apparently not be able to stand up against Chao Erh Feng. On the other hand, the Chinese position was a difficult one. The Amban at Lhasa had tried to get Gurkhas to enlist and to buy rifles and ammunition from Nepal, and had recently decapitated a Chinese official apparently on the ground of conspiracy with the Tibetans. A hostile country was behind Chao Erh Feng, who had apparently worked down on Chiamdo from Derge, and the subjugation of Tibet would no doubt be accompanied by serious atrocities. The Government of India accordingly suggested that a representation should be made at Peking, in which it might be pointed out that it would not be easy to prevent Nepal from taking measures to protect her interests, and that the British Government could not be indifferent to disorder on its frontiers, resulting possibly in a complete change of the *status quo*, and setting up conditions wholly inconsistent with the spirit of the agreements with Tibet and China which recognized the continuance in Tibet of a Tibetan government. Further, that the Chinese Government might be told that the British Government would be forced in self-defence to strengthen its escorts at Gyantse and Yatung if the unsettlement of the country continued. They added that China and also Russia could at the same time be assured that it was only desired to maintain the *status quo* under the Treaties and Trade Regulations, and that an offer might be made of the good offices of the British Government with the Nepal Durbar, to whom both sides had made overtures, to promote a better understanding between the Tibetans and Chinese.

As regards the Nepal Durbar's fears of the revision of the Anglo-Russian Agreement after three years, the Government of India proposed that they should explain to the Nepal Durbar that the subsidiary arrangement only referred to scientific expeditions to Tibet, and that although it might be revised, it was not necessary that it should be revised, and that its revision would not affect the main agreement.

With the approval of His Majesty's Government, the Resident in Nepal was subsequently informed in this sense; and was also shown a copy of the Convention, and of the subsidiary agreement.

In the meanwhile four Tibetan officials had arrived in Calcutta. The senior of these, a junior Secretary of the Dalai Lama, brought a scarf for His Excellency the Viceroy from the Lama and a verbal message announcing his return to Tibet. He also had a Tibetan paper with a seal, said to be that of the Lama, authorizing him to represent the case of the Tibetans in the present trouble to His Excellency, the Political Officer in Sikkim and the British Trade Agent, Gyantse. The other Tibetan officials had a similar paper bearing three or four seals of monasteries. At an interview with the Foreign Secretary they spoke freely of Chinese oppression and said they looked to the British Government for help.

His Excellency the Viceroy, in addressing the Secretary of State on the subject, on the 15th February, said that to turn the deputation away would prob-

ably have a bad effect and injure British interests, in view of the reception accorded in Russia to Dorjjeff's party. His Excellency proposed, therefore, to receive the deputation, and to send by it a verbal message to the Dalai Lama saying that he was glad to learn of his return to Tibet and thanking him for the scarf. He would also express his hope for the prosperity and well-being of His Holiness and of Tibet and for the continuance of the friendly relations between Tibet and India. As regards the differences between the Tibetans and Chinese, His Excellency proposed to say that he hoped these would soon be settled amicably, and that the British Government were precluded from interfering in the internal administration of Tibet by their treaty obligations with China and Russia.

On the 17th February, the Tibetan Trade Agents at Yatung informed the British Trade Agent that a communication had been received from the Lhasa Shapés that, owing to the arrival of 40 Chinese mounted infantry at Lhasa on the 12th February and the near approach of the remainder of the Chinese army from Chiamdo, the Dalai Lama and some officials had left Lhasa on the same day and were flying to Gangtok where they wished supplies to be arranged for by the Maharaja Kumar of Sikkim.

Telegraphing from Kangma on the 19th February, the British Trade Agent at Gyantse reported that the Lama, three Shapés, three Ministers, and a party numbering about one hundred, passed through Kangma at midnight of the 17th and 18th, and that the Chinese officials had sent troops to the Chumbi valley presumably in order to prevent the Lama from passing through. Fighting had taken place at Kangma and 10 Chinese had been killed.

On the 19th, the Lama arrived at Phari where he was allowed the temporary use of the dāk bungalow. The position at Phari was that 140 Chinese troops had collected from all sides against 400 Tibetans, including those with the Lama, but no disturbance occurred. Previous to the Lama's arrival at Phari, the British Trade Agent, who enquired whether he should proceed to Phari with mounted infantry and escort the Lama to Chumbi, was instructed not to do this and to observe strict neutrality. He was however told that, in the event of the life of the Lama being in danger and his claiming British protection at the Trade Agency, he should extend such protection and report the matter for orders at once.

On the 20th the Lama arrived at Chumbi. During his stay the Chinese sent an agent to ask permission to occupy the dāk bungalow which was readily granted. Shortly after, three Chinese officials of Chumbi interviewed the British Trade Agent and wished him to entice the Lama to remain, but knowing that Chinese troops were coming from Phari he would not listen and told the Lama to leave at once. The Chinese had an audience with the Dalai Lama, who acknowledged salutations, but no conversation took place between them. Before leaving for Gnatong on the 21st he left with the British Trade Agent the following report:

"Tibetan people at Lhasa have been greatly oppressed by the Chinese. Chinese mounted infantry arrived there and fired on Tibetans killing and wounding them. I with my six ministers had to make good my escape and it is now my intention of proceeding to India to consult with the British Government. Since leaving Lhasa, I have been greatly harassed on the road by Chinese troops. At Chaksam two hundred Chinese Mongol infantry were behind me, and I left a party of soldiers there to keep them back. Small engagement took place there in which seventy Chinese and two Tibetans were killed. I have left Regent and Acting Ministers at Lhasa, but I and my Ministers have brought our seals with us. The British Government have been treating me with all courtesy for which I am very grateful, and I now look to you for protection and I trust relations between the British Government and Tibet will be that of a father to his children. I hope to give full information on my arrival in India, and wish to be guided by you."

On the 21st, eighteen armed troops were said to have arrived at Phari and demanded ponies from the Tibetans, saying that if they refused they would behead the Jongpon's menials and also the headmen of the village and send them to the Chinese Amban at Lhasa. One Tibetan was wounded with a sword and the Chinese behaved very brutally. All small villages were also reported to have been looted by Chinese *en route* from Gyantse to Phari.



On the 22nd, news was received that the Lama had arrived at Gnatong (Sikkim) on the previous night and was proceeding to Darjeeling, where he was expected to arrive on the 27th. This information was communicated to the Secretary of State, who was informed that instructions had been issued to show the Lama every courtesy but to treat the visit as private. The Government of India also proposed that, until other arrangements could be made, the Lama should be invited to occupy Hastings House in Calcutta as the Tashi Lama had done; also that no reply should be sent to his messages beyond ordinary civilities.

On the 23rd, the Secretary of State telegraphed that His Majesty's Minister, Peking, was being consulted as to the representations to be made to the Chinese Government, and that it was essential that a strictly non-committal attitude should be maintained on all points at issue between China and Tibet. The Secretary of State also approved the reply His Excellency the Viceroy proposed to make to the Tibetan deputation in Calcutta.

On the 26th, Mr. Max Müller telegraphed from Peking that he had made formal representations to the Chinese Government emphasising their mistake in not having been more open as to their plans with His Majesty's Government.

His Excellency Liang Tun-yen replied that it had been his intention to speak to Mr. Max Müller on the subject, as an Imperial decree deposing the Dalai Lama had just been communicated to him. He had, he said, at the time that he made the suggestion regarding the passage of Chinese troops through India, explained to Sir John Jordan the purely pacific intention of the Chinese Government. His Excellency said that the force despatched to Lhasa did not exceed 2,000 men under a Brigadier (not Chao, who was not in Lhasa territory), and he begged Mr. Max Müller to assure His Majesty's Government that the intentions of the Chinese Government were merely to be able to police the country and to exercise more effective control than in the past, especially in regard to Tibet's obligations towards neighbouring States. The Chinese Government desired to assure His Majesty's Government that they had no desire to modify the *status quo* in Tibet or to alter the internal administration in any way. They had not meant to deprive the Lama of his power and repeated messages had been sent to him to that effect. He had already been deprived of his title in 1904, but it was subsequently restored to him, and now they would punish him personally by deposing him and appointing a new Dalai Lama. Unless, however, unforeseen circumstances compelled them to such a course they contemplated no further aggressive action in Tibet. Finally, His Excellency begged His Majesty's Government not to give credence to false reports spread by Lamaists as to the burning of monasteries and outrages.

Mr. Max Müller suggested to His Excellency that it would be in the interest of China to publish through the press a contradiction of Reuter's exaggerated report that 25,000 Chinese troops, trained on the Japanese system, were being pushed into Tibet from Szechuan, and this he promised to do.

The decree deposing the Lama enumerated his alleged misdeeds ending with his flight on the 12th February from Lhasa, deprived him of his title, ordered that he was to be treated as an ordinary person whether he returned to Tibet or not and gave instructions for the discovery and confirmation of a new Dalai Lama as the true embodiment of previous generations of Dalai Lamas in accordance with precedent. It further declared that the real objects of the expedition into Tibet were the preservation of peace and the protection of the trade marts.

The Wai-wu-pu's note forwarding a copy of the decree stated that all matters affecting the relations of Tibet would continue to be dealt with in accordance with the treaties with Great Britain and China.

Mr. C. A. Bell, Political Officer in Sikkim, was informed on the 26th that instructions had been received from the Secretary of State, that, in the event of fighting taking place between the Chinese and Tibetans in Tibet, and of Chinese officials at Gyantse or Yatung seeking shelter in the British posts at either of those places, the British Trade Agents should maintain an attitude of strict



neutrality, but might grant an asylum to Chinese officials, only if they were satisfied that the officials were in imminent danger of losing their lives. It was also to be made unmistakeably clear to any Chinese who might take refuge with British officials, in order to save their lives, that they must accept the condition that they would leave the country if this were demanded by the Tibetans. It was added for the guidance of Mr. Bell and the officers serving under him, that it was essential that a strictly non-committal attitude should be maintained on all points at issue between China and Tibet.

On the 27th, the Secretary of State was informed that Mr. Bell had left for Darjeeling with compliments to the Lama and enquiries after his health, also that the Resident in Nepal had been instructed to ascertain the views of the Prime Minister on the situation.

On the same day Mr. Max Müller telegraphed that the Consul at Chengtu did not think that the Chinese troops which were in and about Tibet exceeded 8,000. They had three or four machine guns, some mountain guns and a search-light, but no wireless telegraphy arrangements.

On the 28th, Mr. Max Müller reported that Prince Ching's written reply, dated 27th February to his note repeated the verbal assurances and expressed appreciation of His Majesty's Government's fair and friendly attitude. It explained that the so-called expedition was merely a police force of 2,000 men to tranquillise the country, protect the trade marts, and compel the Tibetans to conform to the treaty. By thus fleeing again, the Dalai Lama must be considered to have voluntarily renounced his position. Instructions had repeatedly been sent to the Amban to observe treaties, prevent disorder, protect the clergy and laity and maintain friendly relations with neighbouring States. Further, Prince Ching attached importance to the Anglo-Chinese Treaty relating to Tibet, and stated that there need be no apprehension as to its being broken, also that the dismissal or retention of the Lama would under no circumstance be used to alter the political situation in any way.

The Dalai Lama arrived in Darjeeling on 1st March 1910.

On the 3rd March, Mr. Bell called on the Dalai Lama and conveyed His Excellency the Viceroy's compliments, but not the invitation to Calcutta, since it appeared doubtful whether the Lama would wish to go there, unless he felt sure of receiving a reply from the Viceroy which he would consider satisfactory. The Dalai Lama told Mr. Bell, when they were alone, that when, before the Tibet Mission, Ugyen Kazi presented the letter from His Excellency the Viceroy (Lord Curzon), his (the Dalai Lama's) reason for refusing it was on account of his agreement with China to act solely through Chinese intermediaries in foreign affairs. Similarly, the Chinese refused to permit him to reply when Colonel Younghusband wrote to him during the Mission. When he was at Peking he was assured by the Emperor of China that he would retain his former position and power in Tibet and that no harm would be done to the people of Tibet. Since his arrival in Lhasa this promise had been broken. The 40 Chinese mounted infantry and the Chinese police, who were already in Lhasa, fired on inoffensive Tibetans in Lhasa, killing three, wounding one high official and wounding the pony of another. He then fled, fearing that he would be made a prisoner in the Potala Palace and deprived of all temporal power. The Chinese sent 400 soldiers from Lhasa to Phari by the direct route and 300 along the road to Gyantse, offering a reward to anybody who should capture him or kill his Ministers. Some of the Chinese letters offering these rewards fell into his hands.

The Dalai Lama then stated that his reason for coming to India was to ask the help of the British Government against the Chinese; that unless the British Government intervened, China would occupy and oppress Tibet, destroy the Buddhist religion there and the Tibetan Government, and would govern the country by Chinese officials; that China would extend her power into Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim, since China claimed these States as under her, and that she would eventually extend her power into India; that there were already two thousand Chinese troops around Lhasa and more were following, and such a large number of troops were not required for Tibet alone.

Mr. Bell promised the Dalai Lama to inform the Government of India of what he had said.

On the 4th March Mr. Max Müller of the Peking Legation telegraphed that the Russian Minister had also made representations to the Chinese Government in regard to the flight and deposition of the Dalai Lama, pointing out that, with its millions of Lamaist subjects, Russia could not be indifferent to what was happening in Tibet, and expressing the hope that China would avoid stirring up unnecessary trouble there. Mr. Max Müller also mentioned that he had pointed out to the Wai-wu-pu the advantage of being frank with the British Government regarding the future developments in Tibet, especially with reference to the possible despatch of reinforcements, but that they had shown no inclination to be communicative.

On the 5th March, the Government of India, in view of the general assurances given at Peking, reviewed the whole position in a telegram to the Secretary of State. The conclusion arrived at was that there could be no doubt whatever that the action of the Chinese Amban in Lhasa and the movements of Chinese troops in the east of Tibet were quite irreconcilable with the assurances of the Chinese Government. Nepalese and Tibetan versions independently confirmed the information as to the aggressive intentions of China received from other sources. The country was tranquil before the aggressive movement began and the Tibetan and Chinese authorities were working together. Beyond the intrigues of China itself in Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim, there were no disturbances on the borders, and no representation had been made to either the Chinese or Tibetan authorities at Lhasa that there was any dissatisfaction with the way in which the Treaty obligations were carried out. From Yatung a report was received that a large number of Chinese were being settled in the Kham Province, and that Tibetans were being driven out of their lands for them. The local Chinese officials in the Chumbi valley had for some time past adopted an attitude of aloofness from our officers, at times amounting to obstruction. The Government of India had been credibly informed that they instigated the Tibetans to give monopolies of wool, yak-tails, etc., which resulted in the diversion of the trade from India. During the flight of the Dalai Lama, British Agents at Gyantse and Yatung had preserved an attitude of strict neutrality, yet the local Chinese officials persistently abstained from making any communication to them. The Government of India had not been informed from a Chinese source of any of the movements of China. The local Chinese authorities apparently made no secret of their designs or their attitude.

Information had been received from a reliable source that the Chinese troops in Tibetan territory numbered 4,900, as against the 2,000 given by the Chinese authorities, that the regular troops in Szechuan were 2,000 and the local troops 12,000, that the regular troops in Yunnan numbered 10,000, the local troops being uncertain, and that the regular troops in Nanking and Kinkiang had been ordered to hold themselves in readiness to reinforce the others.

The Government of India regarded the cumulative effect of this evidence, coming from so many different sources, as absolutely irresistible and as proving beyond doubt that China was determined to create a violent change in the *status quo* in Tibet, which would seriously affect the British position on the North-East Frontier and obliterate the Tibetan Government. It was idle, they said, to talk of this movement as one to police Tibet, when it had the effect of driving the Tibetan Government out of the country, and they could only advise His Majesty's Government at the present stage that something more tangible than general assurances was required from China.

News was received on the 5th March that the Dalai Lama had accepted the Viceroy's invitation to him to stay at "Hastings House," Calcutta.

On the same day the Tibetan Ministers called on Mr. Bell, and gave their version of the Tibet embroglio. The account is too long for notice here, but is given as Appendix V.

The Chinese version of the case was telegraphed from the British Legation at Peking on 6th March. This also is given in Appendix VI.

On the 12th March the Government of India telegraphed a review of the position in Tibet to the Secretary of State. Their message is fully summarised in

**Appendix VII.** Its chief purport was that the Government of India thought it necessary to demand definite assurances from the Chinese Government:—

- (1) that the Chinese garrison in Tibet would be limited to a number sufficient for purposes of maintenance of internal order ;
- (2) that a real Tibetan Government would be maintained ;
- (3) that the trade mart would be policed by Chinese officers ;
- (4) that an Amban should be appointed at Lhasa, who would be less hostile to British interests ;
- (5) that the Chinese local officers should receive instructions to co-operate with our Trade Agents, and not to hinder direct dealings between our officers and Tibetans.

The Government of India also recommended that at this stage it might be well to inform the Chinese that, in view of the disturbed state of Tibet, the change in the *status quo* and the unfriendliness of the local Chinese officers, the British Government must reserve the right to retain and increase, if necessary, the escorts at Gyantse and Yatung. They considered it improbable that their agencies would be attacked by the Chinese, but individual Chinese might get out of hand.

On the 13th March the Dalai Lama arrived in Calcutta and, after an exchange of formal visits on the morning of the 14th, was accorded a private interview with His Excellency the Viceroy on the afternoon of the same day.

After compliments, in the course of which the Dalai Lama expressed his cordial thanks for the hospitality extended to him and the kindness of his reception, His Holiness said that he had had a trying time in his journey from Lhasa, and was in danger from the Chinese soldiers who pursued him. At the time that he left Lhasa there were 500 of the old Chinese troops and 40 newly arrived troops, the advance guard of a force of 2,000 men who were then distant only two days' march from Lhasa. In all, 2,700 troops had come into Lhasa and its neighbourhood lately, according to the information which he had received. The total number of Chinese troops in Tibet was not required for Tibet alone. The Chinese had designs on Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan, which they intended to subdue and would thus destroy the last vestiges of the Lamaist religion. The Chinese had more than once interposed to prevent amicable direct relations between Tibet and the British Government. The Sikkim trouble of 1888 and the Younghusband mission of 1904 were entirely due to the action of the Chinese. When at Peking His Holiness had asked the British Minister to eliminate the harmful intervention of the Chinese. The constitutional position of the Amban was to take charge of foreign relations, leaving internal affairs to be administered by the Tibetans. But the Amban had encroached and, in spite of the promise of the Emperor, had taken over charge of the internal administration. Chao Erh Feng had destroyed monasteries and killed monks in Eastern Tibet and desecrated the religion of the Tibetans. Being anxious for the establishment of direct relations with the great British Government, and realizing the hostility of the Amban he had come to India and appealed for the intervention of the British. Under the Trade Regulations of 1908, direct relations between the British and Tibetan Governments had been assured, and he appealed to us to see that the rights of the Tibetans in this matter were observed. He asked that he might be restored to the position of the 5th Dalai Lama who had negotiated with the Emperor of China as the ruler of a friendly State, and he also asked that the Chinese troops should be withdrawn.

Questioned by His Excellency as to whether he knew the terms of the treaties into which the British Government had entered with China and Russia, His Holiness said that he was studying them. The Tibetan Government claimed the right of direct dealing with the British Government and did not recognize the 1890 and 1906 treaties, to which they had been no party. He had had no communication with the Chinese at Lhasa since he left Phari. He would not return to Lhasa under the present political conditions there, as the promises made to him at Peking had been disregarded. He would not trust the written word of the Peking Government, as they had violated the promises given him by the Dowager Empress. Questioned by His Excellency as to what he intended to do if he did not return to Lhasa, he said he could not say at present, but unless the matter was

satisfactorily settled he would not return to Lhasa. More than this he could not say. He denied that he had intrigued against China. He had only been two months in Lhasa before he left. The Amban was altogether hostile. He, the Dalai Lama, had come away with his ministers and the seals of office. He had left with the Regent whom he had appointed (the incarnated head of the Tso-moling monastery) the seal which was used in signing the 1904 treaty. But his own seal was with him. He had had no intercourse with the Regent since he left. The Chinese intercepted all official letters and he had had no official communication with Tibet. Some private letters had come through. But any communication had to be secret.

Questioned by His Excellency as to what were the real facts of his treatment of Lord Curzon's letter brought to him by Rai Bahadur Ugyen Kazi, he said that Ugyen Kazi had come into his presence, but that he had told him that he could not receive the letter except through the Amban, and he advised Ugyen Kazi, in his own interests, to go away quietly as the Amban would deal hardly with him. Very few people knew anything about this incident. As to Dorjief he was now in his own country. He had been one of seven assistants to his, the Dalai Lama's, chief spiritual adviser, and had never had anything to say to any but spiritual matters.

At the end of the interview His Holiness said that he had made his appeal and asked what would be the answer. His Excellency the Viceroy said that he was very glad to have the opportunity of entertaining His Holiness and of meeting him, and had given instructions that every consideration should be shown to him, but political questions of importance required due consideration, and that he could not say more than that he would communicate the Lama's remarks to His Majesty's Government.

The Dalai Lama then repeated his expressions of gratitude to His Excellency and took leave.

On the 18th March, the Dalai Lama left Calcutta for Darjeeling.

His Majesty's Government did not pass orders on the Government of India's telegraphic proposals of the 12th March, mentioned above, until the 18th April.

Some of the events and affairs of this interval, 12th March to 18th April, which need not be noticed here, are given in Appendix VIII.

On the latter date Mr. Max Müller, His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Peking, was informed by His Majesty's Government that there was no longer any doubt that China was actively making her suzerainty over Tibet effective, and that it was therefore necessary to consider how the change would effect (1) British Indian relations, both commercial and political, with Tibet; and (2) the relations of the three Frontier States of Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan with both India and China.

As regards (1), the Chinese Government had already given assurances that they would scrupulously fulfil all treaty obligations affecting Tibet, and it would therefore be enough for the moment to inform them that His Majesty's Government would expect that the treaty obligations of China and Tibet in respect of the latter would be scrupulously maintained, and that the pending negotiations and representations on the subject of tariff, trade agents, monopolies, tea trade, etc., would not be prejudiced by delay or by any change of administration.

The second point was, however, of greater urgency, both in view of the military strength of Nepal, and of her value to India as a recruiting field, and as delay might create mistrust in all three States and even encourage China to raise claims in regard to them, it would be necessary to make a clear intimation to China that His Majesty's Government could not allow any administrative changes in Tibet to affect or prejudice the integrity either of Nepal or of the two smaller States, and that they were prepared, if necessary, to protect the interests and rights of these three States.

The assurances which the Government of India proposed should be demanded from China were considered to go too far in the direction of questioning her

admitted suzerainty over Tibet, and of interfering in the internal affairs of that country, and it would be sufficient for the time being if Mr. Max Müller addressed a note to the Wai-wu-pu on the lines stated above.

Mr. Max Müller was at the same time instructed to press the Chinese Government to send strict orders to their local officials to co-operate with the British officers in a friendly manner, since without such friendly relations (of which there had recently been a marked absence) friction between the two Governments was certain to arise. Mr. Max Müller was also informed that it would be well that he should impress upon the Chinese Government the inadvisability of locating troops upon, or in the neighbourhood of, the frontiers of India and the adjoining States, in such numbers as would necessitate corresponding movements on the part of the Government of India and the rulers of the States concerned, and he was to add that His Majesty's Government were unable to believe that the presence of a large Chinese force could be required for the simple police duties contemplated in Article 12 of the Trade Regulations of 1908.

Mr. Max Müller addressed the Chinese Government in the sense ordered, and the purport of their reply was as follows—

The sovereign rights of China in Tibet could not suffer the least abatement or injury. The Tibetan customs tariff, the trade agencies and the import of Indian tea were all questions which the Wai-wu-pu had long desired to settle by negotiation, but the reference to the grant of monopolies was not understood.

As for the Nepalese, they were properly (or originally) feudatories of China, and Bhutan and Sikkim were both States in friendly relations with China. In the event of steps being taken in the future for the reorganization of the internal government of Tibet, such would have no other object than the advancement of progress and order in Tibetan territory, and should not affect those States in any way.

A system of police was being gradually introduced, sufficient to repress disturbance and maintain order. When this system was properly established, Chinese troops would be arranged merely with a view to the maintenance of peace in the districts, and there was no intention of stationing a large force on the frontier.

There were treaties relating to the affairs of Tibet which both China and Great Britain had to observe, and the Wai-wu-pu were bound in all matters affecting international relations to issue instructions for the fulfilment of treaties. The Chinese Government hoped the British Government would order their frontier officers to transact business matters amicably with the local Chinese officials, to the advantage of both countries.

On the 17th May, in accordance with instructions received from His Majesty's Government, Mr. Bell was instructed to inform the Dalai Lama and Tibetan Ministers definitely in writing that His Majesty's Government could not interfere between them and the Chinese Government; that His Majesty's Government would take such steps as might seem desirable to them to enforce the Anglo-Chinese and Anglo-Tibetan Conventions, but by those Conventions they were specially precluded from interfering in the internal administration of the country, and they could therefore only recognize the *de facto* Government. Mr. Bell was instructed to add that so long as the Dalai Lama and his followers chose to remain in India, they would be treated with respect, and to ask the Dalai Lama to state what his plans were as to future residence. Mr. Bell was also instructed to inform the Maharajas of Sikkim and Bhutan, in writing, of the communication which he made to the Dalai Lama, adding an assurance that His Majesty's Government would not allow the rights and integrity of Sikkim and Bhutan to be prejudiced by any administrative changes in Tibet. He was also told to inform the trade agents at Yatung and Gyantse of the communication to the Lama.

This action was duly taken by Mr. Bell, who reported that the Dalai Lama was greatly depressed at the decision, and said that, after consulting his Ministers, he would give a reply shortly.

Subsequently the Tibetan Ministers asked Mr. Bell not to publish the decision of Government, until they had appealed against it, and received a reply.

On the 28th May, the British Trade Agent at Yatung reported that, judging from disquieting reports from Tibetans, he was of opinion that a Tibetan uprising against the Chinese was highly probable, when the decision of Government in the Dalai Lama's case was made known. He considered that his Agency was likely to be disturbed, and that his military escort should be increased by at least 75 men, making a total of 100. Recent events had shown the great strategical importance of this frontier, and in view of the present state of affairs in Tibet, the Trade Agent considered it very desirable that a sufficient number of troops should be located at Yatung. Rumours were said to be rife that the Chinese intended to despatch 200 soldiers to Yatung and 100 to Phari.

This report was followed up by one dated 4th June, from Mr. Bell, the Political Officer in Sikkim. He represented that it was probable that the Tibetans would feel resentment against the British Government on account of their decision regarding the Dalai Lama and that Tibet generally would be in a disturbed state, and that there might be isolated attacks on our Agencies. The Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master-General, Captain Brancker, had inspected the posts at Gyantse and Yatung, and recommended that a strong double company numbering say 200 men, with 2 machine guns, should be sent to Gyantse; two double companies, say 350 men, to Yatung, whence a detachment of 50 men should be detailed to guard the military telegraphists at Phari, and a similar detachment for the same purpose at Gnatong. The large increase at Yatung was necessary, because Yatung lay in the bottom of a narrow valley. The detachment at Gangtok should be increased to a full double company for which there was barrack accommodation.

Mr. Bell concurred entirely in these recommendations; as soon as the country settled down, the extra troops could be withdrawn, but, meanwhile, he did not consider that the Trade Agencies would be safe with less.

On the 9th June, Mr. Bell's and the Trade Agent's reports were communicated to the Secretary of State by the Government of India, who said that they were not in a position to discredit, and were inclined to share Mr. Bell's views as to the probability of isolated attacks on the Agencies when the decision of Government regarding the Dalai Lama became generally known, but that, in their opinion, the movement of small detachments, such as Mr. Bell advised, would be attended with considerable risk. Accordingly, after consultation with the military authorities, the Government of India recommended that, in order to ensure the safety of the Agencies, they should despatch immediately to Gyantse one battalion Native Infantry, a section of Sappers and Miners, and two sections mountain artillery, also that one battalion and a section of Sappers and Miners should be sent to hold the line of communications.

On the 10th June, the Secretary of State replied that His Majesty's Government would be prepared of course to sanction the despatch of troops into Tibet if they were satisfied that such a step was absolutely necessary for the protection of their officers. The political consequences, however, would be embarrassing. The result of recent diplomatic communications with the Chinese Government was that the British Government had accepted their views that it was they who were responsible for the maintenance of order at Gyantse and elsewhere in Tibet. The result of sending troops might probably be that the Chinese Government would strain every nerve to send sufficient force into the country to justify them in claiming the complete withdrawal of the British escorts under Article XII of the Trade Regulations. It was also possible that the advent of British troops might be taken by ignorant local Tibetans as intervention on their behalf against Chinese authority, and this might lead to their attacking the Chinese, in which case British troops, who obviously would have to maintain a neutral attitude, would have to look on during the Chinese reprisals that would follow. There would also be the disagreeable moment when the British Government would have to withdraw its troops as soon as the danger was over, or as sufficient force had been established by the Chinese to maintain order. It was to be remembered that, without giving the Chinese Government previous



explanations of the proposed action, the British Government could not move troops into Tibet. It would also have to be stated explicitly that it was solely to protect their officers that the troops would in no way intervene as between Tibetans and Chinese, and that as soon as circumstances permitted they would be withdrawn.

As regards Mr. Bell's reports, the Secretary of State said it was difficult to see why the decision to refuse to intervene on behalf of the Dalai Lama should impel Tibetans to attack the British Agencies. He suggested that it might be pointed out to the Lama's ministers that an attack by Tibetans on the Agencies would make it difficult for the British Government to maintain their hospitality to him, that punishment for such attack would ultimately be inflicted by the Chinese, and that, if troops were sent by the British Government, it would be solely to protect their officers, and that, whatever happened, they would not intervene to save the Tibetans from punishment by China. The Secretary of State recognized that the disturbed state of the country might lead to attacks on British posts by irresponsible bands, and thought that the Dalai Lama and his ministers should be urged, in their own interests, to use all their influence to prevent hostile action by Tibetans towards the British agencies. His Lordship was sure that the Government of India realised as clearly as His Majesty's Government, the political disadvantages of moving troops. If on further communication they were satisfied that the risk was such as to leave no alternative, His Majesty's Government would sanction their despatch; but beyond purely preparatory measures, no action was to be taken until the Government of India had replied to, and received the decision of His Majesty's Government. The Secretary of State asked whether the Chinese had any soldiers or police at Chumbi and Gyantse, also whether their force at Lhasa would allow of strong detachments to be sent to those places.

A further point on which the Secretary of State was not satisfied was the strength of the force which it was proposed to despatch. His military advisers were of opinion that the strength proposed by Mr. Bell would suffice.

On the 15th June the Dalai Lama and his ministers sent in a representation to Government regarding their decision in his case.

It detailed breaches of the treaties committed by the Chinese, the looting and destruction of monasteries, various acts of oppression and the usurpation of administrative power in Tibet. It also specified portions of Tibet which had already been converted into a province of China and concluded with a request that His Majesty's Government would reconsider their decision, and that they would negotiate with the Chinese Government on behalf of the Tibetans.

On the 27th June, the Government of India after consulting with the Political Officer in Sikkim, informed the Secretary of State that they had fully reconsidered, in Council, the situation in Tibet and were satisfied that outbreaks might occur at any time, and that the escorts at Yatung and Gyantse were not capable of resisting attacks to which they might be subjected.

In consequence it was their unanimous opinion that the following steps were necessary :—

- (a) that a sufficient force should be mobilised without delay and be held in readiness at some point within our borders, whence Gyantse could be speedily relieved ;
- (b) that the minimum strength of the force should be as proposed in their message dated the 9th June ;
- (c) that arrangements should be at once made to collect supplies for this force for three months at Gnatong : and that one battalion of Pioneers and one company of Sappers and Miners should be moved forward to assist this operation ;
- (d) that as soon as supplies were ready, and should the situation then require it, one battalion and two sections Mountain Artillery should be concentrated near Gnatong, whence under favourable conditions Gyantse could be reached by a relief force in about one week by forced marches.



The Government of India trusted that the above steps could be readily explained to China, as being in conformity with the policy of His Majesty's Government, while they admitted of favourable interpretation by the Tibetans, and requested that sanction to the foregoing measures might be given without delay, in view of the unsatisfactory position of the garrisons in Tibet, and of the time required for preparation, estimated at one month.

The immediate requirements included a post at Gyantse for the Trade Agent's escort, on the site of the new Trade Mart, which must be more defensible than the post now occupied by the present escort. Apart from the question of acquiring the new site, about which there had been much obstruction, unless orders were issued from Peking to facilitate construction, difficulties about supply of labour would certainly be made by the local Chinese officials. The Government of India therefore requested that arrangements might be made to bring pressure upon the Chinese Government at Peking to ensure the speedy settlement of both these questions.

As to the Chinese forces in Tibet, there were 30 Chinese old-drilled police, armed with old breech-loaders at Gyantse. In the Chumbi valley there were 130 Chinese old-drilled soldiers armed with snider rifles and 4 magazine rifles. There were not any new drilled Chinese soldiers at Gnatong or Gyanste. There were at Lhasa about 1,500 Chinese soldiers, of whom 1,000 were new drilled and armed with modern magazine rifles; the remainder were old drilled and were armed with various old pattern guns. The Government of India could not say whether the Chinese could detail sufficient troops for the defence of the Trade Agencies as well as themselves; they had recently had to send out detachments from Lhasa to Kongbu where there had been disturbances.

It was added that couriers had recently arrived at Darjeeling from the Tibetan district of Nyarong, asking the permission of the Dalai Lama to rise against the Chinese, and that other districts and monasteries had also asked to be allowed to fight, but that hitherto they had been restrained by the ministers.

On the 29th June the Secretary of State telegraphed that the points raised in his previous telegram did not appear to be answered, and that the presence in Tibet of British troops must lead to political and possibly military entanglement. Were the troops to stand by while the Chinese and Tibetans fought it out, or while Tibetans were being punished by Chinese? Would not the British Government inevitably be driven to side with the weaker party, with results equally embarrassing whichever it might prove to be? Again, after order was established, would it be possible to withdraw the troops without loss of prestige in Nepal and the border States? These questions were vital and only if lives were really in danger could they be put aside. The reports from the Government of India contained no material facts to satisfy His Majesty's Government that this was the case, and the Secretary of State gathered that the Government of India were not satisfied, since they did not now contemplate the immediate despatch of reinforcements to the British posts. If danger to the Trade Agencies was not immediate, the proposals of the Government of India seemed unnecessary, and the massing of troops on the frontier was likely even to provoke disturbance by encouraging a belief by the Tibetans that the British Government were going to help them. If, however, danger was immediate, surely reinforcements of posts should also be immediate. From this point of view Mr. Bell's proposals seemed preferable. The undesirability of sending small detachments through difficult country was appreciated, but if real emergency existed, the Secretary of State considered the risks must be run, and this was better than making elaborate preparations on a large scale which might at any moment be stultified by news that attack was imminent. If the Government of India were satisfied on further consideration that circumstances were such as to justify the despatch of immediate reinforcements on Mr. Bell's scale, His Majesty's Government would sanction it. If reserves were necessary, the Secretary of State enquired whether they could not be collected, with their supplies, at some convenient centre on the railway, where they would be less likely to attract the attention of Tibetans.

As regards the construction of a new post at Gyantse, the Government of India were asked to consider whether the present post could not be rendered

defensible or whether a new post could be built by troops, in the event of their being sent up. The Secretary of State added that it was undesirable to raise fresh questions with the Chinese who, moreover, were not likely in existing conditions to be able to compel the Tibetans, while an attempt to do so would not add to British popularity.

On the 30th June the Trade Agent telegraphed that he had received information that the Phari people were coming down in a body to raise a general protest against the high-handed action of the Chinese. They said that they had been harassed with constant demands for supplies and transport animals, and that they were going to tell the Chinese that their sufferings had become unbearable and that they would leave their homes. They further stated that, if the Chinese used force to them, they would fight.

From a report received from the British Trade Agent at Gartok, it appeared that, while the Tibetan officials were grieved to hear of the deposition of the Dalai Lama the general public were delighted.

On the 2nd July, Mr. Bell reported that the Tibetan Ministers had ordered the Phari Jongpen to request the Trade Agent at Yatung and his soldiers not to interfere in the event of there being fighting between the Chinese and Tibetans in the Chumbi valley.

On the 3rd July the Secretary of State was informed that the Government of India proposed to reply, through Mr. Bell, to the representation from the Dalai Lama and his Ministers that His Majesty's Government were unable to reconsider their decision not to interfere between the Tibetans and Chinese. The Secretary of State was also asked whether it would be possible to move the Chinese Government as regards the action of the local Chinese in preventing supplies being taken to the Lama and his party at Darjeeling.

On the 5th July, the Government of India submitted the following comments on the points raised by the Secretary of State in his message of the 10th June :—

(1) Whether troops were sent to reinforce the Trade Agency escorts or not, everything possible would be done by the Chinese to send a sufficient force into Tibet to justify them in claiming the complete withdrawal of the escorts, under Article XII of the Trade Regulations. This was known to be the ambition of the local Chinese officers.

(2) There was the possibility that the advent of British troops might be taken by ignorant local Tibetans as an intention to intervene on their behalf against Chinese authority, but both the Tibetan and Chinese local authorities would be informed that the troops had been sent merely to protect the British Agents, that they would be withdrawn as soon as affairs settled down, and that they would remain absolutely neutral if any conflict took place between the Chinese and Tibetans.

(3) If the foregoing was carried out, the embarrassment, which would otherwise be experienced, would be avoided when the time came for the withdrawal of the strengthened escorts. In any case, the present escorts would have to be withdrawn sooner or later [*vide* (1) above].

(4) The Tibetans had been soliciting and expecting British intervention on their behalf, and when it was definitely understood by them that it was intended to give the Dalai Lama no assistance whatever in his difficulties with the Chinese, it was considered probable that they might wreak their despair and disappointment on any British subjects or property within their reach.

(5) The Government of India recognised that political and possibly military entanglements might result from the presence of additional troops. They, however, did not propose to send troops into Tibet unless an attack on the Agencies either was made or was imminent: consequently their answer to the first two direct questions, in the Secretary of State's telegram of the 29th June, was that they would propose to act in accordance with the procedure indicated in the communication which, in his telegram of 10th June he suggested the Government of India should make to the Dalai Lama. They did not regard it as inevitable, in the event of conflict between the Chinese and Tibetans, that they should be driven to side with the weaker party.

(6) The Government of India did not consider that the withdrawal of troops would be followed by loss of prestige in Nepal and the border States, if their intentions were distinctly announced before the troops were despatched.

It was not possible to say that an attack on either of the British posts was imminent: but recent telegrams which had been sent to the Secretary of State indicated that the probability of a general rising of the Tibetans was daily becoming greater, and the danger to the escorts might become imminent at any moment. The object of the Government of India was to be prepared to meet that danger if it became imminent. By the preparations which they proposed, relief would be brought to Gyantse within eight days. Without these preparations, relief would take over a month, and they did not consider that the risk should be accepted.

With regard to the military aspect of the case, the Government of India offered the following remarks. In the event of Tibet being generally disturbed, they were confronted with the problem how to get troops to Gyantse and how to feed them. A force of 200 men, with baggage and supply column, if opposed at all in the south of Gyantse, must run considerable risk. The detachment would require 317 animals and 188 followers, a serious incumbrance for 200 men. Unless the Tibetans wished, a force of 250 men in Gyantse could not draw on local supplies and the reserve supplies stored there would last less than two months. If the country was disturbed, troops on the line of communication were in any case necessary, to ensure supply in Gyantse. Apart from objections to sending small detachments into the country, to which the Government of India still adhered, the gain in time by accepting Mr. Bell's proposal would only be about five days. Adverting to the Secretary of State's remark that "if real emergency exists, the risks must be run;" one of the risks was that, unless suitable preparations were made, the relieving troops under Mr. Bell's proposals might starve after 27 days; or after 40 days, if the supplies now under orders reached there in time, which was doubtful. In view of this last consideration, "elaborate preparations" were necessary in any case, whatever might be the strength of the relieving detachments. As the nearest railhead, Siliguri, was not near enough for immediate support and the Lower Tista valley was unhealthy and difficult to cross at this season it was considered that the troops should be on the higher levels beyond. The post at Gyantse was too large for 50 men, though possible for 250. Meanwhile, until Gyantse was reinforced, it could not be held in the event of serious attack. The troops might build a new defensible post, but unless they were to do this by *force majeure*, construction could not be commenced until a site had been accorded, and in this respect the Chinese had been and were still obstructive.

After careful reconsideration, the Government of India were of opinion that the despatch of reinforcements on the scale recommended by Mr. Bell would only invite attack, with perhaps very far-reaching results. They, therefore, desired to repeat the proposals which they had submitted in their telegram of the 9th June. They added that they were apprehensive lest delay in deciding on these preliminary steps might result in their being left with a much more serious situation to face later, when weather conditions would be less favourable and their difficulties would be largely increased in consequence.

On the 7th July the Resident in Nepal reported that he had been informed by the Prime Minister that the object of the visit to Katmandu of the Tibetan Depon was to convey a verbal message from the Dalai Lama, asking the Nepal Darbar's advice regarding his return to Tibet. The Prime Minister enquired whether the Government of India would desire any special advice to be given; if not, he proposed to advocate the Dalai Lama's return on the ground that, in his opinion, the Lama would not be deprived of spiritual powers, and might hope to re-establish his position by regaining the confidence of the Tibetans. The Prime Minister thought that the present political situation in Tibet would be improved by the return to Lhasa of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Ministers now at Darjeeling.

On the 8th July, in accordance with instructions received from the Secretary of State, Captain Weir, British Trade Agent at Gyantse, was asked to telegraph his opinion as to the possibility of disturbance in Tibet on the decision of His Majesty's Government not to intervene on behalf of Dalai Lama becoming gen-

erally known. He was also asked whether he thought that any attack by Tibetans on the Trade Agency was probable, and whether the situation required that arrangements should be made to allow of the prompt reinforcement of his escort.

Captain Weir replied that he did not think that Tibet would be generally disturbed unless the Dalai Lama returned to the country. The Lama would consider the British Government his enemy, as he had been refused their help, and on his return, an attack would be made on the Agency and also on the Chinese. Captain Weir also considered that it would have a very salutary effect on the Chinese and Tibetans if reinforcements were sent to Gyantse. The Tibetans especially would undoubtedly regard the decision of Government as to the Dalai Lama as evidence of England's fear of China, and the Agency would be the object of their contempt and possibly of attack.

On the 10th July, the Resident in Nepal was instructed to inform the Prime Minister that the Government of India did not wish to influence the Maharaja in the personal advice that he might desire to offer the Dalai Lama as to returning to Tibet, but that, while they would feel precluded from directly advising the Lama to return, lest this step should result in regrettable personal consequences to himself, they felt that he would be well advised to meet the Chinese half-way in the event of their making a genuine attempt to induce him to return, and provided that he felt assured of his own safety.

In repeating to the Secretary of State the messages from and to the Resident in Nepal, the Government of India stated they were of opinion that the return of the Dalai Lama to Tibet, with the approval of the Chinese, might solve a difficult position. It was added that the opinion of Captain Weir given on the 9th July that the Lama's return would probably be followed by a general rising against the Chinese, was, of course, based on the supposition that His Holiness returned as an act of hostility to China.

On the 11th July, the British Trade Agent, Yatung, reported that the inhabitants of Phari and the Chumbi valley had made a protest against the proceedings of the Chinese. The local Chinese officials entertained them to a feast and promised to remedy their grievances, and to communicate the Amban's order in due course. The people meanwhile returned to their homes.

On the 13th July, the Secretary of State telegraphed that His Majesty's Government's policy was to avoid military and political entanglements in Tibet. At the same time they placed above all other considerations the obligation to ensure the safety of their Agents. They recognised the force of the objections to the despatch of reinforcements on the scale proposed by Mr. Bell and accepted the alternative proposed on the understanding that, in case of emergency arising before the completion of the preparations for the whole force, a dash could be made for Gyantse by a portion of it. There remained the political objection that the collection of the force on the frontier might precipitate a crisis, which His Majesty's Government most desired to avoid. If, however, troops had to be moved into Tibet for the protection of the Trade Agents, the objections in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, to keeping them there for any length of time were so serious as to be insuperable. It was to be remembered that a temporary withdrawal of the Agents and escorts need not prejudice their return when disturbances ended and trade revived. His Majesty's Government, therefore, desired that, if the movement of troops was necessary, its object should be to withdraw the Agents with safety and with the least possible delay. This being so, it was a question whether, after the troops had reached the frontier, future risks should not be obviated by sending the force to Gyantse at once to withdraw the Agent, whatever the state of the country might be at the moment.

On this point the Government of India were asked to telegraph their views, bearing in mind that to withdraw, after the post had been attacked, would be more open to misrepresentation than if withdrawal was effected at once, in combination with a show of force on the frontier. The overtures of the Dalai Lama to Nepal as to his return to Tibet seemed to point to further complications. The Secretary of State therefore directed that Mr. Bell and the Trade Agent at Gyantse should make perfectly clear the limitations as to the object of the movement of the troops,

and that a communication to the same effect should also be made to Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan. Finally the Secretary of State stated that it should be strongly hinted to the Dalai Lama and his Ministers that, unless they exerted themselves in the cause of peace, their presence near the frontier would not be tolerated.

On the 15th July, Mr. Bell reported that, in course of conversation, the Dalai Lama had informed him that Palha Kenchen and two other officials had arrived at Phari *en route* for Darjeeling to ask the Dalai Lama to return to Lhasa. The Lama said that he was doubtful whether he could depend on any promises given by the Chinese, since the promise given by the late Dowager Empress had been broken; but that he would hear what the officials said on their arrival here and would then ask Mr. Bell's advice what he should do.

Mr. Bell's message was communicated on the 17th July to the Secretary of State who was informed that Mr. Bell had already been instructed as to the line of action he should take if a deputation visited Darjeeling to invite the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet. The Government of India were, however, of opinion that, before allowing the Lama to return to Lhasa, they should feel thoroughly certain that his return was approved by the Chinese Government at Peking, and they asked the Secretary of State whether this could be ascertained. The Chinese Government had formally deposed the Dalai Lama, and his return to Tibet, without the approval of China, might provoke the difficulties which it was desired to avoid. On the other hand, if China approved, it might help to solve the present difficult position, as stated in the Government of India's communication of 10th July.

On the 20th July, the Secretary of State telegraphed approving the answer which it was proposed to make to the Dalai Lama regarding his further appeal for British intervention, and stating that His Majesty's Minister at Peking had been authorised to approach the Chinese Government regarding the Lama's supplies, should he think it desirable.

The Secretary of State also approved the answer given to the Prime Minister, Nepal, and the instructions to Mr. Bell regarding the Lama's return to Tibet, but stated that in any advice that Mr. Bell might give, it should be made plain to the Lama that His Majesty's Government took no responsibility for his safety if and when he left India. These instructions were communicated to Mr. Bell. Further, His Majesty's Minister at Peking, would be instructed to explain to the Chinese Government the reasons for collecting troops at Gnatong, to point out that the flight of the Dalai Lama and consequent troubles were due to China's own action, and to say that if, as was now understood, they wished for his return to Tibet, His Majesty's Government would, of course, place no difficulties in his way, but that if, as the result of their treatment of him on his return or for any other reason, disturbances ensued endangering the lives and property of British subjects, the force stationed at Gnatong would enter into Tibet at once for their protection. This communication, the Secretary of State thought, would probably induce the Chinese to say whether they approved the Lama's return or not, but His Majesty's Government were not disposed in any case to negotiate with them on his behalf or to incur any responsibility, direct or indirect, for his safety.

On the same day, His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Peking reported that he had mentioned to the Wai-wu-pu the interference of the local Chinese authorities with the supplies, especially gold and silver, sent to the Dalai Lama at Darjeeling from Tibet, pointing out the injustice of such a proceeding. The Wai-wu-pu informed Mr. Max Müller that they would telegraph to Lhasa, for information.

On the 21st July Mr. Bell was informed that the Secretary of State had directed that the orders about the grant of asylum to Chinese officials, in the event of their being in imminent danger of losing their lives, should be applied to Tibetan officials in similar circumstances, but that as there would be difficulty in requiring Tibetan refugees to leave their own country at the bidding of the Chinese, this condition should not apply to them.

On the 23rd July 1910, the Government of India informed the Secretary of State, in reply to his telegram of 13th July, that in their opinion, the withdrawal of the Gyantse Trade Agency, save in case of grave emergency would be a fatal error :

in all probability it would not only provoke a crisis, but would ruin British prestige on the Tibetan frontier, and have the worst possible effect in India, while it would certainly encourage the Chinese in their aggressive policy on the Burma-Assam border. The situation had recently shown some slight amelioration, and they thought it might be still further improved if the Chinese Government approved of the Dalai Lama's return. Recent information from Tibet did not appear to indicate the probability of any immediate and dangerous agitation on the Chumli-Gyantse line, and, while they adhered to the necessity for the preparations which they had recommended, they were opposed in the present circumstances to any advance across the frontier. They also explained that further enquiries regarding the collection of fodder in Tibet showed that the time given for a force to reach Gyantse from Gnatong had been underestimated and that it would now take at least 20 days after sufficient supplies had been collected at Gnatong. They did not consider that the collection of supplies at Gnatong would precipitate a crisis if their reasons were publicly announced, and they would commence the collection at once on hearing from the Secretary of State. The necessary communication to the Dalai Lama would also then be made.

On the 26th July, the Secretary of State telegraphed that it should be understood that if His Majesty's Government were compelled by circumstances to authorise the advance of troops into Tibet, it would be with a view to withdrawing the Agents, and that in the meantime preparations should be commenced.

On the 29th July, the Government of India informed Mr. Bell that, in view of reports which has been furnished by him regarding the unrest prevailing in Tibet and the possibility in certain eventualities of attack on the British Trade Agencies, His Majesty's Government had agreed to a force and supplies sufficient to allow of the relief of Gyantse within a reasonable time, should necessity arise, being collected at Gnatong. Preparations would commence forthwith, but no advance was to be made across the frontier unless an attack was made on either of the Agencies, or unless the Government of India were satisfied that such attack was imminent, and in no case should any advance be made without the specific orders of the Government of India. One company of Sappers and Miners and one battalion of Pioneers was to be moved at once to Gnatong; and as soon as supplies were ready, should the situation then require it, two sections of Mountain Artillery and one battalion Native Infantry would be concentrated near Gnatong. It was essential that there should be no misunderstanding as to the object of the concentration on the British frontier. This object was solely to provide means for the protection of the British officers in charge of the Trade Agencies and their establishments, in case of necessity. If the troops were sent into Tibet territory, they would remain strictly neutral in the event of conflict between the Chinese and Tibetans, and would be withdrawn as soon as circumstances permitted. Mr. Bell was further instructed formally to announce the decision of His Majesty's Government and its object to the Sikkim and Bhutan Darbars, and to direct the Trade Agents at Gyantse and Yatung to make similar announcements to the local Chinese and Tibetans.

The Government of India added for Mr. Bell's personal information, and for confidential communication to Captain Weir and Mr. MacDonald, that, in the event of it being necessary to despatch troops for the relief of the Trade Agencies, there could be no question of the relieving force remaining even temporarily in Tibet; their instructions would be to withdraw the Trade Agents and their escorts and establishments and return to India at once.

With regard to the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Ministers at Darjeeling, the following instructions were conveyed to Mr. Bell. In the first place, he was forthwith to inform them, in writing, with reference to their representation that His Majesty's Government regretted that they were unable to reconsider their decision as previously communicated to the effect that His Majesty's Government could not interfere between the Chinese Government and them. He was also to announce to the Dalai Lama and Ministers the foregoing decision as to the concentration of troops and its objects, and point out to them that an attack by Tibetans on the Trade Agencies would make it difficult for the British Government to maintain their hospitality to them, that punishment for such attack would ultimately be inflicted by the Chinese, and that, if troops were sent by the British



Government, it would be solely to protect their officers, and that, what ever happened, they would not intervene to save Tibetans from punishment by China : Mr. Bell was, therefore, to urge them in their own interests to use all their influence to prevent hostile action by Tibetans towards the Agencies and give the Dalai Lama and his Ministers a strong hint that their presence near the frontier would not be tolerated, unless they exerted themselves in the cause of peace.

The Resident in Nepal was also instructed to communicate to the Nepal Darbar an announcement similar to that which Mr. Bell was instructed to make to the Bhutan and Sikkim Darbars.

According to information furnished to Mr. Bell by one of the Dalai Lama's Chief Ministers, the Chinese have stationed 100 troops at Tsona near the north-eastern corner of Bhutan. Reports have also reached the Government of India, that the Chinese are about to station 500 troops in Gartok, and that they are recruiting men from the different districts in Western Tibet for the Tibetan Army ; the British Trade Agent at Gartok has been asked to state whether there is any truth in these reports.

From a letter addressed by the Nepalese Representative at Lhasa to his Government, it appeared that, although the Amban at Lhasa has appointed three

Tibetan officials as "Kazis of the Kasyal"\* in place of those who accompanied the Dalai Lama to India, the Chinese are exercising full authority. The Representative also reported that the Chinese police at Lhasa had punished a Nepalese subject without reference to him, and that on learning this he called on the Chief of the Police Department and requested that in future Nepalese subjects accused of any crimes should be sent to him for trial and punishment in accordance with Nepalese treaty rights and privileges in Tibet. This the Chinese officer promised to do.

In March 1907, about six months after Mr. Chang's departure from India *via* Chumbi, to Tibet, to arrange the opening of the trade marts there, as already related (page 75), rumours were rife that he wished to bring about an alliance between Nepal and Tibet, and that with this object he was about to visit Nepal. On the 16th April 1907 the Resident in Nepal was asked to furnish any information he might acquire in connection with these reports; and he replied on the 23rd idem that Sir Chandra Sham Sher Jung, the Prime Minister, had informed him, in answer to an inquiry, that no further news, beyond that already reported in the letters from the Nepalese Representative at Lhasa, had reached him on the subject of Mr. Chang's intentions, so far as they concerned Nepal. Sir Chandra also said that, should he be addressed on the matter, he would take no action without consulting the Government of India, as he dared not incur the serious displeasure of the British Government. He promised to keep the Government of India informed of Mr. Chang's intentions with regard to Nepal. He professed to set little value on the Chinese connection, but said he should prefer to avoid a rupture as he would lose popularity in Nepal if his policy should result in strained relations with Tibet. He said he regarded Tibet as being so much under the influence of China now that her future was likely to be guided by the Chinese Amban in Lhasa to an extent that had not been in vogue previously.

The Nepalese Representative at Lhasa subsequently reported to his Government that, in April, Mr. Chang had asked him to procure from Nepal 50 Gurkha soldiers, a bandmaster, and two buglers for the Tibetan Army. The Representative was instructed by the Prime Minister to say definitely, if the matter came up again, that the Nepal Government would not entertain the proposal.

Captain W. L. Campbell, British Trade Agent at Yatung, reported on the 29th February 1908 that reliable news had been received from Nepal that Mr. Chang had sent a letter to the Nepal Darbar stating that he would visit that country and investigate the circumstances in which transport animals were supplied to the Government of India during the Tibet Mission.

On the 1st March 1910 the Dalai Lama, as previously related, arrived at Darjeeling, and soon after this event the Prime Minister in Nepal submitted a memo-



randum (mentioned in Appendix VI) to the Government of India, in which he asked the following questions :—

- (i) if the territorial integrity of Tibet was threatened from quarters other than India or Russia, say from the Nepal side, did Article II of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906 and Article I of the Anglo-Russian Arrangement of 1907 bring any positive obligation upon Great Britain or Russia to interfere, and
- (ii) was the substitution of the word " State " in Article III of the Convention of 1906 in place of " Power " used in Article IX (d) of the Lhasa Convention of 1904 supposed to bring Nepal under the former article ?

The matter was referred to the Secretary of State and in accordance with instructions received, the Resident in Nepal was informed on the 1st June that both questions in the Prime Minister's Memorandum should be answered in quite general terms that Nepal's position *vis-à-vis* Tibet and her rights in that country were not, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, prejudiced by the Conventions with Tibet, China, and Russia. The Resident was to add, in making a communication to this effect, that the British Government could not be indifferent spectators of disturbances near their border, and that, in view of their obligations to Russia and China, and of their close and peculiar relations with Nepal, they should expect to be consulted by Nepal before the latter took a line of action which might involve it in armed conflict with China or Tibet. He was at the same time to convey the Government of India's cordial acknowledgments of the Prime Minister's correct and friendly attitude hitherto.

In connection with the question of a treaty with Nepal, whereby the foreign relations of that State would be placed in the hands of the British Government, His Majesty's Government agreed with the Government of India that it would be better to await overtures from Nepal. Should, however, the Prime Minister show uneasiness, the Resident was instructed to inform him that so long as he consulted the British Government before committing himself and followed their advice when it was given, and preserved his present correct and friendly attitude, His Majesty's Government would not allow the interests and rights of Nepal to be affected or prejudiced by any administrative changes in Tibet. Finally the Resident was asked to send the Government of India a copy of the communication to the Prime Minister, which was to be made in writing.

The Prime Minister of Nepal, in acknowledging the communication, asked for fuller information as to the scope and intention of the clause of the Resident's letter which read as follows : " The British Government could not be an indifferent spectator of disturbances near their border and in view of their obligations to China and Russia and of their close and peculiar relations with Nepal they should expect to be consulted by Nepal before the latter took a line of action which might involve it in armed conflict with Tibet and China." The Resident replied on the 15th June that, so long as the present correct and friendly attitude of consulting the British Government before taking action was maintained and if advice, when it was given, was followed, His Majesty's Government would not allow the interests and rights of Nepal to be affected or prejudiced by any administrative changes in Tibet. This position was accepted by the Prime Minister.

Under Article V of the Lhasa Convention of 1904 the Tibetan Government

**Revision of the Tibet Trade Regulations.** undertook *inter alia* to establish Tibetan Trade Agents at Gartok, Yatung, and Gyantse. In consequence of an attempt by Chang Tachen (page 76), Chinese Imperial Commissioner in Tibet, to usurp the functions of the Tibetan Government by appointing certain Chinese officials as Trade and Diplomatic Agents at the marts in Tibet, His Majesty's Minister at Peking was instructed by His Majesty's Government to press the Wai-wu-pu (the Chinese Government having engaged, under Article I of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906, to take the necessary steps to secure the due fulfilment of the terms of the Lhasa Convention) to take immediate steps to compel the Tibetan Government to carry out their engagements. On the 8th April 1907 Sir J. Jordan telegraphed to Sir E. Grey that the Wai-wu-pu had stated in reply that since Gartok, Yatung, and Gyantse had been opened as trade marts the Chinese Government considered it to be of urgent importance that regulations, under which the marts were to be administered, should be drawn up by British and Chinese representatives; and the Chinese

Government proposed to nominate Chang Tachen as the Chinese Commissioner to negotiate the Trade Regulations with the special representative to be appointed by the Government of India. His Majesty's Government, however, was not prepared to fall in with this proposal, seeing that it ignored the necessity of Tibetan delegates participating in the discussion as provided by Article III of the Lhasa Convention. The point was of importance for the Tibetan Government's refusal to recognize the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and the Tibet Trade Regulations of 1893 as binding on her, on the ground that Tibet, not being represented by a fully authorized delegate, had not accepted responsibility, resulted in Sir F. Younghusband's Mission of 1903-04. Sir J. Jordan was accordingly instructed to inform the Wai-wu-pu that His Majesty's Government considered the association of a fully authorized Tibetan delegate, appointed by the Tibetan Government, with the British and Chinese Commissioners a *sine quâ non* of the negotiations. Eventually, after some delay, the Chinese Government agreed to the proposal, and intimated through Sir J. Jordan that Chang Tachen had been instructed to proceed to India, accompanied by a Tibetan delegate. On the 14th July Sir J. Jordan informed Sir E. Grey that he had notified to the Wai-wu-pu the appointment of Sir L. W. Dane as British Commissioner to negotiate with Chang Tachen and the Tibetan delegate, and had at the same time intimated that the Tibetan Government would be informed of the appointment of Sir Louis Dane and requested to furnish their delegate with proper credentials.

The Chinese Commissioner, Chang Tachen, accompanied by the Tsarong Shapé, the representative of the Tibetan Government, arrived at Simla on the 24th August 1907.

Negotiations commenced some three weeks later; and Mr. Chang put forward a draft of Revised Regulations, the preamble of which led to some serious discussion. Mr. Chang asserted that the negotiations were really being conducted between the British and Chinese Governments, and claimed, on behalf of China, sovereignty as well as suzerainty over Tibet and full administrative authority in Tibet. This would extend even to the appointment of Chinamen instead of Tibetans as Tibetan Trade Agents at the trade marts.

It was impossible to accede to these claims, and as Mr. Chang declined to take the more reasonable view of the position, Sir J. Jordan was instructed to place the matter before the Wai-wu-pu in order to induce them to issue explicit instructions to Mr. Chang on the point and thus obviate the deadlock which threatened. The Wai-wu-pu now put forward a draft preamble of their own; and subsequently the Government of India prepared a fresh draft preamble, which, while retaining as much as possible of the Wai-wu-pu's wording, emphasized the point that the negotiations were being conducted under Article III of the Lhasa Convention as well as under Article I of the Peking Convention, and insisted on the retention of the substance of the Regulations especially in regard to trade marts and tea. It was, in the opinion of the Government of India, essential that the Shapé, as well as the Chinese and British Commissioners, should sign the Regulations.

This modified preamble suggested by the Government was accepted by the Chinese Government.

Meanwhile discussions at Calcutta had continued between Sir L. Dane and Mr. Chang; and eventually on the 16th February 1908 all the draft articles, with the exception of those relating to direct references by the Government of India to the Lhasa authorities and the question of a Tibetan text of the Regulations, had been settled. Matters relating to customs and imports of tea had been reserved, at Mr. Chang's request, for such action as might be desirable subsequently in the opinion of His Majesty's Government and China.

Sir J. Jordan was therefore instructed to address the Wai-wu-pu on the subject of direct communication with the Lhasa authorities and also as to the Tibetan text. He was authorized to accept any compromise provided that the essential principle of fixing the Tibetan Government with the full responsibility for the fulfilment of the Regulations was secured.

On the 20th February Sir L. Dane left Calcutta for England, and Mr. E. C. Wilton, of the Chinese Consular Service, was appointed British delegate in his place.

On the 7th March Sir J. Jordan telegraphed to Sir E. Grey an addition, which the Wai-wu-pu had proposed to the article dealing with the question of direct references between the Government of India and the Lhasa authorities. The proposed addition was in the following terms:—*“The purport of the British references shall at the same time be communicated to the Chinese Amban. Questions which cannot be decided by agreement between the Government of India and the Lhasa High Authorities shall, in accordance with terms of Article I of the Peking Convention of 1906, be referred for settlement to the Governments of Great Britain and China.”* The Wai-wu-pu, he said, were willing to accept the British draft article relating to the Tibetan text of the Regulations if the British Government would in turn accept their proposed addition.

This compromise was accepted by H's Majesty's Government; and the Wai-wu-pu were informed accordingly.

Eventually on the 20th April 1906, the negotiations were concluded and the Regulations signed by Mr. Wilton, by Mr. Chang Tachen, the Chinese Commissioner, and by the Tsarong Shapé, the Tibetan Delegate.

The full text of the Regulations is given in Appendix IX.

A point on which Mr. Chang laid stress throughout the foregoing negotiations was the withdrawal of all troops from the Trade Marts. The Government of India in informing the Home Government of this fact, stated that they considered it of the greatest importance that small escorts should be retained at the marts after the evacuation of the Chumbi valley to ensure the safety of the British officers stationed there until such time as the local administration had become so efficient as to dispel any fears for their safety.

After the evacuation of the Chumbi valley in February 1908 His Majesty's Government again raised the question of the withdrawal of the British officer stationed at Gyantse, and enquired whether it could be said that trade requirements were such as to justify his retention when it was thought advisable on political grounds to withdraw him. On consideration of the matter the Government of India decided that his retention would not be justified on the grounds of trade requirements, but in informing the Secretary of State of this decision they strongly recommended the retention of a British officer at Gyantse for some little time after the signature of the Regulations in order to facilitate the introduction and proper working of the new arrangements. His Majesty's Government were also informed that even if a Native Agent was appointed to Gyantse the Government of India were of opinion that some measure of protection was absolutely necessary till such time as the local administration of the marts was sufficiently developed. His Majesty's Government eventually deferred to the opinion expressed by the Government of India, but at the same time stated that in order to remove Chinese suspicion, Sir J. Jordan would be instructed to inform the Wai-wu-pu of the desire of the British Government to replace the British officer at Gyantse by a Native Trade Agent. The Chinese Commissioner had also evidently realized the awkwardness of the position that might be created by an attack on our unprotected Trade Agents in Tibet and agreed to the retention of escorts of 50 and 25 men at Gyantse and Yatung respectively. Mr. Wilton gave an assurance that these numbers should not be exceeded.

In June 1908 orders were issued for the despatch of a mixed body of 15 Indian Infantry and 10 Mounted Infantry to Yatung. The Gyantse escort, which consisted of 68 men, was simultaneously reduced to 50.

At the request of Mr. Chang, the Chinese Commissioner who negotiated the Trade Regulations of 1908 with Mr. Wilton, the British Commissioner, questions regarding the import of Indian tea into Tibet and of a customs tariff had been reserved for future consideration by the Governments of Great Britain and China, and in the meantime the Government of India maintained the position that Indian tea might be exported to Tibet on payment of a duty not exceeding that at which Chinese tea was imported into England. This contention had not been accepted by the Chinese who asserted

that they were entitled to prohibit entirely the import of Indian tea into Tibet. The question, therefore, remained undecided pending the opening of negotiations for the settlement of a customs tariff, but the seizure in September 1908 by the Chinese Commissioner of Customs at Yatung, of four cases of Indian tea which had been imported by certain Surat traders residing at Gyantse, and representations regarding the levy by the Tibetans of customs dues on merchandise contrary to the Lhasa Convention and the Tibet Trade Regulations, which had been received from the Government of the Punjab and the Political Officer in Sikkim made it clear that steps for the settlement of a customs tariff could no longer be delayed; nor could the strong feeling on the subject in commercial circles be disregarded. The Government of India, therefore, on the 10th February 1909, represented the position to the Secretary of State and advised that the question of the import of Indian tea, coupled with that of the introduction of a tariff, should be taken up at Peking without delay.

The necessity for action in the matter was confirmed by reports received from the British Trade Agent at Gyantse that the Chinese intended to establish customs ports at all the three trade marts. In connection with this the British Trade Agent was instructed to refer the Chinese Commissioner of Customs at Yatung to Article IV of the Trade Regulations of 1893 and to Article IV of the Lhasa Convention of 1904, under which dues could not at present be levied on goods imported into Tibet.

Subsequently, however, the Government of India proposed, on a reconsideration of the whole situation, that the question of the imposition of a customs tariff should not be brought to the notice of the Chinese Government at present. The Secretary of State was also furnished with a memorandum regarding the grant of monopolies in Tibet, restrictions on trade between Garhwal and Tibet, and levy of dues in Tibet. The action of the Tibetans in these matters constituted an infringement by the Tibetans of Articles II and IV of the Lhasa Convention and Articles IX and XII of the Tibet Trade Regulations, 1908, and the Government of India asked to be permitted to address a protest to the Tibetan High Authorities at Lhasa under Article III of the Regulations referred to. In the matter of the monopolies, they pointed out that the right to trade freely in Tibet would be rendered nugatory, unless they were cancelled and stated that, in urging their prohibition, they had no desire to claim any right of interference in the internal affairs of Tibet. His Majesty's Government, however, after a reference to Sir J. Jordan, were satisfied that it was not possible to separate the question of the import of Indian tea into Tibet from that of the general tariff with any hope of success, while there was a fair prospect of settlement if the two questions were coupled. If, therefore, the Government of India thought it worth while to take up the whole question, the Secretary of State asked to be furnished with a statement of the case.

The Secretary of State also authorized the Government of India, to address the Tibetan High Authorities at Lhasa on the subject of the matters relating to the levy of duties in Tibet and restrictions on trade between Garhwal and Tibet which constituted an infringement of the Lhasa Convention and the Trade Regulations, 1908.

In May 1905, the Government of India approved a suggestion made by Mr.

C. A. Sherring, as a result of his tour in Western Tibet, that a few selected traders should be allowed to proceed to Gartok

for the purposes of trade. This decision was communicated to the Resident in Kashmir with a view to traders from Ladakh being encouraged to undertake the journey. The Resident in Kashmir subsequently forwarded a report from his Assistant at Leh from which it appeared that only one trader had availed himself of the permission. This was a man named Shadi Lall, an old and experienced merchant on the Leh-Yarkand line. He left Ladakh for Gartok in October 1906, and after crossing the Tibet frontier met with constant obstruction. He arrived within a few marches of Gartok where he was detained for 15 days and had several interviews with the Assistant Governor who refused to allow him to trade. He sent messages to the Governor who eventually came out to see him. The Governor

declined to allow him to proceed to Gartok or to dispose of his merchandise. He also declined to allow him to proceed towards Rudok or in any direction except along the route by which he had just come. The Champas (nomad inhabitants) had also orders to boycott him. Eventually, seeing that there was no hope of success for his venture, the merchant returned to Leh. He estimated his losses at Rs. 1,354, and petitioned that the Governor of Gartok might be called on to recompense him for the loss which he suffered. The Resident in Kashmir stated that in his opinion the attitude assumed by the Tibetan authorities seemed to preclude any prospect of trade being established, for the present at all events, between Leh and Gartok. On receiving the above information, the Political Officer in Sikkim was instructed to lay the facts before the Lhasa Government and to point out to them the grave violation of the terms of the Lhasa Treaty which had been caused by the action of the Governor of Gartok. He was to add that the Government of India understood that immediately after the execution of the Treaty of 7th September 1904, the Lhasa Government had informed the local authorities of its terms and instructed them to secure compliance therewith, and that they felt sure that the Lhasa authorities would at once take steps to call the local authorities to account for their disobedience of their orders, and would insist on compensation being paid to the victim of their arbitrary conduct. The British Trade Agent at Gartok was also requested to use his influence with the Garpons of Gartok, with a view to the removal of the restrictions against British subjects proceeding to Gartok for purposes of trade.

On the 22nd June, the British Trade Agent at Gyantse telegraphed that a reply had been received from the Ti-Rimpoche to Mr. White's communication regarding the obstruction by the Tibetans of a British Indian merchant proceeding from Ladakh to Gartok. The Ti-Rimpoche stated that the Garpons had been asked for an explanation, and that on its receipt, he would write again. The Ti-Rimpoche added, however, that, according to the treaty, there was to be no hindrance on the road between the frontier and Gyantse and between the Gartok frontier and Gartok, but that it was not stated that a man might leave the trade route and wander all over the country at will. The Tibetan Government were not aware to what place the British Indian trader went, but it would be well if, in future, Indian traders were instructed to keep strictly to the trade route in accordance with the terms of the treaty, and not go beyond, as this would prevent differences arising between the British and Tibetan Governments. The incident and the action taken were reported to the Secretary of State in a despatch dated the 28th June 1906. It was stated that the reply of the Tibetan authorities was so far as it went satisfactory, and that it was hoped that, after Mr. Calvert's visit to the trade mart at Gartok, there would be no further reason to complain of the attitude of the Garpons, more especially as Mr. Chang, the Chinese Commissioner for Trade Marts, who was about to visit Gyantse and Lhasa, had expressed himself most anxious to do everything possible to facilitate and improve trade between India and Tibet.

On the British Trade Agent at Gartok pointing out to the Garpons, with reference to the case of the trader Shadi Lall from Ladakh, that it was a contravention of the Convention to obstruct British traders, the Garpons denied that they had prevented the trader from proceeding to Gartok or from selling his goods, but explained that as he had arrived too late in the season, he could not dispose of them. The trader wanted a passport and impressed labour to proceed to Lhasa, and was told that no orders had been received from the Tibetan Government to furnish traders with passport or impressed labour for the journey between Gartok and Lhasa, and that he had then returned to Ladakh after staying at Gartok for a few days. Thakur Jai Chand added that he had fully explained matters to the Garpons, who were aware of the conditions of the Lhasa Convention.

On the 3rd September the Political Officer in Sikkim received a letter from the Ti-Rimpoche communicating a reply to the inquiry which had been made from the Garpons of Gartok, in connection with Shadi Lall's case. The Garpons stated that they met the trader at Gargunsa, when his interpreter mentioned that he was anxious to trade in Tibet and required transport. They explained to him that persons were not permitted to proceed beyond the trade marts, but they denied having prevented the local inhabitants from purchasing goods, and alleged

that he did actually sell some goods in Gartok. The Ti-Rimpoche, in forwarding this version of the incident, again asked that traders might be informed that they were not permitted to proceed beyond the trade marts in Tibet.

Several cases of interference with the trade between India and Tibet came to the notice of the Government of India during the period under review. The

**Trade between India and Tibet.**

more important of these are given below. No definite action in respect of them was taken at the time; but the whole question of the dues levied from British traders in Tibet, and of the restrictions imposed upon trade between Tibet and India kept carefully in view, and at the close of the period of this Summary it was under consideration to make a representation on the subject to the Tibetan High authorities.

It was arranged in June 1905 that Mr. Sherring, the Deputy Commissioner

(1) *Levy of dues by Tibetans on Bhutias at Taklakot and Gyanema in Western Tibet.* of Almora should tour in Western Tibet during the season when the local fairs were held, and conduct inquiries as to the best means of developing trade and encouraging pilgrim traffic between India and Tibet. On the conclusion of his journey, Mr. Sherring was instructed to report on the question of the dues levied by Tibetans on Bhutias trading at Taklakot and Gyanema. It appeared from his report that the dues levied by Tibetans were of three kinds, namely:—(1) Payments made to British officials and transferred by them to Tibetan authorities; (2) payments made direct to Tibetan authorities by traders crossing certain passes into Tibet; and (3) dues payable by traders direct to Tibetan authorities at certain marts. Further enquiries with regard to the nature of these payments were made from the Government of the United Provinces. The additional information collected showed that payments were actually made under the three heads referred to above, and the Government of the United Provinces suggested that in order to ensure the cessation of payments, a sum of Rs. 5,000 a year should be offered as compensation to the local Tibetan officials to be used by them in the construction of roads from India to the trade marts. The Government of India considered, however, that it would be inadvisable to issue orders at once stopping payments of the dues, and decided, with the approval of the Secretary of State, to defer consideration of the question pending discussion of the revised Trade Regulations. A further report was submitted by the Government of the United Provinces on the 15th November 1906, from which it appeared that the Barkha Tarjum was continuing to levy dues from Indian traders, thus placing obstacles in the way of their trading. The Government of India suggested in a telegram, dated 22nd April 1907, to the Secretary of State that, following the precedent established in 1905 and 1906, an official should be sent from the United Provinces to the Gartok marts in order to ensure that British traders should have fair play as regards illegal imposts pending settlement of the Trade Regulations. The Secretary of State replied, however, on the 30th April 1907 that he was unable to consent to this proposal.

Meanwhile in 1906, the Jongpens at Phari had been interfering in the local

(2) *The Phari Jongpens' interference in local administration and trade.* administration in the Chumbi valley; and collecting taxes from traders. Mr. White, Political Officer in Sikkim, considered that

so long as the Jongpens who represented Tibetan authority in the valley, were permitted to reside at Phari, their influence would be adversely felt, and progress in British relations with the Tibetans would be constantly hampered. He recommended that a communication should be addressed to Lhasa drawing attention to the action of the Phari Jongpens as contrary to the terms of Article IV of the Treaty, and stating that the Jongpens had been permitted to reside at Phari only in a private capacity and not as officials of the Tibetan Government. But the Government of India considered that in view of the conclusion of the Adhesion Agreement with China and of the probability that the British Government would evacuate Chumbi in January 1908, it was advisable that the Assistant Political Officer, Chumbi, should so regulate his relations with the Jongpens as to avoid any necessity for references from the Government of India to the Lhasa Government. Mr. White was further informed that, as long as the Jongpens at



Phari were prevented from taxing, or interfering with, British trade, the Government of India were willing that they should administer such justice as was customary between the inhabitants of the country, and even regarded it as desirable that the local revenue should be collected and paid to our officers through them, should they evince any wish to act as intermediaries in the matter.

Later, in the winter of 1907-08, it was reported that the Phari Jongpens were interfering with British trade, and that certain customs dues were still being levied at Phari in contravention of Article IV of the Lhasa Convention. Certain officials of the Tibetan Government had also been appointed to control the sale of rice, paper and *gur*, which Mr. Bell considered was a violation of Article II of the Convention.

The Political Officer suggested that these contraventions of the Lhasa Convention should be brought to the notice of the Tibetan High authorities at Lhasa under Article III of the Tibet Trade Regulations, 1908, the purport of the reference being communicated to the Chinese Imperial Resident at Lhasa.

Another case of interference with trade between India and Tibet also came to the notice of the Government of India about this time. Lieutenant Bailey, British Trade Agent at Gyantse, informed the two

(3) *Restrictions on trade between Northern Sikkim and Tibet.*

Tibetan Trade Agents on the 22nd May 1908 that the Khamba Jongpen was preventing traders from Lacheng and Lachung in Northern Sikkim from going to Shigatse, a privilege which they had formerly enjoyed. The Tibetan Agents admitted that the Jongpen had no right to do this, but said that as Khamba Jong was under Shigatse they would have to approach the Shigatse authorities and would let Lieutenant Bailey know the result of their inquiries. Lieutenant Bailey further informed the Tibetan Agent that he hoped they would settle the matter without delay, as the traders in question were sustaining considerable loss owing to the breach of the Lhasa Convention by a Tibetan official for whose conduct the Government of India would hold the Lhasa authorities responsible.

As the restrictions were not removed, the Political Officer in Sikkim suggested in November 1908 that a representation on the subject should be made to the Tibetan High authorities.

From a later report received from him it appeared that not only were Sikkimese traders from Lacheng and Lachung still forbidden to proceed beyond Khamba Jong, but Tibetan traders were also prohibited from exporting or importing goods by the Lacheng and Lachung routes. Moreover, the Khamba Jongpen himself monopolised the trade with the Sikkimese, and in lieu of making cash payments for goods purchased, gave them Tibetan articles at his own price in return for the madder, bamboos and planks which they exported to Tibet.

In April 1909 the Government of the United Provinces brought to notice certain restrictions imposed on the trade of the Garhwal Bhutias by Tibetan officials.

(4) *Restrictions on trade between Garhwal and Tibet.*

Under ancient custom two Tibetan officials visited Niti in Garhwal annually for the purpose nominally of ascertaining whether any disease prevailed there; and thereafter two inhabitants of Niti went to Daba in Tibet to obtain the permission of the Jongpens there for their fellow-countrymen to visit Tibet. Until these formalities were complied with, the *Bhutias* were not allowed to cross the Niti and Mana passes into Tibet.

The Resident in Kashmir reported in June 1909 that a duty of 10 per cent. had been levied during the last two years on articles exported from the eastern ilakas of Ladakh to Tibet and that the Tibetan officials responsible for its levy were the Jongpen of Rudok and the Garpons of Gartok. The Resident was informed in reply that the whole question of the dues levied upon goods entering Tibet from India was under the consideration of the Government of India with a view to representations being made on the subject to the Chinese Government.

(5) *Levy of dues in Western Tibet.*



Captain O'Connor, British Trade Agent at Gyantse, having been called upon to explain why he had not before reported the refortification of the Gyantse Jong,

**Refortification of the Gyantse Jong.**

replied on the 2nd October 1905 that the Jong had now been rebuilt upon much the same lines as before it was demolished by us, though without loopholed walls. He stated that the Tibetan delegates in August 1904 had urged that jongs were not properly fortifications; that they in no way obstructed the roads, and were necessary as head-quarters of district administration, and that Sir F. Younghusband, in consequence, decided that jongs were not included in the term "forts and fortifications" in clause 8 of the Convention, the Tibetan expressions for armaments also being expressly chosen with his approval to exclude the word "jong." Captain O'Connor urged strongly that all reference to the rebuilding of the Gyantse Jong might therefore be omitted from the letter which it was proposed to address to Lhasa, as, if the action taken by the Tibetans were objected to, an accusation of breach of faith would certainly be provoked.

Sir F. Younghusband explained that on the occasion when the Convention was being translated by Captain O'Connor, in conjunction with the Tibetan Secretaries, the Tibetans had asked that, as the jongs were official residences of district officials, the latter might be allowed to reside in them. Sir F. Younghusband authorised Captain O'Connor to state that he had no objection to district officials living in the jongs, if they wished to do so, after destruction of the fortified portions. Sir F. Younghusband pointed out that, although the particular word "jong" was not used in translating clause 8 of the Treaty, the word which was used included fortifications of all kinds. He added that in any case the point was settled by the annexure to the Convention which declared the English text to be binding. He stated that he certainly gave no countenance or authority for rebuilding of fortifications on the site of Gyantse Jong.

His Majesty's Government held on the 28th November 1905 that although exception could not be taken to the erection of official residences proper, the British Government had the right to object to such residences being built so as to constitute fortifications, and requested that any warning as to fortifications which it might seem necessary to pronounce in view of Captain O'Connor's report as to works being undertaken at Gyantse Jong, might be worded with reference to the distinction between the two classes of buildings. The Lhasa authorities were addressed accordingly.

News was received by the Political Officer in Sikkim, during the month of July 1908, that the Phari Jongpens had issued

**Proposed rebuilding of the Phari Jong.**

orders for the rebuilding of the Phari Jong.

On the 14th September the Political Officer was informed that the Government of India agreed with him that a warning should be conveyed to the Tibetan Trade Agent at Yatung that any rebuilding of the Jong would be a contravention of Article VIII of the Lhasa Convention of 1904. The communication was to be couched in the form of an enquiry as to whether the orders referred to had been issued by the Jongpens. It was added that the Government of India did not consider it necessary, at the present stage, to indicate that they would not object to the building to a moderate extent of official residences and offices, provided that the British Trade Agent's approval was first obtained to the plans of such buildings. The Phari Jongpens who were addressed as ordered, replied that they thought the Phari Jong would be rebuilt, but that they did not know when.

They were accordingly told that they would not be permitted to rebuild the Jong, in accordance with the Lhasa Convention.

Later, owing to reports that orders had been given to the local people to rebuild Phari Jong, the British Trade Agent at Yatung inquired from the Tibetan Trade Agent about the matter; and on being informed that residences for the two Jongpens and a court-house would be constructed in accordance with orders received from Lhasa, the British Trade Agent mentioned that he thought that the Government of India would object to any buildings at all on the site of the old Jong, but that, if the Pishi Depon would give him plans of what was proposed, he would forward them and receive orders on the subject. He added that until this question was settled no work whatever should be started. The Pishi Depon said he understood

this and that he would do nothing without further orders from Lhasa. The Chinese officials at Zatung also intimated that they thought that the British Trade Agent's request for plans was quite reasonable.

On the 3rd March 1907, while on shooting leave, a sepoy attached to the escort of the Trade Agent at Gyantse injured a Tibetan woman by shooting her in the hand. After ascertaining the facts with the assistance of the Trade Agent, the Officer Commanding the escort dealt with the case by punishing the sepoy under military rules. The local Tibetan authorities were requested by Captain O'Connor to be present at the enquiry, but, after consultation with Mr. Gow, they declined to do so. Mr. Gow subsequently wrote to the Trade Agent to the effect that Mr. Chang had instructed him to intimate that no such mixed case should have been tried without the Chinese Commissioner being informed and being present. No mention whatever was made of Tibetan authorities, but Mr. Gow added that the Chinese would be compelled to adopt similar measures, in the event of assaults by natives upon British soldiers or subjects, unless there was a rehearing of this case by Joint Commissioners. These facts were reported to the Secretary of State on the 28th March, and the Government of India added that the Chinese claim to interfere was, apparently, based upon Article VI of the Trade Regulations of 1893, which did not, however, apply, as it referred only to trade disputes. As the Trade Agent possessed no magisterial powers, no formal trial of the case had taken place. Captain O'Connor had asked to be invested with such powers, but without the consent of the Tibetan Government, it would not, apparently, be possible to delegate to him authority to take cognizance of mixed cases. As the question of jurisdiction at Gyantse in mixed cases between British subjects and Tibetans or Chinese was one of some difficulty, the Government of India thought that it would be better to reserve it for discussion at the time when the Trade Regulations were received. They proposed, therefore, with the Secretary of State's approval, to tell Captain O'Connor not to return any reply to Mr. Gow's communication, but to report, for the orders of the Government of India, before taking any action, any further mixed case that might occur. In the meanwhile, with a view to minimise, as far as possible, the risk of collision between the local inhabitants and subordinates, whether civil or military, at Gyantse, instructions were issued to the effect that no shooting leave or leave to sleep outside the post should be granted to such subordinates without the concurrence of the Trade Agent. It does not appear that the matter was further pursued.

On the 4th July 1908, a *fracas* occurred in Phari between some Tibetans and Chinese on the one side and Bhutanese on the other. It appeared that about the 20th June, a Bhutanese on arriving in Phari found a Tibetan trader living with his wife who was a Tibetan. He, therefore, assaulted the trader and shut him up in his house in which were ten other Bhutanese. On hearing of the incident, the Chinese officials sent 12 soldiers and four Yungs to arrest the Bhutanese. As the Bhutanese refused to give themselves up, the Chinese ordered the people of Phari to capture them. The house was subsequently set on fire and the first Bhutanese to appear was killed and the other ten taken prisoners and sent down to the Chinese Popon's Yamen at Pi-pi-tang, from which place the prisoners were released by an armed body of Bhutanese, the Chinese offering no resistance owing to the troops at their disposal being insufficient. The case was eventually settled by the Kipu Rupon, one of the Tibetan Trade Agents at Gyantse, and the Lhasa Tunling (Chinese military official) with Rai Ugyen Kazi Bahadur, Bhutan Agent at Kalimpong, acting as a representative of the Bhutan Durbar, on the following terms :—

The Tibetans agreed to pay :—

- (1) Rs. 5,500 as compensation to the Bhutan Durbar ;
- (2) Rs. 1,000 as compensation to the Thimbu Jongpen for the death of his orderly in the riot ; and
- (3) Rs. 500 indemnity to the family of the murdered Bhutanese.

The Phari headman and other people engaged in the disturbance were sentenced to whipping, imprisonment and fine, the latter to be paid to the Bhutanese as compensation. This was paid in full in silk and tea.

The Bhutan Durbar sent a sum of Rs. 111-2-0 to the Ti-Rimpoche and a similar amount to the Tibetan Council at Lhasa, as an apology for—

- (a) the imprisonment by the Bhutanese of the Tibetan trader;
- (b) the rescue of the Bhutanese imprisoned by the Chinese at Pi-pi-tang.

The British Trade Agent at Yatung reported on the 18th April 1908 that the cultivators at Chumbi had ploughed a portion of the land rented for the military camp without permission. The cultivator stated that the Depon and the Chinese officials had given them permission to occupy the land during the absence of the Trade Agent who contended that such permission was invalid, as the land had not yet been handed back to the Tibetans. The land included sites of the bazar still occupied by Indian traders, also offices and quarters of the postal and telegraph officials, and the Trade Agent proposed to retain possession of the whole plot until a final settlement had been arrived at as regards the site of the Trade Agency. The Political Officer in Sikkim saw no objection to the proposal, which was approved by the Government of India on the 23rd April.

In June 1908, the Chinese Frontier Officer and Commissioner of Chinese Customs at Yatung represented to the Trade Agent at Yatung that the people who owned the land at present occupied by British officials at Chumbi were suffering considerable inconvenience and asked that the Government of India might be addressed with a view to the people being permitted to sow crops on the land. On the 17th September, the Political Officer in Sikkim was asked to instruct the British Trade Agent to inform the Chinese officials, should they again raise the question of restoring the land, that the Government of India regretted that they were unable to spare any of the land now that accommodation was required for the Trade Agent's escort.

On the 19th December, the Trade Agent reported that Chinese surveyors were surveying at Yatung, and that he had heard that the Chinese intended to remove the British Trade Agency from the present site in Chumbi, called Shasima, Yatung.

On the 25th January 1909, the Chinese Commissioner of Customs informed the Trade Agent that the location of the British Trade Agency at Shasima instead of at Yatung was a contravention of the treaty, but led him to believe that the Chinese expected that the question of having the trade mart at a more suitable place in the Chumbi valley would be raised.

At the request of the Jongpen and head Lama of Taklakot two vaccinators were deputed by the Government of the United Provinces to that place. The Tibetan border officials expressed their willingness to pay all the expenses of the vaccinators, but the Government of the United Provinces, as an act of courtesy, decided that half their pay and travelling expenses while on deputation should be provided from district funds, the Jongpens arranging for the payment of the balance.

Owing to a claim made by the Chinese Commissioner of Customs at Yatung to be furnished with information as to the quantity and description of arms and ammunition imported from time to time into Tibet from India, the Political Officer in Sikkim was requested in June 1908 to instruct the British Trade Agent at Yatung to supply the Chinese Commissioner of Customs with the necessary information.

Owing to the reports that Chinese officials in Lhasa were publishing in a Lhasa newspaper articles calculated to stir up feelings of hostility towards the British Government, His Majesty's Minister at Peking, under instructions from the Secretary of State, asked the Chinese Government in July 1909 to issue orders to their

officials in Tibet to put a stop to the practice, and to cultivate friendly relations with the British Government. The Chinese Government agreed, and issued the necessary orders.

The Chinese Superintendent of the Gyantse trade mart informed the British Trade Agent in April 1909 that it was proposed to connect Lhasa with the Chinese telegraph wire at Batang by wireless installations at intervals. Nothing further has yet been done in the matter.

**Interference with the Gyantse mail.** Owing to the occurrence of one or two serious cases of attack on, and interference with, the postal runners of the Gyantse Trade Agency during 1909, without the offenders being brought to justice, the Dza-sa-Lama, wrote at the suggestion of the British Trade Agent at Gyantse, to the headmen of all the villages on the Gyantse-Phari road to the effect that, if in future no culprit was forthcoming when the *dāk* was interfered with, or the telegraphic line cut, the headmen themselves would be held responsible.

**Protection of the telegraph line to Gyantse.** In the early part of 1908 the Jongpens of Gyantse received orders to take measures to prevent the telegraph line being tampered with, and they accordingly arranged to have the line patrolled between Gyantse and Phari. A proclamation was also issued in the Chumbi valley enjoining every one not to interfere with the line. Notwithstanding these measures the line between the two places referred to was tampered with in September 1908 and again several times during 1909.

**Question of the transfer to China of the rest-houses on the road to Gyantse.** In reply to an enquiry made on the 4th May 1908 by Sir J. Jordan, His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Peking, at the instance of the Wai-wu-pu, the former was informed on the 24th November that the estimated cost of the eleven rest-houses on the routes leading from the Indian frontier to Gyantse, which were to be taken over by China in accordance with Article VI of the Trade Regulations, amounted to Rs. 22,778. (This sum did not include the cost of furniture and fittings.) On the 3rd January 1909, Sir J. Jordan reported that the Chinese Government had sent him a draft for this amount, and had requested him to communicate their request that an officer might be appointed to hand over the rest-houses to the Chinese Commissioner of Customs at Yatung. On the 11th January, the Political Officer in Sikkim reported that the Chinese Commissioner had asked Lieutenant Bailey, British Trade Agent at Yatung, when it would be convenient to hand over the rest-houses.

On the 18th January 1909, Sir J. Jordan was informed that the Government of India considered it desirable that the amount of the rent to be charged by China for the use of rest-houses should be settled before they were handed over. They suggested that, if the Wai-wu-pu agreed, the rental might be decided by the British Trade Agent and the Chinese Commissioner, and pointed out that the price of the rest-houses did not include cost of fittings and furniture which remained the property of the Government of India, who would retain responsibility for the upkeep of the buildings. On the same date instructions were sent to the Political Officer in Sikkim that, pending a reply from Sir J. Jordan, no action should be taken and no reply made to the communication of the Chinese Commissioner, who subsequently informed Lieutenant Bailey that he had been directed by his Government to discuss the question of rent of the rest-houses with the official deputed by the Government of India. On Sir J. Jordan telegraphing that he understood from the Wai-wu-pu that the Chinese Commissioner was empowered to arrange locally the question of rent and that, so far as he could see, there was no objection to the procedure, Lieutenant Bailey was authorised to discuss the question of rent on the assumption that the Government of India would continue to bear responsibility for the upkeep of the buildings and that the furniture and fittings would not be handed over to China.

In May 1909, the Political Officer in Sikkim forwarded a draft agreement prepared by the Chinese Commissioner of the Customs at Yatung, to regulate the transfer to, and lease from, China of the rest-houses on the routes leading from the Indian frontier to Gyantse. As some of the provisions of the agreement were

considered objectionable, the Political Officer was asked in August 1909 to instruct the British Trade Agent at Yatung to endeavour to obtain the agreement of the Chinese authorities to the following terms and to report for orders the results of any further discussions with the Chinese Commissioner :—

I.—The Government of China hereby agrees to lease to the Government of India the aforesaid rest-houses with effect from the date of the signature of this Agreement in consideration of an annual rental of rupees one thousand seven hundred to be paid in two half-yearly instalments, *viz.*, on the 1st January and on the 1st July in each year by the British Trade Agent at Yatung to the Chinese Commissioner of Customs at Yatung. Each of the rest-houses shall be rented with a compound extending thirty yards from the outside wall of the houses on all four sides.

II.—Plans shall be prepared in quadruplicate of each of the rest-houses and attached compounds and each plan shall show the quarters which are reserved for the use of the British official employed on the inspection and maintenance of telegraph lines from the marts to the Indian frontier and for the storage of their materials.

III.—In the event of the transfer to China of the telegraph lines from the Indian frontier to Gyantse in accordance with the provisions of the second clause of Article VI of the Tibet Trade Regulations, 1908, the Chinese Government shall be at liberty to reserve one-half of each rest-house for the use of the Chinese officials employed on the inspection and maintenance of the said telegraph lines and for the storage of their materials provided that, if such accommodation is reserved, the rent payable by the Government of India under Article I of this Agreement shall forthwith be reduced by half.

IV.—The Government of India shall be responsible for the maintenance of the rest-houses and shall execute and defray the cost of such ordinary repairs as may from time to time be necessary. The furniture in the rest-houses shall remain the property of the Government of India.

V.—The Government of India shall be at liberty to effect such alterations or additions to the rest-houses as may hereafter be deemed necessary by them. The actual cost of such alterations or additions shall be defrayed by the Government of China, but the Government of India shall pay therefor additional rent at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum on the capital cost of such additions or alterations.

VI.—Should any of the rest-houses suffer damage by fire or other cause, if such damage is proved to be due to the negligence of British subjects, the Government of India shall be responsible for such repairs or rebuilding as may be necessary to restore the rest-houses to their original condition, but, if such damage is proved to be due to the negligence of Chinese or Tibetan subjects, or to natural causes, the Government of India shall cause to be executed such repairs or rebuilding as may be necessary, the cost thereof being recoverable from the Government of China.

VII.—So long as the rest-houses are being rented by the Government of India any British, Chinese, and Tibetan officers of responsibility wishing to make the use of any of the rest-house shall obtain a pass either from the Political Officer in Sikkim or the British Trade Agent at Yatung or the British Trade Agent at Gyantse, and shall pay for such occupation the following fees :—

For one day or portion of a day, eight annas a head.

For one night, one rupee a head.

VIII.—The present agreement shall be in force for a period of ten years reckoned from the date of signature of the aforesaid regulations; but, if no demand for revision be made on either side within six months after the end of the first ten years, then the Agreement shall remain in force for another ten years, from the end of the first ten years; and so it shall be at the end of each successive ten years.

IX.—The English and Chinese texts of the present Agreement have been carefully compared, and in the event of any question arising as to the interpretation of this Agreement, the sense as expressed in the English text shall be held to be the correct sense.

The matter was still under consideration when Lord Minto left India.

During November 1909, the Political Officer in Sikkim reported that no wool

Grant of monopolies by the Lhasa Government.

and no Tibetan traders had so far arrived in Kalimpong, although some 2,000 maunds had usually arrived at this time of the year. The deadlock was attributed to the Tibetan Government having insisted on granting a monopoly in respect of wool, yak-tails and hides, and to the Chinese having declined to allow the measure.

The leading traders of Kalimpong petitioned the Government of India showing how severely they would suffer from the effects of the monopoly in respect of wool, if it were continued.

The Bhutan Durbar also were greatly perturbed about the monopoly in question, which was causing them heavy loss, and asked the Government of India to have it set aside.

Nothing had been done in the matter during the period under consideration.

In 1906 the Russian Government made a suggestion to enter into an agreement with His Majesty's Government to prohibit scientific journeys in Tibet for five years ; and the Secretary of State thought it would

Scientific journeys in Tibet.

Travel and exploration in Tibet.

be well, in view of the negotiations which were then proceeding with Russia, not to decline to consider the proposal as refusal to consider it would make it still more difficult to object hereafter if Russia sent a mission to Tibet.

The reason why His Majesty's Government objected to British explorations was that such explorations would not tend to the maintenance of Tibet in a state of political isolation or to the stability of the friendly relations with the Lhasa Government. The proposal would therefore be made to the Russian Government, but the Ambassador would be instructed to avoid the use of language committing to the principle that Russia was entitled to claim equality of treatment with the British Government in Tibet.

In the course of conversation the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs stated to Sir A. Nicolson that he intended to prevent, so far as lay in his power, any Russian explorers from entering Tibet, for the present at any rate. It was an easy matter for the Indian Government to prevent explorers from entering Tibet, as India was conterminous with that country, while Russia was not a neighbour of Tibet, as Mongolia lay between them. M. Isvolsky said that Russians might prepare exploring expeditions from Mongolia into Tibet, without the cognizance of the Russian authorities, and it would be exceedingly difficult to prevent this. He presumed that His Majesty's Government did not desire to isolate Tibet in perpetuity and added that in these days it would be very difficult to do so.

An annexe to the arrangement of the 31st August 1907 between Great Britain and Russia concerning Tibet (see page 75), provided for the exclusion from Tibet of "any scientific mission whatever" for a period of three years,

On the 4th December 1905, Mr. C. A. Bell, I.C.S., lately Assistant Political Officer in the Chumbi Valley, asked for permission to apply privately to the Tibetan Government to make a journey in Tibet.

Mr. Bell's proposed journey into Tibet negatived.

He proposed to visit Shigatse, Lhasa, the Lho-pa country, Kon-gbu, Lharugo, Tak-po, Tso-na, and Ta-wang.

In view of Mr. Bell's special qualifications, and of the fact that he was known to the Lhasa authorities, it was considered not improbable that they would be willing to grant a passport in his case if application were made for one by the Government of India. But since, in the case of Mr. Wilton, the Secretary of State had deprecated such application it was doubtful whether it would be right to permit even a private one to be made to the Lhasa Government by an officer of the Indian Government. As, however, it was very important for scientific and commercial reasons that the Government of India should do what they could to facilitate journeys such as that proposed by Mr. Bell and other officers on different occasions, private enquiry was made from the Secretary of State in January 1906 whether, in the event of the negotiations with China leading to a satisfactory settlement of the adhesion question His Majesty's Government would be likely to reconsider the orders at present prohibiting the Government of India from applying to Lhasa for passports. Attention was drawn to the fact that although the Government of India were not entitled under the Lhasa Convention of 1904 to demand such passports, yet there was nothing in the Treaty which prohibited them from doing so.

On the 23rd February 1906, the Secretary of State replied that it was the policy of His Majesty's Government to avoid extending their responsibilities in

Tibet, and they considered that, even in the special cases mentioned of applications from responsible and fully qualified officers who wished to travel for scientific and commercial objects of which the Government of India approved, it would be prudent to refrain from asking for passports. To do so would, it was thought, tend to arouse a suspicion in the minds of Tibetans that the British Government were not content with the access to the marts secured by the Convention, but were anxious to obtain fresh ones and to establish influence in districts into which they had not hitherto penetrated. Further, the suggestion that Mr. Bell should apply for a passport privately, and not with the authority of the Government of India, did not seem to meet the objections, an application from an officer of the Government being hardly distinguishable, in the existing circumstances, from one made by the Government itself.

Mr. Bell was accordingly informed that the Government of India were unable to sanction his request.

In October 1906 Mr. Bell, Political Officer in Sikkim, was permitted by the

**Visit of the Political Officer in Sikkim to Shigatse.**

Government of India to accept an invitation from the Tashi Lama to visit Shigatse. The Lama told Mr. Bell that he had felt reassured about Chinese designs against him from Lhasa, since he had received a letter from the Chinese Emperor stating that he would not be punished for having visited India. But he still feared trouble and said that he would write to the Indian Government, if necessary. The Lama stated that at his meeting with the Viceroy in Calcutta, His Excellency had promised him assistance if he were injured by the Chinese or the Lhasa Government, and had said that, if his officers wanted weapons, they could have what they wanted. Mr. Bell repeated to the Tashi Lama the correct recorded account of the conversation which took place at His Excellency's interview with the Lama in Calcutta. The Tashi Lama said that this version was no doubt correct. Mr. Bell was of opinion that the power of the Tashi-lhunpo Government in Tibet had been increased on account of the friendship between the Tashi Lama and the Government of India.

With the approval of the Secretary of State the Government of India deputed

**Deputation of the Assistant Commissioner of Kulu to Western Tibet.**

Mr. Calvert, the Assistant Commissioner of Kulu, to proceed to Western Tibet during the course of the summer of 1906, for the purpose of inspecting the Gartok trade post and examining and reporting on the conditions of the existing trade between the Punjab and Tibet. Mr. Calvert was to proceed to Gartok *viâ* Shipki, and if the Tibetans did not object, return *viâ* Rudok and Hanle.

Mr. Calvert arrived at Shangtsi *en route* to Gartok on the 31st July, where he was joined by Thakur Jai Chand, British Trade Agent at Gartok, who had come out to meet him. He had an interview with the Dzongpon of Tsaparang and established friendly relations with him.

On the 4th August, Mr. Calvert reached Gartok, and had an official interview with the senior Garpon with whom he discussed matters relating to trade.

The local authorities and people along the route traversed were friendly and assisted in supplying the transport required. Mr. Calvert entered British territory again on the 25th September, and proceeded *viâ* the Spiti valley to Kulu. Subsequently he prepared a report on the conditions of trade between the Punjab and Tibet and on the trade routes traversed by him.

On the occasion of the Tashi Lama's visit to India in the winter of 1905 (*q.v.*)

**Captain Fitzgerald's visit to Shigatse.**

Captain Fitzgerald, A.-D.-C. to the Commander-in-Chief, was permitted to accept an invitation from the Tashi Lama to accompany the Tibetan party on its return to Shigatse.

Mr. David Fraser of the *Times* was also permitted to accompany Captain Fitzgerald. They were not allowed to proceed beyond Shigatse. They left Shigatse on their return journey on the 21st February 1906.

On the 23rd March 1906, His Majesty's Secretary of State for India requested

**Dr. Zugmayer.**

that, if Dr. Zugmayer, who proposed to undertake a scientific journey for the Royal Bavarian Academy of Science to Chinese Turkistan and Tibet, arrived at the fron-



tier of Tibet either by way of Gyantse or the western route to Leh, he might be accorded, by the British officials on the frontier, any facilities required by him in connection with his return to British India. The necessary instructions were accordingly issued to the Political Officer in Sikkim, the Resident in Kashmir, and the British Trade Agent at Gartok. It was reported from Kashgar in June that Dr. Zugmayer arrived at Khotan on the 21st May. On the 6th June he left for the mountains in the direction of Polu.

From a report subsequently received by the Resident in Kashmir it appeared that the doctor reached Leh on the 2nd October, and that he made an attempt to go to Rudok, but was not permitted to proceed thither by the Tibetans.

Dr. Sven Hedin, the Swedish traveller, who contemplated an exploration of the region of the Great Central Lakes in Tibet, the country between the Sangpo

and the Dangra Yumtso, the region from which the Indus and the Sangpo take their beginnings, and the course of the Upper Brahmaputra, reached India overland *via* Persia and the Nushki route, and arrived in Simla on the 22nd May 1906. He requested that the Government of India would facilitate his entrance into Western Tibet.

His Majesty's Government to whom the matter was referred decided that it was impossible to grant Dr. Sven Hedin the facilities to travel in Tibet for which he had asked, and the latter thereupon left for Kashmir with the intention of entering Tibet from the north.

Dr. Sven Hedin had no Chinese passport, and was accordingly informed under instructions from the Government of India, that in view of the regulations of the Chinese Government, he could not be permitted to cross the frontier into Chinese Turkestan. Dr. Sven Hedin, however, telegraphed for a passport, and was accordingly allowed to proceed to Leh pending its arrival. Later, as it was ascertained that the passport had been issued, he was allowed, in anticipation of its receipt, to cross the frontier, at his own risk.

He consequently left Leh and proceeded in the direction of Lake Yeshil Kul. His subsequent movements can be read in his own published account of his journey; though it may be mentioned here that he arrived at Shigatse in the following February, and received a very curtly-worded communication from Mr. Gow, the Chinese Trade official at that place, ordering him to return by the way he had come. Dr. Sven Hedin stayed at Shigatse about a month, and then left on the 20th March 1907 in the direction of Leh. He had, however, at first suggested going on to Gyantse; and the Secretary of State accordingly ordered that in the event of Dr. Sven Hedin reaching Gyantse, the assistance to be given to him there by the British Trade Agent should be confined to facilitating his return to India notwithstanding any order from Mr. Gow to the contrary. No official action was, however, to be taken by Captain O'Connor in the matter until the doctor reached Gyantse, but there was no objection to information being conveyed to the doctor unofficially regarding the instructions of His Majesty's Government. It was further stated that instructions would be issued to His Majesty's Minister at Peking to explain the circumstances to the Chinese Government, to mention the unconciliatory attitude of Mr. Gow in general matters, and to inform them of the instructions given to Captain O'Connor.

This action was duly taken in Peking; and Sir J. Jordan was also instructed to call the attention of the Chinese Government to the difficult position in which Dr. Sven Hedin's proceedings had placed the British Trade Agent at Gyantse, and to invite them to take steps to prevent the recurrence of such a situation.

The Wai-wu-pu, in reply, said that they appreciated the awkward situation in which the Trade Agent at Gyantse had been placed and promised to do their utmost in future to prohibit foreigners entering Tibet from Chinese territory, but pointed out that the task was rendered peculiarly difficult owing to the wide extent of uninhabited frontier.

In reply to a telegram from the Secretary of State, dated the 30th November 1909, asking for the views of the Govern-

ment of India on an application from a Russian Buddhist ecclesiastic to be allowed to make a religious pilgrimage to the Dalai Lama *via* India, the Government of

Desire of a Russian Buddhist to cross India on a pilgrimage to the Dalai Lama.

India on the 17th December 1909 informed His Lordship that at the present time it was clearly desirable to prevent the visit if this could be done without prejudice to British relations with Russia. They also suggested that the reply to the Russian Government might be to the effect that the Government of India had adopted an attitude of discouraging Indian Buddhists from going to Tibet and that their position might be misunderstood if they allowed a Russian Buddhist to enter Tibet *viâ* Darjeeling; and they added that in any case it would appear desirable that the Government of India should first ascertain whether the Chinese and Tibetan authorities would have any objection to the visit.

Count Benkendorff had accordingly asked to bring these considerations to the notice of the Russian Government, who, it was hoped, would not press the request.

On the 8th January 1910, the Acting Consul-General for Japan at Calcutta

**Proposed visit of a Japanese to Gyantse for the purpose of obtaining Sanskrit Buddhist manuscripts.**

applied for permission for Mr. B. Aoki, Secretary to Count K. Otani, Lord Abbot of the head monastery of Buddhism in Japan, to visit Gyantse for the purpose of obtaining certain Sanskrit Buddhist manuscripts. The Government of India replied that they regretted that they were unable to grant the necessary permission.

In April 1910, three Chinese Army officers were desirous to cross the frontier into Tibet; but with the approval of His Majesty's Government, the Political Officer in Sikkim was instructed that until the situation in Tibet had cleared up, passes should be refused to the Chinese officers in question.

Action was taken accordingly; and Mr. Chien Hsi Pao addressed the Government of India in the matter, explaining that the party in question consisted of military graduates, and suggesting that there must have been some misunderstanding. Further, he asked that the matter might be fully investigated, and that either passes be granted or that he might be informed of the reason for the refusal.

The Chinese Amban at Lhasa was informed that owing to the misunderstanding which it was anticipated that the passage of the military graduates across the Indian frontier might give rise to, the Government of India were unable to accede to his request.

Subsequently, in June, Mr. Bell reported that one of the graduates in question, Mr. Chien Fu Sheng, had made his way secretly from the Darjeeling district across the frontier into the Chumbi valley in the disguise of a Tibetan. The matter was brought to the notice of the Chinese Resident at Lhasa who was informed that Mr. Chien Fu Sheng's action, being an infraction of the law, should he again appear in British India on any future occasion, proceedings would be taken against him under the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation of 1873.

On the 8th February 1909, the Government of India informed the Secretary of State that the Director-General of the

**Desire of the Chinese Government to place Tibet in postal communication with the Chinese system.**

Post Office of India had received a communication from the Inspector-General. Chinese Imperial Posts, announcing the desire of the Chinese Government to place Tibet in postal communication with the Chinese system, and proposing the exchange of mails between China and Tibet by means of the intermediate carrying services of the Indian Post Office. China was not a party to the Postal Union and hence could not claim the liberty of transit for mails across India by the services of the Indian Post Office, which was guaranteed to Union countries by Article IV of the Principal Convention of Rome, but, as the Government of India had in the case of the exchange of mails across the Burma Yunnan frontier, already entered into postal relations with China, they saw no objection to the extension of the Union principle to China in this case, provided that the Chinese Post Office authorities agreed to the establishment of a direct postal exchange between India and Lhasa, if the Government of India considered this desirable. To effect this a special agreement with the Chinese Imperial Post Office would be necessary.

It appeared that the probable object of the Chinese was to secure the withdrawal of the British postal system between India and the trade marts, as contemplated in Article VIII of the Trade Regulations of 1908, for they had enquired at

what places on the frontier the exchange of mails should be effected. As the Government of India maintained mail communications of their own up to Gyantse and Gartok, they considered that the exchange of mails between their post office and the Chinese should take place at those places until the efficiency of the Chinese postal service was demonstrated. The Government of India proposed, with the approval of the Secretary of State, to instruct the Director-General to reply to the Chinese communication on these lines.

On the 24th February, Sir J. Jordan, His Majesty's Minister at Peking, telegraphed to His Majesty's Government that he concurred generally in the course of action proposed. He thought, however, that the Chinese Government might possibly object to Gyantse and Gartok as places for the exchange of mails, on the ground that the courier service between these places and India was merely for the transmission of the posts of the British Trade Agents and that we could not claim that it should be used for ordinary postal communication, although we could retain it for its present purpose until the Chinese postal service became efficient.

His Majesty's Government intimated their approval (March 24) of the reply which the Government of India proposed to send to the Inspector-General, Chinese Imperial Posts; and the Director-General of the Post Office of India accordingly despatched it on the 7th May.

In November 1909, Mr. Teng-Wai-ping of the Chinese Postal Administration, arrived in Calcutta *en route* to Tibet to make the preliminary arrangements for establishing the postal communication agreed to.

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### SIKKIM.

In December 1903, the political management of the State of Bhutan was transferred to the Government of India from the Government of Bengal in order to facilitate the establishment of friendly relations between Colonel Younghusband, the Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Affairs, and the Tongsa Penlop of Bhutan.

It had previously been arranged that the Political Officer in Sikkim, who was formerly subordinate to the Bengal Government, should, during the continuance of the Mission, be subject to the direct control of the Government of India in all matters relating to Tibet. All matters relating to the internal administration of the Sikkim State and its relations with the British Government were, however, dealt with by the Bengal Government as before. At the close of the Mission, the Government of India considered it desirable that this arrangement should be continued until matters affecting Chumbi and the trade route to Tibet were finally settled. They also proposed to retain the Bhutan State, for the present, under their direct control.

In January 1905, the Government of Bengal represented, however, that the position, occupied by the Political Officer in Sikkim as subordinate partly to the Government of India and partly to the Local Government, was not satisfactory, and it was accordingly suggested that the Sikkim State should be taken wholly under the control of the Government of India. The Government of India accepted this view, and, in June 1905, orders were issued severing the connection between the Government of Bengal and the Political Officer in Sikkim. This officer was, at the same time, appointed to be in political charge of the Bhutan State and the Chumbi Valley, while the Trade Agent at Gyantse was placed under his control.

In a despatch No. 103, dated 19th October 1906, the Secretary of State suggested that, with a view to reduce the work in the Foreign Department of the Government of India, the control of the States of Sikkim and Bhutan should be handed back to the Local Government.

The Government of India, in their reply dated the 21st February 1907, deprecated the adoption of this course. They pointed out that the main route for British trade with Tibet passed through the Sikkim State, and that both that State and Bhutan were closely connected with Tibet. They accordingly considered it

very important that the political control of these States should remain with the Government of India, until such time, at least, as British relations with the Tibetans were placed upon a more definite and satisfactory footing, and trade within the prescribed limits was safely established.

At the same time, in order to meet the Secretary of State's wishes on the subject as far as possible, the Government of India expressed their willingness to introduce, as a tentative measure, a system of direct relations between the Trade Agent at Gyantse and the Government of India, so long as the post in question might be held by Captain O'Connor. Captain O'Connor was accordingly authorised to submit his communications, on all subjects having a political aspect, direct to the Government of India, forwarding at the same time copies to the Political Officer in Sikkim.

In all routine matters the Trade Agent was still to address the Political Officer in Sikkim, to whom he was to be subordinate with regard to such matters.

On the 3rd May 1907 the Secretary of State informed the Government of India that he saw no reason to alter his opinion as to relieving the Foreign Department of the direct control of Sikkim and Bhutan, but that he had no objection to the transfer of the control of these States being postponed until the retirement of Mr. J. C. White. Mr. White retired in 1908 but existing arrangements have been allowed to continue.

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## BHUTAN.

During Lord Minto's Viceroyalty a very important change has taken place in the relations between the Government of India and the Bhutan State.

**Chinese interference with Bhutan. Conclusion of a new treaty with that state.**

Early in 1908 reports were current of an intention on the part of China to inquire into the affairs of Bhutan; and in April 1908, Mr. Ma Chi Fu, one of the Chinese Representatives in Chumbi, started for Bhutan accompanied by a party which included about twenty Chinese soldiers.

Subsequently Rai Bahadur Ugyen Kazi, the Bhutan Agent, showed Mr. Bell copies of two letters received by the Maharaja, one from the Amban at Lhasa, the other from the Chinese Popon at Pi-pi-tang in the Chumbi valley. The Amban's letter stated that Bhutan was under Chinese suzerainty, and that he was sending an officer to report on the condition of the country, its climate, its crops, and the people. The Popon's letter, which was couched in language such as that used towards village headmen, ordered the Penlops and other Bhutanese barons to attend at the boundaries of their fiefs and conduct him through them. The Maharaja of Bhutan, in asking Ugyen Kazi for his advice, stated that it was now more than 240 years since Bhutan had belonged to the Dharma Rajas and that he had never heard that during this time any Chinese official ever came to Bhutan to make enquiries, that he hoped the Mission would return from Paro, but that he could not prevent them coming further in, if they wished to do so.

Ugyen Kazi informed Mr. Bell that he had replied advising the Maharaja to say that forty years ago, when Bhutan was at war with the British, China never offered her any assistance or took any steps in the matter, that Bhutan had never given tribute to China, nor had any of her officials ever been paid by China, and that he would on this occasion overlook the rudeness of the Popon's letter in addressing the barons of Bhutan as common people, as he had no doubt that it was a mistake of the clerk who wrote the letter. The Maharaja was at Tongsa, his provincial capital, and Ugyen Kazi was of opinion that he should not go to either of the capitals of Bhutan (Punakha or Tashi-cho-dzong) to receive the Mission. Ugyen Kazi further informed Mr. Bell that Bhutan had never in any way acknowledged the suzerainty of China, and assured him that there was no fear of the Maharaja committing himself in any way with the Chinese.

Ma Chi Fu returned to Pharijong on the 7th May.

In October 1908, the Government of India proposed to His Majesty's Government that, in view of the gravity of the change which had taken place in the politi-

cal situation on the north-east frontier of India, owing to the active policy pursued by the Chinese in Tibet, and an attempt made by the Amban at Lhasa to assert China's sovereign rights in Bhutan, Mr. Bell, the Political Officer in Sikkim, should be deputed to Bhutan at an early date with the object of negotiating with the Bhutan Darbar for a new treaty, by which the external relations of that State would be placed under British control in exchange for which the Bhutan subsidy of Rs. 50,000 a year would be increased, if necessary, up to two lakhs a year.

The proposal was approved in June 1909 by His Majesty's Government who desired that Mr. Bell should, in the course of conversation, explain to the Maharaja of Bhutan the following understanding, which, on conclusion of the treaty, should be embodied in a *kharita* from the Viceroy to the Maharaja, viz., that it necessarily followed from any obligation which the British Government might accept to advise him and support him in the conduct of his foreign affairs, that he himself should not enter into any agreement with the authorities of foreign states without the consent of the British Government, and that he should not, without the same consent, permit agents or representatives of foreign Powers to reside in Bhutan, or part with land to the authorities, representatives or officials of any foreign state.

After clearing the ground with the assistance of Rai Ugyen Kazi Bahadur, the Bhutan Agent, Mr. Bell, accompanied by Captain Kennedy, I.M.S., left Buxa Duar for Bhutan on the 28th December, and on the 8th January 1910 concluded the treaty—text of which is given below—with the Maharaja of Bhutan and entire Council, in exchange for an addition to the Bhutan subsidy of Rs. 50,000, making it one lakh a year. Mr. Bell also explained to the Maharaja and Council the understanding desired by His Majesty's Government, which was subsequently embodied in a *kharita* from His Excellency the Viceroy to the Maharaja, dated the 11th March 1910.

The following is the text of the treaty, which was ratified by His Excellency the Viceroy on the 24th March, and, with the permission of His Majesty's Government published on the 26th idem :—

“Whereas it is desirable to amend Articles IV and VIII of the Treaty concluded at Sinchula on the 11th day of November 1865, corresponding with the Bhutia year Shing Lang, 24th day of the 9th month, between the British Government and the Government of Bhutan, the undermentioned amendments are agreed to on the one part by Mr. C. A. Bell, Political Officer in Sikkim, in virtue of full powers to that effect vested in him by the Right Honourable Sir Gilbert John Elliot-Murray-Kynynmound, P. C., G.M.S.I., G.M.I.E., G.C.M.G., Earl of Minto, Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council, and on the other part by His Highness Sir Ugyen Wangchuk, K.C.I.E., Maharaja of Bhutan.”

The following addition has been made to Article IV of the Sinchula Treaty of 1865 :—

“The British Government has increased the annual allowance to the Government of Bhutan from fifty thousand rupees (Rs. 50,000) to one hundred thousand rupees (Rs. 1,00,000) with effect from the 10th January 1910.”

Article VIII of the Sinchula Treaty of 1865 has been revised and the revised Article runs as follows :—

“The British Government undertakes to exercise no interference in the internal administration of Bhutan. On its part, the Bhutanese Government agrees to be guided by the advice of the British Government in regard to its external relations. In the event of disputes with, or causes of complaint against, the Maharajas of Sikkim and Cooch Behar such matters will be referred for arbitration to the British Government, which will settle them in such manner as justice may require, and insist upon the observance of its decision by the Maharajas named.”

Done in quadruplicate at Punaka, Bhutan, this eighth day of January in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and ten, corresponding with the Bhutia date, the 27th day of the 11th month of the Earth-Bird (Sa-ja) year.”

In June 1910 the Government of India informed the Secretary of State of some further instances of attempts by the Chinese to interfere with Bhutan.

The Bhutan Agent at Phari had reported that the Chinese Amban at Lhasa had sent a letter to the Maharaja of Bhutan demanding an explanation of his having allowed certain of the Dalai Lama's men to pass to India through Bhutan terri-

tory with goods for the Lama ; and that the Maharaja had replied that the Amban should prevent men leaving Lhasa with goods for the Lama, but that once men reached Bhutan territory he (the Maharaja) could not stop them.

Further, the Chinese had told people at Yatung that Bhutan was under China and that soldiers would be sent there to guard the country, when Chao Erh Feng arrived at Lhasa with his troops. Mr. Bell had also supplied a translation of a letter addressed by the Chinese frontier officer at Pipitang to Ugyen Kazi enclosing a proclamation from the Lhasa Amban in which it was ordered that Chinese Tibetan rupees must be allowed to circulate in Bhutan.

The Government of India proposed that Mr. Bell should direct the British Trade Agent at Yatung to inform the Chinese Frontier Officer that, as the external relations of Bhutan were controlled by the Government of India, he was replying in the place of the Bhutan Government, and that in future any communication which the Chinese Frontier Officer might wish to address to the Government of Bhutan should be addressed through him, and that he would forward it to Mr. Bell for transmission ; and that, as regards the present proclamation, the Government of India could not agree to instruct the Bhutan Government that Chinese rupees must be allowed to circulate in Bhutan, that being a matter in which the Bhutanese must please themselves.

His Majesty's Government considered that the correct procedure, in the event of the Maharaja receiving any Chinese letters, would be for him to send them to Mr. Bell, who would either draft answers in consultation with the Maharaja, or refer to the Government of India, for instructions, if necessary ; and Mr. Bell was accordingly asked to take the opportunity to prescribe this procedure, in replying to the Maharaja's letter to him about the circulation of Chinese coinage in Bhutan. It was, however, to be understood that, although replies might be drafted by Mr. Bell, they should issue under the Maharaja's signature.

In December 1906, Messrs. Duncan Brothers & Co., Calcutta, enquired what guarantees, if any, the Government

Question of the protection to be afforded to investors in tea plantations or other ventures in Bhutan.

of India would be prepared to give that investors in tea plantations or other ventures in Bhutan would be protected in the

enjoyment of rights conferred on them by leases or agreements made with the Bhutan Durbar. On the 22nd February, they were informed that the Bhutan Durbar had not yet approached the Government of India on the subject of the employment of European capital for the development of the country, and that no direct dealings on the subject of financial arrangements were ordinarily permissible between Durbars of Native States and capitalists or financial agents. It was added that having regard to the existing condition of internal affairs in Bhutan, the Government of India were not prepared at present to permit Europeans to embark in permanent industrial enterprises in the country.

The Political Officer in Sikkim, accompanied by Major Rennick, Captain

Election of the Tongsa Penlop as hereditary Maharaja of Bhutan.

Campbell, and Captain Hyslop, visited Bhutan on the invitation of the Tongsa Penlop in December 1907 in order to be pre-

sent at the ceremony of his election as hereditary Maharaja of Bhutan. On the 17th December Mr. White reported that Sir Ugyen Wangchuk, the Tongsa Penlop, had been elected hereditary Maharaja of Bhutan that day by all the Lamas, Penlops, Jongpens, etc., in open Darbar.

Relaying operations on this boundary have been in progress during the year.

The Bhutan-Jalpaiguri boundary.

In January 1909, certain reference pillars, which the survey party found necessary, owing to the configuration of the ground, to erect on the Bhutan side of the Jiti river, were destroyed by the Bhutanese.

The Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam asked Mr. Bell to induce the Bhutanese to allow the re-erection of the pillars which were for reference only. The Government of India, however, considered that, as such pillars would inevitably be regarded with suspicion by the local Bhutanese officials who do not understand the purpose for which they are erected, and would look upon them as a design

to facilitate encroachment in the future, it was undesirable for political reasons that any reference pillars, however useful they might be for the future determination of the boundary, should be erected within the territory of the Bhutan Government.

Owing to disputes over a piece of land in Bhutan territory, on which stands a liquor shop, adjoining the Rangamati Tea Estate, Mr. Hamilton, the Manager of the garden, obtained control over the plot of land and the liquor shop by taking a lease in the name of a native agent of his garden, named Dhojbir, with the object of controlling the supply of liquor to the garden coolies. Dhojbir, however, offended the Bhutanese authorities by refusing to obey certain orders given to him and was in consequence fined, and his lease was also cancelled in 1907 and the land given to another man. This resulted in a dispute between the Bhutan authorities and Mr. Hamilton, which threatened at one time to become serious, but the matter was eventually settled, in January 1908, with the cognisance of Mr. White, who was Political Officer, Sikkim, at the time, by Mr. Hamilton agreeing to collect the rent of Rs. 1,200 due from Dhojbir before the end of 1909 and himself leasing the land from Singi Jhora to the Bane river, together with the liquor shop, from the Bhutan Darbar for Rs. 2,200 a year for a term of five years.

This lease contravened article 7 of the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation, 1873, but in the special circumstances of the case, the Government of India decided, with the concurrence of the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam, to take no action towards the cancellation of the lease.

In compliance with a request made by the Bhutan Darbar the Government of India in July 1909 sanctioned the grant to them, rent free, of a plot of land in Kalimpong for a residence for the Bhutan Agent and for trading purposes on the following conditions :—

- (i) that houses will not be constructed on certain parts of the plot; and
- (ii) that the land will be restored when it is no longer required for the purposes for which it was given.

The Government of Bengal were asked to take steps to acquire the land and to place it at the disposal of the Political Officer in Sikkim who was instructed to make a suitable communication to the Bhutan Darbar when making the land over to them.

At the request of the Maharaja and in view of his special position and of the friendly relations existing between him and the British Government, sanction was granted as an exception to the general rule, to seven gold, 120 silver and three bronze medals being prepared in, and issued on payment from, the Mint at Calcutta to the Maharaja of Bhutan, who asked for them for distribution in commemoration of his succession to the *gadi*.

## ASSAM.

### THE NAGA HILLS.

The Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam reported on the 2nd April 1906, in regard to a British subject who was killed in 1905 in the trans-frontier Naga village of Yachumi, that efforts had been made to secure the surrender of the murderer, but without result. The people also declined to go to Mokokchang to give their version of the occurrence. The Lieutenant-Governor accordingly, with the approval of the Government of India, authorised the Deputy Commissioner, Naga Hills District, to visit Yachumi, with an escort of 100 rifles of the Naga Hills Military Police. The officers accompanying the force were the Deputy Commissioner, the Commandant of the Naga Hills Battalion, and the Subdivisional Officer of Mokokchang.



No opposition was offered, but as the murderer had absconded, the expedition did not result in his capture. A fine of 30 cattle was exacted from the village of Yachumi to which the murderer belonged and the village of Kehomi, in which he was suspected of having taken refuge, was burnt.

The Government of India expressed approval of the manner in which the expedition was carried out.

On the 7th June 1906, the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam drew

Extension of the area of political control in the Naga Hills.

the attention of the Government of India to the deplorable conditions which prevailed in the villages of the Naga Hill tribes

situated a short distance across the eastern frontier of the province and, in order to check the perpetration of barbarities by their inhabitants, advocated the establishment of an area of political control along and beyond the frontier. The Government of India remitted the case to the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam for further consideration, specially with reference to the point whether, in the event of the question being pursued, the change would involve any augmentation of military police forces or increase in administrative charges.

On the 7th December 1907, the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam, in reviewing the whole history of events on this portion of the frontier, urged that there was no reason to apprehend that the proposed extension would involve military operations or additional expenditure. Sir Lancelot Hare concurred in the opinion of his predecessor as to the desirability of permitting the officers of the Naga Hills District to exercise some control over the tribes just across the frontier.

In a despatch, dated the 16th July 1908, the Government of India, proposed, subject to the approval of His Majesty's Government, to accept the proposals of the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam for an extension of the area of political control. They thought that they would be accepting a grave responsibility if, in opposition to the advice of successive Lieutenant-Governors supported by the practically unanimous opinion of local frontier officers, they declined to take steps to ensure the safety of frontier villages and to put a stop to horrible barbarities, more especially when this end could be achieved without adding to the expenditure or increasing political risks. The Government of India accepted Sir Lancelot Hare's suggestion that, with the proviso that villages situated at a distance of more than 12 miles from the frontier should not ordinarily be included, it was undesirable to define geographically the limits of the proposed belt of control.

On the 13th November, His Majesty's Secretary of State for India replied that he had considered in Council the recommendations for an extension of the area of political control in the Naga Hills and was unable to accept them. He was not satisfied that the action proposed might not produce results wider and more serious than were at present anticipated. Nor was he satisfied on the facts as reported that it was at the present moment necessary, in the interests of the dwellers within the British border, that there should be a departure from the principle of non-interference by the extension of the area of our responsibilities on this section of the frontier.

The Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam were accordingly informed that the Government of India could not agree to the proposals.

In 1909, several cases occurred in which the eastern frontier of Assam was

Raids by Aishan Kukis living in the unadministered tract east of the Naga Hills and Manipur. violated by Aishan Kukis living in the unadministered tract east of the Naga Hills and Manipur.

The Lieutenant-Governor considered that such acts, involving a violation of the British frontier, could not be tolerated, and as the extension of political control was not permitted by the Secretary of State for India, he was forced to recommend (August 5, 1909), the only other alternative, which was open to him, namely a punitive promenade against these marauders in the coming cold weather by an adequate force of military police operating from the Naga Hills.

Before sanctioning the promenade, however, the Government of India asked for certain information as to the villages against which the expedition was to be directed, the strength of the force, and whether any demand for reparation

had been made. Enquiry was also made as to whether Temimi was the village which it was proposed in 1908, to bring under British administration—a proposal which was finally rejected by His Majesty's Government. The Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam replied that the statement about Temimi being a British village was correct, as it moved across the border and came under British control some years ago and had since paid taxes. Further, that owing to the recalcitrant attitude of the tribesmen who attacked the Manipur villages, and owing also to the impossibility of the Deputy Commissioner, Naga Hills, communicating during the rains with the tribesmen who had raided Temimi, the Lieutenant-Governor preferred not to demand reparation until authorised by the Government of India to inflict adequate punishment in case of refusal. The Eastern Bengal and Assam Government accordingly proposed to demand suitable reparation as soon as the country was open in November, and also considered that if reparation was refused the promenade might be limited to visiting villages and the neighbourhood from which the raiders came. The Local Government were informed, in reply, that in the event of a refusal of the raiders to give reparation, the promenade might be undertaken as suggested.

On the 30th May 1910, the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam reported that the punitive expedition against the Aishan Kukis, living in the unadministered tract east of the Naga Hills and Manipur, had been successful, and that all the principal offending headmen concerned had been captured. The actual cost of the expedition was said to be insignificant, and it was expected that the whole amount would be realised from the fines imposed upon the offending villagers. It was, however, found necessary to leave a guard of 50 military police, under a native officer, at Melomi in a stockaded post, where they were to remain until the Kuki immigrants, who had been the cause of the trouble, returned to the Manipur State to which they belonged, and the country settled down.

As Melomi was one of the villages which it was proposed in 1908 to bring under administration, a measure which the Secretary of State refused to sanction, the guard could not be permitted to remain there for an indefinite period. The Local Government were accordingly asked to say when it was anticipated that it would be possible to withdraw it. They replied that they did not anticipate that it would be possible to withdraw the guard at Melomi before the end of the next cold weather. In acknowledging receipt of the report and the successful manner in which the expedition was carried out, the Government of India expressed a hope that the desirability of withdrawing the guard, as soon as the fear of Kuki reprisals had passed away, would be borne in mind.

On the 21st March 1907, the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam sub-

#### Expedition to the village of Kehomi.

mitted for the orders of the Government of India, correspondence on the subject of an outrage committed by some members of the trans-frontier village of Aghilutomi, or Kehomi, on a trading party from the British village of Seromi. No lives were lost, but two of the traders were wounded, and their property was apparently carried off.

The attack appeared to have been entirely unprovoked, and it was made within a day's march of the frontier. The Deputy Commissioner had been instructed to call upon the headmen of Kehomi to come in and explain their conduct, and if they complied, and made such reparation as might be thought sufficient, no further action would be taken. His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, however, had very little hope that the summons would be obeyed, and was of opinion that it would probably be necessary to visit the village with an armed force and exact a fine, or, in default, burn the houses. The village had been burnt in 1906 during the Yachumi expedition, but the punishment then inflicted had failed to exercise a deterrent effect. The Local Government accordingly asked that sanction might be given for the despatch of an expedition to Kehomi to exact the necessary reparation. It was proposed that the force should be composed of two detachments of 30 rifles each of the Naga Hills Military Police under the command of a military officer, and the Sub-divisional Officer, Mokokchang. The Government of India agreed with the Local Government, and orders were accordingly issued sanctioning the adoption of the measures proposed, in the event of the headmen failing to comply with the Deputy Commissioner's summons.

The headmen did fail to comply with the Deputy Commissioner's summons, and the proposed expedition accordingly proceeded to Kehomi, and destroyed all building and household materials, together with about 300 maunds of grain; all the live-stock belonging to the village was also captured or destroyed. The Government of India expressed approval of the manner in which the expedition had been carried out, and concurred in the Lieutenant-Governor's appreciation of the conduct of the officers and men concerned in it.

On the 16th July 1908, the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam submitted certain proposals for exacting satisfaction from the village of Yazim and other trans-frontier Naga villages, which were concerned in a violation of the frontier in the course of a raid on the village of Yangpi in January 1908.

Sir Charles Bayley proposed to inflict a fine of 25 mithan on the village, and suitable smaller fines on the other villages concerned, and to authorize the Deputy Commissioner of the district or the Sub-Divisional Officer, Mokokchang, to visit these villages with a force of 75 rifles (Military Police), in the event of the fines not being forthcoming within a reasonable period.

The Government of India approved these proposals, and also agreed with the Local Government that, for the present, the Sub-Divisional Officer should only be permitted to cross the frontier in the event of the offending villages failing to pay the fines imposed.

### THE LUSHAI HILLS.

On the 8th November 1906, the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam submitted proposals for the delimitation of the southern boundary of the Lushai Hills district, and for the exaction of satisfaction for outrages committed by inhabitants of the unadministered village of Zongling on the British administered villages of Pemthar and Siata. As regards the latter cases it is sufficient to say that the Chief of Zongling having failed to give reparation, the Superintendent of the Lushai Hills proceeded with the sanction of the Government of India to Zongling in December 1907 accompanied by an escort of Military Police, and exacted a fine of twenty guns from the village.

In connection with their demarcation proposals, the Local Government represented that there was no clear territorial boundary to the south of the Lushai Hills District, and that British and independent villages lay interspersed throughout a considerable area and especially down a long tongue of land to the south of the village of Sherkor. At the time when the Lushai Hills were handed over to the Assam Administration, it was found that the definition of the southern boundary of the district presented special difficulties, and it was decided that the question of defining the frontier should be allowed to lie over till after the cold weather of 1898-99. In 1899 a further postponement was considered desirable, and in August 1900 the Chief Commissioner of Assam informed the Government of India that, in his opinion, the exact delimitation of a boundary on the southern frontier of the Lushai Hills District, was not of any real importance. He recommended that matters should be allowed to remain as they were for the present, and the Government of India concurred in this opinion. Mr. Hare considered, however, that, while the existing state of affairs continued, there would always be friction, and he recommended strongly, in order to prevent this, that a recognisable and convenient boundary should be laid down to the south of Sherkor. This boundary would be fixed, after careful local enquiry, with reference to the tribal connections of the various villages as well as the physical features of the country. The Lieutenant-Governor proposed that the work should be done by the Superintendent on the occasion of his visit to Zongling. The Government of India agreed with the Local Government that it was certainly desirable, in order to prevent complications, that a recognisable boundary should be laid down separating the administered from the unadministered area. They felt some doubt, however, as to whether it would be possible to fix any satisfactory line which would be respected in practice as an administrative frontier. The Assam Administration

had stated in 1898 that the Lushais were a *jhuming* and nomad folk, and that no arbitrary line on the map, or even any range of hills, nor point between hill and hill would receive practical recognition. Before final orders were passed in the matter, the Government of India, therefore, desired that a further report might be submitted in the light of the experience and information that might be gained by the Superintendent of the Lushai Hills during his visit to Zongling. Further, in view of the fact that the nominal northern boundary of the Arakan Hills overlapped the line which it was proposed to take as the southern boundary of the Lushai Hills, it was requested that, with the permission of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, the Burma Government might be consulted before further proposals were submitted regarding the line to be fixed as the southern administrative boundary of the Lushai Hills.

### THE ASSAM FRONTIER.

Early in 1907 a party of 30 armed Shandus entered Kon territory and at-

tempted to collect tribute, with the result that they were fiercely attacked and with the exception of five of their number were all massacred.

Proposal to bring the country inhabited by the Kongs and Shandus within the area under the regular administration of Government.

Both the Kongs and Shandus appealed to Government for intervention; and the Government of Burma recommended (May 2, 1907) that the Deputy Commissioner of the Arakan Hill Tracts District and the Superintendent, Chin Hills, should be deputed to visit the unadministered country to enquire into the circumstances of the outrage, and prescribe and, if necessary, enforce a final settlement of the matter.

The Government of Burma was informed on the 10th June that, as the administration of the strip of territory in which the two tribes dwelt had not been taken over by Government, and as only one subject of administered territory was concerned, the Government of India could not agree to the deputation of British officers with escorts to prescribe and enforce a settlement in unadministered territory. If, however, the tribes desired the mediation of Government, the good offices of British officers might be proffered and the case might be heard in British administered territory. In the event of this offer being refused the tribes were to be warned that an invasion of British territory, whether on the pretext of seeking refuge or otherwise, would be sternly repressed.

The Government of Burma, on the 11th October 1907, asked that the orders of the Government of India might be reconsidered, and reiterated the proposal that the Deputy Commissioner of the Arakan Hill Tracts and the Superintendent, Chin Hills, should visit the unadministered tract and, after enquiry, prescribe and, if necessary, enforce a final settlement of the matter. Further, as it was possible that, in order permanently to preserve the peace between the rival tribes, it might be necessary to undertake the administration of the unadministered tract, the Lieutenant-Governor recommended that the Superintendent of the Lushai Hills should also be present, and that the three officers should jointly consider whether an extension of control would be necessary, and, if so, where the frontier between Assam and Burma should be placed and what arrangements would, in their opinion, be required for the maintenance of internal order.

On the 30th October 1907, the Government of India approved these proposals, and added that the question of the extension of our administration over the tract would be decided on receipt of a report from the officers of the Burma Government and the Superintendent, Lushai Hills.

On the 17th November 1907, the Government of Burma forwarded a joint report by the Deputy Commissioner of the Arakan Hill Tracts district and the Superintendents of the Chin and Lushai Hills on the question of bringing under regular administration the unadministered territory situated between the Northern Arakan and the Lushai Hills. At the same time they represented to the Government of India that the massacre of the Shandus by the Kongs in December 1906, provided a strong argument against the continuance of the established policy of non-interference in the tract in question, and said that, if direct control

was not exercised over the Chiefs and tribes of this tract, who were concerned in the massacre, there could be no guarantee that similar atrocities would not recur. Nor was it, in their opinion, likely that future disturbances in the unadministered tract would be confined entirely to that area. The people themselves would welcome British administration, which would extend to them a sense of security, while the additional expenditure, which would be involved by advancing the administrative frontier so as to include the area inhabited by the Kons and Shandus, would be inconsiderable. The Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam were in favour of the proposed extension, and were prepared to receive under administration a portion of the new area. The Lieutenant-Governor of Burma accordingly recommended that the territory adjoining the Arakan and Lushai Hills should be brought under settled administration, and certain proposals were put forward for the distribution of the tracts between the Governments of Burma and Eastern Bengal and Assam, and for the demarcation of the boundaries. In reply, the Government of Burma were informed that, in view of the recently declared policy of His Majesty's Government as to the inadvisability of departing from the principle of non-interference by the extension of administrative frontiers, and in the absence of any special circumstances calling for immediate action in the present case, the Government of India were unable to consider the proposals at present.

On the 9th January 1909, in reply to a communication from the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam, signifying their concurrence in the Burma Government's proposals to extend British administrative control to the tract of unadministered territory lying between the Northern Arakan and the Lushai Hills, the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam were informed of the decision arrived at in the matter by the Government of India.

On the 9th September 1907, the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam addressed the Government of India on the question of the policy to be pursued in dealing with the Abors and other tribes inhabiting the hills to the north of the Dibrugarh Frontier Tract.

Sir Lancelot Hare pointed out that the reluctance of the British authorities to enforce their rights had been misunderstood; that more than half a century of proximity to civilization had failed to redeem the tribes from their native savagery; that it was necessary to assert the rights of the British Government, and to provide facilities for the development of trade. His Honour accordingly recommended a modification of the policy of non-interference hitherto pursued which experience had proved to be unsuccessful. It was proposed to deal, in the first instance, with the Abor tribes living to the west of the Dihong river, and those living between the Dihong and the Dibong. The measures considered desirable were:—

- (i) to prohibit and, if necessary, prevent by force the extortion of blackmail by the Abors from traders, etc., between the "inner" and the "outer" lines;
- (ii) to impose a poll-tax or house-tax on all Abors settled between the "inner" and "outer" lines, who had not yet been called upon to pay it;
- (iii) to levy a tax from the residents of hill villages beyond the "outer" line on the land cultivated by them between the "inner" and the "outer" lines;
- (iv) to substitute a system of presents for the fixed "posa" (a form of subsidy to secure the peace of the frontier);
- (v) to encourage the tribesmen to visit Sadiya and settle in British territory;
- (vi) to require the tribesmen to receive in their villages the political or other officers of Government, who might have dealings with them;
- (vii) to take measures through the Political Officer for the purpose of preserving the valuable stock of *Simul* timber in the forests north of the Brahmaputra.

It was further proposed that the Assistant Political Officer, Sadiya, with a sufficiently strong escort, should visit the principal villages of the Abors lying

beyond the "outer" line with the object of coming to terms with them and informing them of the orders and intentions of Government.

After due consideration, the Government of India informed His Majesty's Secretary of State for India on the 11th June 1908, that they were not prepared to accept these proposals in their entirety. They were of opinion that while it was desirable to assert British sovereignty over the tract between the "inner" and "outer" lines, it would be sufficient to prohibit the collection of blackmail within this tract, to impose a reasonable poll-tax or house-tax on those settlers within it, who had not yet been called upon to pay any such tax and to take such measures as could conveniently be enforced for the preservation of the forests. The Government of India were anxious to avoid the risk of provoking disturbance among the tribesmen by too sudden an extension of active control. As regards crossing the "outer" line it was proposed, subject to the approval of His Majesty's Government, to inform the Lieutenant-Governor that, on the assumption that he was satisfied that a tour could safely be made to the villages in question, without risk of conflict with the Abors, the Government of India were willing that it should be undertaken.

In a despatch, dated the 4th September, Lord Morley replied that the policy of non-interference was essentially sound, and that he was unable to admit the plea that it had failed to a degree to justify its reversal. He agreed with the Government of India that the Local Government's proposals could not, therefore, be accepted in their entirety. The proposed tour of the Assistant Political Officer, Sadiya, to the Abor villages beyond the "outer" line might be undertaken on the conditions laid down by the Government of India, provided that it could safely be made without risk of conflict with the tribes. He laid particular emphasis upon the necessity of avoiding any action involving the risk of serious consequences; and accepted the recommendations of the Government of India that it would be sufficient at present, in order to assert British sovereignty over the tract between the "inner" and "outer" lines, to come to an agreement with the Abors in regard to the cessation of blackmail and the imposition of a reasonable poll-tax or house-tax on all settlers within the tract, and, if possible, to make such arrangements as might be practicable for the preservation of the forests. Lord Morley, however, requested that the matter might again be submitted for his consideration before the tour of the Assistant Political Officer was finally sanctioned.

On the 8th October, the orders of His Majesty's Government were communicated to the Local Government with the request that a copy of the detailed instructions, which it was proposed to issue to the Assistant Political Officer, Sadiya, might be forwarded to the Government of India, in sufficient time to admit of the approval of His Majesty's Government being obtained before the tour commenced. The attention of the Local Government was at the same time drawn to a suggestion made by Lord Morley regarding the grant of some pecuniary compensation to the Abors for the loss of commission or royalty on timber, which they undoubtedly considered a legitimate source of revenue; and it was requested that this point should be considered by Mr. Williamson when he visited the villages.

On the 31st October, the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam reported that His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, after personal consultation with the Assistant Political Officer, Sadiya, was of opinion that the tour could be undertaken without risk of complications, but that as time would not allow of the original programme being fulfilled, it was proposed that Mr. Williamson should only visit, during the ensuing cold weather, the area between the "inner" and "outer" lines and villages in the immediate vicinity of the "outer" line, and should confine his attention to the initiation of measures for the effective assertion of British sovereignty over the tract between the "inner" and "outer" lines. A copy of the draft instructions, which it was proposed to issue for Mr. Williamson's guidance, was also submitted for approval.

With a despatch, dated the 25th November, a copy of the draft instructions, with which the Government of India expressed their concurrence, was forwarded for the information and approval of His Majesty's Government. Sanction was also requested to the proposed tour by Mr. Williamson, which it was pointed out did not differ materially from the promenades within the "outer" line, which the Assistant Political Officer had made periodically during past years.



On the 12th January 1909, His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, in expressing his approval of the proposed tour of the Assistant Political Officer, Sadiya, in the Abor country, and of the instructions which it was proposed to issue to him directed that it should be made clear from the outset that acquiescence on the part of the tribes would be followed by measures of compensation. Lord Morley also intimated his wish to be consulted, when the time arrived, as to the advisability of extending negotiations to the more remote villages. The Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam were informed accordingly. They subsequently reported that, owing to the illness of the Assistant Political Officer, Sadiya, the proposed tour had been postponed.

In July 1909, the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam reported that conditions were now favourable for a tour to certain villages beyond the "outer" line; and that they considered some such tour essential for a complete settlement with the Abors. They accordingly proposed that Mr. Williamson should undertake the tour during the ensuing cold season accompanied by an adequate escort of military police.

The proposal was recommended to the Secretary of State, and sanctioned by him, on the understanding that the settlement of difficulties in the area between the "outer" and "inner" lines should be the sole object of the visit to the villages beyond the "outer" line. The necessary instructions were accordingly issued to the Local Government.

In July 1908, the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam reported that a settlement of Tibetans, which had previously been formed on the Mishmi Hills, had been attacked by the Mishmis and broken up, 70 Tibetans being killed and the survivors, thirty in number, made captives, most of whom were sold as slaves to the Abors.

Four of these unfortunates, who were held in bondage by the Abors of Dambuk, made an attempt to escape: two were recaptured in British territory by the Abors, and two were rescued by the Bomjur guard. The Local Government suggested that the Assistant Political Officer, Sadiya, should visit the villages concerned, and endeavour to obtain the release of the recaptured Tibetans; also that the two Tibetans, who were in British territory, should be sent to Darjeeling for repatriation.

The Local Government were informed that orders regarding the Assistant Political Officer's visit would be communicated on receipt of a reply to a reference which had been made to His Majesty's Government on the general question of frontier policy, but that the two Tibetan refugees should meanwhile be sent to the Political Officer in Sikkim, for repatriation.

On the 23rd March 1910, the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam reported that the Assistant Political Officer at Sadiya had obtained the surrender of the other two Tibetans held in bondage by the Abors of Dambuk. One died shortly after his release, and the other was sent to the Political Officer, Sikkim, for repatriation.

On the 24th May, the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam reported that Tungno Miju, the Chief of Pangum, had reported at Sadiya that some Tibetans had arrived at his village, with news that a thousand Chinese soldiers had arrived at Rima, demanding taxes of the Tibetan Governor. The Governor refused to comply, and had been imprisoned. The Tibetans also brought orders to Tungno Miju from the Chinese to cut a track from Tibet to Assam broad enough for two horsemen to ride abreast: the Chief refused to obey the order, saying that he was a British subject. The Chief was ordered to return and report further developments, but was not authorised to declare himself to be a British subject.

Later the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam asked for instructions as to the policy to be pursued on the north-east frontier in the event of further information being received confirming the report of the effective occupation of Rima by the Chinese.



They pointed out that the Mishmis, the tribe immediately concerned by their proximity to the Chinese force at Rima, are not subjects of Tibet and still less of China, and that, although they cannot claim to be British subjects, the British Government is entitled, if it desires to do so, to hold that the Mishmis are under its protection, and to decline to allow either China or Tibet to interfere with them in any way.

In the opinion of the Local Government three courses seemed to be possible :—

- (1) that the Mishmis should continue as they are, savage and independent tribes between British territory and Tibet ;
- (2) that the Mishmis should be taken definitely under our protection ; and
- (3) that the Chinese should be allowed to absorb the Mishmis.

The first course, they thought, would be the best if the Chinese were not inclined to be aggressive, which was, however, what must be expected. As to the second course, if our territory were extended up to the Tibetan frontier, our posts must be advanced many miles beyond their present situation and located in a sparsely inhabited and mountainous country, and there would be difficulties in defining the boundaries and protecting our marches. The third course was also open to objection, for to allow the Chinese to extend their influence right down to the foot of the hills might be productive of serious administrative inconvenience and would involve a loss of prestige.

The matter was still under consideration at the close of the period under review.

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## BURMA.

The Government of Burma reported in July 1905 that three residents of an administered village called Lungno in the Chin Hills had been seized and killed in unadministered country by the people of Wellaung, a village in the unadministered tracts of the Chin Hills, and that the villagers of Lungno were incensed and anxious to make reprisals. The Government of Burma therefore requested permission to despatch an expedition to punish the villagers of Wellaung. Sanction was granted, but the officer in charge of the expedition was instructed to refrain from destroying property unless circumstances rendered it necessary. The expedition started on the 20th November 1905 and reached Wellaung on the 6th December 1905. The Superintendent of the Chin Hills telegraphed on the 12th December 1905 that he had interviewed the Wellaung people. They admitted the murder of the Lungno men and gave the names of the leaders, five of whom were arrested. He stated that fines would be inflicted when the resources of the village had been ascertained, and that part of the murdered men's property had been recovered. The villagers appeared to be cowed and not inclined to resist demands.

The Government of Burma telegraphed, on the 26th December 1905, that the Superintendent of the Chin Hills had collected from the Wellaung villagers the full value of the property taken from the murdered British subjects, also compensation amounting to Rs. 450 and a fine of Rs. 368. The punitive column returned to Haka in administered territory on the 5th January 1906.

On the 12th March 1909, the Government of India approved a proposal made by the Government of Burma that

**Visit of a punitive force to the village of Bong.** the Superintendent of the Chin Hills, accompanied by a force of 20 Military and 25 Chin Police, should visit the village of Bong in unadministered territory. The object of the visit was to apprehend the villagers, who murdered the brother of the Bong Chief, and threaten other members of his family, in retaliation for the surrender by the Chief, to the Superintendent of the Chin Hills of a Chin cooly of Bong, who was wanted for the murder of a Burman in the Pakokku Hill Tracts in January.

On the 12th February, the Government of Burma telegraphed that information had been received of a raid on the village of Naungmo, in the Upper Chindwin district in administered territory, in which 13 villagers had been killed and heads carried off.

From a subsequent report by the Deputy Commissioner of the Upper Chindwin district, it appeared that the outrage was the work of Chins from the village of Makware, lying in unadministered territory somewhere between the Chindwin and the administrative border of the Naga Hills. The raiders visited the village on the 7th February 1910 and killed 13 persons, carrying off their heads. One boy of seven years of age was also carried away. The Deputy Commissioner, who paid two visits to Kaunghein, the nearest point to Salein, a village near the administrative border several marches north of Naungmo, and which also suffered by the raid, could obtain no authentic information as to the motive for the raid.

At the close of the period under review, the Lieutenant-Governor was awaiting the result of further inquiries, before formulating proposals for punitive action; but His Honour was of opinion that an expedition would probably be necessary during the winter of 1910-11 in order to punish the raiders, and recover the captive boy.

On the 13th February 1909, the Government of Burma reported that, on the 7th idem, a trans-frontier Chief, Minshaw, with his villagers, numbering about one hundred attacked the administered village of Londu, on the border of the Northern Arakan Hill Tracts, and killed one man, captured two and wounded five. The Lieutenant-Governor proposed, with the approval of the Government of India, to authorize the Deputy Commissioner of the Northern Arakan Hill Tracts, if necessary, to follow into unadministered territory, with an escort of Military Police, and to recover the captives and demand reparation from the raiders.

On the 16th February, the sanction of the Government of India was conveyed to this proposal, and the Government of Burma were asked to report the strength of the escort, which would accompany the Deputy Commissioner, and the nature of the reparation, which it was proposed to demand. They reported on the 2nd March that the Deputy Commissioner, Arakan Hill Tracts, was taking an escort of 30 Gurkhas against the trans-frontier Chief Minshaw and his villagers; and that the reparation to be demanded for the raid was to take the form of a fine of guns and cattle or other articles. The village raided was said to be in unadministered territory, and the Government of Burma accordingly instructed the Deputy Commissioner that if the raid was an inter-tribal affair, wholly in unadministered territory, he was not to cross the border, but to confine himself to ascertaining and reporting the facts of the affair.

The Deputy Commissioner's report. In or about the year 1906, certain inhabitants of the villages of Kunlaung, in unadministered territory, seemed to have contracted disease from a visit paid by one of them to the village of Londu, situated within the administrative border of the Northern Arakan Hill Tracts district. The raid was afterwards instigated by one Lainambu with the permission of Minshaw, the Chief of Kunlaung, in order to recover compensation from the Londu villagers. In the course of the raid, which was made on the 6th February 1909, two women were carried off as hostages, and one man met his death in attacking the raiders, as they were retreating with their captives. The Deputy Commissioner found it unnecessary to visit the village of Kunlaung, or to cross the administrative border of his district. After a careful enquiry held at Pengwa, within the administrative border, Mr. Thom imposed a fine on the village of Kunlaung, consisting of ten head of hill cattle. The fine was duly paid, five of the cattle being given by the Deputy Commissioner to the headman of Londu as compensation for the death of his son, and one animal being presented to the village of Londu as a whole. The settlement appeared to give satisfaction to all parties. The Chief of Kunlaung and the man Lainambu were at first detained in custody by the Deputy Commissioner, but the Lieutenant-Governor considered that there was no sufficient ground for the deportation of any person, and that it was unnecessary

to proceed against individuals with a view to their punishment for the respective shares taken by them in the raid and the death of the villager of Londu. These two persons were accordingly set at liberty and allowed to depart.

On the 21st January 1909, the Government of India informed the Government of Burma, with reference to certain proposals which had been put forward by the Administration with the object of improving the relations between frontier officials and the tribes in unadministered tracts adjoining territory under settled administration, that, while fully agreeing with His Honour as to the desirability of cultivating friendly relations with the Chiefs and members of these tribes, the Government of India were of opinion that it would be better not to issue general instructions on the subject. They were also averse to the proposal to allow frontier officers to tour at their discretion across the border, as such action might possibly bring about more frequent interference in tribal disputes and so constitute a departure from the policy of non-interference in tribal affairs which had hitherto been prescribed, and of which His Majesty's Government had recently expressed their entire approval. But, in so far as it was possible to promote better relations with the tribes without departing in any way from the policy laid down, the desires of the Local Government had the full sympathy of the Government of India.

During his autumn tour of 1907 His Excellency Lord Minto visited Burma, and held durbars at Lashio and at Mandalay, on the 17th and 29th November respectively, for the reception of the Chiefs and Nobles of the Northern Shan States and other native gentlemen of Burma. His Excellency delivered addresses at both the durbars.

On this frontier Lord Minto's policy was chiefly directed to the enforcement of the declaration made to China by Great Britain in the spring of 1904 regarding the Anglo-China Burma-China border north of latitude 25° 35'—viz., that pending a formal settlement the watershed between the N'Maikha on the one side and the Shweli and Salween rivers on the other, should be regarded as the provisional boundary.

A year after this declaration was made a party of British and Chinese officials went by arrangement between the two Governments along the watershed in order that the British representative might point out its actual position and features to the Chinese representative. But nothing resulted from this proceeding, the Chinese Government showing an obvious wish to procrastinate and delay settlement.

After the expedition had completed its work, Mr. Litton, who had accompanied it as the British representative, continued his explorations on the Upper Salween, where he reached a point eight marches further than the highest point visited by the Commission in the previous spring. He was able to trace the course of the Salween up to the north of latitude 27° 20' up to which point it is confined within a series of ridges. Up to 26° 20' there were some traces of Chinese jurisdiction, but further north there was no trace of Chinese authority up to latitude 27° 35' where the Yetche territories begin. An examination of the country showed that the divide between the Salween and the Irrawaddy continued to be a conspicuous range of 12,000 to 13,000 feet up to latitude 28° 30', where it merged into a vast snowy east and west range, which was visible from the point reached by Mr. Litton.

In March 1906, a few months after Lord Minto's arrival in India, negotiations with China on the subject of the border were resumed. During that month Sir E. Satow handed to the Chinese Government the text of an Article which he had drafted on the subject of the Burma-China Frontier north of 25°

35'. From a later letter from the Foreign Office to the India Office, it appeared that the Chinese Government had refused to accept the watershed between the Irrawaddy and the Salween as the boundary, although it was proposed to pay an annual sum as compensation for the extinction of all claims of local Chinese headmen on the British side of the boundary.

Subsequently (May 1) His Majesty's Minister at Peking forwarded a note to the Chinese Government, in which he informed them that His Majesty's Government intended to regard the watershed, described in the draft article previously presented by him, as the frontier and that, failing its acceptance on the terms offered, the Government of Burma would be instructed to occupy and administer the country without further negotiations.

In reply the Chinese Government stated that in their view it would be very unjustifiable for His Majesty's Government to take the action proposed in the event of the Chinese Government refusing to accept the terms offered them. They accordingly requested that the British Government might be informed that the terms of the 4th Article of the Burma Convention of 1894 ought to be conformed to; that a careful examination of the features and conditions of the country should be made; and that both countries should, in an impartial spirit, negotiate a settlement of the question with a view to an early decision. His Majesty's Government, however, proposed to adhere to the note presented by Sir E. Satow and instructed the *Chargé d'Affaires* at Peking to inform the Chinese Government accordingly. His Majesty's *Chargé d'Affaires*, however, suggested deferring the communication until the views of the Chinese Government in regard to the proposed Bhamo-Tengyueh Railway (*q.v.*) had been ascertained. His Majesty's Government agreed to this suggestion.

But from this time, the summer of 1906, until early in 1910 no further advance was made towards a settlement. A note showing all that passed during this interval in regard to this border is printed as Appendix X. It is enough here to relate that in 1907 a detachment of Chinese troops visited Hpala in the unadministered tract on the British side of the watershed. This proceeding caused the Burma Government to propose, in accordance with the policy communicated to the Chinese Government in Sir E. Satow's note of May 1, 1906, the despatch of a Civil Officer with a strong armed escort to extend effective occupation and administration of the territory up to the watershed; but as the Chinese subsequently showed no further indications of encroachment, it was decided by His Majesty's Government not to assert British claims in the manner suggested, for the present.

In January 1910, however, the Burma Government reported that a raid had been committed by the Chief of Tengpeng, which is on the Chinese side of the frontier, on Pienma and certain neighbouring villages on the British side of the watershed, claimed as the Burma-China frontier. The Lieutenant-Governor, after consulting the local officers as to the action which should be taken, was of opinion that it was not necessary that an expedition should be despatched at present for the punishment of the raiders owing to the lateness of the season, and the difficulty of collecting the necessary transport. He, however, considered that, if action of that nature was taken, it might most suitably be in November 1910. In the meantime, the Local Government had asked His Majesty's Consul at Tengyueh to bring the facts of the raid to the notice of the local Chinese authorities, and to request them to take immediate steps to procure the withdrawal from British territory of the raiders, if any of them were still remaining; to punish the Chief of Tengpeng; and to require the Chief to compensate the inhabitants of Hpimaw and other raided villages for injuries inflicted on them.

This action was taken, and the Taotai replied to the Consul stating that Pienma was in Chinese territory, and that he (the Taotai) could not recognise that the frontier had been violated. The Local Government drew attention to Sir E. Satow's note to Prince Ching, dated the 1st May 1906, in which the Chinese Government were informed that His Majesty's Government intended to regard the watershed as the frontier, and that, failing its acceptance by the Chinese, the British Government would occupy and administer the country. The

Lieutenant-Governor considered that immediate action was imperative, and as a tour in the locality was not feasible until after the next rains, His Honour recommended that the British Minister at Peking should be moved to address a strong protest to the Chinese Government, and insist on the Taotai being ordered to deal suitably with the raiders, and to withdraw his reply to His Majesty's Consul.

In informing His Majesty's Secretary of State for India of the position of affairs, and of the recommendations made by the Local Government, the Government of India said that they believed that the raid was merely a preliminary movement on the part of the Chinese, who might proceed to occupy the unadministered tract, and so create a position of much difficulty, unless effective action was taken to extend British control over the tract in question. They thought that action could not be deferred without damaging British prestige, and accordingly preferred that arrangements should be made at once for a tour in November 1910. On the 29th March, the Secretary of State replied that His Majesty's Minister at Peking had recommended that a journey to Teng-keng should be undertaken by His Majesty's Consul at Teng-yueh to ascertain facts, and that he (Lord Morley) had strongly supported the proposal.

On the 1st April, the Government of Burma reported that they had heard from His Majesty's Consul at Teng-yueh that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had sanctioned his journey to the scene of the raid to ascertain the facts of the case, and that the Taotai had promised to furnish a small escort. Mr. Rose said he would start about the 5th April.

On the 16th April, the Burma Government received a message from Mr. Rose to the effect that all sources of information had been blocked by the Chinese authorities, and that he had advanced to Pienma, leaving his heavy baggage and escort in China. Mr. Rose stated that he found the villages occupied by 20 Chinese soldiers, who retreated as he entered, and that he had received a friendly reception from the natives and neighbouring chiefs. The total losses sustained by the victims of the raid were estimated at about Rs. 2,500. As the passes were closed by a month's storms, Mr. Rose intended proceeding to Teng-yueh *via* Teng-keng, as soon as possible.

The Local Government stated that the fact that Mr. Rose found the sources of information blocked by the Chinese authorities, and the village of Pienma occupied by Chinese soldiers, confirmed the opinion expressed by the Lieutenant-Governor of Burma that the raid was a preliminary movement by the Chinese, which it was necessary to check without delay. Sir Thirkell White hoped that this view would be placed strongly before His Majesty's Government, by the Government of India.

On the 25th April, the Burma Government reported that they had received a further message from Mr. Rose, stating that he had arrived at Teng-keng, and had found the Pao-Shan Magistrate with a large escort prepared to enter Pienma, under orders which he had received some days previously. There was considerable excitement among the tribesmen, and Mr. Rose considered that the peaceful settlement of the question would be rendered increasingly difficult by the advance of the Chinese party at the present juncture. The Magistrate had promised to delay his departure, pending further instructions, and Mr. Rose asked His Majesty's Consul-General to use his influence with the Chinese Viceroy to prevent any one from crossing the frontier.

The Burma Government said that the report confirmed the opinion that the Chinese were preparing to occupy British territory and emphasised the need for decisive action and they recommended that arrangements should be made at once to despatch, at the earliest possible date—probably November or December 1910—an expedition to bring under British administration the tract in which Pienma was situated, and to eject by force, if necessary, any raiders or Chinese soldiers or officials, who might be found in occupation. They also reported that the local Chinese Government had ordered a Magistrate to proceed to Pienma to investigate matters.

The Government of India, in informing the Home Government of the serious situation disclosed by Mr. Rose, and of Chinese occupation of Pienma, said that

they considered it necessary that a strong protest should be made at Peking at once, and a demand made for the punishment of the raiders, and the withdrawal of the Chinese troops and officials to the east of the frontier claimed by Great Britain. Should the Chinese not withdraw, after the suggested protest at Peking, the Government of India recommended action on the lines proposed by the Burma Government. Shortly afterwards His Majesty's Representative at Peking telegraphed stating that he had received a note from the Wai-wu-pu, claiming that the Pienma villages were in Chinese territory, upholding the action of the Provincial authorities in exercising jurisdiction, and requesting him to instruct His Majesty's officials not to interfere, and finally reminding the Chargé d'Affaires of the Chinese Government's suggestion for a joint delimitation. Subject to the approval of His Majesty's Government, and without prejudice to any further action, which they might instruct him to take, Mr. Max Müller proposed to refer the Wai-wu-pu to the last sentence of Sir E. Satow's note of 1st May 1906 (in which it was stated that, failing acceptance of the terms offered by His Majesty's Government, the Government of Burma would be instructed to occupy and administer the country without further negotiations) and to the warning of the risk of collision contained in the note by Sir E. Satow of the 30th January 1904. Mr. Max Müller also proposed to request the Wai-wu-pu, with a view to minimising this risk, to remind the authorities in Yunnan of the orders, which were sent to them in 1898, that they should make no attempt to exercise Chinese authority to the west of the watershed claimed by Great Britain.

The Wai-wu-pu's attitude, as disclosed in this telegram, accentuated in the Government of India's opinion, the necessity for action; and they informed the Secretary of State to this effect, and asked for very early authority to be accorded to the proposed expedition, as a considerable time would be required for preparations.

On the 14th June, the Burma Government submitted a copy of a memorandum, received from His Majesty's Acting Consul at Tengyueh, relating to Military affairs on the Chinese frontier of Burma. The Lieutenant-Governor agreed with Mr. Rose that it was unlikely that the Deputy Commissioner would meet with any resistance or hostility from the natives of the unadministered territory in question. On the contrary, all the information, which had been obtained pointed to the fact that the indigenous tribes would welcome the advance of a British party to protect them against the encroachments of the Chinese. It was impossible to say what attitude would be adopted by the Chief of Tengpeng, and the other local Chiefs, who claimed to exercise some authority on the British side of the watershed, but it seemed improbable, if Mr. Hertz was allowed to proceed with an escort of military police, that these Chiefs and their retainers would be bold enough to offer any active opposition or to venture on an attack. Mr. Rose reported that the Chinese regular troops nearest to the frontier consisted of 200 men at Ku-yung Kai armed with modern rifles in good condition, about 500 men at Tengyueh, who were armed with antiquated weapons, and 1,500 modern troops at Talifu. It was in order that we might be in effective occupation of the territory before the Chinese took steps to despatch troops across the watershed, that the Lieutenant-Governor had recommended that Mr. Hertz should be allowed to proceed as soon as the local conditions rendered the journey possible. If the Chinese were thus forestalled, it seemed improbable that they would then employ their troops to enter the tract, and attack Mr. Hertz' escort.

On the 29th July, His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, telegraphed that instructions had been sent to His Majesty's Minister at Peking to the effect that His Majesty's Government were convinced that the watershed frontier alone afforded any hope of finality, and that they had definitely decided to despatch an expedition, in the autumn, to remove intruders from what His Majesty's Government held to be British territory, with a view to enforcing the policy laid down in 1906, and to extending effective administration over the whole district to the west of the watershed. Further, that in view of what had passed previously, it did not appear to be necessary to make any communication to the Chinese Government on the subject, until the expedition was about to start. The Burma Government were accordingly told that the preliminary arrange-



ments for the proposed expedition may be put in hand at once, the preparations being kept confidential as far as possible.

In March 1910, the Political Officer in Sikkim reported that he had received a report to the effect that Chinese troops had entered the country of the Khampti tribe to the east of Assam. The Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam, who were asked to make enquiries as to the correctness or otherwise of the report, stated that in January 1910, information was received that several hundred Chinamen had appeared in Khampti Long. Enquiries were instituted, and it was ascertained that some Chinese had appeared in the valley, but had left again owing, it was said, to trouble in their own country. They had expressed their intention of returning next cold weather. The Local Government further stated that the Assistant Political Officer, Sadiya, had been instructed to obtain any information that he could about the movements of these people, but there did not appear to be any reason for supposing that Chinese had appeared in the Khampti valley in any considerable number.

In July, the Government of India, informed His Majesty's Government that a detailed report had been sent in by the Burma Government confirming the information regarding the visit to Khamti of a Chinese official with a military escort. There was some discrepancy as to the actual date of the visit, as to whether the Chinese officers professed to have come merely to arrange trade matters or to assert a claim to a portion at least of the Hkamti State in the valley of the Nmaikha. But it was clear that the Chinese had violated the extreme north of the boundary claimed by the British Government, and had designs on the Shan States of Hkamti, and, taken in conjunction with similar activity displayed in Yunnan by the Chinese, this placed in jeopardy the entire frontier north of the administered portion of the Myitkyina district, and was in direct defiance of the formal claim by the British Government to regard the Irrawaddy-Salween watershed up to the confines of Tibet, as the frontier between Burma and China. As far as the Government of India, were aware, the Chinese had not asserted formal claims to Hkamti, which has been regarded as subordinate to the British Government ever since the annexation of Upper Burma, and the Principal Sawbwa had, on several occasions, sent tributary offerings to Burma and acknowledged allegiance to the British Government.

In order to forestall Chinese designs, His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of Burma recommended that a civil officer should be despatched in November or December from Myitkina to Hkamti, with an escort of military police sufficient for his personal safety, to assert British supremacy in a formal manner, and to deliver to the Sawbwa, who had recently succeeded his brother, a *sanad* as in the case of the other Shan Chiefs, to indicate that his authority is recognised by, and derived from, the British Government. The officer would also collect valuable information regarding the tribes around Hkamti, and the nature of their connection, if any, with the Chinese authorities in Yunnan and Szechuan. Since there was some doubt as to the real object of the Chinese officer's visit, the Burma Government strongly recommended that this step should be taken, without any preliminary formal protest at Peking, as by raising the question with the Chinese Government, an undesirable element of importance would be attached to the British officer's proposed visit, and at the present moment a representation to China might lead to a claim that the entire country as far as the Malikha is within the Chinese Empire, rendering it difficult thereafter for us to take forcible possession without some appearance of an act of war against a friendly country.

The Government of India, concurred in the view of the Burma Government and with the approval of His Majesty's Government the Local Government, have been instructed to put in hand the preliminary arrangements for the visit.

During 1899-1900 the frontier south of latitude 25° 35' had been demarcated by a joint Commission, but a portion of it to the south-east of the Wa country, between the Namting and Nalawt rivers, was not accepted by the Chinese Representative.

Burma-China frontier between the Namting River and the Nalawt River.



In December 1906, as is explained in greater detail in Appendix X, the Chinese Government reverted to the matter, and suggested the appointment of a Joint Commission to investigate and report, for the purposes of a final settlement. But the matter was not further proceeded with during the period under review.

Lord Curzon's Government had been strongly opposed to any suggestion

#### Railways.

that in pursuit of fanciful political ambitions, Indian money should be used in order to spread-eagle British railways over foreign countries, while a lucrative field of investment awaited development in India. They accordingly deprecated the idea of a railway from Bhamo to Tengyueh, of which the Secretary of State had indicated the possible use as a counterpoise to the active part French enterprise was taking in preparing for the extension of French railways in Yunnan, and as a means of giving effect to the principle recognised by China that British enterprise should receive equal treatment with that of France in the matter of concessions.

However, in spite of the Indian Government's want of accord in the matter, the Secretary of State decided that a survey of the line in question should be undertaken at the cost of Indian revenues. A reconnaissance was accordingly put in hand and carried out with favourable results during 1905. Mr. Lilley who undertook the work reported that the line would be 124 miles long, of which 42 miles would be in British territory, and 82 in Chinese. The traffic prospects were good, and the net earnings were calculated to be sufficient to cover interest charges at the rate of  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. on the estimated cost of the line, which, for a  $2\frac{1}{4}$  foot gauge, was put at 114 lakhs. The Government of India accordingly sanctioned a detailed survey during the next cold season.

They also provided a sum of Rs. 20 lakhs for the commencement of the work on the British section in 1908-09 and asked the Secretary of State whether, in anticipation of the completion of the survey, steps could be taken to procure a concession from the Chinese Government for the construction and working of a line from Bhamo to Tengyueh. They further decided to have a reconnaissance made in order to ascertain whether an extension of the line beyond Tengyueh was financially feasible, and suggested to the Secretary of State, that in order to avoid possible objection by the Chinese authorities, the sanction of the Chinese Government should be obtained to surveys for a line from Tengyueh to Talifu, and if necessary to Yunnan-fu.

In December 1906 it was reported that the Taotai of Tengyueh had received instructions to arrange for the protection of the British Survey party; and accordingly work was commenced early in February 1907, and completed with satisfactory results in May, as far as Talifu near the shores of the Erh-hai Lake.

The whole line from Bhamo to Talifu, 240 miles, was estimated to cost Rs. 4,08,00,000, and to yield a return of nearly  $3\frac{1}{2}$  on that outlay. The Government of Burma recommended (June 5) that the project should be considered, and that, if a practicable arrangement could be made with the Chinese Government, the construction of the line should be undertaken.

Meanwhile the question of obtaining a concession from the Chinese Government for the construction and working of the line from Bhamo to Tengyueh, had been under consideration.

In September 1906 His Majesty's Minister at Peking was informed that the Government of India considered Shan and Chinese co-operation desirable, and directed to instruct His Majesty's Consul-General at Yunnan-fu to negotiate on this basis for the construction of the portion of the line within Chinese territory.

Some three months later, December 1906, on hearing of the existence of a movement to obtain the issue of a decree directing that all railways in Yunnan, except those of France, were to be entirely Chinese, His Majesty's Minister at Peking verbally reminded the Wai-wu-pu of the definite promise of equal privileges with the French given to Sir E. Satow by Prince Ching in a note dated the 16th March

1902, and warned them against the repetition of the tactics adopted in regard to the Suchow railway in 1905.

At the same time, His Majesty's Minister at Peking put forward the suggestion that the arrangement to be made with the Chinese Government for the Bhamo-Tengyueh Railway might follow the lines of the Canton-Kowloon Railway Agreement, the Chinese Government, he thought, might be approached with a more reasonable prospect of success, if negotiations proceeded on this basis.

The views of the Government of India having been invited on this proposal they replied (December 15, 1907) to the effect that if there were any chance of British capital being raised for the whole line to Yunnan-fu, probably the best course would be to adhere to the policy of holding China to the pledge of the 16th March 1902, while allowing the Chinese to subscribe to the capital with a share in the Directorate and giving the Shan States traversed some benefits. The line could then be constructed in sections as opportunity offered. If, however, His Majesty's Government considered that the capital could not be raised without a British guarantee, the Government of India did not consider that Indian interests were sufficiently involved to justify an Indian guarantee, in which case a concession might be sought, as a compromise, for a line to Tengyueh only, a promise being given that the Chinese line to Yunnan-fu should be constructed on the Kowloon-Canton arrangement, subject to the condition that the British line should be continued onwards if the Chinese line was not constructed by the stipulated date. If China would not grant even this concession, but would consent to the Kowloon-Canton agreement for the whole line from the British frontier, the Government of India would accept this settlement, as the line would be of great importance to Burma. It was added that it looked as if China would not accept any new arrangement, and in that event it rested with His Majesty's Government to decide what action should be taken to enforce the pledge of the 16th March 1902, and to obtain adequate compensation for the refusal of China to fulfill that pledge.

In January 1908, His Majesty's Minister at Peking addressed the Secretary of State suggesting that it would be impossible to obtain a concession for a company to build the Bhamo-Tengyueh line under a guarantee by the Government of India, and that no concession could now be obtained for the construction of railways in China except on terms similar to those of the Tientsin-Pakow Railway Agreement under which China insists on complete ownership and control.

In view of this information, the Government of India now informed His Majesty's Government that they thought it would be well to approach the British and Chinese Corporation, who had successfully negotiated and completed agreements for several railways in China, with a view to securing a concession to raise a loan for China on the Tientsin-Pakow terms for the line between the Burma frontier and Yunnan-fu. They added that, under this arrangement, they would incur no liability except that of having to construct the section of 40 miles in British territory; but that, as negotiations were likely to be difficult and protracted, they would be willing to contribute, say, £10,000 towards the preliminary expenses involved.

Lord Morley, expressed to Sir E. Grey approval of this course, and requested him, if he saw no objection to ascertain from the British and Chinese Corporation whether they would be prepared to take up a scheme for a railway to Tengyueh from the Burma frontier on the lines of the Tientsin-Pakow Railway Agreement, provided that assent to such a scheme could be obtained from the Chinese Government. Lord Morley stated his willingness to communicate to the Corporation copies of the reports and estimates, which had been supplied to him by the Government of India, in respect of the projected railways. He also undertook that, if an Agreement, such as was suggested, was obtained by the Corporation from the Chinese Government and the work of construction commenced, he would authorize the Government of India to take in hand the construction of the line from Bhamo to the Chinese frontier, and that a grant of £10,000 would be made from Indian revenues to the Corporation, as a contribution towards preliminary expenses involved in negotiations.

Sir E. Grey thereupon addressed His Majesty's Minister in the sense desired, but the latter advised that before approaching the Corporation, the proposals of

His Majesty's Government should be explained to the Wai-wu-pu and an attempt made to secure their acceptance of them in principle. Sir E. Grey authorised the adoption of this procedure, and, on the 16th October, Sir J. Jordan laid the proposals before the Wai-wu-pu. At an interview, on the 23rd *idem*, with one of the Chinese Ministers, Sir J. Jordan was informed that a telegram had been sent to the Viceroy of Yunnan enquiring his views on the proposal.

During the next few months His Majesty's Minister at Peking and the British Consul-General at Yunnan-fu, in interviews with the Viceroy of Yunnan and the Grand Secretary, urged the merits of the projected railway, pointing out that it was likely to be a fairly profitable enterprise, that it in no way infringed the sovereign rights of China, and that it would link up Yunnan and Burma railways, and thereby benefit trade and international relations.

An account of these interviews is given in Appendix XI.

On the 28th June 1909, the Burma Government submitted a representation pointing out the need of immediate action as regards the construction of the Bhamo-Tengyueh Railway. The Lieutenant-Governor stated that recent additional evidence of the importance of establishing railway communication between Burma and Yunnan had been afforded by valuable reports on the mineral resources of the country by Mr. Coggin Brown, of the Geological Survey in India, who had been in Yunnan on two occasions. Sir H. Thirkell White, therefore, requested that His Majesty's Government might be asked to take such measures as would induce the Chinese Government to come to a prompt and reasonable settlement, as, if the French railway was established before effective steps had been taken to ensure the provision of railway communication between Burma and Yunnan, a serious injury would have been inflicted on British commerce and influence in Western China.

It was also reported at this time that American engineers had been definitely engaged for railways between Yunnan-fu and Tengyueh and between Yunnan-fu and Szechuan. His Majesty's Minister at Peking was accordingly addressed in the matter; and he reported (July 21) that he had taken the opportunity of mentioning to Mr. Fletcher, the United States Chargé d'Affaires, the matter of the engagement of American engineers for the Yunnanfu-Szechuan and Yunnanfu-Tengyueh Railways, and of explaining to him that the proposal, if carried out, would probably be found to conflict with the engagements which China had contracted with His Majesty's Government in regard to railway construction in the province of Yunnan. Mr. Fletcher had no information, but said that he fully appreciated the privileged position His Majesty's Government claimed in a district adjoining their Indian Empire. His Britannic Majesty's Acting Consul-General for Yunnan-fu and Kueichou subsequently informed Sir J. Jordan that the men had been engaged by the Yunnan Delegates of the Provincial Railway Bureau, who had been sent to the United States for the purpose early last year, and that the conditions of the contract had been approved at Peking. The intention was apparently to survey the two lines, and ascertain which of them offered the better prospects of construction.

In an interview with Prince Ch'ing, Sir J. Jordan took the opportunity of asking for an explanation of these proceedings, and of stating the attitude which he would be compelled to adopt in the event of their being allowed to interfere in any way with the engagements recorded in the exchange of notes, which took place between His Highness and Sir E. Satow in March 1902. The Prince showed himself perfectly familiar with the contents of these notes, and did not attempt to question their binding effect. Sir J. Jordan explained that, recognising that the complete fulfilment of this undertaking might impose a severe strain upon China at present, he had consented to consider, as an initial measure, a modified scheme for the construction, under conditions far from onerous to China, of a short line of railway from Bhamo to Tengyueh. This proposal had been discussed, in the first instance, between Sir J. Jordan and the Wai-wu-pu, and had, at the latter's suggestion, subsequently formed the subject of several interviews between Sir J. Jordan and the Viceroy of the Province. The present Viceroy, Li Ching Hsi, had promised to give it his careful consideration, but before he reached his post, Sir J. Jordan had received the news that the work was apparently to be entrusted to engineers of

another nationality with the approval of the Central Government. In reply to Sir J. Jordan's request for an explanation, the Prince and Ministers denied all knowledge of the transaction, and assured him that the new Viceroy would not fail to give effect to the arrangement which he had made with Sir J. Jordan before leaving Peking. The great objection, it was explained, from the Chinese point of view to the project put forward by Sir J. Jordan, was that it bound China to construct an unremunerative railway in a distant region, while there were many parts of the Empire where railways were far more urgently required. The American engineers, if engaged at all, were, they said, probably intended for the Yunnan-Szechuan Railway. On being questioned as to why His Majesty's Government objected to China building her own railways with foreign expert assistance, Sir J. Jordan replied that that was not our objection, and that His Majesty's Government would welcome any genuine attempt of the kind. Sir J. Jordan was, however, inclined to think that the present step was taken with the deliberate intention of blocking railway connection between Burma and Yunnan. It was notorious that the Yunnan treasury was empty, and that the province was in no condition to undertake railway construction. Sir J. Jordan wished, therefore, to make it clear at the outset that the result of any contention such as that which the above question suggested would be that His Majesty's Government would revert at once to the strict letter of the 1902 engagement, and demand the same rights as those which had been accorded to the French. The Prince deprecated such a course, and suggested that Sir J. Jordan might await further developments without feeling any uneasiness.

In a despatch, dated the 2nd November 1909, Sir J. Jordan reported that at an interview on the 26th October with the Grand Secretary, Nat'ung, and His Excellency, Liang Tunyen, he again pressed the question of the Bhamo-Tengyueh Railway. Sir J. Jordan repeated all the arguments used on previous occasions in favour of the project, and pointed out that, while the French Railway from Tonquin, would soon reach Yunnan-fu, Burma was practically cut off from all means of communication with Yunnan. The Grand Secretary, while expressing appreciation of the British attitude said that the question would be fully considered as soon as the new Viceroy reached Yunnan.

In February 1910, it was reported that the French rail-head had reached Yunnan-fu on the 30th January 1910. Accordingly on the 24th February the Government of India brought to the notice of His Majesty's Government that, while the British project for a railway from Bhamo to Tengyueh appeared to be as far from realisation as ever, the French railway had reached its present objective, and that this, coupled with the evidence of the likelihood of further railway extensions in Yunnan, rendered it most desirable that steps should be taken to secure British interests before it was too late. They mentioned that His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General at Yunnan-fu in his despatch No. 39, dated the 1st September 1909, to His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Peking, had pointed out that, if there was no early prospect of a railway from Bhamo to Tengyueh, the French railway would divert the trade of Hsiakuan, the largest and most important centre for foreign goods in Western Yunnan, from Burma to Tongking; and that His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Tengyueh had informed the Burma Government that, in his opinion, the French railway would also capture the trade of Tali-fu, the collecting and distributing centre of the greater part of the Burma-China trade. The British Government are thus threatened with a serious blow commercially in Yunnan, and further delay in the completion of the Bhamo-Tengyueh railway would rob the line of much of its practical value.

The Government of India also said that it was evident that the Chinese authorities fully realised the value of railways in Yunnan, and that they could not but believe that the replies of the Chinese Government to the representations of Sir J. Jordan were but excuses to delay the realisation of the British project. However, as His Excellency Li Ching-hsi had since arrived at Yunnan-fu, they earnestly suggested for the consideration of His Majesty's Government whether it would not now be possible to urge the Chinese Government to expedite a settlement, and to fix a date by which the British Government might expect to receive a final answer in the matter.

Meanwhile His Majesty's Consul-General at Yunnan-fu had just recently interviewed the new Viceroy of Yunnan on two occasions when he took the opportunity to repeat all the arguments, political and commercial, in favour of the line; to explain fully the Government of India's plans for a narrow gauge railway, laying stress on its comparative cheapness, and the prospect of its earning over  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. on the capital outlay; and to suggest, subject to confirmation by his Government, the construction of the whole line on a joint-Government basis, each side furnishing half of the capital, and receiving half of the profits.

The matter, however, did not advance further towards settlement, during the period under consideration.

On the 1st April 1910 the French railway to Yunnan-fu was declared open for traffic.

The Government of Burma forwarded a copy of certain correspondence received from the British Consul at Tengyueh

**Raids committed by Chinese subjects in the Myitkyina District.**

and also from the Consul-General at Yunnan-fu on the subject of the disturbed condition of the Myitkyina frontier. It was reported that two raids were made last year by Chinese subjects on the British Kachin villages of Lakrao and Chaungmaw which are situated in the Myitkyina district close to the border. In the first of these raids seven women and children were carried off from Chaungmaw into Chinese territory, while in the second nine persons were abducted from the house of the headman of the village of Lakrao, the headman and his brother having previously been killed by the abductors, on the Chinese side of the border. As the result of representations made to the Chinese authorities in the matter, the persons captured in each case were permitted to return to their homes, but the Lieutenant-Governor of Burma considered that steps should be taken to exact reparation from the offenders in order to prevent the recurrence of similar incidents. His Honour accordingly proposed, with the approval of the Government of India, to request His Majesty's Consul-General at Yunnan-fu to demand the surrender of the raiders under Article XV of the Convention of 1894, and to press for the payment of indemnities to be fixed in the Chaungmaw case at Rs. 1,000, and in the Lakrao case at such sum as the Deputy Commissioner of Myitkyina might consider suitable after consulting the Chinese Assistant Commandant. The Government of India agreed that some form of redress should be demanded from the Chinese Government, and they saw no objection to indemnities being claimed by the Consul-General in the manner proposed by the Burma Government. They did not consider, however, that the wording of Article XV of the Convention of 1894 could be held to warrant a demand for the surrender of Chinese subjects for offences committed in British territory, although they were aware that in 1896 Mr. Hertz had succeeded in obtaining, by informal negotiations with the Sawbwa of Nantien, the extradition of two Chinese Shans accused of committing murder on the British side of the frontier. The Government of India were of opinion therefore that, if objection was raised by the Chinese local officials to comply with an informal request for extradition, it would be sufficient if the Consul-General pressed the Chinese authorities to bring the accused persons to trial before a Chinese court.

The Lieutenant-Governor of Burma also recommended, with a view to the pacification of the Kachin country on the Chinese side of the border, that the Consul-General should be asked to urge the Chinese authorities to establish posts of 50 men each at Kuyung and Simapa in fulfilment of the spirit of the arrangements made at Man Ai in 1902 between the local British and Chinese officials for the preservation of order. The Government of India saw no objection to the adoption of the course proposed, and requested that the result of the action taken by Mr. Wilkinson in the matter might be communicated in due course.

The Government of Burma, on the 24th May 1906, forwarded a letter from the British Consul at Tengyueh in which he stated that in the Chaungmaw case one thousand rupees compensation had been paid to him.

On the 24th August 1906, the Government of Burma forwarded further correspondence regarding the raid made by Chinese subjects on the British Kachin village of Lakrao. His Honour considered it unnecessary to press for an indemnity in this case, as the Chinese Assistant Commandant and the Deputy Commissioner

of Myitkyina District had agreed that an indemnity should not be claimed if the murderers were arrested and punished, and it had subsequently been reported that two of the murderers had been sentenced to ten and two abettors to three years' imprisonment in China. The Government of India approved the proposal.

On the 7th February 1908 the Secretary of State telegraphed that the Chinese

Proposed appointment of a Chinese Consul at Mandalay.

Minister in London had enquired whether there would be any objection to a Chinese Consul being posted to Mandalay (Ava)

instead of to Rangoon as provided by the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1894.

The Lieutenant-Governor of Burma, who was consulted stated that the presence of a Chinese Consul at Mandalay might be embarrassing, and that it would be preferable that he should reside at Rangoon. The Government of India replied to the Secretary of State to this effect.

On the 27th February Sir J. Jordan telegraphed to the Foreign Office suggesting that the British Government should obtain the formal recognition of Mr. Macartney as British Consul at Kashgar in return for Chinese Consul at Mandalay, and on the 2nd March the Secretary of State enquired whether the views of the Government of India as to the objections to a Chinese Consulate at Mandalay were in any way affected by the suggestion. The Government of India replied that they thought that it would be better to keep the two questions distinct, in view of the fact that the Chinese request, if conceded, would be likely to cause embarrassment under the favoured nation clause.

On the 11th March 1908, the Foreign Office informed the Chinese Minister in London that, as His Majesty's Government considered it important to maintain the principle that Consuls in India should reside only at seaports, they regretted that they were unable to meet the wishes of the Chinese Government in regard to the appointment of a Chinese Consul at Mandalay instead of at Rangoon.

On the 29th April, the Secretary of State telegraphed that a compromise had been suggested on lines permitting a Chinese Consul, while having head-quarters at Rangoon, to visit Mandalay from time to time when the circumstances of the Chinese community there required it, and asking whether it was not possible to secure some *quid pro quo* at Kashgar or elsewhere.

The Government of India in asking the Lieutenant-Governor of Burma for his views informed him that the Chinese Minister in London had appealed to Article XIII of the Burma-China Convention of 1894, regarding the appointment of Consuls, and had urged that as Mandalay, where there were from seventy to eighty thousand Chinese, now surpassed Rangoon as a centre of Chinese trade, China was entitled to appoint a Consul there, in the same way as England was permitted, under the agreement of the 4th February 1897, to station a Consul at Momein or Shunning-fu instead of at Manwyne. The Lieutenant-Governor replied that the Chinese Minister had been misinformed regarding the Chinese in Mandalay as at the last census the Chinese population of Mandalay town and district was 1,576; the total Chinese population of the province was under 70,000 and the Chinese population of the city of Rangoon was 11,018. He was not aware of any grounds for the suggestion that Mandalay now surpassed Rangoon as a centre of Chinese trade and was satisfied that this was not the case. Chinese population of Mandalay and places to the north, consisted principally of Yunnanese who were loyal and well behaved and neither gave trouble nor required protection; there was no possible legitimate need of a Chinese Consul at Mandalay, or of an official visit of a Chinese Consul to that place, and in his opinion the only reason for the proposal to place the Chinese Consul at Mandalay was to foment intrigue, probably against the Bhamo-Tengyueh Railway project and to undermine the cordial relations at present existing between the people, as distinguished from officials of Yunnan, and ourselves. He added that the official visit of a Chinese Consul to Mandalay would have the same design and an equally bad effect, and that from a political point of view it would be specially undesirable that anything should be done to revive interests in the claims formerly put forward by China to suzerainty over Upper Burma. As it would be obvious to anyone in Mandalay that for trade purposes the presence of a Consul there was not necessary, his visit would certainly be regarded as having a political significance. The agreement in the



Conventions of 1894 and 1897 was that China might appoint a Consul at Rangoon, and that as the commerce between Burma and China increased, additional Consuls might be appointed as the requirements of trade might seem to demand. A peripatetic Consul was not contemplated. Sir Herbert White advised that this position should be maintained, and that until the development of trade required a Consul elsewhere the Consul appointed should remain at Rangoon. For these reasons the Lieutenant-Governor urged as strongly as possible that the proposed compromise should not be accepted. He was convinced that its adoption would tend to accentuate the difficulties of our position in Yunnan and would be of no benefit to Chinese traders in Mandalay. These views, which were concurred in by the Government of India, were communicated to the Secretary of State on the 23rd May 1908.

On the 16th October 1908, the Secretary of State intimated that the Chinese Government proposed to appoint a Consul at Rangoon who would have charge of the interests of all Chinese subjects in Burma as far as he could. The Government of India after reference to the Burma Government agreed to this proposal, subject to the reservation that the Consul should not be permitted to make official visits to Mandalay or elsewhere in Burma, but should exercise his consular functions solely at Rangoon. The Chinese Minister in London was informed accordingly by the Foreign Office on the 17th November 1908 and the name of Mr. Ou-Yang Keng and subsequently that of Mr. Hsiao Yung Hsi was submitted by the Chinese Government as nominee for the post.

On the 22nd July 1909 the Government of India formally recognised the appointment of Mr. Hsiao Yung Hsi as Consul for China at Rangoon.

On the 7th March the Government of Burma brought to notice certain articles of a most offensive and scurrilous nature about the Chinese Imperial family, which had appeared in the Chinese newspaper "Kuang Hua" published in Rangoon.

It appears that at the end of 1908 and early in 1909, the Chinese authorities complained to the Burma Government, through His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General at Yunnan and His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Peking, of the tone of the paper, but at the time it was not considered feasible to take any action against its managers, and the matter subsequently dropped, owing to the failure of the paper. It had, however, recently been revived, and although the managers of the new paper had been warned, offensive articles continued to be published, which led to a protest from the Chinese Consul at Rangoon. The Local Government proposed that the managers of the paper, being foreigners, might be warned that if they continued to publish offensive or scurrilous articles about the Chinese Imperial family, or articles exciting disaffection or inciting rebellion against the Chinese Government, they would be made to remove themselves from British India under the Foreigners Act, 1864. The Government of India were of opinion, however, that owing to the scandalous nature of the articles, and the prompt action taken by the Chinese authorities on their complaint against the newspaper at Lhasa, a warning would not meet the case, and the Burma Government were accordingly instructed, on the 21st March, to direct the managers of the paper to remove themselves from Burma forthwith.

On the 28th August 1907 the Government of Burma submitted a proposal for the advance of the northern administrative frontier of the Myitkyina District so as to include an additional area to the north and west of the confluence of the Malikha and Nmaikha rivers. The proposal was supported partly on the ground that the notified boundary did not actually correspond with the boundary which had hitherto been treated by the local officers as the limit of administration, and partly on the ground that the Burma Gold Dredging Company had applied for permission to extend their operations beyond the confluence of the two rivers. It was also proposed that, if the boundary were altered in the manner suggested, a Military Police post should be established at the Kwitao ferry during the open season of each year.

The Government of India sanctioned the proposal on the 11th October 1907.



On the 22nd July 1909 the Government of Burma submitted, for the approval of the Government of India, a proposal for the revision of the entire northern administrative boundary of the Myitkyina District. It was explained that of the two new areas which it was proposed to bring within the boundary, the Ningru and the Laban tracts, on the west of the Irrawaddy, had for many years been treated as administered territory, and that all the villages in these tracts had paid tribute. Further, that none of the Chiefs in unadministered territory claimed any jurisdiction over these tracts. As regards the other area it was explained that the boundary adopted in practice had not been the arbitrary line drawn from the junction of the Nmaikha and Meungdonkha to Manang Bum, but the northern watershed of the Shinngaw stream, thereby including under administration the whole of the Shinngaw valley. The reason for the departure in practice from the boundary, as notified, was said to be that officers working in the Kachin Hills found it inconvenient to deal with the same headman's jurisdiction, as partly within and partly without the boundary, and they, therefore, assumed that the boundary should follow the recognised limits of headmen's charges, an arrangement which has always been accepted without question by the tribes concerned. As the proposal entailed no change of practice, and no extension of administration, the Government of India sanctioned the proposal.

On the 31st May, the Burma Government telegraphed that some time previously, information had been received that fighting had taken place between the Chiefs of Mong Se and Mong Hai, beyond the frontier of the Kengtung State, and that the Yunnan Government requested that orders might be sent to Kengtung to prevent the rebels entering British territory or being given assistance. The Burma Government replied that Kengtung had maintained strict neutrality, and would continue to do so.

On the 27th May, the Superintendent of the Southern Shan States reported that the Mong Se Chief had arrived at Mong Yang in the Kengtung State, and recommended that he should be granted asylum and treated as a political offender. The Local Government approved of the proposal, and said that the Mong Se Chief might remain in British territory, but must not use it as a basis of hostilities against China, and that he must, therefore, be required to surrender to the Kengtung Sawbwa's officials all arms in the possession of himself and his followers so long as he remained in the Kengtung State.

Subsequently, His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Peking telegraphed to the Burma Government that the Chinese Government had represented to him that the Yunnan authorities were pursuing the Mong Se Chief, who had been plundering and burning villages; that they feared he might escape into Burma, and hoped that the Local Government would prevent rebels from crossing the frontier, or at least from remaining permanently in Burma. The Lieutenant-Governor proposed, with the approval of the Government of India, to reply to the Legation that the Mong Se Chief had arrived in Kengtung State, and that he would be allowed to remain there during good behaviour, but would not be allowed to use British territory as a basis of hostilities against China. The Burma Government were informed that the Government of India considered the proposed reply to be suitable, but that, as direct communication on the subject with Peking was prohibited, the Secretary of State had been asked to communicate it, if His Majesty's Government concurred.

On the 21st February, the Government of Burma forwarded a note from the Wai-wu-pu, which they had received through His Majesty's Minister at Peking, requesting that facilities might be given to Mr. Sa Chun-lu, an Inspector of Schools, to make a tour of inspection of Chinese schools in Burma, Singapore, and other places, with a view to their improvement. The note stated that the Chinese residents in Rangoon some years ago combined together to found six primary schools; that although reforms had been instituted in these schools from time to time, it was found that they were far from perfect. They, therefore, asked that an expert official might be sent to make a thorough inspection of the schools. The Lieutenant-Governor did not think it advisable that

the Chinese community in Burma should be encouraged to look beyond the Government of India, and to seek control and guidance at the hands of the officials of the Chinese Government, as there already existed a well-equipped and thoroughly sympathetic Education Department in Burma; or that the Chinese should be given any opening for the exercise of political influence in the country. His Honour accordingly informed the Minister at Peking that he was unable to welcome the proposal of the Chinese Government. The Government of India approved of the reply.

On the 12th April, the Government of Burma reported that a telegram had been received from His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Peking, stating that, owing to a mistake on the part of the Legation, Mr. Sa Chun-lu had already started for Singapore and Burma, and that the Wai-wu-pu hoped that, under these circumstances, the necessary protection would be afforded to him. The Lieutenant-Governor informed His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires that it was believed that Mr. Sa had arrived in Burma, but that, as he had not communicated with the Local Government, and had not informed them of his movements, no protection was necessary.

On the 4th May, the Burma Government reported that Mr. Sa Chun-lu had remained in Rangoon during his entire stay, and had left, by sea, on his return to China, on the 5th April 1910. The Local Government, at the same time, stated that information had been received from His Majesty's Consul at Amoy, that a Chinese subject, named Lin Lo-tsun, was travelling from Amoy to Burma, with the ostensible object of inspecting the schools in which Chinese are educated in Burma. It was not known whether Lin Lo-tsun had arrived, but his movements would be watched while he remained in Burma. The Lieutenant-Governor pointed out that these official deputations of Chinese officers to Burma were open to the gravest objections, and His Honour hoped that the Government of India would take such steps as they thought fit to ensure that they were not repeated. His Majesty's Secretary of State thought there might be some force in the objections to such missions as those of Messrs. Sa Chun-lu and Lin Lo-tsun to Burma, especially in view of the present not very satisfactory local relations between the Chinese and His Majesty's Government; but he was not aware of any principle or practice of international comity in virtue of which exception could formally be taken to them. It was, accordingly, decided to instruct His Majesty's Minister at Peking that, in the event of similar applications for facilities being made by the Chinese Government, to reply that no facilities were necessary, and to report the fact, at once, for the information of His Majesty's Government.

On the 4th July the Government of Burma forwarded a report on the work done by the Burma-China Boundary Pillar Construction Party of 1907 from Pang Hsang Nalawt to the Mekong.

This section of the boundary covered a distance of 290 miles and included 62 pillars. The position of these was very stubbornly contested by the Chinese Commissioners in 1898-99. Mr. Gordon's relations with the Chinese delegates were excellent throughout, and he finished the erection of the 62 pillars in 68 days.

On the 30th March 1910, the Burma Government reported the results of a meeting between British and Chinese officials held at Sima in the Myitkyina District in December 1909, for the settlement of frontier offences. The meeting was a successful one, and will, it is hoped, tend to promote cordial relations between the British and Chinese frontier officials.

In October 1905, a request was made by certain American Baptist missionaries at Kengtung to tour among the Wa and Lahu tribes in Chinese territory, and near the provisional Burma-China boundary between the Nam Ting River and the Nalawt. The Chinese authorities, who had been consulted through the British Consul-General at Yunnan-fu, thought that the missionaries should be dissuaded from making the journey, but they offered, if the journey were to be undertaken to provide as far as possible for the safety of the party by means of a large escort through the

administered districts. They represented, however, that they could not undertake to protect the missionaries if they entered the Wa country. Having regard to the fact that if any harm occurred to the missionaries, whether in British or Chinese territories, inconvenient complications might ensue, the Government of Burma proposed to issue instructions to the effect that the missionaries should be discouraged from making the proposed journey. In view of the possibility of operations being undertaken to vindicate the British provisional boundary in the neighbourhood in question, and for the reasons put forward by the Government of Burma, the Government of India approved of the course proposed by the Lieutenant-Governor.

On the 24th January 1910, the Burma Government intimated the desire of an American Presbyterian mission party, to proceed early in March, on a tour of missionary exploration from Kengtung overland to Canton *via* Mong-se, Ssumao, Puer-fu and the Wulung river, avoiding the Wild Wa country entirely. As the Consul-General, Yunnan-fu, saw no objection, and the frontier was now quiet, the Lieutenant-Governor considered that the proposed tour might be safely undertaken, and the Government of India accordingly consented.

On the 2nd June 1910, the Government of Burma referred for orders of the Government of India a proposal made by the American Baptist Mission at Keng Tung, to establish two outstations at Mong Lem and Mong Meng in Yunnan, which had been favourably received by the local Chinese authorities. The Lieutenant-Governor proposed to inform the missionaries that, being American subjects, they should apply for passports to the Minister of the United States of America at Peking, and that, when these had been obtained, the Burma Government would obtain the necessary passports from His Majesty's Consular officers in Yunnan for the native preachers of British nationality, whom it was proposed to employ in China. The Lieutenant-Governor also proposed to request the missionaries to issue stringent instructions to their subordinates to confine themselves strictly to their religious duties, and particularly to abstain from interfering in any litigation that might arise in which Christian converts were concerned. The Government of India approved of the action proposed.

In February 1909, sanction was accorded to the grant to certain of the Shan States of agricultural loans aggregating Rs. 38,000, and bearing interest at 5 per cent. to be repaid within ten years. With the concurrence of the Government of Burma it was decided that these loans, and all future advances to the Shan States should be made from the Provincial Loan Accounts.

In June 1909, the Government of Burma was authorised to assess and remit Collection and remission of revenue and tribute in the Shan States. tribute in the Shan States in accordance with existing principles, subject to the conditions that any enhancement or permanent remission to the extent of more than 25 per cent., shall be reported for the orders of the Government of India, and that any enhancement or remissions of less than that amount are reported for the information of the Government of India. The Burma Government was at the same time informed that the orders did not affect the existing arrangement under which the Lieutenant-Governor was empowered to sanction temporary remissions of tribute, up to a maximum of half the annual tribute of any State, on condition that the sums remitted are spent each year on works of public utility.

On the 25th June 1908, the Superintendent and Political Officer, Southern Shan States, brought to the notice of the Burma Government two serious dacoities, which had recently been committed in North Siam on certain traders from the Shan State of Kengtung.

In the first case, which occurred on the 6th April 1908, south of Lampun, a band of fifty men attacked a party of Kengtung traders near the village of Me Pang, and carried off cash property to the value of Rs. 29,813. A porter was so seriously wounded that he died in the Chiangmai Hospital, and two of the traders were also injured. In the second case, which also occurred in Lakhon jurisdiction, a band of dacoits attacked the traders while they were encamped in a Zayat

near the village of Pa Kawng. The Kengtung caravan, which numbered thirty-one, were able to beat off the dacoits, but three of their men were killed and three wounded.

On the 25th July, the Burma Government addressed His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Bangkok on the subject, and suggested that, if he thought fit, the matter might be brought to the notice of the Siamese authorities with a view to the arrest and punishment of the dacoits, the recovery, if possible, of the property stolen, and the payment of compensation for the loss of life sustained in the two affrays. The action taken by His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor was approved by the Government of India on the 21st August.

### SIAM.

In July 1905 the Secretary of State asked for the views of the Government of India on a proposal to add a Vice-Consul to the existing Consular staff at Bangkok and to charge Indian revenues with half the net cost of the appointment. The Government of India after consulting the Government of Burma replied they did not consider there were sufficient reasons to justify any portion of the cost of the proposed appointment being charged to Indian revenues.

In 1904 the Secretary of State informed the Government of India that it was proposed to appoint an additional Consular Officer at Lakhon and that it was intended that Indian revenues should bear half the cost of the appointment. He therefore asked for the opinion of the Government of India on the matter. The Government of India replied that, in their opinion, Vice-Consuls should be posted both at Lakhon and Chiengrai, but that, if only one officer could be appointed, he should be placed, at Chiengrai. In December 1904 the Secretary of State informed the Government of India that His Majesty's Government had decided to station Consular Officers at both Chiengrai and Lakhon, the latter post being filled by the transfer of the Consular Officer hitherto stationed at Nan. He stated that it was also proposed to appoint a Consular Officer at Nan, the cost being divided equally between the Indian and Imperial Exchequers. The Government of India replied in May 1905 that they were of opinion that Indian interests were not sufficiently concerned to warrant their contributing from Indian revenues towards the maintenance of the appointment at Nan. In November 1905 the Secretary of State asked the Government of India whether, in view of certain representations made by the British Minister at Bangkok, they considered that there was sufficient ground for modifying the decision arrived at by them as to the provision of an officer at Nan. The Government of India, after consulting the Government of Burma, stated that they were unable to alter their opinion that Indian interests were not sufficiently concerned to warrant their making any contribution towards the cost of the appointment at Nan.

From further correspondence received from the India Office, it appeared that His Majesty's Government had accepted the opinion of the Government of India on this subject. The appointment of Vice-Consuls at Lakhon and Chienmai in Siam had accordingly been approved, the latter officer holding charge of the district of Nan.

On the 14th August 1907 the Secretary of State for India asked for the views of the Government of India on a proposal of the British Minister in Siam that the appointment of Vice-Consul at Chiengrai should be abolished, and that an additional Vice-Consul should be appointed at Chiengmai, one of whose duties would be to visit the western district. He added that the Foreign Office concurred in the proposal, and enquired whether, out of savings on account of Chiengrai, Indian revenues would make a fixed contribution of £350 or £400 towards the maintenance of the new post and to cover all outgoings.

The Government of India, after consulting the Lieutenant-Governor of Burma, stated that they were willing to make a fixed annual contribution of £350, on the understanding that the additional Vice-Consul would visit the western district. The additional Vice-Consul was accordingly appointed.

The Government of Burma forwarded, on 5th February 1906, correspondence

**Violation of British territory by Siamese Police.** regarding a case of alleged violation of British territory by seven Siamese Police from the Methawa Police Station, Lapun

State in Siam. The police were reported to have penetrated three miles into British territory, and to have threatened to fire on a party of British native subjects, who were in charge of an elephant, unless they at once returned to Siamese territory. The whole party were then taken back with the elephant to the Methawa Police Station where they were confined. The Commissioner of the Tenasserim Division directed a British Police Officer to proceed at once to the spot and enquire fully into the matter.

In connection with this incident the British Minister at Bangkok forwarded a copy of the Siamese Government letter in which they freely admitted that a trespass had been committed, and expressed the hope that the Government of Burma would appreciate the fact that this was not a case of intentional wrong, but only a technical trespass due to an excess of zeal on the part of the Siamese gendarmerie. The Siamese Government also stated that strict instructions had been issued to the gendarmerie to prevent a recurrence of such incidents. In these circumstances the Government of Burma considered it unnecessary to demand any further satisfaction. They proposed moreover to inform His Majesty's Minister at Bangkok that no exception would be taken to the crossing by the Siamese authorities of the frontier in hot pursuit of criminals if due report were made as early as possible, and if any persons arrested were handed over to the police on the British side of the frontier. The Government of India, however, did not consider that a communication in these terms need be made to the British Minister. They stated that it would be sufficient if the Lieutenant-Governor of Burma replied to the effect that he agreed with the British Minister in thinking that no further action need be taken in the matter.

On the 16th October 1906, Mr. Beckett, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires,

**Registration in Siam of subjects of Native States in India as British subjects.**

Bangkok, forwarded a copy of a despatch which he had received from Mr. Stringer, British Consul at Chiangmai, in which

Mr. Stringer raised the question whether natives of Nepal and Bhutan came within the category of persons of Asiatic descent who might be registered as British subjects when residing in Siam. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires stated that by Article 1, paragraph 3 of the Agreement between Great Britain and Siam of 29th November 1899, "all persons of Asiatic descent born within the Queen's Dominions or naturalized within the United Kingdom or born within the territory of any Prince or State in India under the suzerainty of, or in alliance with, the Queen" fell within the category of British subjects who might be registered. Mr. Beckett understood that both Nepal and Bhutan were, if not under the suzerainty of, at least in alliance with, His Majesty, and he had instructed Mr. Stringer accordingly. He requested, however, that he might be informed of the views of the Government of India on the subject, and, since many natives of Afghanistan and territories along the northern borders of India were increasingly evident in Siam, and might apply to be registered as British subjects, he enquired whether the Government of India could furnish him with a list of such territories as, in their opinion, fell within the definition of the third paragraph of Article I of the Agreement referred to. In reply the Government of India stated that, in their opinion, both Nepal and Bhutan fell within the category of States of India under the suzerainty of, or in alliance with, the Sovereign of Great Britain and the subjects of those States might, therefore, be registered as British subjects. They also forwarded a list of the districts, agencies, and States in Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province and stated that, if any person of Pathan origin claimed to be a resident of any of those districts, agencies, or States, he should be provisionally registered and given Consular protection. They added that *bonâ fide* subjects of the Amir should not be registered as British subjects, but that it was desirable, unless Mr. Beckett saw any objection, that Consular Officers should extend their good offices to any native of Afghanistan who might apply to them for Consular assistance.

## APPENDIX I.

(Referred to on page 38 of the text).

In July 1906, the Government of India addressed the Secretary of State regarding the Indian interests involved in the Baghdad Railway question. Reference was made to Sir N. O'Connor's statement on the 12th April that, if the Germans once surmounted the difficulties, financial and otherwise, attending the construction of the line through the Taurus range, and reached the open plain beyond it, they would not be likely to permit British participation in the scheme on acceptable terms. His Excellency had added that, if the Germans were unable to obtain assistance for the Taurus section, they might find themselves forced to seek another less expensive alternative by avoiding the mountains and constructing a line from Eregli, or from some point west of Eregli direct to Mersina, whence by utilising the existing Mersina-Adana railway the line could be continued eastwards on the route originally planned.

The fact that the Germans had recently obtained a controlling interest in the Merina-Adana line appeared to the Government of India to be an indication of the probability of Sir N. O'Connor's forecast. By this move not only had they carried out the condition of the contract requiring them to construct a line to the Mediterranean, but they had also secured a means of transporting material, rolling-stock, etc., which would enable them to forward work on the Baghdad line without having to wait till the Taurus was pierced.

The Government of India considered that, if the problem of the Cilician Gates were solved in this way, German influence and manipulation of Ottoman finance would possibly enable the Company eventually to dispose alone of the financial difficulties that were at one time held likely to bar the completion of the line without external assistance, and that in this way it seemed probable that if participation in the scheme were much longer delayed, the pecuniary embarrassment of the Company could not be relied on as a factor in the situation inducing them to seek the assistance of Great Britain.

The Government of India further pointed out that it appeared to have been the original intention of the concessionnaires that the line should terminate at a port or near the open sea, and that some spot in the neighbourhood of Koweit seemed to have been indicated at first as a likely terminus. It seemed, however, to the Government of India that the best site was in the neighbourhood of the Khor Abdulla or of Kathama Bay. Captain Mahon, who had been specially deputed in 1905 to make an examination of all possible termini, was of opinion that there were no engineering difficulties which would prevent Basrah from being made the terminus, and he considered that it would provide a steamer port fully equal to the demands of trade for many years to come. He had further pointed out that, from a commercial point of view, Basrah possessed advantages over all other possible termini, and the Government of India remarked that a report of Mr. Grant-Duff of 9th May, regarding German attempts to purchase from Persia a concession for a port and a coaling station at the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab, was thus not without significance.

It was stated that the Germans had clearly shown that they had no intention of confining their energies to the mere construction of a through line of rail. The Convention itself had given them the right to construct a branch from Sadijeh to Khanikin, to establish various industries, to construct quays at the terminal port, to utilise such natural water power as may be available, and, during construction, to run steamers on the Tigris. Schemes had also been started by German commercial associations for the exploitation of the mineral wealth of the country traversed by the railway. Nor did the Germans intend to restrict their activity to Mesopotamia only. In 1897, they had appointed, for the first time, a Consul to reside at Bushire, where their commercial interests were of the most slender description. In Mesopotamia, they had posted a Vice-Consul at Mosul ostensibly for the purpose of looking after the affairs of the German Scientific Mission to Kela Shergat and Babylon, and His Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdad had expressed the opinion that the real object of the so-called Scientific Mission was the collection of information and the dissemination of German influence in connection with the Baghdad Railway. A scheme had even been mentioned for starting at Bahrein a banking business under the auspices of the Deutsche Bank, and the German Consul at Bushire had more than once made special enquiries as to the status of German subjects trading at this port and their claims to German Consular representation.

It was added that, from Sir C. Spring-Rice's report of the 28th March 1906, there was reason to suppose that the mission of the newly-appointed German Minister to Persia was not unconnected with the project for linking up the Baghdad Railway with Persia by means of a road *viâ* Khanikin. Sir C. Spring-Rice had pointed out that, in the event of this concession being granted, and in the event of the revival of a concession which the Germans formerly possessed for the construction of a road from Khanikin to Kermanshah, they would control the pilgrim route to Kerbala, which was the only line in Persia certain to pay. It appeared also that the German diplomatic representatives had been taking an unusual interest in the



progress of the boundary dispute between Turkey and Persia, and it was obvious that the acquisition by Turkey of a considerable slice of the mountainous country bordering Mesopotamia on the east would tend greatly to strengthen the position of the power holding the plains of the Euphrates and Tigris. Sir N. O'Connor had reported on the 17th April 1906 that the President of the Anatolian and the Baghdad Railway Companies had succeeded in obtaining a promise from the Sultan of a concession for a scheme of irrigation in the plain of Konia by draining the marshy area extending to some 16,000 acres in the neighbourhood of Karavita, a project which the Germans had had in view for some time past. The Government of India remarked that other similar schemes might be expected to make their appearance in due course. They were also of opinion that when once definite construction had commenced, a more or less gradual process of interference by Germany would result in their obtaining the administration of those portions of the Turkish Empire through which the railway would pass, as the Germans fully realised that the great risk to the line lay in the misgovernment and disorder of the districts through which it would run. In time, this process could have but one end, namely, the consolidation of German influence throughout this vast and important territory and the eventual concentration into German hands of all real power there. For the maintenance of order, local forces, doubtless officered and controlled by Germany at the expense of Turkey, would have to be kept up. Further, it was stated that, by means of the Haidar Pasha-Eregli line, the greater part of Anatolia had been brought within the German sphere of influence and that the Osmanli inhabitants of this region, who were capable of being converted into excellent fighting material, would doubtless form the basis of the forces recruited for the purpose of maintaining order. It was added that the rapid extension of the Hedjaz Railway and its linking up with the Baghdad line would enable the Turkish troops to be concentrated either on the western or eastern frontiers of the Sultan's dominions, and that the British position in Egypt and at Aden, and even the Red Sea route to India, would be threatened. It would also be more difficult for the Arabs to make head against the power of the Porte.

The Government of India pointed out that they could not regard with equanimity the creation of such a situation. With the concentration of so much power in German hands, and with the shadow of a Russo-German alliance looming in the distance, there would be ground for serious apprehension. These considerations led them to the opinion that the interests of India demanded a more active policy, and that, as it was hopeless to attempt to block the scheme, it became imperative to secure an interest in the undertaking so as to minimize the risks of its falling under the control of a single power or being utilized as a means of overthrowing the present predominant position held by the British Government in the Gulf. It was argued that, though in time of peace the control of the south-eastern portion of the line would materially add to the British position in the Gulf, in the event of war it would certainly not provide any guarantee of safety. There would, moreover, be nothing to prevent this particular section from being used by the enemy at will. It was, therefore, suggested that Indian interests would be most effectively safeguarded by taking part in the scheme as a whole. Such a course would pave the way for the employment of British officers for the maintenance of order, and the faculty which Englishmen possess for the management of Asiatics might be expected soon to secure to them the predominant share of these duties in the regions traversed by the line. The Government of India, therefore, strongly recommended that, in the event of no decision having as yet been arrived at on the subject of British participation in the railway, every effort should be made to obtain the largest possible share in the whole project from Eregli onwards. As an alternative, but only in the event of this proving impracticable, they advocated securing control of the Baghdad-Basrah Gulf Section and of the port upon the Gulf.

From correspondence which took place early in November 1906 between Sir A. Nicolson and Sir E. Grey, it appeared that M. Isvolsky, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, was of opinion at the time that Germany had sufficient funds to enable her to carry the Baghdad Railway line over or through the Taurus, but that, from that point to the terminus, German financiers would find difficulty in carrying on the undertaking without foreign assistance. The Russian Minister considered that the line should be international, at any rate in regard to the last sections, and that the British and Russian Governments should act conjointly in the matter. In reply to an enquiry from Sir A. Nicolson as to the manner and form in which the proposed participation should be carried out, M. Isvolsky stated that he had no definite opinion, and that he would have to consult his colleagues and obtain the consent of the Cabinet to participation. On the 8th November 1906, Sir E. Grey wrote to Sir F. Bertie that he had informed M. Cambon of M. Isvolsky's view and that M. Cambon was strongly of opinion that overtures from Germany should be awaited. Subsequently the Foreign Office communicated a memorandum to M. Isvolsky regarding the attitude which the British Government would adopt upon the question of participation in the event of the line being prolonged beyond the Taurus Mountains. The memorandum stated that His Majesty's Government were of opinion that no steps should be taken on their part until Germany had re-opened the question; that His Majesty's Government did not consider the enterprise in its present stage to be of more than commercial importance, but that, if it developed into a through line of communication between Europe and the Persian Gulf, it would raise



political questions. In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government considered that it would be desirable if an arrangement could be arrived at whereby Great Britain, Russia, and France, as well as Germany, might have an opportunity of participating in the undertaking; that the possibility of concluding such an arrangement would depend upon the attitude taken at Berlin in regard to the matter, but that it would nevertheless be desirable that the three Governments should arrive at a preliminary understanding as to the lines on which a satisfactory settlement could be made.

On the 21st November 1906, Sir F. Bertie wrote to Sir E. Grey that M. Pichon had informed him that, from enquiries made by the Minister of Finance, it seemed that the railway could not be completed to the Persian Gulf without the aid of the Paris and London markets. Asked by Sir F. Bertie as to how much further forward from the present completed portion of the railway at the foot of the Taurus it could be carried by Germany with German resources only, M. Pichon replied that, as a result of the enquiries which he had made, he had come to the conclusion that the Germans would not be unaided to continue the Baghdad Railway through the Taurus. He stated that they wished to produce the impression that they could do so, but that they really depended on being able to obtain further kilometric guarantees through the 3 per cent. additional Turkish Customs duties, to be levied with the consent of the Powers. M. Pichon further reported that he had instructed the French Ambassador at Constantinople to act in concert with His Majesty's Ambassador at that place in dealing with the questions still at issue in regard to the levying of the additional duty.

On the 12th December 1906, Mr. Barclay forwarded to His Majesty's Government a record of a conversation regarding the Baghdad Railway between Mr. Braham, correspondent of the "Times" in Constantinople, and the German Ambassador. The latter told Mr. Braham that he was determined to push on the construction of the next section of the railway and that he was confident of being able to secure the small revenue required as guarantee. He argued that the construction of the second section could not affect British interests in any way as they did not begin before the neighbourhood of Mosul. Mr. Braham told the Ambassador that when once the Germans were over the Taurus they might be in a better position to negotiate with England than they were at present. The Ambassador replied that it would not be possible for Germany to build the whole line without the help of England.

On the 23rd December 1906, Sir F. Bertie wrote to Sir E. Grey that M. Pichon had informed him, in the course of an interview, that the German Ambassador at Constantinople had stated to a French financier that the Emperor of Germany desired the co-operation of France in the further construction of the Baghdad Railway. M. Pichon stated that, if this should really be the case, it meant the co-operation of England also, as the French Government would not act in the matter except in concert with His Majesty's Government and the Russian Government. It appeared certain that the Germans could not for the next three years make any further important progress in construction without outside financial assistance. During such time, the only thing to be done would be for His Majesty's Government and the French Government to keep each other fully informed of everything which reached them in regard to the question of the railway, unless, in the meanwhile, the German Government approached the French Government with the view of coming to terms.

On the 4th January 1907, Sir C. Spring-Rice reported to Sir E. Grey that he had received information to the effect that Russia had offered to withdraw her objections to the Baghdad Railway and to German enterprise in Mesopotamia generally on the condition that she herself should have the right of constructing the Khanikin-Baghdad branch and of fixing the tariff on the railway when constructed. Sir C. Spring-Rice considered that the tariff, as fixed by Russia, would make all trade from the south or west to Persia by that route impossible, and would give Russia the monopoly of Persian trade, which, he thought, so far as concerned imports, would be reserved for Russian industry and the Tiflis-Tabriz-Hamadan route.

About the end of the same month, Mr. Cartwright, His Majesty's Minister-Resident at Munich, wrote to Sir E. Grey regarding the Baghdad Railway scheme in so far as it was affected by the financial situation in Germany. Mr. Cartwright stated that there was great reticence in banking circles when dealing with the subject, but that, from information indirectly obtained from Herr Tischler, one of the Directors of the Branch of the Berlin Imperial Bank in Munich, it appeared that negotiations were going on between Paris and London with regard to the participation of French and English capital in the undertaking. Herr Tischler seemed to be of opinion that Germany's desire for the participation of foreign capital was indicated by the international character given to all publications, statements and appeals made by the German Syndicate as to the construction of the railway, but he thought that Germany never would nor could consent to give up her control of the enterprise, and that, if the participation of foreign capital could only be obtained by the surrender of her position, she would renounce foreign assistance, and obtain the necessary financial help in her own country for the completion of the enterprise. He added, however, that Germany would prefer at present not to face such an eventuality.

On the 19th February 1907, Sir N. O'Connor forwarded to Sir E. Grey a memorandum by Mr. Block reviewing the financial situation of the Turkish Empire, which, it appeared, was in such an unsatisfactory condition that the Porte would have no justification in pledging further revenues for new loans or for the construction of railways. Sir N. O'Connor considered that it would be to the advantage of Great Britain as well as of other countries to induce, if possible, the Sultan to adopt a sounder financial policy before embarrassing the Exchequer with heavy charges for further kilometric guarantees of the Baghdad Railway. But he did not think that the four Powers would be likely to agree among themselves to interfere in the internal affairs of Turkey in the direct way which would be necessary to secure the object in view. Still less did he think that Germany would be willing to co-operate with them in a matter of which the primary object was to delay the further construction of the railway, respecting which a definite agreement had been concluded between the Ottoman and German Governments. The situation would be altered if Germany were to agree beforehand with the three other interested Powers to internationalise the railway, which she was not likely to do at present. Even then the task suggested by Mr. Block would be so difficult that the Powers would probably prefer to postpone its consideration until a change of régime held out some prospect that their joint endeavours to place the finances of the Empire on a firmer basis would meet with the support and good-will of Turkey herself.

On the 4th March 1907, Sir E. Grey reported to Sir F. Bertie that he had told M. Cambon that, though the Baghdad Railway formed no part of England's negotiations with Russia about Persia, it had appeared incidentally in the course of the negotiation that Russia had ceased to regard the railway as something to be opposed at all costs; that she was willing to come to an arrangement with Germany about it; and that, in fact, she felt that no settlement with regard to Persia would be complete from her point of view unless she had some such arrangement.

On the 7th of the same month, Sir E. Grey wrote to Sir A. Nicolson that in the course of a conversation which he had had with Count Benckendorff, the latter asked him whether England would initiate any proposal in connection with the Baghdad Railway, and that he replied in the negative. Count Benckendorff stated that M. Isvolsky would prefer that the railway should not be made, but that if it was to be made, the situation must be accepted and the best terms secured. Sir E. Grey then said that if the railway, which might be made in the long run, became a through route from sea to sea, it was obvious that all the Powers—Russia, France, England, and Germany—would be affected by and concerned in it. He therefore thought that, if Germany made any proposal, it should include an arrangement with Russia.

In a letter to Sir F. Lascelles, on the 8th March 1907, Sir E. Grey stated that he had reminded Count Metternich that, in conversation with others the latter had expressed himself not altogether satisfied with the relations between England and Germany, and that he had instanced the Baghdad Railway, and England's attitude towards it as a cause. Sir E. Grey told Count Metternich that he did not think it fair to quote the Baghdad Railway when it was a subject on which England had not received any proposals from Germany. Count Metternich said that he did not suppose that Germany would make any proposals, and that he had been informed that England had no interest in the railway except to see that no fortified port was made on the Persian Gulf. Sir E. Grey observed that, if the railway became an alternative route to the Far East, going from sea to sea, it must have political consequences which would affect more or less every Power interested in the region. Count Metternich was unable to see that it could have any political or strategic importance so far as England was concerned, but Sir E. Grey maintained the opinion that the change made by so great an enterprise must be a matter of interest to neighbouring Powers. Count Metternich then said that Germany had now made further progress with the railway, and that he did not think that any proposal which she might make in the matter would meet the views expressed in England. He further stated that Germany could never consent, after having made so much progress with the enterprise by herself, to be deprived of any part of it. Sir E. Grey replied that he was not aware, that in any quarter, deprivation had been suggested. Participation was not the same thing as deprivation.

On the 15th March 1907, Sir F. Lascelles forwarded to Sir E. Grey a report from Mr. Consul-General Oppenheimer giving his views on the subject of the Baghdad Railway scheme so far as it was affected by the financial situation in Germany. Mr. Oppenheimer reported that he had it on absolutely trustworthy authority that the French and the German financial groups had come to an agreement concerning the continuation of the railway according to which the Germans should construct the Taurus line from Fregli to Adana (220 kilom.) and the French the next portion to Haleb (Aleppo, 200-300 kilom.). It was stated that this would give the French at Aleppo a junction for their railway lines in Syria. Mr. Oppenheimer added that it was generally believed that Great Britain was endeavouring to prevent the construction of the Taurus line, and as there was no inclination under these circumstances to give Great Britain any chance of influence, British capital for the Taurus line was not wanted. Moreover, the capital for this line was said to be already secured. Mr. Oppenheimer further reported that there seemed to be a desire on the part of Germany that the negotiations with Great Britain should be resumed after the Taurus line had been constructed, but not until then.

On the 25th April 1907, Sir E. Grey reported to Sir F. Bertie that he had told M. Cambon that the most essential condition for British co-operation in the Baghdad Railway was that they should have the construction and working of the Southern, or Baghdad, end of the line to the Gulf, and that, if such could be satisfactorily arranged, the British Government would be willing to participate. On the 1st of the following month, Sir N. O'Connor wrote to Sir E. Grey stating that he had received information from private but reliable sources which indicated that the construction of the Baghdad Railway was not likely to be proceeded with in the immediate future.

On the 18th June 1907, Sir A. Nicolson informed Sir E. Grey that M. Isvolsky had mentioned to him that he had received from Count Benckendorff a copy of a memorandum setting forth the views of His Majesty's Government in respect of the Baghdad Railway. M. Isvolsky remarked that he doubted if the Memorandum would be pleasing to Berlin, and that it seemed to him at first sight that Great Britain had taken up an attitude somewhat in advance of that which she had hitherto assumed. Sir A. Nicolson replied that he did not gather that there was any intention of communicating the memorandum to the German Government for the present, and that His Majesty's Government had merely communicated their views to the French and Russian Governments for their confidential information. M. Isvolsky said that he understood that His Majesty's Government did not intend to address themselves to the German Government until the latter had made the first overtures.

On the 31st July 1907, Sir E. Grey told M. Cambon that he had heard there were difficulties both at St. Petersburg and at Paris about the British Government's proposals in regard to the Baghdad Railway. Sir E. Grey said that he should like it to be clearly understood that the British Government did not wish to press anything at the moment, but that they desired that, if further progress was attempted with the Baghdad Railway, the matter should be discussed with them. M. Cambon said that there were three objections to the British Government's proposals :—

- (1) The Sultan would never give such a concession for the Baghdad end.
- (2) Russia would never agree to the condition which the British Government had put forward.
- (3) It could not be reconciled with the internationalisation of the line.

Sir E. Grey replied that his idea had been that France, Germany and England should all construct and work different sections, but under an international Board, and that Russia should make her own connection and so come in under the same Board, on the same sort of terms. M. Cambon then said that Russia did not wish the railway connection from the Caucasus to the Persian Gulf, because she thought the result would be to open the way for British and German trade to her own disadvantage. He understood that what Sir E. Grey meant was that the proposal the British Government had put forward was a desire, and not a condition, and that he would so inform his Government.

On the 28th August, 1907, Sir C. Spring-Rice wrote to Sir E. Grey that he had no reason to believe that the Germans had obtained a concession to construct a railway from Baghdad to Tehran. He stated that the Germans had at one time possessed a road concession to Khanikin, but that it had lapsed and had not, so far as he was aware, been renewed. The Russians had now constructed a road to Hamadan, and a German railway concession would interfere with this enterprise. He added that no railway could be constructed in Persia till 1910 without the permission of Russia, and that a concession would not be easily obtained under present circumstances.

On the 31st December 1907, Sir E. Grey wrote to Sir A. Nicolson that M. Sevastopoulo, of the Russian Embassy, had called upon Sir C. Hardinge on the 22nd idem, and, by direction of the Russian Ambassador, had communicated to him the substance of a confidential letter from M. Isvolsky on the subject of the Baghdad Railway. Its purport was to the effect that M. Isvolsky had read with interest the account sent him by Count Benckendorff of what had passed between the German Emperor and Sir E. Grey at Windsor, and between Herr von Schon and Sir E. Grey at the London Foreign Office, relating to the railway. It was stated that great anxiety was felt in Russia as to the influence which the consequences of the building of the line would have on the actual situation in the Caucasus, Asia Minor and Persia. It was particularly in the latter country where a junction of the Baghdad railway with the future Persian railways would imply an extension of German commercial interests and competition with existing trade, that alarm for the future was felt. It was added that although England and France had preserved their liberty of action, Russia had not the same position of absolute freedom, since, at the beginning of the recent Anglo-Russian negotiations, M. Isvolsky had given assurances to Germany that no action would be taken which could in any way prejudice German interests without previous discussion with the German Government. Views had consequently been exchanged between Germany and Russia, with a view to obtaining from Germany guarantees against the extension of German influence in Persia to overcome the opposition of Russia to the construction of the railway. From this exchange of views there had been no results. The consequence of Sir E. Grey's interviews mentioned above was that a new situation had been created, and, as the Russian Government had fully realised this fact, the question would be carefully considered in all its bearings. The Russian Government had appreciated the manner in which His Majesty's Government had

## APPENDIX II

(Referred to on page 45 of the text).

The following is the text of the Agreement which was concluded on the 21st October 1909 between Sardar Muhammad Yakub Khan, the new Kharan Chief and the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, and was subsequently confirmed by the Government of India :—

Whereas His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council has been pleased to sanction my succession to the Chiefship of the Kharan State, I, the undersigned Sardar Muhammad Yakub Khan, hereby agree to the following articles in substitution of the agreement, dated the 5th June 1885, which was concluded between the late Sir Robert Sandeman, K.C.I.E., Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, and my late grandfather Sardar Azad Khan, and subsequently renewed in the case of my late father, Sirdar Sir Nauroz Khan, K.C.I.E., of Kharan, on his succession to the Chiefship :—

## I.

That the boundaries of the Kharan State shall be as laid down in Appendix A attached to this agreement.

## II.

That I shall remain loyal to the British Government and shall maintain, to the best of my power, peace and order within the above mentioned boundaries, and that I shall be responsible for the safety and protection of all travellers and others, who may travel by any of the routes passing through my territory, and I shall render them every assistance in my power. Should British officers proceed on duty to the Kharan district, there will be no objection to their doing so; on the contrary every precaution will be taken to look after their safety and to help them in every way. If in any way I should fail in the above duties it shall be optional for the Government of India to make such arrangements as they may deem expedient either by the location of " thanas ", levy posts or troops within or on my borders, or in any other manner.

## III.

The rights possessed by my father in Panjgur outside the above mentioned boundaries of Kharan, *i.e.*, the right of all the revenue of Khudabadan, which village shall be considered my *jagir*, and the right to half the revenue of Sari Kauran and Tasp, shall be continued to me. As also the *muafi* enjoyed by my father in Garm Kan, Tasp, Washbod, Isai, or elsewhere in Panjgur. The present arrangements regarding collection of the above revenue and regarding the management of my *jagir* in Khudabadan shall continue, subject to such modifications as may from time to time be considered necessary by the Honourable the Agent to the Governor-General.

## IV.

As regards the new Indo-European Telegraph line, I hereby accept all responsibility for the security and protection of such portion of it as passed through the aforesaid boundaries of my State *via* Ladgasht. I shall also be responsible for the safety and protection of all Telegraph employes, residing in or visiting my territory in connection with the maintenance and working of the aforesaid line, and I shall always afford them every assistance in my power and furnish escorts for them if necessary. In consideration of the above, I shall receive from the British Government a subsidy of Rs. 4,000 (four thousand rupees) per annum.

Should it be authoritatively reported at any time that I have failed in the performance of the aforesaid duty, or if at any time any injury be done to the line as would lead to the belief that due care was not exercised in its protection, it shall rest with the Honourable the Agent to the Governor-General to cancel or withhold, in whole or in part, the above subsidy and to make such other arrangements for the protection of the line as he may deem fit, such as the establishment of military or levy posts or thanas, etc., in such places along the line which passes through my territory as may be considered necessary.

## V.

I undertake to prevent, to the best of my power, the passage through my country of arms and ammunition from any country lying without my territory.

I also engage not to import or allow any of my subjects or residents in Kharan to import into my territory arms and ammunition without obtaining the permission of the Honourable the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan.

I shall also, to the best of my power, assist the British Government in suppressing all illicit traffic in arms and ammunition if required to do so.

## VI.

In consideration of my acceptance of the above articles, the British Government may be pleased to continue in my favour the annual subsidy of Rs. 6,000 (six thousand) which my late father, Sardar Sir Nauroz Khan, enjoyed, this subsidy being in addition to the Telegraph subsidy mentioned in Article IV above.

## APPENDIX A.

## Boundaries of the Kharan State.

I. The northern boundary starts from a point midway between pillars Nos. 7 and 8 on the Perso-Baluchistan frontier, runs north-east to Chakal and thence east to Guruk, where it bends

## Northern boundary.

sharply to the north, and after dividing the grove of Shotagan from the other date groves of Ladgasht keeps a north-easterly direction to the southern limit of the Hamun-i-Mashkel. It then follows the southern limit of Hamun as far as the Wad-i-Sultan, and after skirting the western limit of the Wad-i-Sultan to the northern limit of the Hamun, follows the latter until the neighbourhood of Reg-i-Wakhab is reached.

After leaving the limits of the Hamun-i-Mashkel the boundary follows the line of sand-hills south of Reg-i-Wakhab and Galichah until it reaches a point south-west of Gaukok where it bends north-east and after skirting the western limit of the Gaukok Hamun follows the crest of the Gaukok and the chain of low hills running from the Gaukok to the Raskok range until that range is reached. It then follows the crest or watershed of the Raskoh as far as the Sultani Kand pass, whence it runs north-east to the bed of the Albat river, and, after following the bed of that river to the Albat Koh, bends south-east to the Parod river.

II. From the Persian frontier the crest of the Parrag Koh and the Koh-i-Sabz to the Sorgari peak: from the Sorgari peak the watershed

## Southern boundary.

running south from that peak to Bugdar in the Bansor range and thence the crest of the Bansor range to the Sabzap pass, thence the Sabzap river to Kenagi Chah, thence the Jarochahi river to the Laghar range and thence the crest of that range to the point from which the Hukami river issues into the Raghahi valley; from this point to the Hukami stream to its junction with the Durrachahi stream, thence the Durrachahi to its junction with the Gitchk, thence the Gitchk to the point where it unites with the Raghahi and forms the Tank and thence the Tank to Pusht-i-Koh and a point on that river immediately south of and opposite to the Zung Gonden range.

III. Until permanently demarcated the eastern boundary will remain as it now exists,

## Eastern boundary.

starting from the eastern limit of the northern boundary at Parud, as described in I, to the eastern limit of the southern boundary, as described in II, at Pusht-i-Koh and a point on the Tank river immediately south of and opposite to the Zang Gonden range.

IV. As demarcated by the Perso-Baluch Boundary Commission, starting from the western

## Western boundary.

limit of the southern boundary, as described at II above (Perso-Baluch boundary pillar No. 3 and west of Parag Koh) to a point on the western limit of the northern boundary, as described at I above (a point midway between boundary pillars Nos. 7 and 8 on the Perso-Baluch frontier). The western boundary from pillar No. 3 northwards as laid down by the Perso-Baluch Boundary Commission is as under:—

From pillar No. 3 it follows the watershed of the subsidiary range (*i.e.*, that from Tank-i-Grawag to Siahan) to its junction with the Siahan Koh, and thence it is defined westward by the main watershed of the Siahan range to a point about four miles east of the pass called Bonsar or Sharindor on the main road connecting Isfandak with Jalk. At this point, which is marked by pillar No. 4, a subsidiary watershed or spur runs northward, along which the boundary extends leaving all drainage into the cultivated tracts of Kalagan on the Persian side. The boundary is here marked by a conspicuous peak, distinguished by a natural bluff resembling a tower on its summit. From this peak 5 it is carried to pillar No. 6, which is placed on the main road leading a little south of east from the village of Kaladan towards the Mashkel river. Pillar No. 6 is four miles from the village of Kaladan. From pillar No. 6 the boundary runs direct to pillar No. 7 on the main road connecting Jalk with Ladgasht and Mashkel at 12 miles from Ziarat-i-Pir-Omar at Jalk.

From pillar No. 7 the boundary is carried in a northerly direction by a straight line to pillar No. 8.

Pillar No. 8 is placed on the road connecting the date groves of Ladgasht with those of Muksokhta or Muksotag, and it is erected at a distance of three miles from the southern edge of the Muksotag grove so as to divide the southern group of the date groves, including Ladgasht and Kallag, from the northern group, which includes the Muksotag, Gorani and others.

SARDAR MUHAMMAD YAKUB KHAN,  
Chief of Kharan

[     ] Seal of Sardar Muhammad Yakub Khan,  
Nausherwani,  
Chief of Kharan

Signed and sealed in my presence this 21st day of October 1909.

A. H. McMAHON,  
Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan.

## APPENDIX III.

NOTE SHOWING THE TERMS OF THE DRAFT ADHESION AGREEMENT HANDED TO SIR E. SATOW AT PEKING BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT IN THE SPRING OF 1906, TOGETHER WITH THE SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE AND NEGOTIATIONS TO WHICH IT GAVE RISE.

(Referred to on page 67 of the text.)

*Treaty between Great Britain and China.*

Article I.

The Convention concluded on 7th September 1904 between the Governments of Great Britain and Tibet, the texts of which in English and Chinese are attached to the present Convention as an annexe, shall be faithfully observed by both high contracting parties subject to the modification stated in the ratification appended thereto, and both high contracting parties shall, whenever the necessity arises, take steps to secure due fulfilment of the terms specified therein.

Article II.

The Government of Great Britain engages not to encroach on Tibetan territory nor to interfere in the administration of Tibet. The Government of China also undertakes not to permit any other foreign State to interfere with the territorial or internal administration of Tibet.

Article III.

The concessions which are mentioned in Article IX (d) of the Convention concluded on 7th September 1904 by the Governments of Great Britain and Tibet are denied to any other State or to the subject of any other State, but at the trade marts specified in Article II of the aforesaid Convention Great Britain shall by arrangement with China obtain the privilege of laying down telegraph lines connecting with India.

Article IV.

Such of the provisions of the Indo-Tibet Agreements of 1890 and 1893 concluded by the Governments of Great Britain and China as do not conflict with the purport of the present Convention shall remain in full force.

Article V.

The English and Chinese texts of the present Convention have been carefully compared and found to correspond, but in the event of there being any difference in meaning between them the English text shall be authoritative.

Article VI.

This Convention shall be ratified by the Sovereigns of both countries, and ratifications shall be exchanged within a fixed number of days after the date of signature by the Plenipotentiaries of both Powers. Two copies of each of the English and the Chinese texts of this Convention shall be prepared and all four shall be signed and sealed by the Plenipotentiaries of both Powers.

The following were Sir E. Satow's comments on the above draft:

*Article I.*—It was understood from Mr. Tang that this was identical with Article II of the Government of India's draft Convention.

*Article II.*—Verbal alterations were necessary, other words such as "annex" and "intervene" being substituted for the words "encroach" and "interfere." He understood that the words "any other Foreign State" did not exclude the contracting parties.

*Article III.*—The preceding remark applied to the words "any other State" in this article also. Sir E. Satow suggested that the phrase "in return for the privilege" might be altered to "have the right," and that the words "by arrangement with China" might be omitted, if the intervention of China were objected to.

*Article IV.*—This article appeared to be redundant, but Sir E. Satow understood that Prince Ching wished it to be included. If the article were to be accepted, he proposed the following as a more suitable wording:—The provisions of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and Anglo-Chinese Agreement of 1893 shall, subject to the terms of this present Convention and of the annexe thereto, remain in full force."

Sir E. Satow had no remarks to offer regarding *Articles V and VI.*

He added that the original Article V of the Indian draft Agreement had been omitted from the present Chinese draft, and suggested that it would perhaps suffice to secure its object by



an exchange of notes. Finally, he stated, that he made it clear to Mr. Tang that he could only transmit the Chinese proposals to His Majesty's Government, and that he had received no authority to discuss the terms. At the same time he observed that a good opportunity for endeavouring to conclude the affair seemed to be afforded by the spontaneous action of the Chinese Government.

The Government of India concurred generally in these comments and saw no objection to the acceptance of the Chinese draft, subject to a satisfactory settlement by exchange of notes in the sense of Article V of the original draft framed by the Government of India, and to the alterations suggested by Sir E. Satow, including the omission of the words "By arrangement with China" in Article III. To prevent any risk of alteration of the internal administration of Tibet by China to the detriment of the British Government, it was suggested that the following words should be prefixed to Article II: "so long as the terms of the Convention of the 7th September 1904 are scrupulously fulfilled and the present administrative and general status of Tibet is maintained." It was further pointed out that so far as the actual working of the Convention on the spot was concerned, no great importance need be attached to the Chinese adhesion, and that, in the opinion of the Government of India, the settlement of the Dalai Lama's future was a question of greater moment. At present, matters were working smoothly, and the return of the Tashi Lama after his most successful visit to India would further conduce to this result. It was, therefore, suggested that, if His Majesty's Government were prepared to renew negotiations, it could perhaps be arranged that the Chinese Government should definitely announce the exclusion from Tibet of the present Dalai Lama and intern him as had been done in the case of one of his predecessors. It was argued that this measure would allay the existing unrest at Lhasa and would tend towards good relations between Tibet and India. Reference was made to the fact that Mr. Tang in negotiations with Mr. Fraser\* had asserted that the removal of the Dalai Lama and the appointment of the Tashi Lama had been carried out because the latter was understood to be friendly to the British Government, and it was pointed out that China now had an opportunity of showing how far this profession was genuine. On the 12th February Sir E. Satow was instructed to the following effect by the Foreign Office:—

- (1) The negotiations were to be conducted at Peking.
- (2) Subject to the exchange of notes in the sense of Article V of the original Indian draft, there was no objection to the acceptance of the Chinese draft with the verbal amendment suggested by Sir E. Satow, including omission in Article III of the words "by arrangement with China."
- (3) Article III should be amended so as to make it clear, as in Article IV of the Indian draft, that the concessions enumerated in Article IX (d) of the Tibet Convention would be denied to any State and its subjects except China.
- (4) If Sir E. Satow anticipated objection on the part of the Chinese Government as regards Article II, he need not press for the introduction of the words suggested as an addition by the Government of India, but if he saw a reasonable prospect of success he should sound them as to the definite exclusion of the Dalai Lama from Tibet.

On the 3rd April, the Secretary of State telegraphed that an early settlement of the Chinese Adhesion agreement. adhesion negotiations was anticipated by Sir E. Satow, if certain modifications in the draft Treaty were agreed to by the Government of India:—

- (1) In Article II the word "interference," to which the Chinese attached importance, was to be retained.
- (2) In Article III as China had objected to the omission of the words "by arrangement with China," Sir E. Satow proposed, as a compromise, for the passage beginning "but at the trade marts" to the end of the article, to substitute the following words "but it has been arranged with China that at the trade marts specified in Article II of the foreshaid Convention, Great Britain shall be entitled to lay down telegraph lines connecting with India."
- (3) Throughout the Adhesion Agreement wherever the words "Governments of Great Britain and Tibet" occur, the words "Governments of" were to be omitted.
- (4) The Chinese Government were agreeable to the exchange of Notes regarding the employment of foreigners in the sense of Article V of the Calcutta draft, provided that Sir E. Satow was authorised to state verbally that China might employ foreigners for twelve months after the date of signature in order to give time for the reorganisation of the Customs. The object of this proposal was to enable the Chinese Government to employ Mr. Henderson of the Imperial Chinese Customs to organise the Customs at Yatung.

On the 14th April, the Viceroy replied accepting the proposed modifications. On the 27th April, the Secretary of State telegraphed that the agreement had been signed on that day by Sir E. Satow, and that ratifications were to be exchanged in London three months after signature.

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\* Foreign Secretary to the Government of India till October 1905.



## APPENDIX IV.

*Summary of the Dalai Lama's proceedings in Peking on the occasion of his being summoned there by the Chinese Emperor in the autumn of 1908.*

(Referred to on page 72 of the text.)

The Dalai Lama arrived at Peking on the 28th September, and on the 30th a delegate named Lo Sang tan seng called on Sir J. Jordan with a message of greeting and a present of a silk scarf from the Lama. During his conversation with the delegate, Sir J. Jordan gathered that the Lama would like to see him, but he had no intention of responding to the invitation until the Lama had been received in audience and he (Sir J. Jordan) had had an opportunity of ascertaining that the Chinese Government had no objection to a visit of ceremony.

The delegate also visited the American, French, German and Russian Legations. The American and French Ministers both called upon the Lama a day or two later and were received in private audience.

The American Minister, who was in confidential communication with emissaries from the Lama, one of whom was Dorjief, subsequently informed Sir J. Jordan that the emissaries were quite satisfied with the provisions of the new Trade Regulations, but were apprehensive of Chinese encroachment on Tibetan autonomy. This, however, they were disposed to accept as inevitable. The American Minister also mentioned that the Lama proposed to return to Tibet in about six weeks and to leave some representatives at Peking to arrange matters with the Chinese Government.

On the 8th October, the Wai-wu-pu addressed a note to the Foreign Ministers informing them that the Dalai Lama would receive the members of their staff on any day except Sunday between the hours of twelve and three, and that the introduction would take place through the two Chinese officials in attendance—one of whom was Chang-yin-Tang. The object of this step was clearly to deprive the Dalai Lama of the opportunity of ventilating his grievances to the representatives of the Foreign Powers and to assert the claim of the Chinese to control the external relations of Tibet.

On the 23rd October, Sir J. Jordan, under instructions from Sir E. Grey, informed the Wai-wu-pu that the British Government did not desire to put any obstacles in the way of the return of the Dalai Lama to Tibet. On behalf of the Wai-wu-pu Yuan Shih Kai expressed his appreciation of the message and stated that the Dalai Lama was well disposed towards the British.

On the 4th November, news was received from Sir J. Jordan that the Empress-Dowager had issued a decree conferring a new honorific title upon the Dalai Lama, making him an annual grant of 10,000 taels and commanding him to return to Tibet as soon as the ceremony of investigating him with the new title was completed. The Lama was also commanded, on his return to Tibet, to observe the ordinances and the rules of the Sovereign State, to admonish the Tibetans to be law-abiding, to earn the confidence of the Chinese Court, and to furnish the Chinese Amban with a report on all matters for the information of the Throne.

Sir J. N. Jordan visited the Dalai Lama on the 20th October, and M. Korostovetz, the Russian Minister, previously paid a formal visit.

During the interview with Sir J. Jordan the Dalai Lama said that the events which had occurred in the past were not of his making and that it was his sincere desire that peace and amity should exist between India and Tibet. He concluded by asking that his words might be reported to His Majesty the King-Emperor, Sir J. Jordan said in reply that the Lama's desire was fully reciprocated by his country and that he would not omit to carry out his request. Dorjief and two Councillors of State, agents of the Dalai Lama, subsequently called upon M. Korostovetz and sought his advice and support in conducting their relations with China. Dorjief seems to have been the spokesman and active member of the deputation. The nature of the assistance which they required was not, so far as could be gathered from M. Korostovetz, clearly specified, but they were evidently apprehensive of a forward Chinese policy in Tibet and wished to enlist outside support in combating it. M. Korostovetz told them, so he said, quite plainly that Russian policy had undergone a complete change since 1904. Russia had discovered to her cost the mistake of bolstering up Asiatic States and she had come to an agreement with Great Britain as regards Tibet which precluded all interference in the affairs of that country. Tibet, he said, was, after all, in a much better position than Korea, which had lost its independence, and her wisest course was to fall in with Chinese views and to make the best of the altered situation. Dorjief, who did not find this advice very palatable, pointed out that the restraints which had been placed upon travellers visiting Tibet would operate unfavourably upon Russian Buriats, who would no longer be permitted by the Chinese to visit their spiritual head at Lhasa. The new régime meant,

he said that while all foreigners were to be excluded from the country, it was to be overrun by increasing numbers of Chinese. The delegates finally suggested that they might find relief from their present position by having recourse to Great Britain and spoke of appealing to Sir J. Jordon, but M. Korostovetz gave them to understand that he was unlikely to intervene between them and the Chinese Government.

The delegation from the Dalai Lama, which visited Sir J. Jordan some days later, did not include Dorjief and did not enter into political discussion of any kind. They asked him, however, on behalf of the Dalai Lama to convey the respectful greetings of His Holiness to the King-Emperor and to transmit to His Majesty a "hata" or scarf as a token of his good-will and esteem.

The American Minister, Mr. Rockhill, informed Sir J. Jordan that the Lama, with a view to defining his position with regard to China, had prepared drafts of memorials to the Throne embodying his aspirations on two points, one spiritual and the other temporal, both of which he regarded as of cardinal importance.

In the first, which related to the protection of the Yellow Church, he reminded the Emperor that the Dalai Lama had been ruler of Tibet before the Manchu dynasty came to China. He acknowledged the favour which had invariably been extended to the Church by the Manchu Emperors, and expressed, in terms which Mr. Rockhill regarded as somewhat minatory, the hope that its glory and prestige would continue to be upheld in the future. Mr. Rockhill suggested that the language should be toned down into an expression, of confidence that the Church would continue to enjoy the Imperial protection, and the suggestion was accepted.

The second memorial asked that all reports from the Ambans at Lhasa, instead of passing through the Viceroy of Szechuan, should be sent to Peking direct and should bear the golden seal of the Dalai Lama. The Delegates explained that the Viceroy of Szechuan exercised at present a controlling voice in the direction of Tibetan affairs and often took it upon himself to modify or reverse decisions taken at Lhasa. They, no doubt, also anticipated that this control would become more effective in future with Chao Erh Feng as Resident in Tibet and his elder brother, Chao-Erh-hsun, Viceroy of Szechuan. Mr. Rockhill himself was inclined to view this request as not unreasonable, but referred to the opinion of his Chinese Secretary, Dr. Tenny, who felt sure that it would be resisted by the Chinese Government.

According to a later report received from Sir J. Jordan, the decree issued by the late Empress-Dowager conferred upon the Dalai Lama, who already bore the title of "Hsi-T'ien-Ta-Shan-Tzu-Tsai-Fo", meaning the Great, Good, Self-Existent Buddha of Heaven, the additional title of "Ch'eng-Shun-Tsan-Hua-Hsi-T'ien-Ta-Shan-Tzu-Tsai-Fo", meaning the loyally Submissive Vice-regent, the Great, Good, Self-Existent Buddha of Heaven.

The directions in the decree for the conduct of the Lama on his return to Lhasa are interesting in that they contain the first unequivocal declaration on the part of China that she regards Tibet as within her sovereignty.

Mr. Rockhill also informed Sir J. Jordan that the Dalai Lama, in preparing his expression of thanks for the honours conferred on him, sought to improve his position by proposing that he should memorialise the Throne directly, but that the Board of Dependencies refused to allow him to do so.

On the 19th November, Mr. F. A. Larson, a Swedish Missionary, called on Sir J. Jordan in company with Hanta Wang, a Mongal Prince, who was in attendance on the Dalai Lama. The Prince gave Sir J. Jordan to understand that he desired to obtain for the Lama some information regarding the Tibet Regulations and the Anglo-Russian Convention relating to Tibet of which the Lama had heard, but of which he had been told nothing by the Chinese Government. The Lama was anxious to cultivate the most friendly relations with England and was ready and willing, when he returned to Lhasa, to foster trade with India in every way, but there were many rumours as to the meaning of the Regulations and Convention and, not having seen the texts, he was very much in the dark on the subject. As Sir J. Jordan had learnt from various sources that the Lama was really in doubt as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards him, he assured the Prince that so long as the Trade Regulations and Treaties were faithfully observed the Lama's relations with India were certain to be harmonious and amicable. On Mr. Larson enquiring where the terms of these documents could be found, Sir J. Jordan authorised Mr. Campbell, Chinese Secretary, to assist Mr. Larson in obtaining copies of the English text.

The Maharaj Kumar of Sikkim visited the Dalai Lama at Peking on the 22nd and 25th November. Major W. F. O'Connor accompanied the Kumar on his first visit when no political subject of any kind was broached. On the second visit the Kumar was alone with the Lama. According to the Kumar, the Lama seemed confident regarding his influence over his own people in Tibet, but expressed himself as nervous regarding his relations with the Chinese. He, however, realised the necessity of working in harmony with China, but said that good

relations would depend very much upon the character and disposition of the Chinese Amban. The impression which the Kumar gathered from the Lama's remarks was that the Lama did not like the Chinese, but understood his dependence upon them and the necessity of avoiding friction. The Lama was also said to be desirous of dwelling on good terms with the Government of India and satisfied with the existing Treaty provision which he intended to preserve. The Kumar further mentioned that the Dalai Lama expects to meet the Tashi Lama at Nagchuka on his way back to Tibet.

The Dalai Lama, who left Peking by train on the 21st December, proposed leaving the railway at Chenchow, whence he would proceed to Kumbun *via* Tungkuan, Haian-fu and Lanchow. At Kumbun the Lama would await the receipt of an Imperial letter after which he would travel direct to Lhasa where he expected to arrive in May 1909.

The day before the Lama left Peking he sent two of his councillors to the British Legation to pay a visit of farewell on his behalf. In addition to some presents of incense and other articles for Sir J. Jordan, they brought a *hata* (scarf) which they especially begged should be transmitted to His Majesty the King-Emperor with a message of respectful greetings from His Holiness.

The Councillors said that the Dalai Lama's visit to Peking had been a useful educative influence to himself and his advisers and had resulted, they hoped, in the resumption of the time-honoured relations with China. It had also enabled them to ascertain the views of His Majesty's Government with regard to Tibet, and after the assurances which Sir J. Jordan had given them, they now went back thoroughly convinced that, so long as they faithfully carried out the terms of the recent convention, they could look forward with confidence to the maintenance of friendly relations with His Majesty's Indian Government. This, they considered, one of the most valuable results of their journey. The Councillors also explained that the Lama's proposal to leave two or three of his councillors to represent his interests at Peking had, for the time being, been abandoned in deference to the views of the Chinese Government.

Dorjief, one of the Lama's councillors, was apparently afraid of the prospect of returning to Lhasa, and decided to settle in St. Petersburg, where his ostensible object was to found some Buddhist monasteries. Dorjief who left Peking on the 23rd December 1908, proposed to remain for some time in the Trans-Baikal region before proceeding to his destination.

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## APPENDIX V.

(Referred to on page 86 of the text.)

The Tibetan Ministers in attendance on the Dalai Lama at Darjeeling called on Mr. Bell, Political Officer in Sikkim, on the 5th March 1910, and put forward their view of the Tibet case as follows :—

Chinese suzerainty had never been formally acknowledged by Tibet. The fifth Dalai Lama (the present Dalai Lama is the 13th) had visited Peking at the invitation of the Chinese Emperor and there made a verbal alliance with him on terms of equality to the effect that China and Tibet would respect and help each other.

After this the Chinese gradually obtained control of Tibet's external affairs. About a century ago, the then Chinese Amban issued an edict that, firstly, Tibet must act in foreign matters through the Chinese Amban. Letters to the neighbouring Governments of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan were treated as foreign matters. Secondly, Chinese accused of offences must be tried by Chinese officials, and Tibetans accused of offences must be tried by Tibetan officials. Thirdly, a scale of free transport for Chinese officials in Tibet was fixed. Other provisions were also contained in the edict.

About 60 years ago, a second edict, more stringent than the above, was issued by the then Amban : of this the Ministers offered no details. Though they had never agreed to them in writing, the Tibetans did not dare disobey the above edicts and thus the Chinese control over Tibetan external affairs had grown up.

The present position was that, under the Lhasa Convention of 1904 and the Tibet Trade Regulations of 1908, the Tibetans had the right in certain matters to deal with the British direct. Tibet did not recognise the Peking Convention of 1906, on the ground that it was not signed by the Tibetan Government and they were not consulted about it.

The Tibetan Government complained of the following breaches of treaties by the Chinese :—  
(a) The first paragraph of Article III of the Trade Regulations, 1908, had been violated, because the entire administration of the trade marts had been taken by the Chinese into their own hands and the Tibetans were allowed to do nothing (this can be certified to by the British Trade Agents at Gyantse and Yatung). Also that the Chinese had written to the Tibetan Government that they were putting Chinese police into the trade marts and this in itself contravened Tibetan rights under the article referred to.

(b) Article III, Trade Regulations, 1908, allowed free intercourse between Tibetans and British Trade Agents. Yet the Chinese officials at Gyantse were continually telling the Tibetan officials that they were not to visit the British Trade Agents (the British Trade Agent, Gyantse, can confirm this).

(c) Articles III and IV of the Trade Regulations, 1908, and the maintenance of the *status quo* gave the Tibetan officials the right of trying Tibetan subjects, but Chinese officials at Gyantse had on several occasions tried Tibetan subjects.

(d) The Convention of 1904 recognised a "Tibetan Government," and Article I of the Convention of 1906 recognised the Convention of 1904, but the Chinese had interfered with the Tibetan Government's position—(1) in 1908 Amban Len demanded the seal of the Council (Kasha) from the Sechung Shape and the Kolan Lama, saying that it had been given by the Emperor of China. They refused, urging that it had been given by a former Dalai Lama. (2) The following territories which belonged to the Tibetan Government had been forcibly taken possession of by the Chinese, *viz.*, Tsakakratho and Traya and Chamdo. These territories constituted a very considerable portion of Tibet and their seizure very materially altered the position of the Tibetan Government. Moreover, from the State of Derge which was jointly under China and Tibet the Chinese had entirely removed Tibetan jurisdiction; and though Litang and Batang were under China, the monasteries in these districts were under the Dalai Lama. The Chinese had made a list of monks in the Litang Gonchen monasteries and had declined to allow any fresh monks to join, so that when the present monks died the monasteries would cease to exist.

The request of the Tibetans, according to a paper which the Maharaj Kumar of Sikkim had been asked to give Mr. Bell, ran as follows :—"It is important that, understanding the above, the Chinese officers and troops, civil and military, should be withdrawn; that the monasteries which have been destroyed should be replaced, and that looted property should be given back in accordance with law. As the Chinese Empire did not look after the welfare of Tibetans so far, the condition of Tibetan affairs in future, to be as in the time of the fifth Dalai Lama. If the above could be done, friendly relations between British and Tibetans, whose territory adjoins each other, will be everlasting. All Buddhists will pray to the gods for the furtherance of the power and prosperity of the British Empire and will also look after the interests of both parties in the same way as if they were parents and children of the same house."

Mr. Bell informed the Ministers that it was not possible for him to make a statement of any kind in the matter, but that he would report what they said to the Government of India.

## APPENDIX VI.

(Referred to on page 86 of the text.)

*Summary of the Chinese version of the Tibet Embroglio as communicated to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Peking, Mr. Max Müller, by His Excellency Natung.*

Mr. Müller telegraphed on the 6th March 1910 that he had had a special interview with His Excellency Natung, who was a Grand Councillor as well as President of the Wai-wu-pu. Mr. Max Müller pointed out that His Majesty's Government were receiving from Tibetan sources detailed accounts of events in Tibet, and he wished to be able to send them authoritative information from the Chinese side. Natung readily responded and expressed himself as being only too anxious to assist in placing the facts before His Majesty's Government. He sketched the Dalai Lama's career, showing how impossible it was to place confidence in him. Since he assumed the direction of affairs in 1895, he had been a source of continual trouble into China and his wilful disregard of treaty obligations and intrigues were the cause of the British expedition in 1904. He had then fled without leave from Tibet; the Chinese Government had all along treated him considerately and borne with his insubordination, but since he returned to Lhasa territory, his proceedings and his flight from Lhasa without just cause had compelled the Chinese Government to depose him and appoint another. Mr. Max Müller asked Natung for definite instances of insubordination, and the latter said that though the Amban had gone to meet him on his arrival, he had refused to see him again to discuss matters amicably during the 50 days that he was in Lhasa, he had stopped the usual supplies to the Amban and his escort, and by refusing transport according to regulations had endeavoured to cut communications with China. It had been carefully explained to the Dalai Lama that the troops were coming as police and in order to protect the trade marts, and that no alteration whatever in the internal administration or interference with the church was contemplated; but the march of the troops was impeded from the first by bodies of Tibetans, and finally the supplies collected for Chinese troops were burnt. Mr. Max Müller mentioned to Natung the events which were reported to have taken place in Lhasa at the time of the flight of the Dalai Lama. His Excellency said that the Chinese Government had no such information; he would not assert that the entry of troops had been without incident, but he could not credit the statements as to unprovoked attacks on Tibetans, because the strictest orders had been given to the troops to the contrary. Again it was not true that the position or power of the Dalai Lama had been diminished, and he (Natung) refused to believe that a promise had been given by the Amban that only one thousand troops should come to Lhasa; such a promise could not be made without the authorization of the Chinese Government, and this had not been given. He stated with emphasis that there was not a shadow of foundation for the newspaper report as to a proposal by the Viceroy and Chao Erh Feng for converting Tibet into a province of China; His Excellency said that such a course would be a contravention of Anglo-Chinese Treaty stipulations and did not enter into the thought of the Chinese Government. He reminded Mr. Max Müller that the Chinese Government were formally blamed for not compelling the Tibetans to observe treaty engagements, and that His Majesty's Government had insisted on a Tibetan delegate signing the Trade Regulations of 1908, as they considered that otherwise the Tibetans would not conform to them. Adverting to the troops in Tibet, Natung stated that Chao Erh Feng's force was still in Chiamdo and Derge, and that no part of it had entered Lhasa territory. The force which had been sent to Lhasa was a separate body of 2,000 Szechuan troops and these were the only additional troops in the country over and above the normal escort of the Amban and the guard at the post stations. China had always had the right to station troops in Tibet and the recent reinforcements were merely sent for the protection of the trade marts, the maintenance of order and peace, and the observance of treaty obligations. He repeatedly assured Mr. Max Müller that the steps which had been taken by the Chinese Government only concerned the person of the Dalai Lama himself. The sixth Dalai Lama had been removed for misconduct in 1710, and there were numerous precedents for the removal of the Lama. Nothing would be done to disturb the existing administrative system in Tibet or the Lama's Church. China had millions of Lamaists among her Mongolian subjects and Lamaist functionaries at the Court of Peking, and it was absurd to suppose that Lamaism would be interfered with by the Chinese Government. As for the accusation of burning monasteries, one only had been destroyed, and this was over a year previously, by Chao Erh Feng, because the Lamas had ambushed a Chinese Amban and killed him and thirty of his escort. His Excellency assured Mr. Max Müller that the Prince Regent himself was paying the greatest attention to this question and had sent repeated telegrams to the Amban directing him to maintain order and observe treaty obligations; a telegram sent from Lhasa on the 26th February had reached the Grand Council on the 4th March and stated that the Szechuan troops were behaving properly, that the Council were carrying on the administration as usual, that the Lamas and people were pursuing their avocations without molestation, and that the country was tranquil. His Excellency thanked the British Government for affording him this opportunity of placing the Chinese side of the question before His Majesty's Government, whose correct and fair attitude he thoroughly recognised; and he trusted that the Chinese Government might rely on their support towards the objects he had stated. He promised to keep Mr. Max Müller informed as to events in Tibet and to give him a detailed statement of the Chinese Government's indictment against the Dalai Lama. Finally, Natung gave a private hint that the Dalai Lama had only been prevented by the distance from fleeing to Russia and suggested that Russia was taking an interest in him.

## APPENDIX VII.

((Referred to on page 87 of the text.)

*Summary of telegraphic report from the Government of India to the Secretary of State, on the 12th March 1910, regarding the position in Tibet.*

On the 12th March, the Government of India telegraphed to the Secretary of State that their latest information indicated that the Chinese had taken into their own hands all power at Lhasa and had posted soldiers at Chaksam ferry, where no Tibetans were allowed to cross without a pass from the Amban. The Tsarong Shape was the only high Tibetan official left at Lhasa and he had to consult the Amban before taking any action. Various reports as to oppressive and aggressive action of the Chinese had been received, but it was difficult to authenticate them. The British Trade Agents reported that the Chinese did not allow Tibetans to deal direct with them. It seemed, however, that no Tibetan authority existed any longer.

As regards the Chinese statements that no alterations in the internal administration were contemplated and that the power and position of the Dalai Lama had not been diminished, it was pointed out that these could not be reconciled with established facts. Mr. Bell had received from the Maharaj Kumar of Sikkim copies of correspondence between the Assistant Amban at Lhasa and the Dalai Lama, which there was every reason to believe was genuine, showing, firstly, that it was intended to deprive the Dalai Lama of temporal power and, secondly, that it was contemplated to send only 1,000 troops. Letters received from the Nepalese Representative at Lhasa showed clearly that the number of troops was fixed by the Amban at 1,000.

The statement that His Majesty's Government insisted on the Trade Regulations of 1908 being signed by a Tibetan delegate, as they considered that otherwise the Tibetans would not conform to them, was evasive and misleading. The question was keenly contested, and the Government of India trusted that any misapprehension on this point would be removed. It was significant of the attitude of the Chinese Government.

The Secretary of State was also informed that a letter had been addressed by the Maharaja of Bhutan to the Emperor of China, through the Political Officer, Sikkim, drawing attention to the trouble of the Tibetans and their inconsiderate treatment at the hands of the Amban, who made no allowance for their ignorance, and adding that so many troops were not required in a religious country like Tibet, that all Buddhists felt for the sufferings of the Dalai Lama, who was the King of Lamas, and that there would be trouble with raiyats and traders and enmity with other Rajas, if the Chinese troops remained. It was not proposed to forward this letter.

As to Nepal, the attitude of the Prime Minister was friendly and correct. He said that he could despatch 8,000 men to the frontier at short notice, but that he would undertake no enterprise which the British Government might disapprove of. He considered the interests of Nepal in Tibet were bound to suffer from the increased vigilance of the Chinese in Tibetan affairs, and more especially from the guarantees of territorial integrity given to Tibet by Great Britain and Russia. Assurances had been received by the Nepalese Representative at Lhasa from the Ambans, regarding the protection of Nepalese interests. A memorandum was being drawn up by the Prime Minister, in which he would ask the extent to which the British Government considered Nepal free to act against Tibet or China in defence of Nepalese rights in Tibet. He hinted that if the British Government could guarantee him support for the continuance of existing relations for Nepal *vis-à-vis* Tibet and China, he would not be indisposed to consider the question of an agreement between the British and Nepalese Governments giving the British Government control of Nepal's foreign relations with China.

The Prime Minister advised the Kasyal Kazis, in reply to their appeal, to settle their differences with the Amban amicably by accepting the assurances regarding Chinese intentions in sending one thousand troops for police duty; justified his refusal to send armed assistance to Tibet; and offered the services of his Representative at Lhasa to conduct negotiations between the Chinese Amban and the Tibetan Government. He also sent through his Representative a letter to the Amban, to be delivered if the situation continued unchanged; if not, to be communicated in so far as it might be appropriate. The letter expressed regret at the misunderstandings, explained the reply which he had sent to the Kasyal Kazis, thanked the Amban for the assurances given to the Nepalese Representative, and expressed an earnest hope that the Dalai Lama would be recalled to Lhasa and reinstated in his former position and power.

The Government of India were of opinion that pressure by the British Government at Peking for the re-establishment of the former Tibetan Government under the Dalai Lama, which would be welcomed by the Nepal Government, would probably be the best solution,

and said that, if the Chinese would accept it, friendly offices of the British Government could be offered. The Dalai Lama would be a source of trouble to the Chinese, as the Tibetans and Lama-Buddhists would not recognize that he had been deposed spiritually. The Government of India had no reason to support him, but his restoration would be a proof of a desire to maintain the *status quo* and would restore confidence on the frontier, and they thought that it might still be possible to bring about a *modus vivendi* if China wished to be friendly, although the Tibetan Ministers in conversation with Mr. Bell denied the suzerainty of China.

The Government of India suggested that in any case they must protect their own interests. Their frontier States were unsettled. The military authorities considered that the number of troops in Tibet and the rumoured location of a garrison at Yatung constituted a menace to the peace of the border. The edict issued by the Chinese Government in 1908 contemplated the reform of the Tibetan Government, not its abolition.

The Government of India also pointed out that there had been the following breaches of the Trade Regulations of 1908, *viz.*, the administration and policing of trade marts had been taken over by the Chinese, which was not consistent with Article III, and direct dealings between our Agents and Tibetans had been prevented. The Convention of 1904 recognized the Tibetan Government and Article I of the 1906 Convention recognized the Convention of 1904. The Chinese had forcibly occupied and dispossessed Tibetans of Tsakalho, Traya and Chiamdo provinces of Eastern Tibet, thus lopping off a large slice of Tibetan territory.

In any case, therefore, the Government of India thought it necessary to demand definite assurances from the Chinese Government:—

- (1) that the Chinese garrison in Tibet will be limited to a number sufficient for purposes of maintenance of internal order ;
- (2) that a real Tibetan Government will be maintained ;
- (3) that the trade mart will be policed by Chinese officers ;
- (4) that an Amban shall be appointed at Lhasa, who will be less hostile to British interests ;
- (5) that the Chinese local officers shall receive instructions to co-operate with our Trade Agents, and not to hinder direct dealings between our officers and Tibetans.

Finally, the Government of India recommended that at this stage it might be well to inform the Chinese that, in view of the disturbed state of Tibet, the change of the *status quo* and the unfriendliness of the local Chinese officers, the British Government must reserve the right to retain and increase, if necessary, the escorts at Gyantse and Yatung. They considered it improbable that their agencies would be attacked by the Chinese, but individual Chinese might get out of hand.

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## APPENDIX VIII.

(Referred to on page 88 of the text).

*Summary of Tibetan affairs and connected correspondence from the 12th March to the 18th April.*

On the 19th March, the Secretary of State was informed that (1) Assistant Amban Wen had been dismissed for showing favour to the Tibetans; (2) the Chinese had posted a proclamation in the Gyantse bazar forbidding the Tibetans to call the Dalai Lama by that title; (3) the Dalai Lama's statement that the Chinese now prevented him from holding any communication with Tibet was confirmed; and (4) that there was no doubt that the monopolies in wool, etc., were suggested by Mr. Chang Yin Tang, who was also known as the Tang Tarin Amban.

On the 20th March, the British Minister at Peking reported that the Chinese Government had informed him that they had appointed Gulatan Sepa Lobatoang Tanpa, of the "Kanpus" or "Abbata" to be Regent in Tibet, and to take charge of the "Shang Shang" or administration. As to the selection of a new Dalai Lama, the Chinese Government stated that it would take some time for completion of proceedings in connection therewith.

From a report received on the 22nd March, from the Consul-General at Chengtu, it appeared that Derge, Chiamdo, Draya, and Gartok in Eastern Tibet have been effectively occupied by the Chinese, and that Chao Erh Feng was at Chiamdo.

On the same day news was received through the Nepalese Representative at Lhasa, that (1) all was quiet there, (2) a notice had been published revoking the monopolies in trade in wool and yak-tails and (3) 1,000 Chinese troops in all had recently arrived in Lhasa.

On the 23rd March, the Secretary of State intimated that he was communicating with the Foreign Office as to the assurances to be demanded from China, and that he awaited the memorandum by the Prime Minister of Nepal and the views of the Government of India thereon. In the meantime the Prime Minister was to be advised to take no action without reference to the Government of India. The Secretary of State also enquired whether, in view of questions that might raise as to the boundaries of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan, they could be precisely defined.

On the 26th March, the Government of India replied that a copy of the Prime Minister's memorandum had been sent to the India Office and that their views thereon would be communicated as soon as possible. As regards the boundaries of Nepal and Bhutan with Tibet, they had not been demarcated and apparently could not be precisely defined; the Sikkim-Tibet boundary, as laid down in Article I of the Convention of 1890, followed a clearly-defined natural watershed, but Mr. Bell was being asked if there was more precise information. The Government of India continued that the Dalai Lama had sent in a written statement justifying his action and following substantially the line taken by him in his interview with His Excellency the Viceroy. The Maharaja, Council and people of Sikkim had also presented a memorial against the action of the Chinese in demolishing monasteries and in acts of sacrilege and their treatment of the Dalai Lama. They stated that the indignities offered to His Holiness were the cause of deepest sorrow and disgust to Buddhists and prayed for mediation with China to maintain the Tibetan Government in freedom of internal administration. They had been informed that the situation was receiving consideration. Mr. Bell had been instructed, without being obtrusive, to take a suitable opportunity of getting a list of the monasteries alleged to have been destroyed and specific acts of alleged sacrilege. A notice had been posted at Yatung signed by Mr. Cheung forbidding the import of silver into Tibet under instructions from the Chinese Popon at Pipithang, and threatening traders if they disobeyed the order. The British Agent at Yatung had been instructed to enquire of Mr. Cheung the reason for this order and to point out that silver was not one of the commodities in which trade could be prohibited under Article 3 of Trade Regulations, 1893.

According to a report sent by the Nepalese Representative at Lhasa to his Government, a copy of which was received by the Government of India on the 26th March, it appeared that a deputation of Tibetan representatives left by the Dalai Lama waited on the Chinese Amban after the flight of the Dalai Lama. These representatives were conciliatory to the Amban, who having lost his temper, denounced the Dalai Lama, saying that if he came back at once he could take up the administration; if not, the Government could get on without him. Further, in conversation with the Nepalese Representative, a Chinese military officer said that when the Chinese Government saw the British advancing on Tibet they decided that Tibet must be protected, and that, as the Tibetans could not do this, the Chinese must do it for them. It was also stated that the Chinese authorities in Lhasa were impressed with the importance of avoiding a conflict with the Tibetans.

On the 27th March, information was received that, on the recommendation of Chao Erh Feng, the Reform Council had moved the Chinese Government to sanction the incorpora-

ation of Derge (the largest State in Eastern Tibet) into the Chinese Empire, an annual allowance being made to the Chief.

On the 1st April, the British Trade Agent at Yatung telegraphed that he interviewed Mr. Cheung, who stated that he was aware that there was no prohibition against the import of silver into Tibet, but that he had stopped it under instructions of the Chinese Popon at Pipithang, who traced the order from old records in which a previous Amban prohibited the import about ten years ago. On being asked if it was his intention now to allow import, Mr. Cheung replied that he had referred the matter to the Chinese Popon who had addressed the Amban at Lhasa.

On the 4th April, the Secretary of State was furnished with the text of a letter which Mr. Bell had received from the Dalai Lama's Ministers, giving information regarding the destruction of monasteries in Eastern Tibet by Chao Erh Feng and other Chinese officials.

On the same day Mr. Bell telegraphed that at a recent interview with him the Tibetan Ministers asked that a British officer might be sent to Lhasa or Gyantse to enquire into the conduct of the Chinese in Tibet, and that the Government of India might conclude an alliance with Tibet, each to help the other as required, on the same terms as those of the arrangement which, they said, existed between the Government of India and the Nepal Durbar. Mr. Bell informed the Ministers that he would report their request to the Government of India. Mr. Bell's telegram was repeated to the Secretary of State.

On the 5th April, a memorial from the second son of the late Chief of the Derge State to His Excellency the Viceroy was received on the subject of the annexation of the country by the Chinese. A letter from the Dalai Lama was also received announcing his safe arrival in Darjeeling.

On the 7th April, Mr. Bell telegraphed that, according to statements made by the Tibetan Ministers, there were now 2,400 Chinese soldiers in Lhasa, 500 at Lharigo, fourteen days' march to the north-east of Lhasa, and 500 more at Gyamda, ten days' journey east of Lhasa, making altogether 3,400, whereas the normal Chinese garrison of Lhasa and the surrounding country is only 500. The Ministers also stated that Amban Lien had announced his intention of dismissing those Ministers who accompanied the Dalai Lama to India and pointed out that such dismissal would be a very serious interference with the functions of the Tibetan Government. The Ministers further said that Chinese soldiers had taken possession of the Dalai Lama's palace, known as Norbu Lingka, near Lhasa, and were endeavouring to construct barracks at Lhasa sufficiently large to contain 1,000 Chinese troops. They hoped that Russia, which itself has Buddhist subjects, would agree to the despatch of a British officer to Lhasa in order to help the Buddhist religion. In conclusion, they declared that the only offence of themselves and the Tibetan people was their struggle to maintain their country's freedom. Mr. Bell's message was communicated to the Secretary of State.

On the 9th April, news was received that the Chinese had posted soldiers at Ramagang, 10 miles this side of Lhasa, to examine all travellers, and that the troops which had been posted at Chusul and Chaksam had returned to Lhasa.

On the 11th April, the Secretary of State was informed that the Resident in Nepal had been furnished with a copy of a letter sent by Lien Yu, Chinese Amban at Lhasa, to the Tashi Lama in which occurred the following passage: "If the Potala Lama (Dalai Lama), now void of rank, returns to Lhasa immediately, I shall not make him suffer any injury even to a hair in his head or any loss to his wealth and property, and we are sending officers to India for his return, and I hope and trust that you will also send officers and explain matters to the Tale Lama and try to induce him to return to Lhasa."

On the 11th April, a report was received from the Resident of Nepal on the Nepal-Tibet boundary from which it appeared that, although the boundary had not been regularly demarcated, there was not much doubt regarding it, the boundary following for the greater part of its length, well-defined watersheds and ridges.

On the 12th April, the Secretary of State telegraphed, with reference to a request which had been made for a translation of the decree of the Chinese Government deposing the Dalai Lama, that no action on the part of His Majesty's Government or the Government of India would be required.

On the same day, the Political Officer in Sikkim reported that the Chinese Frontier Officer at Pipithang had forwarded to the Tibet Trade Agent at Yatung a proclamation by the Chinese Amban at Lhasa, requiring all persons in Tibet to accept the Chinese rupee for three tankas and *vice versa*, whatever the market value of each may be.

On the 14th April, Mr. Bell was informed in reply to an enquiry made by him that there was no objection to the Maharaja of Sikkim paying a visit to the Dalai Lama, provided that the visit was made unofficially.

On the 16th April, Mr. Bell telegraphed that a verbal message had been sent by the Maharaja of Bhutan through Ugyen Kazi, asking that the number of Chinese troops in Tibet should be reduced, and that the Dalai Lama's powers should be restored to what they were before the Younghusband Mission. He also requested that the Government of India should arrange to despatch a British officer to Lhasa from time to time, that more Indian troops should be stationed at Gyantse and Yatung than at present, and that the British, and not Chinese or Tibetans should police the trade marts. Mr. Bell's message was repeated to the Secretary of State.

On the 18th April, Mr. Bell was asked to inform the Dalai Lama verbally that His Excellency the Viceroy had received his letter and was glad to know of his safe arrival in Darjeeling. He was also asked to inform the Lama that the situation in Tibet was receiving the anxious consideration of the Government of India and His Majesty's Government, and that His Excellency had no news of importance to communicate so far.

On the same day, Mr. Bell telegraphed that the Tibetan Ministers had given him the following information regarding the acts of the Chinese authorities in Tibet: "The Amban was dismissing Tibetan police where these existed and was posting Chinese troops throughout the country. He had closed the Tibetan mint and Tibetan arsenal, had removed thirty good rifles from the Tibetan armoury and proposed confiscating all the rifles possessed by Tibetans throughout the country. He had forbidden the Regent to perform his religious duties, saying that he would select another Lama for this. He was taking steps to deprive of their appointments the Ministers, who had accompanied the Dalai Lama to Darjeeling, had posted soldiers in most of their houses, and had broken open sealed doors of the Dalai Lama's palace at Norbuling near Lhasa."

The Ministers begged that, while discussion was in progress between the British and Chinese Governments, the aggression of the Chinese might be stopped and the Tibetan Government in Darjeeling might be allowed to communicate with their deputies at Lhasa, but that if this could not be done, British officers with soldiers might be sent to Lhasa to enquire into the present condition of affairs and discuss matters there with Chinese. Mr. Bell's message was communicated to the Secretary of State.

On the 18th April, a memorial addressed to His Excellency the Viceroy by the Maharaja of Bhutan was received, asking for the intervention of the Government of India in favour of the Dalai Lama.

## APPENDIX IX.

(Referred to on page 101 of the text.)

## TIBET TRADE REGULATIONS.

*Preamble.*—Whereas by Article I of the Convention between Great Britain and China on the 27th April 1906, that is the 4th day of the 4th moon of the 32nd year of Kwang Hsu, it was provided that both the High Contracting Parties should engage to take at all times such steps as might be necessary to secure the due fulfilment of the terms specified in the Lhasa Convention of 7th September 1904 between Great Britain and Tibet, the text of which in English and Chinese was attached as an Annexe to the abovementioned Convention.

And whereas it was stipulated in Article III of the said Lhasa Convention that the question of the Amendment of the Tibet Trade Regulations which were signed by the British and Chinese Commissioners on the 5th day of December 1893 should be reserved for separate consideration, and whereas the amendment of these Regulations is now necessary ;

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the Emperor of the Chinese Empire have for this purpose named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say :

His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India—Mr. E. C. Wilton, C.M.G. ;

His Majesty the Emperor of the Chinese Empire—His Majesty's Special Commissioner Chang Yin Tang ;

And the High Authorities of Tibet have named as their fully authorised Representative to act under the directions of Chang Tachen and take part in the negotiations—The Tsarong Shape Wang Chuk Gyalpo.

And whereas Mr. E. C. Wilton and Chang Tachen have communicated to each other since their respective full powers and have found them to be in good and true form and have found the authorisation of the Tibet Delegate to be also in good and true form, the following amended Regulations have been agreed upon :

I.—The Trade Regulations of 1893 shall remain in force in so far as they are not inconsistent with these Regulations.

II.—The following places shall form, and be included within, the boundaries of the Gyantse mart :

(a) The line begins at the Chumig Dangsang (Chhu-Mig-Dangs-Sangs) north-east of the Gyantse Fort, and thence it runs in a curved line, passing behind the Pekor-Chode (Dpal-Hkhor-Choos-Sde), down to Chang-Dong-Gang (Phyag-Gdong-Sgang) ; thence passing straight over Nyan Chu, it reaches the Zamsa (Zam-Srag) ; (b) from the Zamsa the line continues to run, in a south-eastern direction, round to Lachi-To (Gla-Dkyii-Stod), embracing all the farms on its way, *viz.*, the Lahong ; the Hogtso (Hog-Mtsho) ; the Tong-Chung-Shi (Grong-Chhung-Gshis) ; and the Rabgang (Rab-Sgang), etc. ; (c) from Lachi-To the line runs to the Yutog (Gyu-Thog), and thence runs straight, passing through the whole area of Gamkar-Shi (Ragal-Mkhar-Gshis) to Chumig Dangsang.

As difficulty is experienced in obtaining suitable houses and godowns at some of the marts, it is agreed that British subjects may also lease lands for the building of houses and godowns at the marts, the locality for such building sites to be marked out specially at each mart by the Chinese and Tibetan authorities in consultation with the British Trade Agent. The British Trade Agents and British subjects shall not build houses and godowns except in such localities, and this arrangement shall not be held to prejudice in any way the administration of the Chinese and Tibetan local authorities over such localities, or the right of British subjects to rent houses and godowns outside such localities for their own accommodation and the storage of their goods.

British subjects desiring to lease building sites shall apply through the British Trade Agent to the Municipal Office at the mart for a permit to lease. The amount of rent, or the period or conditions of the lease, shall then be settled in a friendly way by the lessee and the owner themselves. In the event of a disagreement between owner and lessee as to the amount of rent or the period or conditions of the lease the case will be settled by the Chinese and Tibetan Authorities in consultation with the British Trade Agent. After the lease is settled the sites shall be verified by the Chinese and Tibetan Officers of the Municipal Office conjointly with the British Trade Agent. No building is to be commenced by the lessee on a site before the Municipal Office has issued him a permit to build, but it is agreed that there shall be no vexatious delays in the issue of such permit.

III.—The administration of the trade marts shall remain with the Tibetan Officers, under the Chinese Officers' supervision and directions.

The Trade Agents at the marts and Frontier Officers shall be of suitable rank, and shall hold personal intercourse and correspondence one with another on terms of mutual respect and friendly treatment.

Questions which cannot be decided by agreement between the Trade Agents and the Local Authorities shall be referred for settlement to the Government of India and the Tibetan High Authorities at Lhasa. The purport of a reference by the Government of India will be communicated to the Chinese Imperial Resident at Lhasa. Questions which cannot be decided by agreement between the Government of India and the Tibetan High Authorities at Lhasa shall, in accordance with the terms of Article I of the Peking Convention of 1906, be referred for settlement to the Governments of Great Britain and China.

IV.—In the event of disputes arising at the marts between British subjects and persons of Chinese and Tibetan nationalities, they shall be enquired into and settled in personal conference between the British Trade Agent at the nearest mart and the Chinese and Tibetan Authorities of the Judicial Court at the mart, the object of personal conference being to ascertain facts and to do justice. Where there is a divergence of view the law of the country to which the defendant belongs shall guide. In any of such mixed cases, the officer or officers of the defendant's nationality shall preside at the trial; the officer or officers, of the plaintiff's country merely attending to watch the course of the trial.

All questions in regard to rights, whether of property or person, arising between British subjects, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the British authorities.

British subjects, who may commit any crime at the marts or on the routes to the marts shall be handed over by the local authorities to the British Trade Agent at the mart nearest to the scene of offence, to be tried and punished according to the laws of India, but such British subjects shall not be subjected by the local authorities to any usage in excess of necessary restraint.

Chinese and Tibetan subjects, who may be guilty of any criminal act towards British subjects at the marts or on the routes thereto, shall be arrested and punished by the Chinese and Tibetan Authorities according to law.

Justice shall be equitably and impartially administered on both sides.

Should it happen that Chinese or Tibetan subjects bring a criminal complaint against a British subject before the British Trade Agent, the Chinese or Tibetan authorities shall have the right to send a representative, or representatives, to watch the course of trial in the British Trade Agent's Court. Similarly, in cases in which a British subject has reason to complain of a Chinese or Tibetan subject in the Judicial Court at the mart, the British Trade Agent shall have the right to send a representative to the Judicial Court to watch the course of trial.

V.—The Tibetan Authorities, in obedience to the instructions of the Peking Government, having a strong desire to reform the judicial system of Tibet, and to bring it into accord with that of Western nations, Great Britain agrees to relinquish her rights of extra territoriality in Tibet whenever such rights are relinquished in China, and when she is satisfied that the state of Tibetan laws and the arrangements for their administration and other considerations warrant her in so doing.

VI.—After the withdrawal of the British troops, all the rest-houses, eleven in number, built by Great Britain upon the routes leading from the Indian frontier to Gyantse, shall be taken over at original cost by China and rented to the Government of India at a fair rate. One-half of each rest-house will be reserved for the use of the British officials employed on the inspection and maintenance of the telegraph lines from the marts to the Indian frontier and for the storage of their materials, but the rest-house shall otherwise be available for occupation by British, Chinese, and Tibetan officers of respectability who may proceed to and from the marts.

Great Britain is prepared to consider the transfer to China of the telegraph lines from the Indian frontier to Gyantse when the telegraph lines from China reach that mart, and in the meantime Chinese and Tibetan messages will be duly received and transmitted by the line constructed by the Government of India.

In the meantime China shall be responsible for the due protection of the telegraph lines from the marts to the Indian frontier, and it is agreed that all persons damaging the lines or interfering in any way with them or with the officials engaged in the inspection or maintenance thereof shall at once be severely punished by the local authorities.

VII.—In lawsuits involving cases of debt on account of loans, commercial failure, and bankruptcy, the authorities concerned shall grant a hearing and take steps necessary to enforce

payment ; but, if the debtor plead poverty and be without means, the authorities concerned shall not be held responsible for the said debts, nor shall any public or official property be distrained upon in order to satisfy these debts.

VIII.—The British Trade Agents at the various trade marts now or hereafter to be established in Tibet may make arrangements for the carriage and transmission of their posts to and from the frontier of India. The courier employed in conveying these posts shall receive all possible assistance from the local authorities whose districts they traverse and shall be accorded the same protection as the persons employed in carrying the despatches of the Tibetan authorities. When efficient arrangements have been made by China in Tibet for a Postal Service, the question of the abolition of the Trade Agents' couriers will be taken into consideration by Great Britain and China. No restrictions whatever shall be placed on the employment by British officers and traders of Chinese and Tibetan subjects in any lawful capacity. The persons so employed shall not be exposed to any kind of molestation or suffer any loss of civil rights to which they may be entitled as Tibetan subjects, but they shall not be exempted from all lawful taxation. If they be guilty of any criminal act, they shall be dealt with by the local authorities according to law without any attempt on the part of their employer to screen or conceal them.

IX.—British officers and subjects, as well as goods, proceeding to the trade marts, must adhere to the trade routes from the frontier of India. They shall not, without permission, proceed beyond the marts, or to Gartok from Yatung and Gyantse, or from Gartok to Yatung and Gyantse, by any route through the interior of Tibet, but natives of the Indian frontier, who have already by usage traded and resided in Tibet, elsewhere than at the marts, shall be at liberty to continue their trade, in accordance with the existing practice, but when so trading or residing they shall remain, as heretofore, amenable to the local jurisdiction.

X.—In cases where officials or traders, *en route* to and from India or Tibet, are robbed of treasure or merchandize, public or private, they shall forthwith report to the police officers, who shall take immediate measures to arrest the robbers, and hand them to the Local Authorities. The Local Authorities shall bring them to instant trial, and shall also recover and restore the stolen property. But, if the robbers flee to places out of the jurisdiction and influence of Tibet, and cannot be arrested, the Police and the Local Authorities shall not be held responsible for such losses.

XI.—For public safety tanks or stores of kerosine oil or any other combustible or dangerous articles in bulk must be placed far away from inhabited places at the marts.

British or Indian merchants, wishing to build such tanks or stores, may not do so until, as provided in Regulation II, they have made application for a suitable site.

XII.—British subjects shall be at liberty to deal in kind or in money, to sell their goods to whomsoever they please, to purchase native commodities from whomsoever they please, to hire transport of any kind, and to conduct in general their business transactions in conformity with local usage and without any vexatious restrictions or oppressive exactions whatever.

It being the duty of the Police and Local Authorities to afford efficient protection at all times to the persons and property of the British subjects at the marts, and along the routes to the marts, China engages to arrange effective police measures at the marts and along the routes to the marts. On the fulfilment of these arrangements Great Britain undertakes to withdraw the Trade Agent's guards at the marts and to station no troops in Tibet so as to remove all cause for suspicion and disturbance among the inhabitants. The Chinese authorities will not prevent the British Trade Agents holding personal intercourse and correspondence with the Tibetan officers and people.

Tibetan subjects trading, travelling, or residing in India shall receive equal advantages to those accorded by this Regulation to British subjects in Tibet.

XIII.—The present Regulations shall be in force for a period of ten years reckoned from the date of signature by the two Plenipotentiaries as well as by the Tibetan Delegate ; but if no demand for revision be made on either side within six months after the end of the first ten years, then the Regulations shall remain in force for another ten years from the end of the first ten years ; and so it shall be at the end of each successive ten years.

XIV.—The English, Chinese and Tibetan texts of the present Regulations have been carefully compared, and, in the event of any question arising as to the interpretation of these Regulations, the sense as expressed in the English text shall be held to be the correct sense.

XV.—The ratifications of the present Regulations under the hand of His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland, and of His Majesty the Emperor of the Chinese Empire, respectively, shall be exchanged at London and Peking within six months from the date of signature.

In witness whereof the two Plenipotentiaries and the Tibetan Delegate have signed and sealed the present Regulations.

Done in quadruplicate at Calcutta, this twentieth day of April, in the year of Our Lord nineteen hundred and eight, corresponding with the Chinese date, the twentieth day of the third moon of the thirty-fourth year of Kuang Hsü.

L. S.

Signature of

CHANG YIN TANG,

*Chinese Special Commissioner.*

L. S.

E. C. WILTON,

*British Commissioner.*

L. S.

Signature of

WANG CHUK GYALPO,

*Tibetan Delegate.*

The following note on the subject of the Trade Agents' escorts at Gyantse and Yatung was also presented by Mr. Wilton to the Chinese Commissioner and Tibetan Delegate on the same day:—

I have the honour to state, in special reference to Article XII of the Tibet Trade Regulations, signed to-day, that the strength of the Trade Agents' armed guards at Gyantse and Yatung shall not exceed 50 and 25, respectively, and the desirability of reducing these numbers even before their absolute withdrawal under Article XII shall be carefully considered from time to time as occasion may offer and the conditions of the marts may admit.

The British Government will take special measures to ensure that the armed guards are kept under close control, and that discipline is maintained at the fullest pitch, and that they are not allowed to interfere with the people of the country unnecessarily.

With the approval of the Secretary of State for India, the Regulations were published in the *Gazette of India* on the 16th May.

The Regulations were ratified on the 14th October 1908.



## APPENDIX X.

(Referred to on page 130 of the text.)

Note regarding the Burma-China boundary between the Namting and Nalawt rivers; and also regarding the Burma-China boundary, north of latitude 25° 35' for the period of 1906-09.

On the 29th December 1906, His Majesty's Minister, Peking, forwarded a copy of a note received from the Chinese Government on the subject of the southern portion of the undelimited Burma-China frontier. They claimed that the boundary proposed by Sir G. Scott was drawn so as to pass through a place called K'ung Ming Shan near the city of Chen Pien Ting, which he mistook for a place called K'ung Ming Shan which lies on the real boundary. K'ung Ming Shan was stated by the Chinese Government to be a tract of country where four Chinese Sawbuships were dovetailed into one another, and, therefore, absolutely an integral part of Chinese territory and by no means adjacent to the Burma frontier. The Wai-wu-pu accordingly considered the appointment of a Joint Commission of investigation to be necessary, before a decision could be reached, and they requested that His Britannic Majesty's Government might be asked to appoint an officer to undertake a joint examination of the locality.

On the 19th October 1906 the Government of Burma pointed out that if the whole Wa country were ceded to China the result would be to bring the nominal frontier of China to the border of the Shan States of North and South Hsenwi and Manglun, and thus in close proximity with areas under effective control, which would be most undesirable. The adoption, on the other hand, of any intermediate line would have the effect of dividing the Wa tribes, leaving part of them to China and part to Burma.

The main reason for considering it inexpedient to divide the Wa country was that, as the Chinese were unable to control their frontier tribes, it would be necessary to establish a line of posts along the frontier to maintain effective control over our tribes, and probably to station another British Consul at some Chinese head-quarters such as Chenpien. The Lieutenant-Governor accordingly recommended the adoption of the line laid down by Sir George Scott in 1900. He considered that it would be quite possible to hold this frontier and to keep order in the Wa country, and that this was the line intended by the Convention and had the merit of being known and of providing a good line of cleavage between Was and Mhsos.

On the 22nd March 1907 the Viceroy telegraphed to the Secretary of State that if His Majesty's Government were able, in return for a concession on the Namting-Nalawt section of the Burma-China frontier, to secure the full consent of the Chinese Government to the Salween Shweli-Irrawaddy divide as the boundary further north, with possibly a more satisfactory attitude in other outstanding questions, the Government of India would not object to the surrender to China of the country east of Namkha river, *i.e.*, Mongkha, etc., which was occupied by Chinese posts. Three alternative lines of frontier from the head of Namkha northwards were suggested.

On the 21st May 1907 the Foreign Office asked His Majesty's Minister at Peking whether he considered that the Chinese Government would entertain favourably the compromise proposed by the Indian Government.

On the 3rd August 1907, the British Minister telegraphed to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that, subject to approval, he proposed to put the proposal to the Chinese Government and to urge its acceptance, though he thought that it was not likely to be favourably entertained. He added that any action that might eventually become necessary to make our frontier claims effective would, in his opinion, be justified by the Chinese refusal of what seemed to be a reasonable compromise.

On the 18th October the India Office informed the Foreign Office that on a re-examination of the correspondence, Mr. Morley inclined to the opinion that the proposal for a compromise should not now be submitted to the Chinese Government. He thought that, if there were a reasonable chance of the acceptance of the proposal, or even of its consideration in the spirit in which it would be put forward by the British Government, there would be some justification for the considerable cession of territory which it involved; but if, as stated by Sir J. Jordan, the Chinese Government were not likely to entertain the proposal, it might fairly be assumed that the Chinese Government would regard the proposal less as a concession than as a tardy recognition of right. It would thus follow that the negotiations regarding the boundary would be no nearer completion than before, while the case for the British Government on that part of the frontier, where under any reasonable interpretation of the Agreement of the 4th February 1897, it is least assailable, would be considerably weakened. Mr. Morley also thought that it would be difficult to disregard the strong objections urged by the Government of Burma against a division of the Wa States. It was added that, if at a later date the Chinese Government should display any genuine desire for a reasonable compromise, Sir J. Jordan might be instructed to renew to them the offer of the line which at the time of the demarcation of 1900 was proposed by Sir G. Scott to the Chinese Commissioners, but which was then refused.

Sir J. Jordon was accordingly instructed by the Foreign Office not to submit the proposal to the Chinese Government.

On the 16th December 1907 the Government of Burma reported that a Chinese officer and fifty soldiers had crossed into the valley of the Chippwe Kha during the autumn. The officer was said to have stated that he had been sent by the Chinese Government and had erected a wooden pillar inscribed with Chinese writing, similar to the old frontier pillars, at the village of Hpala. The Lieutenant-Governor recommended that the Government of India should assume effective administration of the territory east of the 'Nmaikha and that the boundary pillar erected at Hpala should be destroyed. His Honour proposed that the Assistant Superintendent of Sadon, accompanied by an escort of 100 military police, with a reserve of the same strength should tour through the tract, and considered that, after British claims had been effectively asserted, further interference could, for the present, be prevented by annual tours of Political Officers with escorts.

The Government of India recommended the proposals to His Majesty's Secretary of State and on the 21st February his sanction was received and the Government of Burma informed accordingly. On the 22nd February, however, the Lieutenant-Governor recommended that, in view of the lateness of the season, the proposed tour should be postponed till December next. This was agreed to, and a report on the situation called for before tour arrangements were undertaken. The Secretary of State, who was informed, approved of the postponement of the tour.

On the 25th March 1908, the Government of Burma forwarded a letter from His Majesty's Consul at Tengyueh, reporting that the Chinese officers, who visited the unadministered territory east of the Nmaikha, were sent by the Yunnan-fu and not by the local authorities, that none of them were of high rank, and that they had been at a small place called Tan-cha, about three miles south of Kuyung, since their return from the frontier. Mr. Ottewill added that no official report had been made by them to the Tengyueh Taotai, but that as they were sent by the Yunnan-fu authorities, they would report to them direct.

On the 28th August, the Government of Burma reported that no information had been received by them of any movements of the Chinese on the Burma-Chinese frontier, east of the 'Nmaikha, since the return into Chinese territory of the party, which visited Hpala in the unadministered tract in the autumn of 1907, and that there was no indication of any intention on the part of the Chinese to return to the 'Nmaikha Valley, during the open season of 1908-09. From information received subsequent to the 16th December 1907, it appeared that the Chinese had not actually erected a boundary post at Hpala, but had made preparations to do so, and were only prevented from carrying their design into execution by a quarrel which occurred among the party.

With a view, however, to bringing the country to the north and west of the 'Nmaikha Shweli and 'Nmaikha-Salween watersheds under effective administration, and in order to remove the impression created by Chinese action, the Lieutenant-Governor submitted revised proposals for the tour by a British officer on the frontier. His Honour recommended that, besides visiting Pienma and Hpare in the immediate neighbourhood of the boundary to the east of the unadministered tract, the officer should extend his tour. The modifications proposed in the original scheme were important and included (a) the extension of the tour northwards and westwards so as to take in Hpala and its neighbourhood; (b) the appointment of Mr. W. A. Herzt, Deputy Commissioner of Myitkyina, to undertake the tour, with the Assistant Superintendent of Sadon as Assistant Civil Officer; (c) the increase of the escort to the strength of 9 officers and 492 military police, with one gun, in charge of the Commandant of the Myitkyina Battalion; and (d) the levy of a nominal tribute from the tribesman, and the possible establishment of a military police post.

In reply to an enquiry as to why, in opposition to the opinion expressed in 1906, it was now considered desirable to levy tribute, the Lieutenant-Governor explained that the measure was necessary in view of the action of the Chinese at Hpala, and of the necessity of emphasising British administration. The immediate establishment of a police post would not follow as a matter of course though such measure might subsequently become necessary, not only for the control of the administered tract, but for the protection of the frontier.

The Government of India, in reporting the revised proposals of the Burma Government to the Secretary of State, by telegram on the 18th October, expressed the opinion that good grounds had been adduced for the visit of the party to Hpala, and that they saw no objection to the proposed extended tour. The proposal to place Mr. Hertz in charge of the tour had their concurrence and they approved his escort being increased to the strength suggested, which the military authorities considered fully justified, and which should be sufficient to dispose of any opposition likely to be encountered by the party. It was, moreover, desirable to make a show of force in order to dispel the illusion that the position of the British on the frontier was dependent on Chinese sufferance. There was no objection to the levy of tribute, and the question of the establishment of a new military police post for the control of the tract could be considered on the conclusion of the tour. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of State the Government of India proposed to issue orders to the Government of Burma accordingly.

On the 23rd October 1900, the Secretary of State replied that the Government of India's telegram of the 8th January 1908 had indicated that the object aimed at would be attained by annual tours, and that the sanction conveyed in his telegram of the 21st February 1908 was strictly limited in its terms. To sanction proposals, which would definitely commit the British Government to permanent occupation, and administration, was, Lord Morley considered, out of the question. The establishment of a military police post, contemplated by the Government of India as a necessary part of the scheme, might lead to difficulties with China altogether incommensurate with any material advantages that might accrue from a forcible assertion of British rights. Even if restricted to the destruction of pillars and the investigation of facts, the tour might lead to a collision, the results of which might not only be very serious locally, but very prejudicial to the general relations between His Majesty's Government and China. Lord Morley had, therefore, proposed to Sir E. Grey that Sir J. Jordan should be again consulted on the question of policy involved before the tour was finally sanctioned. The fact that His Majesty's Government were compelled by the action of the local Chinese official to contemplate as a matter of urgency the mission of an officer with an armed force sufficiently strong to overcome any resistance that might be offered, might lead the Chinese Government to issue order which would bring the difficulty to an end. Even though the Chinese Government might not formally accept the boundary as laid down and notified to them on the 1st May 1906, the need for action on the part of His Majesty's Government would disappear if Chinese interference ceased.

On the 1st November, Sir J. Jordan telegraphed to Sir E. Grey that, in the present hypersensitive state of Chinese feeling on all questions affecting territory, a movement on the scale now contemplated would probably lead to considerable popular excitement throughout China, and should not, he thought, be undertaken unless it was considered necessary to bring the district under effective administration. A tour by an officer with a suitable escort would, on the other hand, appear to be a justifiable measure in view of the reported action of the Chinese in the autumn of 1907, but it seemed to him that even this should be carried out under the conditions, and within the limits, prescribed in Lord Morley's telegram of the 21st February 1908, to the Government of India. In Sir J. Jordan's opinion, any collision with the Chinese could not fail to be very prejudicial to the general relations between Great Britain and China. An intimation to the Chinese Government in the sense suggested in Lord Morley's telegram of the 23rd October 1908, would, he feared, only evoke a repetition of the proposal made by them in 1906 for a joint settlement of the question of the Burma-China boundary.

On the 5th November, Lord Morley telegraphed to the Government of India that, on consideration of Sir J. Jordan's telegram of the 1st idem, His Majesty's Government had come to the decision that the tour might be allowed to take place, but that its object should be confined strictly to ascertaining, and reporting on, the necessary facts as to Chinese encroachments. The character of the tour was to be essentially civil, and the escort as proposed by the Burma Government in 1906, to be limited to 100 military police. The Officer Commanding the escort was clearly to understand that his duties were solely those of escort, and that he was to act under the orders of the civil officer. The itinerary of the tour was to be confined within the narrowest limits consistent with the object as now declared, and it was to be impressed on the officer in charge that it was of the utmost importance that no collision should take place. This consideration was to guide him in deciding how to deal with pillars, if any were found erected. In any case of doubt the officer was to report for instructions before taking action in any way likely to lead to a conflict. He was to be careful to avoid anything of a nature calculated to commit His Majesty's Government in respect of future action. Before instructions to the officer in charge of the tour issued, Lord Morley asked that their substance, revised in the above sense, should be communicated to him for approval.

On the 10th November, the Government of India repeated to the Government of Burma the Secretary of State's telegram of the 5th idem, and invited the Lieutenant-Governor's views with special reference to the question whether it would be safe to send such a small body as 100 military police in circumstances which had changed since 1906.

On the 20th November, the Government of Burma replied that the Lieutenant-Governor, after consulting certain local officers, concurred with them in considering that if the revised itinerary was followed there should be no reduction in the strength of the escort proposed, namely, 9 British officers and 492 native ranks. If, however, the tour was strictly confined to investigating the facts of the alleged encroachments by the Chinese and the itinerary confined within as narrow limits as possible consistently with that object, the escorting force might, in His Honour's opinion, without undue risk, be reduced to the numbers originally proposed in 1906, namely, an escort of 100 military police, with a supporting column of the same strength and an advance ration base of 50 military police, with the addition of 30 signallers, who were now considered necessary. The civil officer would probably merely be required to proceed by the shortest route to Hpala and back; in which case the Lieutenant-Governor considered that his escort might safely be reduced to 100 military police, but the supporting column, ration base and signallers were essential and could not be dispensed with without some danger.

The total force required for a tour of investigation only, besides the British officers, was, therefore, 280.

His Honour further submitted the following remarks for consideration. He stated that the facts of the visit of the Chinese to Hpala in 1907 had been already ascertained and were as already reported to the Government of India. There was no reason to suppose that other encroachments by the Chinese had taken place. The object of the proposed operations, as recommended by the Government of Burma, had throughout been to extend administration. This had been first proposed in June 1904. Following on that recommendation, Sir Ernest Satow, His Majesty's Minister at Peking, had informed the Chinese Government in May 1906, under instructions from His Majesty's Government, that if they failed to regard the frontier, as defined to them, the Burma Government would be instructed to occupy and administer the country without further negotiations. In accordance with that policy the Lieutenant-Governor in 1907 submitted proposals for a tour by a civil officer with an armed escort to extend occupation and administration of the territory. His Honour, therefore, submitted that a tour made with that object would be consistent with the statement made to the Chinese Government by Sir E. Satow in May 1906, and that it was, moreover, the only action which was likely to prove effective. This was in accordance with Sir J. Jordan's opinion. If, however, His Majesty's Government could not sanction the tour with that object, His Honour submitted that it was not worth while incurring large expenditure for the despatch of a civil officer and armed force, merely to confirm information already received, as to the substantial accuracy of which there was no reason to doubt. His Honour further submitted that a tour strictly confined to that object would injure British prestige by leading the tribes to believe that the claim of the Chinese to administer their territory was admitted by the British Government. The Lieutenant-Governor, accordingly, recommended that the tour should be abandoned if it was not permitted with the object of extending effective occupation and administration. He added that he was still of opinion that it was essential to keep the Chinese from the neighbourhood of the Irrawaddy, and to obtain their recognition of the watershed as the boundary.

On the 5th December, the Government of India repeated to the Secretary of State the telegram of the 20th November from the Burma Government, and added that they agreed that it was essential that the Chinese should be kept from the neighbourhood of the Irrawaddy, and that their recognition of the watershed as the boundary should be obtained. They understood that His Majesty's Government still adhered to the policy of occupying and administering the country up to the Shweli-Salween-Irrawaddy watershed, if the Chinese failed to accept this as the boundary, but that, on Imperial grounds, it had been decided that the present time was inopportune to assert British claims in the proposed manner. As the Chinese had been quiet for more than a year, and the Burma Government were of opinion that a tour of enquiry would not elicit any further information, the Government of India thought that His Majesty's Government might, for reasons of Imperial policy, prefer that the tour should be abandoned, in which case the Government of India would not press the local point of view.

On the same day, the Government of Burma telegraphed that Mr. Sly, British Consul at Tengyueh, had reported that the Taotai of that place was about to visit the Burma-Chinese frontier, north-west of Tengyueh, but not where the frontier was in dispute. The Governor-General of Yunnan was said to have instructed the Taotai to examine the frontier, but His Majesty's Consul-General at Yunnan-fu did not think that the Chinese authorities could have been aware of the proposed tour by a British officer on the Burma-Chinese border east of the 'Nmaikha. Mr. Sly suggested that Mr. Hertz should not approach the neighbourhood of the frontier until the Taotai had left. The Lieutenant-Governor of Burma did not regard the matter as affecting his former recommendations. If the tour was sanctioned now, it could not, in his opinion, be undertaken until some time after that mentioned by Mr. Sly. His Honour thought that the position might be altered if it was found that the Taotai did not return to Tengyueh, but remained near the borders.

On the 8th December 1908, the Government of India repeated the foregoing telegram to the Secretary of State, adding that they desired to reserve their opinion as to how far the Taotai's movements affected the situation. They, however, considered that, in the circumstances, it was plainly desirable to await developments.

On the 18th January 1909, in reply to an enquiry from the Secretary of State, as to whether his decision (which he declined to modify) not to permit a tour on the extended scale proposed, should, in view of the Taotai's proceedings, constitute a reason for abandoning a tour of mere enquiry, the Government of Burma intimated that the Lieutenant-Governor adhered to the opinion which he had already expressed. The Taotai's tour was undertaken in Chinese territory, considerably south of the disputed tract, and did not extend to any area claimed as British, and had, in His Honour's opinion, no bearing on the present question. The tour was consequently abandoned with the approval of the Secretary of State, the Government of Burma being informed on the 28th January.

## APPENDIX XI.

(Referred to on page 136 of the text.)

On the 10th December 1908, Mr. Wilton, His Majesty's Consul-General at Yunnan-fu, took the opportunity of a private interview with the Chinese Governor-General to sound him on the subject of the proposed Bhamo-Tengyueh Railway. The Governor-General denied that the Wai-wu-pu had communicated any proposals for a Burma-Yunnan Railway, but he admitted having received a telegram asking for information as to the prospects of the Chinese Railway Company of Yunnan, and enquired the nature of the proposals, which had been laid before the Chinese Government. Mr. Wilton informed His Excellency that it was proposed, in the first instance, to build a railway from Kalikha on the Burma-Yunnan frontier under some arrangement similar to that which had been adopted in the case of the Tientsin-Pakow line. His Excellency took up the attitude that railway communication between Burma and Yunnan would serve no useful purpose and remarked that, if he assented to the proposal, he would be denounced by the gentry and people of Yunnan. Finally, however, he said that he would consider the matter on learning the views of the Provincial Railway Board.

On the 22nd February 1909, His Majesty's Consul-General at Yunnan-fu took the opportunity afforded by a private interview to ask the Chinese Governor-General, if he had any information to give him regarding the proposed Bhamo-Tengyueh Railway. The Governor replied that he had called upon the Provincial Railway Board for their views, but had not yet received their answer. Mr. Wilton, thereupon, requested His Excellency to pronounce a favourable opinion, should an opportunity offer during his visit to Peking. His Excellency said that he could not open any discussion with the Wai-wu-pu on this matter, but that he would give them his views, if called upon to do so. Mr. Wilton reminded him that the proposals, sketched out on the 10th December 1908, in no way infringed the sovereign rights of China. His Excellency assured him that he had made a note of this point, which had impressed him very forcibly, but he returned an evasive answer to Mr. Wilton's enquiry as to whether his views were favourable or not to the proposals mentioned. Mr. Wilton believed that the Chinese Governor-General had no insuperable objection to a Burma-Yunnan railway, provided that the portion of the line within Chinese territory was under Chinese general control.

On the 3rd March 1909, His Majesty's Minister at Peking reported that he was informed by the Grand Secretary, Na-t'ung, at an interview, that the Board of Communications were objecting that the line would not be profitable. Sir J. Jordan combated this view, and urged that in any case, the prime object being to link up connections between Yunnan and the Burma railways, trade must be benefited and friendly relations strengthened. His Excellency, who did not appear to attach much weight to the opinion of the Board, said that both the departing Viceroy of Yunnan, Hsiliang, and the new Viceroy, Li Ching-hai, would be in Peking in about a month's time, and that the presence of these two high officials would furnish an excellent opportunity for examining the question with the assistance of local knowledge.

On the 13th March, His Britannic Majesty's Acting Consul-General for Yunnan and Kueichou, reported that at a private interview with Shen ping k'un, the Acting Governor-General, he had introduced the topic of railway connection between Burma and Yunnan. Shen ping k'un endeavoured to evade discussion by declaring that the newly appointed Governor-General would be in Yunnan-fu in May. Mr. Wilton assured him, however, that he had no authority to ask him to give his formal assent to any railway scheme, but was merely desirous of bringing the question to his notice. His Excellency appeared relieved at this assurance, and admitted that the ex-Governor-General, Hsi Liang, had talked the matter over with him in December 1908. He confirmed Mr. Wilton's impression that Hsi Liang had not been averse to a scheme on the general lines of the proposals laid before the Chinese Government on 16th October of last year. Shen ping k'un said, however, that the gentry of Yunnan-fu had opposed any compromise and had emphatically declared their intention of building all railways in Yunnan with their own capital and with Chinese, preferably Yunnanese, engineers. Mr. Wilton pointed out that the gentry of Tengyueh and Yunchang had evinced no opposition to railway connection between Burma and Yunnan, and that he was confident that the merchants and people of western Yunnan would welcome an enterprise of this description. Mr. Wilton laid stress on the fact that the only hope for the prosperity of Yunnan lay in the development of the province, which would be very largely assisted by a railway from the frontier to Tengyueh. Shen ping k'un admitted that competent Chinese railway engineers were scarce at the present, and ridiculed the contention of the Yunnan-fu gentry that they would and could build a railway from the provincial capital to Suifu in Szuchuan. This scheme, he said, was their pet child for the moment, and they talked of beginning in the autumn. The cost could not be less than forty million taels (say, five million pounds) and he was at a loss to know how this amount could be raised. He was convinced in his own mind that nothing would be done in this direction. In reply to Mr. Wilton's enquiry, the Governor-General said that the province had about four million taels (say, half a million pounds) contributed, and promised for railway expenditure. Mr. Wilton remarked that the estimate of the British engineers for a line from the frontier to

Tengyueh was from five hundred thousand to six hundred thousand pounds. Mr. Wilton emphasised the fact that this scheme of railway construction did not impugn in any way the sovereignty of China in Yunnan. His Excellency explained that the commercial prospects of Yunnan were indeed desperate, and he held that salvation lay in improved communications. Mr. Wilton asked if he might take this to mean that, on the arrival of the new Governor-General, he would advise him favourably in the matter of railway connection between Burma and Yunnan. After some hesitation, Shen ping k'un said Mr. Wilton might count upon his support in this matter.

On the 30th May, His Majesty's Minister at Peking reported that he had interviewed both the ex-Viceroy of Yunnan, Hsi Liang, and his successor, Li Ching Hsi, and placed matters relating to the Bhamo-Tengyueh railway before them. The departing Viceroy of Yunnan was reluctant to discuss a matter for which he was no longer responsible. His Excellency, however, promised that, if consulted by his successor, he would recommend the project although his information was that the development of trade between Burma and Yunnan was still insufficient to justify the construction of a railway. Subsequently Sir John Jordan had two interviews with Li Ching Hsi, the newly-appointed Viceroy, who was of opinion that the time was not yet ripe for railway construction between Bhamo and China, as the customs receipts and total trade were still relatively small, and it therefore seemed premature to spend money upon an expensive railway on a remote and wild frontier. Sir John Jordan pointed out that the whole question had been carefully examined by experts from India, who had proved conclusively that the railway would be a fairly profitable enterprise. His Excellency thoroughly appreciated the line of argument, and finally said he would give the matter his earnest attention, but begged that some time might be given him to study it after his arrival in Yunnan.







